Helen Rivas Rose v. William Parsons Jr. , 2015 Me. LEXIS 82 ( 2015 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2015 ME 73Docket: Yor-14-372
Argued: May 13, 2015
Decided: June 16, 2015
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ.
HELEN RIVAS ROSE et al.
v.
WILLIAM PARSONS JR. et al.
SAUFLEY, C.J.
[¶1] William Parsons Jr. and several neighboring landowners appeal from a
summary judgment entered in favor of Helen Rivas Rose and Nathaniel P. Merrill
by the Superior Court (York County, Fritzsche, J.) on the parties’ claims for
declaratory judgment regarding the continuing existence, scope, and extent of
easements over two roads leading to the beach or ocean in Kennebunk. This is the
second appeal in this matter, taken from the second judgment entered on
cross-motions for summary judgment. See Rose v. Parsons, 2013 ME 77, ¶ 6, 76
A.3d 343.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] In our opinion issued on the first appeal, we vacated in part the court’s
entry of summary judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court for it to
consider issues it had not reached related to the continued existence or
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abandonment of the easements. See id. ¶ 11. On remand, instead of presenting
evidence or testimony for trial, and despite the court’s prompt establishment of a
deadline for depositions and scheduling of a trial date, the parties again pursued
resolution through cross-motions for summary judgment.
[¶3] The court entered a summary judgment in favor of Rose and Merrill on
their claim for a declaratory judgment. It denied the motion for summary
judgment filed by Parsons and other neighboring landowners, dismissed one
neighbor’s cross-claim, and dismissed that neighbor’s motion for summary
judgment as moot. Parsons and the other neighboring landowners appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶4] Summary judgment process is not a substitute for trial, even if the
likelihood of success at trial by one party or another is small. Curtis v. Porter,
2001 ME 158, ¶ 7, 784 A.2d 18 (citing Niehoff v. Shankman & Assocs. Legal Ctr.,
P.A., 2000 ME 214, ¶ 10, 763 A.2d 121). When facts or reasonable inferences to
be drawn from the facts are in dispute, the court must engage in fact-finding, and
summary judgment is not available. Id. ¶ 9.
[¶5] Despite this limitation on summary judgment process, the parties chose
to use the process here, perhaps assuming that the trial court could make necessary
findings of fact on the record presented on summary judgment. To be clear,
however, summary judgment process does not allow for judicial fact-finding. See
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M.R. Civ. P. 56(c) (authorizing the entry of summary judgment based on the
summary judgment record when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact”
and “any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law”). The resolution of the
disputes remaining in this proceeding—including the existence, alleged
abandonment, scope, and extent of easements—requires the determination of facts.
Because the record reveals that there are several genuine issues of material fact in
dispute, we conclude that the entry of summary judgment was not appropriate.1
See Rutland v. Mullen, 2002 ME 98, ¶ 8, 798 A.2d 1104. We must therefore
vacate the summary judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings.
[¶6] Recognizing that this matter has been pending since March 2011, we
encourage the court and the parties to move swiftly toward final resolution on
remand. Because the court entered an order on December 5, 2013, that established
a December 20, 2013, deadline for the taking of depositions and set a trial date in
May 2014, and because the parties thereafter proceeded with their motions for
summary judgment, we assume that all discovery is by now complete.
[¶7] On remand, if the facts and the factual inferences to be drawn from
them are, as one party suggests, not actually contested, the parties may present
stipulated facts to the court for decision. See Christian Fellowship & Renewal Ctr.
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The record does not demonstrate that the parties agreed for the court to enter a decision on a fully
agreed factual record that had been developed through the summary judgment process. See Enerquin Air,
Inc. v. State Tax Assessor, 670 A.2d 926, 927 (Me. 1996) (“The parties agreed that it was not the facts but
the interpretation of those facts that was in dispute.”).
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v. Town of Limington, 2006 ME 44, ¶¶ 5-11, 896 A.2d 287. Such stipulations are
presented in a single document, reviewed and accepted by all parties, that states all
relevant facts. See id. This stands in contrast with the competing statements of
material facts that have been presented in the summary judgment record here.
[¶8] Alternatively, the parties may present contested facts by stipulating to
the admission of a paper record that includes deeds, other documents, depositions,
and affidavits. See Peerless Ins. Co. v. Progressive Ins. Co., 2003 ME 66, ¶ 3, 822
A.2d 1125. When presented with a stipulated record, a trial court may—unlike on
a motion for summary judgment—draw factual inferences from that evidence and
decide disputed inferences of material fact to reach a final result. See Boston Five
Cents Sav. Bank v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 768 F.2d 5, 11-12 (1st
Cir. 1985). If the parties cannot agree on all of the documentary evidence to be
presented, the parties may stipulate to the admission of certain documents and also
present other evidence and live testimony at a trial. See Harvey v. Furrow, 2014
ME 149, ¶ 4, 107 A.3d 604.
[¶9] Thus, on remand, this matter can be resolved promptly on
(1) stipulations of fact, see Christian Fellowship & Renewal Ctr., 2006 ME 44,
¶¶ 5-11, 896 A.2d 287; (2) a paper record admitted by stipulation, see Peerless Ins.
Co., 2003 ME 66, ¶ 3, 822 A.2d 1125; (3) a paper record admitted by stipulation
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supplemented with a brief evidentiary hearing, see Harvey, 2014 ME 149, ¶ 4, 107
A.3d 604; or (4) a full trial.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On the briefs:
Kelly W. McDonald, Esq., and Peter S. Plumb, Esq., Murray,
Plumb & Murray, Portland, for appellants William Parsons Jr.
et al.
Reid Hayton-Hull, Esq., Hull Law Office, LLC, Biddeford, for
appellant Mary Elizabeth Fluke
Alan E. Shepard, Esq., Shepard & Read, Kennebunk, for
appellees Helen Rivas Rose and Nathaniel P. Merrill
At oral argument:
Kelly W. McDonald, Esq., for appellants William Parsons Jr. et
al.
Reid Hayton-Hull, Esq., for appellant Mary Elizabeth Fluke
Alan E. Shepard, Esq., Shepard & Read, Kennebunk, for
appellees Helen Rivas Rose and Nathaniel P. Merrill
York County Superior Court docket number RE-2011-56
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY