People v. Brown , 2015 IL App (1st) 131873 ( 2015 )

Illinois Official Reports
Appellate Court
People v. Brown, 2015 IL App (1st) 131873Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption STANLEY BROWN, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. First District, Sixth Division
Docket No. 1-13-1873
Filed May 29, 2015
Rehearing denied June 23, 2015
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 11-CR-10735; the
Review Hon. Catherine M. Haberkorn, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded with directions.
Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and Tonya Joy Reedy, all of
Appeal State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg,
Carol L. Gaines, and Justin R. Kordys, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of
counsel), for the People.
Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the
court, with opinion.
Justices Lampkin and Rochford concurred in the judgment and
opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Following a bench trial, the defendant, Stanley Brown, was convicted of attempted
first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1 (West 2010)) and sentenced to 17 years’
imprisonment. On appeal from that conviction, the defendant argues that the State failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the specific intent to kill. For the reasons which
follow, we reverse the defendant’s conviction and sentence for attempted first-degree
murder, affirm his conviction on all other charges, and remand this cause to the circuit court
for resentencing.
¶2 As the result of the injuries sustained by Chersari Jones on June 20, 2011, the defendant
was charged by information with attempted first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1
(West 2010)), two counts of aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a) (West
2010)), and three counts of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(a), (b)(1) (West 2010)). The
evidence adduced at trial established that the defendant and Jones were acquainted for over
20 years and had been romantically involved since 2005 or 2006. In May of 2007, the
defendant and Jones were living together. Jones testified that on May 27, 2007, the defendant
struck and kicked her while he was intoxicated. Following this incident, Jones ordered the
defendant to move out of her home. Approximately 7 to 8 months later, Jones told the
defendant that “if he moved back in he cannot have another drink.” Thereafter, the defendant
again took up residence in the apartment that Jones shared with her two children.
¶3 In the afternoon of June 19, 2011, Jones’s children left the apartment to spend the night
with Jones’s sisters. The defendant also left the apartment that afternoon. Jones testified that,
when she went to bed between 10 and 11 p.m., the defendant still had not returned. At
approximately 3 a.m. on June 20, 2011, the defendant returned home and came into the
bedroom which he shared with Jones. According to Jones, she suspected that the defendant
had been drinking, and as a consequence, she got out of bed and went into her daughter’s
bedroom to sleep. At 5 a.m., Jones got up and began preparing to go to work. When the
defendant awoke, Jones told him to gather his belongings as she wanted him to leave the
apartment. She stated that she told the defendant that she was going to drive him to his
mother’s home. According to Jones, the defendant said something, but she was not paying
attention and told him that she did not want to argue. Jones testified that, as she was leaving
her bedroom, she felt “punching” in her back. She stated that shortly thereafter she felt
moisture running down her back, and when she looked down, she saw that she was bleeding.
Jones ran out of the apartment and into the rear alley, yelling for help. She testified that she
got into her car and drove to the nearest police station.
¶4 When Jones arrived at the police station, she encountered Officer Thomas Polick and told
him that she had been stabbed. Officer Polick testified that, when he approached Jones’s car,
he saw blood on her back and on the seat of the car. Officer Polick called for an ambulance.
¶5 The ambulance arrived, and Jones was taken to Loyola University Medical Center where
she came under the care of Dr. Eric Szczesniak. Dr. Szczesniak testified that Jones presented
with four lacerations; two were on the left side of her back near the shoulder blade, one was
on the rear of her left triceps, and the fourth was on the upper portion of her back. The
lacerations had penetrated the skin as well as some of the deeper tissues. However, there was
no injury to the deeper underlying structures. According to Dr. Szczesniak, the cuts were
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likely made by a sharp instrument as they were clean and did not have jagged or rough edges.
Dr. Szczesniak testified that he cleaned the wounds and sutured them. Although Dr.
Szczesniak did not testify to the number of stitches required to close the lacerations, Jones
testified that she received 20 stitches. The doctor opined that it was possible that “the area in
which Ms. Jones presented wounds could have resulted in her death.” According to Dr.
Szczesniak, however, the cuts that Jones suffered turned out to be superficial and not life
threatening. Jones left the hospital that same day.
¶6 By means of a stipulation, the State introduced recordings of phone conversations
between the defendant and Jones while the defendant was incarcerated, awaiting trial. In
several of these phone conversations, the defendant professed his love for Jones and asked
her to get the charges against him dropped and to refuse to testify. In one such recording
made of a phone conversation on August 15, 2011, at 6:05 p.m., the defendant told Jones that
he never thought that he would ever hurt her or take her life.
¶7 After the State rested its case-in-chief, the defendant moved for a directed finding. The
motion was denied, and thereafter, the defendant rested without presenting any evidence.
¶8 Following closing arguments, the trial court found the defendant guilty of all charges,
commenting that “I do believe that he intended to kill her.” The trial court based its
determination that the defendant intended to kill Jones on a number of factors which it
articulated, namely: “this could have been a life threatening situation but was not”; Jones “at
the time had given the defendant his last chance to reside in the home”; and “that by leaving
the bedroom on that day, and telling [the defendant] to leave *** [the defendant] knew this
was over.” After finding the defendant guilty on all counts, the trial court held that the two
counts of aggravated domestic battery and three counts of aggravated battery merged into the
conviction for attempted first-degree murder.
¶9 The defendant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the evidence
adduced at trial was inconsistent with a conviction for attempted first-degree murder and
could only support a conviction for aggravated battery. The trial court denied the defendant’s
motion for a new trial, again articulating the reasons for finding the requisite intent to support
a conviction of attempted first-degree murder which the court had stated when finding the
defendant guilty of the offense. Additionally, the trial court also noted that: the defendant had
used a sharp knife; he stabbed Jones four times; Jones’s wounds were “near organs *** that
could have been life threatening”; Dr. Szczesniak testified that Jones’s “wounds could have
resulted in death”; and the defendant tried to get Jones to drop the charges. After his motion
for a new trial was denied, the defendant was sentenced to 17 years’ imprisonment. This
appeal followed.
¶ 10 In urging reversal of his conviction for attempted first-degree murder, the defendant
argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the specific intent
to kill Jones. According to the defendant, the evidence adduced at trial demonstrates that he
took actions inconsistent with a specific intent to kill: specifically, he stopped stabbing Jones
even though she was neither dead nor dying, and the wounds which she suffered were not life
threatening. He requests that we reverse his conviction for attempted first-degree murder and
remand this case to the trial court with directions to resentence him for aggravated domestic
battery.
¶ 11 The State argues that, when looking at the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s
actions such as the character of the attack on Jones and his use of a knife, the trial court could
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reasonably have found that the defendant possessed the requisite intent to commit
first-degree murder.
¶ 12 The State has the burden of proving each element of a criminal offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 224 (2009). When a criminal
conviction is challenged based upon insufficient evidence, we construe all of the evidence in
the light most favorable to the State and determine whether any rational trier of fact could
have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crime. Id. The weight to
be given to the testimony of the witnesses, their credibility, and the reasonable inferences to
be drawn from the evidence, are all matters to be determined by the trier of fact. People v.
Milka, 211 Ill. 2d 150, 178 (2004). We will not reverse a criminal conviction unless the
evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of
the defendant’s guilt. People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 281 (2009).
¶ 13 “A person commits the offense of attempt when, with intent to commit a specific offense,
he or she does any act that constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that
offense.” 720 ILCS 5/8-4(a) (West 2010). Section 9-1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961,
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
“A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree
murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death:
(1) he either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or
another, or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or another[.]”
720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2010).
¶ 14 In order to prove the defendant guilty of the attempt first degree murder of Jones, the
State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with the specific intent
to kill her. People v. Green, 339 Ill. App. 3d 443, 451 (2003); People v. Garrett, 216 Ill. App.
3d 348, 353 (1991). Intent is a state of mind which can be established by proof of
surrounding circumstances, including the character of the assault, the use of a deadly
weapon, and other matters from which an intent to kill may be inferred. Green, 339 Ill. App.
3d at 451. It is the function of the trier of fact to determine the existence of the requisite
intent, and its determination will not be disturbed on review unless it clearly appears that
there is a reasonable doubt on the issue. Id.
¶ 15 In this case, the evidence is more than sufficient to support the circuit court’s finding that
the defendant is guilty of aggravated domestic battery and aggravated battery. The defendant
cut Jones, a member of his household, four times in the back with a knife or other sharp
instrument. In his brief before this court, the defendant has not challenged the trial court’s
finding of guilt on the two counts of aggravated domestic battery and three counts of
aggravated battery of which he was charged. As a consequence, any claim of error in the trial
court’s guilty finding on these counts has been forfeited. People v. Washington, 2012 IL
110283, ¶ 62. As stated, the defendant’s appeal challenges only his conviction and sentence
for attempted first-degree murder.
¶ 16 For the reasons which follow, we do not believe that the character of the attack on Jones
and the circumstances leading up to that attack justify an inference that the defendant
intended to kill her. In describing the physical sensation she experienced at the time of the
attack, Jones stated that she “felt punching” and “pressure” in her back. She felt no pain at
that time, only pressure. It was not until Jones felt something moist running down her back
that she looked down and saw that she was bleeding. There was no evidence of any struggle
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either before or after the attack, nor was there any evidence that the defendant threatened
Jones. Further, although the defendant inflicted four cuts on Jones’s back, the lacerations
were superficial and not life threatening. As Dr. Szczesniak testified, Jones’s wounds were
not deep. Contrary to the trial court’s recollection of the evidence, Dr. Szczesniak never
testified that Jones’s “wounds could have resulted in death.” As noted earlier, Dr. Szczesniak
testified that it was possible that “the area in which Ms. Jones presented wounds could have
resulted in her death.” However, the doctor was quite clear in his testimony that the
lacerations that Jones actually suffered turned out to be superficial and not life threatening.
Finally, as Jones left the apartment, there was no evidence that the defendant attempted to
pursue her or cause her any further injury.
¶ 17 There is no doubt that Jones suffered serious injuries at the hands of the defendant that
have resulted in permanent scarring. However, not every assault involving serious bodily
injury will necessarily support an inference that the assailant intended to kill the victim.
People v. Mitchell, 105 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1984); People v. Jones, 184 Ill. App. 3d 412, 429-30
(1989). Considering all of the circumstances, the character of the attack and the superficial
nature of the injuries inflicted upon Jones, we believe that the evidence, when viewed in its
light most favorable to the State, is insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant intended to kill Jones. As a consequence, his conviction of attempted
first-degree murder cannot stand. See Garrett, 216 Ill. App. 3d at 353-54; Jones, 184 Ill. App.
3d at 429-31.
¶ 18 For these reasons, we: affirm the defendant’s convictions of both counts of aggravated
domestic battery and three counts of aggravated battery; reverse the defendant’s conviction
and sentence for attempted first-degree murder; and remand this cause to the trial court to
resentence the defendant.
¶ 19 Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded with directions.
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