State of Maine v. Steven E Clarke ( 2015 )


Menu:
  • MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT                                         Reporter of Decisions
    Decision: 
    2015 ME 70
    Docket:   Kno-14-237
    Argued:   May 13, 2015
    Decided:  June 9, 2015
    Panel:          SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.
    STATE OF MAINE
    v.
    STEVEN E. CLARKE
    GORMAN, J.
    [¶1] Steven E. Clarke appeals from a judgment of conviction for tampering
    with a witness (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 454(1)(A)(2) (2014), and violating a
    condition of release (Class E), 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(A) (2014), entered by the court
    (Hjelm, J.) after a jury trial. Clarke challenges the sufficiency of the indictment to
    inform him of the tampering charge and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
    his conviction on that charge. We affirm the judgment.
    I. BACKGROUND
    [¶2]     We view the facts established at trial, including all reasonable
    inferences from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the State. See State v.
    Wyman, 
    2015 ME 2
    , ¶ 15, 
    107 A.3d 1134
    . That evidence establishes that in 2013,
    the State charged Clarke with driving to endanger (Class E), 29-A M.R.S.
    2
    § 2413(1) (2014). One of the State’s witnesses in that matter was a man who
    observed Clarke’s acts that gave rise to the driving to endanger charge.
    [¶3] On September 18, 2013, before the trial on the charge of driving to
    endanger, Clarke went to the auto repair shop where the witness worked. Clarke
    began discussing the case and the upcoming hearing date, and told the witness and
    others that he could go to jail and lose his license if he were convicted. He
    suggested that “maybe [the witness] could miss [his] court date” and that the
    witness “should be quiet and not say anything, [he] didn’t know anything.” The
    witness reported the incident to the District Attorney’s office.
    [¶4]     Clarke was indicted for tampering with a witness (Class C),
    17-A M.R.S. § 454(1)(A)(2), and violating a condition of release (Class E),
    15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(A), to which he pleaded not guilty. After a trial, the jury
    found Clarke guilty of tampering with a witness, and on that basis, the court found
    that Clarke had violated a condition of release by committing new criminal
    conduct.1 The court sentenced Clarke to twelve months in prison for tampering
    with a witness and four concurrent months for violating a condition of release.
    Clarke appeals.
    1
    After being charged with driving to endanger, Clarke had been placed on bail. One of the conditions
    of that bail was that he commit no new criminal conduct. Because Clarke’s conviction for violating a
    condition of release is wholly dependent on his conviction for tampering with a witness, we do not
    address that count separately.
    3
    II. DISCUSSION
    [¶5] Clarke argues that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to
    support his conviction for tampering with a witness.2 A person commits tampering
    with a witness pursuant to section 454(1)(A)(2) when the person, “believing that an
    official proceeding . . . or an official criminal investigation is pending or will be
    instituted, . . . [i]nduces or otherwise causes, or attempts to induce or cause, a
    witness or informant . . . [t]o withhold testimony, information or evidence.”3
    17-A M.R.S. § 454(1)(A)(2). “[A]ttempt” occurs when, “acting with the kind of
    culpability required for the commission of the crime, and with the intent to
    complete the commission of the crime, the person engages in conduct that in fact
    constitutes a substantial step toward its commission.”                      17-A M.R.S. § 152(1)
    (2014).
    [¶6] Clarke stipulated that he understood that a criminal charge was pending
    against him, and the witness testified that he had been subpoenaed as a witness in
    that pending matter. The witness also testified that Clarke suggested he should “be
    2
    Clarke also challenges the sufficiency of the indictment to adequately inform him of the charge of
    tampering with a witness. Because Clarke neither challenged the indictment before the trial court nor
    sought a bill of particulars, we decline to address this argument. See M.R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2), 16(c)(1);
    State v. Shea, 
    588 A.2d 1195
    , 1195 (Me. 1991); see also M.R.U. Crim. P. 12(b)(2), 16(d)(1).
    3
    “Official proceeding” is defined as “any proceeding before a legislative, judicial, administrative or
    other governmental body or official authorized by law to take evidence under oath or affirmation
    including a notary or other person taking evidence in connection with any such proceeding.”
    17-A M.R.S. § 451(5)(A) (2014).
    4
    quiet and not say anything” or that he “could miss [the] court date.”              This
    testimony, including all reasonable inferences regarding Clarke’s intent, constitutes
    a sufficient basis on which reasonable jurors could find, beyond a reasonable
    doubt, that Clarke committed each element of tampering with a witness. See State
    v. Perkins, 
    2014 ME 159
    , ¶ 13, 
    107 A.3d 636
    ; State v. Seymour, 
    461 A.2d 1060
    ,
    1062 (Me. 1983) (holding that “the jury could have reasonably inferred the
    requisite intent to induce [the witness] to lie or testify falsely” from the defendant’s
    statements to the witness).
    [¶7] Contrary to Clarke’s suggestion, that he did not expressly threaten the
    witness or that the witness did not feel threatened by Clarke is of no moment
    because the statute allows a conviction for tampering with a witness based only on
    Clarke’s attempt to induce the witness not to testify against him. See 17-A M.R.S.
    § 454(1)(A). The statute does not require the State to prove that Clarke threatened
    the witness in any way, or that Clarke was successful in affecting the witness’s
    testimony.    See 17-A M.R.S. § 454(1)(A)(2).           The remainder of Clarke’s
    arguments—primarily regarding the witness’s credibility—are not persuasive.
    See Perkins, 
    2014 ME 159
    , ¶ 13, 
    107 A.3d 636
    ; State v. Reardon, 
    486 A.2d 112
    ,
    118-19 (Me. 1984).
    The entry is:
    Judgment affirmed.
    5
    On the briefs:
    Jeremy Pratt, Esq., and Ellen Simmons, Esq., Camden, for
    appellant Steven Clarke
    Geoffrey Rushlau, District Attorney, and Jeffrey Baroody, Asst.
    Dist. Atty., Prosecutorial District VI, Rockland, for appellee
    State of Maine
    At oral argument:
    Jeremy Pratt, Esq., for appellant Steven Clarke
    Jeffrey Baroody, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee State of Maine
    Knox County Superior Court docket number CR-2013-250
    FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Docket Kno-14-237

Judges: Saufley, Alexander, Mead, Gorman, Jabar

Filed Date: 6/9/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/26/2024