Early v. Hobbs ( 2015 )


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  •                                         Cite as 
    2015 Ark. 313
    SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
    No.   CV-15-385
    REGINALD EARLY                                        Opinion Delivered July   23, 2015
    PETITIONER
    PRO SE MOTION FOR BELATED
    V.                                                    APPEAL
    [LEE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, NO.
    39CV-14-75]
    RAY HOBBS, DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS
    DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION                              HONORABLE RICHARD L.
    RESPONDENT                         PROCTOR, JUDGE
    MOTION TREATED AS MOTION FOR
    RULE ON CLERK AND DENIED.
    PER CURIAM
    Petitioner Reginald Early filed in this court a motion for belated appeal of an order that
    denied a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the Lee County Circuit Court. As the notice
    of appeal was timely filed, we treat the motion as a motion for rule on clerk to lodge the appeal
    rather than a motion for belated appeal. Holland v. State, 
    358 Ark. 366
    , 367, 
    190 S.W.3d 904
    , 905
    (2004).
    As Early indicates in the motion, the record was first tendered to this court on December
    30, 2014. Our clerk declined to lodge it because it did not contain Early’s petition for writ of
    habeas corpus. Our rules of procedure require that the record be tendered to this court within
    ninety days of the date of the notice of appeal. Ark. R. App. P.–Civ. 5 (2014). In this case, the
    notice of appeal was filed on October 6, 2014, and Early did not tender a record containing the
    habeas petition to this court until he filed the instant motion on May 1, 2015.
    When a petitioner fails to perfect an appeal in accordance with the prevailing rules of
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    2015 Ark. 313
    procedure, the burden is on the petitioner, even if he is proceeding pro se, to establish good
    cause for failure to comply with the procedural rules. See, e.g., Butcher v. State, 
    345 Ark. 222
    , 
    45 S.W.3d 378
    (2001) (per curiam) (acknowledging that a petitioner is not permitted to proceed
    with a belated appeal in a criminal matter, unless he demonstrates some good cause for his
    failure to perfect an appeal) (citing Garner v. State, 
    293 Ark. 309
    , 
    737 S.W.2d 637
    (1987). Early
    alleges in his motion that the circuit clerk provided him with an insufficient record, and any
    procedural default should be excused.
    We need not consider Early’s asserted grounds for good cause. It is clear from the record
    that he could not prevail on appeal if he were allowed to proceed. An appeal of the denial of
    postconviction relief, including an appeal from an order that denied a petition for writ of habeas
    corpus, will not be permitted to go forward where the appeal is without merit. Seaton v. State, 
    324 Ark. 236
    , 237, 
    920 S.W.2d 13
    , 14 (1996) (per curiam) (citing Chambers v. State, 
    304 Ark. 663
    , 
    803 S.W.2d 932
    (1991) (per curaim); Johnson v. State, 
    303 Ark. 560
    , 
    798 S.W.2d 108
    (1990) (per
    curiam); Williams v. State, 
    293 Ark. 73
    , 
    732 S.W.2d 456
    (1987) (per curiam)). Here, Early did not
    allege grounds in his petition on which the writ could be granted.
    In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Early alleged that the judgment was invalid on
    its face because his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make an appropriate motion for
    directed verdict. Early also alleged that the judgment was invalid because the evidence against
    him was insufficient in that his accomplice’s testimony was not corroborated. A writ of habeas
    corpus will issue when a judgment of conviction is invalid on its face or when the trial court
    lacks jurisdiction over the cause. Hale v. Hobbs, 
    2014 Ark. 405
    , 
    443 S.W.3d 533
    . Although Early
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    2015 Ark. 313
    alleged that the judgment was invalid on its face, the supporting bases Early asserted for that
    allegation, ineffective assistance of counsel and a lack of sufficient evidence, are not cognizable
    claims in proceedings for the writ.
    Early contended in the petition for the writ that the particular claim of ineffective
    assistance that he would raise was one that would not, at the time, have entitled him to relief in
    proceedings under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1. Ineffective assistance of counsel
    claims are not cognizable by habeas corpus—regardless of whether those claims would have
    been successful if raised in a timely Rule 37 proceeding. See, e.g., McConaughy v. Lockhart, 
    310 Ark. 686
    , 
    840 S.W.2d 166
    (1992) (holding that ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not
    cognizable in habeas corpus proceedings). Questions that require factual inquiry that goes well
    beyond the facial validity of the commitment are not the sort cognizable in habeas proceedings.
    Friend v. Norris, 
    364 Ark. 315
    , 
    219 S.W.3d 123
    (2005) (per curiam). Moreover, a habeas
    proceeding does not afford a prisoner an opportunity to retry his case, and it is not a substitute
    for direct appeal or other postconviction relief. Noble v. Norris, 
    368 Ark. 69
    , 243 SW.3d 260
    (2006).
    We affirm a denial of habeas relief where an appellant did not establish any cause to grant
    the writ. Baker v. Norris, 
    369 Ark. 405
    , 
    255 S.W.3d 466
    (2007). The circuit court could not
    properly grant the writ on either of the grounds Early alleged. It is clear that Early cannot
    prevail on appeal, and we deny his motion to proceed with an appeal.
    Motion treated as motion for rule on clerk and denied.
    WYNNE, J., not participating
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