United States v. Judson Broadus , 450 F.2d 639 ( 1971 )

PER CURIAM:

In this 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964) proceeding based on Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L.Ed.2d 57 (1969), and United States v. Covington, 395 U.S. 57, 89 S.Ct. 1559, 23 L.Ed.2d 94 (1969), the District Court denied relief.

In 1954 appellant pleaded guilty to a violation of what is now 26 U.S.C. § 4744 (a) (1) (1964), obtaining marihuana without having paid the transfer tax. At the sentencing the Government presented an information alleging that appellant had pleaded guilty to violations of the Marihuana Tax Act in 1950, and appellant was sentenced as a second offender. He served the sentence in full.

In 1963 appellant was found guilty by a jury of violating the Harrison Narcotics Act and the Jones-Miller Act (21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964); 26 U.S.C. §§ 4704 (a), 4705(a) (1964)). He was sentenced as a second offender on the basis of his 1954 conviction to a mandatory minimum of 10 years, 26 U.S.C. § 7237(b) (1964). The conviction was affirmed by this court, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 337, 350 F.2d 467 (1965). At the time of the hearing before this court, appellant was serving this sentence.

Appellant argues that Leary and Cov-ington provide a complete defense to his 1954 conviction based on his plea of guilty to a Marihuana Tax Act violation, and that consequently he should not have been sentenced as a second offender at the time he was convicted of a Harrison Act violation in 1963. Cognizant of the Second Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Liguori, 430 F.2d 842 (1970), we deferred consideration of this appeal pending action by the Supreme Court on the Government’s application for certiorari in that case. The application for certio-rari has now been denied. 402 U.S. 948, 91 S.Ct. 1614, 29 L.Ed.2d 118 (1971).

Since the facts and issues in this case are identical in all pertinent respects to the facts and issues in Liguori, and since we are persuaded by the reasoning of the Second Circuit’s opinion in that case, we follow its result.

We are cognizant — as was the Liguori court — of language in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970), quoted in Judge Wil-key’s dissent, which indicates that rights unknown at the time of a guilty plea may nonetheless be waived by that plea. See also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 90 S.Ct. 1458, 25 L.Ed.2d 785 (1970). But we decline to elevate that language, written in a context very different from the one. before us now, to the status of a per se rule. The general principle, after all, has always been that a waiver, to be effective, must be an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). (Emphasis added.) The Brady Court did not say. that a guilty plea necessarily waives all rights unknown at the time of the plea; rather, under the general circumstances of the case before it, the Court created an exception to the general principle of nonwaiver. The circumstances of our case are substantially and relevantly different.

Unlike the rights waived in Brady, McMann and Parker, the right at issue here relates to the basic validity of the criminal law which Broadus admitted violating. He pleaded guilty to a substantive offense under a statute subsequently held unconstitutional, subject to a com--píete defense under the privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, in essence, he pleaded guilty to nothing. The Government, therefore, does not have the usual interest in punishing a man who admits' committing a crime, and the guilty plea should not be allowed to accomplish what the Government could not constitutionally accomplish through legislation. Moreover, since Broadus asserts a right which is a complete defense to prosecution, “we are not faced with an accused’s decision to plead guilty based on difficult judgments as to the strength of the government’s case and as to the possibility of leniency. * * * In this case [unlike Brady, McCann and Parker, the defendant] certainly would not have pleaded guilty had he known of his right to assert the privilege as a complete defense.” United States v. Liguori, supra, 430 F.2d at 849. Thus the plea cannot be explained and preserved inviolate as a subtle tactical judgment of defense counsel.

Under the circumstances, the judgment of the District Court must be reversed and this case must be remanded to the District Court with instructions to vacate the 1954 conviction and resentence under the 1963 conviction, unless, of course, appellant has already completed serving that sentence.

Reversed and remanded.