State v. Flint , 2015 Ohio 3689 ( 2015 )

[Cite as State v. Flint, 2015-Ohio-3689.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
CLARK COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 2014-CA-97
:
v. : T.C. NO. 13-CR-528
:
TIMOTHY LEE FLINT : (Criminal appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the 11th day of September, 2015.
...........
RYAN A. SAUNDERS, Atty. Reg. No. 0091678, Clark County Prosecutor’s Office, 50
East Columbia Street, Suite 449, Springfield, Ohio 45502
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
ADRIAN KING, Atty. Reg. No. 0081882, Adrian King Law Office, LLC, Post Office
Box 302, Xenia, Ohio 45385
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
.............
DONOVAN, J.
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{¶ 1} This matter is before the Court on the Notice of Appeal of Timothy Flint, filed
August 21, 2014. Flint appeals from his August 19, 2014 Judgment Entry of Conviction,
issued after he pled guilty to one count of felonious assault, in violation of R.C.
2903.11(A)(1), a felony of the second degree. Pursuant to a plea agreement, another
count of felonious assault in another matter was dismissed (Case No. 2013 CR 0534),
and Flint received an agreed sentence of four years.
{¶ 2} The record reflects that Flint was indicted herein on July 29, 2013, and he
entered a plea of not guilty on August 8, 2013. The Bill of Particulars provides that the
victim herein is Ronald Monroe, and that Flint struck him in the face, knocking him to the
ground, resulting in loss of consciousness, a hematoma, and bleeding to the brain. After
Flint failed to appear in court while on bond and the matter was subsequently continued
on the State’s motion, Flint filed a “Motion” which provides:
The Defendant, through counsel, represents and suggests that there
exists a substantial doubt as to the ability of the Defendant to presently
stand trial and intelligently and knowingly communicate with his Counsel
regarding the preparation and presentation of his defense.
Although the Defendant has previously been evaluated for both
competency to stand trial and not guilty by reason of insanity, the Defendant
through counsel asks this court for a second evaluation. The basis for this
motion is that counsel for the Defense has received from the prosecution
copies of “poetry” written by the Defendant. (Attached).1
1
There are no documents attached to the Motion.
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These “poems” are bizarre in and of themselves, but what troubles
counsel more regarding the nature of the Defendant’s mental state now and
at the time of the alleged offense, is the reference both by the Defendant
and the individual who turned over these documents is the auditory and
visual hallucinations the Defendant is experiencing.
When the Defendant was first evaluated for competency and NGRI,
no mention of these hallucinations were made in the report. While some of
these “poems” pre-date the first evaluation, these poems were not
disclosed to the doctors doing the evaluation nor was the fact that the
Defendant suffers from hallucinations.
Wherefore the Defendant, through counsel, moves this court
pursuant to O.R.C. sec. 29445.37 (sic) and 2945.371, to proceed to an
examination into question of the competency of said Defendant (sic).
Wherefore, the Defendant, through counsel, requests that this court
appoint one or two disinterested, qualified physicians who are specialists in
mental health pursuant to Rule 11 of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure
and section 2954.371 of the Ohio Revised Code.
{¶ 3} Flint also filed a “Motion” that provides that he “hereby enters a plea of Not
Guilty by Reason of Insanity” on April 30, 2014.2 Flint filed an amended motion on
May 1, 2014.
{¶ 4} On June 2, 2014, the court issued an Order that provides: “Counsel for the
Defendant has filed a request for competency evaluation and a plea of not guilty by
2
Crim.R. 11(A) requires that pleas of not guilty by reason of insanity be made in writing.
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reason of insanity; the court hereby ORDERED said examination pursuant to R.C.
2945.[3]71(G)(3)(4).” The court ordered the Forensic Psychiatry Center for Western
Ohio to conduct an examination of Flint on June 11, 2014. The order provides that if “the
examiner reports that the Defendant was insane at the time of the offense, a
recommendation should be given as to the least restrictive commitment alternative
consistent with the Defendant’s treatment needs and the safety of the community,
pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Section 2945.40(F).” At a competency hearing on June
30, 2014, the court concluded, based upon a report submitted by clinical psychologist Dr.
Massimo De Marchis, that Flint was competent to stand trial. The parties stipulated to
the admissibility of the report. The court concluded as follows:
THE COURT: The Court has also reviewed the report from Dr. De
Marchis. The doctor indicates in his discussion that the evaluation failed to
elicit evidence of serious mental illness. Mr. Flint does have a history of
juvenile and adult offenses and a rather extensive history of substance use
disorders going back to his childhood years.
The Defendant claimed experience of hallucinations in all perceptual
areas which the doctor states would be extremely rare, even in the most
disturbed psychotic individuals.
The Defendant’s clinical presentation was not at all consistent with
presentation of an actively psychotic individual, as his communication skills
were logical and coherent and his attention and concentration skills,
memory skills, social/reasoning skills, and reasoning abilities were intact.
The doctor opined Mr. Flint is not a mentally retarded individual. He
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possesses a good understanding about his charges, available pleas, and
potential consequences of a guilty finding.
He demonstrated a good understanding of the adversarial process,
and he was assessed as capable of assisting his attorney in the preparation
of his defense and is capable of assessing advantages and disadvantages
of entering into plea agreements.
Based upon the evaluation, it’s the doctor’s opinion, within a
reasonable degree of psychological certainty, that the Defendant, Timothy
L. Flint, is currently competent to stand trial on both of these offenses.
That being the evidence before the Court, the Court finds that the
Defendant is competent to stand trial. Both cases will be scheduled for
final pretrial and trial dates.
The court also filed an Entry on July 18, 2014, that provides that “[u]pon review of the
report and the opinion of the psychologist, the Court finds the defendant is competent to
stand trial.”
{¶ 5} Also on July 18, 2014, Flint filed a “Withdrawal of Not Guilty By Reason of
Insanity Plea,” which provides that the “motion is based upon the written report completed
by a Clinical Psychologist.” On August 11, 2014, in the course of a pretrial conference,
Flint made an oral motion for another evaluation, and the following exchange occurred:
***
MR. MURPHY:
***
As the Court is aware and has mentioned, Mr. Flint, back on June 24,
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was evaluated by the Forensic Psychiatry Center for Western Ohio. The
report indicated that he was competent to stand trial. Also a not guilty by
reason of insanity plea was entered only as to Case 528. It was the
doctor’s opinion that Mr. Flint was sane at the time of the alleged offense.
Mr. Flint has today raised his concerns regarding that evaluation and would
request the Court for a second opinion as to just the - - not to the
competency issue but to the issue of being not guilty by reason of insanity.
THE COURT: Well, file a motion for that request and I will take it
under advisement.
{¶ 6} On August 11, 2014, Flint filed a written “Motion” requesting “a 2nd Not Guilty
by Reason of Insanity examination of the Defendant,” asserting that the “evaluation by Dr.
De Marchis did not sufficiently take into consideration certain traumatic experiences in
[Flint’s] past.3 The Defendant would also represent and suggest[] that the doctor did not
believe or credit the Defendant’s statements.” The trial court denied the motion on
August 15, 2014, in an Entry that provides: “The motion of the defendant for a second
evaluation on this issue of the defendant’s mental status at the time of the offense is
DENIED,” and on that date Flint entered his guilty plea pursuant to the plea agreement.
{¶ 7} Flint asserts a single assignment of error as follows:
THE COURT []ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT INFORM THE
DEFENDANT THAT HE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE AN
INDEPENDENT PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION AT THE PUBLIC
3
We note that Dr. Demarchis’ report only addresses competency pursuant to R.C.
2945.371(G)(3). An opinion regarding insanity pursuant to R.C. 2945.371(G)(4) was not
rendered. Nevertheless, the substance of the report suggests that Flint was
malingering.
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EXPENSE.
{¶ 8} Flint directs our attention to R.C. 2945.371, which governs “Evaluations of
mental condition,” and provides:
(A) If the issue of a defendant’s competence to stand trial is raised
or if a defendant enters a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the court
may order one or more evaluations of the defendant’s present mental
condition or, in the case of a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, of the
defendant’s mental condition at the time of the offense charged. An
examiner shall conduct the evaluation.
(B) If the court orders more than one evaluation under division (A)
of this section, the prosecutor and the defendant may recommend to the
court an examiner who each prefers to perform one of the evaluations. If a
defendant enters a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and if the court
does not designate an examiner recommended by the defendant, the court
shall inform the defendant that the defendant may have independent expert
evaluation and that, if the defendant is unable to obtain independent
evaluation, it will be obtained for the defendant at public expense if the
defendant is indigent.
{¶ 9} Flint asserts as follows:
Section (B) applies in the instant case. It applies because Mr. Flint
entered a not guilty by reason of insanity plea. * * * The court unilaterally
ordered that the Forensic Psychiatry Center prepare the evaluation. * * *
The Defense did not recommend the Forensic Psychiatry Center so the
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Court was required under the statute to “inform the defendant that the
defendant may have independent expert evaluation and that, if the
defendant is unable to obtain independent expert evaluation, it will be
obtained for the defendant at public expense if the defendant is indigent. *
* * Nowhere in the statute does the Defense’s not making a
recommendation relieve the Court of its obligation to inform the Defendant
of his opportunity to obtain an independent evaluation at the public
expense.
Therefore, Mr. Flint’s case should be remanded back to the trial
court.
{¶ 10} The State directs our attention to State v. Pepper, 2d Dist. Miami No.
2013-CA-6, 2014-Ohio-3841 and asserts that “[m]ost important for this appeal: On July
18, 2014, Flint withdrew his not guilty by reason of insanity.”
{¶ 11} This Court has previously noted that there is a distinction between a
defendant’s competence to stand trial and a defendant’s sanity at the time the offense
was committed, as follows:
Whether a defendant is legally insane at the time an offense is
committed and competent to stand trial are ruled by two different standards.
A defendant is presumed competent unless it is proven by a preponderance
of the evidence that, because of his present mental condition, he is
incapable of understanding the nature and objective of the proceedings
against him or of assisting in his own defense. R.C. 2945.37(G). In
Dusky v. U.S., 362 U.S. 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1960), the
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Supreme Court stated that the test for competency is whether the
defendant “has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational
as well as factual understanding of the proceeding against him.”
Conversely, a person cannot be found not guilty by reason of insanity
unless he proves that, at the time of the commission of the offense, he did
not know, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, the wrongfulness
of his acts. R.C. 2901.01(A)(14).
State v. Saini, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2013 CA 36, 2014-Ohio-5582, ¶ 16.
{¶ 12} In State v. Pepper, the Appellant appealed from his conviction and
sentence after a negotiated plea to one count of murder. Id., ¶ 1. He alleged that the
trial court erred in denying his motion for a second psychological evaluation, and that
defense counsel was ineffective based on counsel’s “failure to file a written plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity * * *.” Id., ¶ 2.
{¶ 13} This Court determined as follows:
* * * First, we see nothing in R.C. 2945.371 that compelled the trial
court to order a second psychological examination. Section (B) of the
statute only applies when “more than one evaluation” is ordered, or,
alternatively when an NGRI plea is entered. Only one evaluation was
ordered and Pepper never entered an NGRI plea. Because only one
evaluation was ordered and because Pepper did not enter a[n] NGRI plea,
the language in R.C. 2945.371(B) upon which he relies had no applicability.
Second, his guilty plea constituted an implied admission of sanity, and the
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trial court’s acceptance of the plea was an affirmation of its belief in
Pepper’s sanity. State v. Fore, 18 Ohio App. 2d 264, 248 N.E.2d 633 (4th
Dist. 1969). Third, with regard to Pepper’s competence to stand trial,
“issues of competency as they relate to a defense to criminal charges are
waived by a plea of not guilty.” State v. Denton, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.
11376, 1989 WL 159195 (Dec. 29, 1989). “Pleas of guilty or nolo
contendere waive all issues of fact and allow the court to go forward on the
basis of the record, resting on the presumption of competence created by
the law.” Id. * * *
Pepper, ¶ 6.
{¶ 14} While Flint entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, he withdrew
the plea in writing on July 18, 2014, prior to requesting another evaluation. We agree
with the State that the withdrawal of his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and his
subsequent guilty plea waived any right he may otherwise have had to an independent
evaluation of his sanity at public expense. Accordingly, Flint’s sole assigned error is
overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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FAIN, J. and HALL, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Ryan A. Saunders
Adrian King
Hon. Richard J. O’Neill