State v. Jarvis ( 2015 )

[Cite as State v. Jarvis, 2015-Ohio-4219.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF LORAIN )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 14CA010667
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
KRISTOPHER L. JARVIS COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 12CR084892
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: October 13, 2015
SCHAFER, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Kristopher Jarvis, appeals the judgment of the Lorain
County Court of Common Pleas convicting him on two counts of kidnapping and one count of
felonious assault and imposing a total prison term of eight years. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I.
{¶2} The Lorain County Grand Jury indicted Jarvis on the following counts: Count I –
kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(B)(1), a felony of the first degree; Count II – kidnapping
in violation of R.C. 2905.01(B)(2), a felony of the first degree; Count III – felonious assault in
violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a felony of the second degree; and Count IV – felonious assault
in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), a felony of the second degree.
{¶3} These charges stemmed from an incident that occurred during the late
evening/early morning hours of January 23-24, 2012. That evening, M.A. reported for work at a
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local bar, where she served as a bartender. The bar did not have many patrons, though, so after
approximately an hour of working, M.A.’s boss told her to stop working and wait at the bar to
see if more customers came. While waiting, M.A. had one alcoholic beverage before Jarvis
approached her, purchased her another alcoholic beverage, and engaged her in conversation.
M.A. did not know Jarvis’s name before this interaction, but recognized his face as a previous
patron of the bar. During the course of their conversation, M.A. discussed her need for new
housing and Jarvis responded that his mother owned a nearby hotel and that he could possibly
arrange for M.A. to live there.
{¶4} Around midnight, M.A. was told that she would not be needed to cover a
bartending shift so she decided to leave. After M.A. left the bar, Jarvis approached her as he
walked from another nearby bar and asked if she would go to that bar with him. Since she
wanted to get contact information for Jarvis’s mother, M.A. agreed to go to the other bar with
Jarvis. After Jarvis drank one beer at the other bar, the two left from the other bar’s rear exit,
which led to the parking lot where Jarvis’s truck was parked. He insisted that he drive M.A. to
her vehicle, which was parked on Broadway Avenue. M.A. agreed and got into Jarvis’s truck
because even though it was not a long walk to her vehicle, she thought Jarvis was being polite on
account of the cold temperature that night. But, Jarvis did not stop when his truck passed the
location of M.A.’s parked vehicle. Rather, he continued driving for several miles as M.A.
constantly asked Jarvis to stop and to explain why he had not stopped at her vehicle’s location.
Despite M.A.’s statements, Jarvis never responded and seemed “oblivious” to her.
{¶5} Approximately three miles from the location of M.A.’s vehicle, Jarvis stopped his
truck when it reached a red light. M.A. got out of the truck at that point and started to walk back
towards her vehicle’s location. Jarvis backed his truck up, apologized, and M.A. decided to get
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back into the truck so that he could drive her to her vehicle. Once back in the truck, though,
Jarvis continued driving in the opposite direction of her vehicle. M.A. again demanded that
Jarvis stop, which led to Jarvis hitting her on the face twice. He suddenly turned down a side
street, which led M.A. to conclude that he was taking her to the woods and that she was going to
die unless she got out of the truck.
{¶6} As a result, M.A. jumped out of the moving truck and her left shoulder hit the
ground, which caused her to scream in pain. Jarvis then backed the truck up and it hit M.A.’s
right shoulder blade. She thought that Jarvis was going to run over her so she sought help from a
nearby homeowner, who said she would contact the police. Jarvis drove away as M.A. sought
assistance.
{¶7} Detective Jacob Morris of the Lorain Police Department subsequently interviewed
Jarvis regarding the incident with M.A. At first, Jarvis denied seeing M.A. on the day in
question or giving her a ride in his truck. Later, though, Jarvis admitted to seeing M.A. He also
admitted to driving her around in his truck, not allowing her to leave the truck, and punching her.
Jarvis further said that it was possible that he hit M.A. while he was backing his truck up.
{¶8} This matter proceeded to a jury trial. The jury issued a guilty verdict on Counts I,
II, and III alleged in the indictment. It, however, found Jarvis not guilty on Count IV. The trial
court entered Jarvis’s convictions and sentenced him to a total prison term of eight years. Jarvis
filed this timely appeal, presenting three assignments of error for our review. Since the first and
second assignments of error both implicate the sufficiency of the evidence for all of Jarvis’s
convictions, we elect to address them together.
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II.
Assignment of Error I
The verdicts for kidnapping, as defined by the court, in counts one and two
were not supported by sufficient evidence.
Assignment of Error II
The verdict for felonious assault, as defined by the court, in count three was
not supported by sufficient evidence.
{¶9} In his first and second assignments of error, Jarvis argues that there is not
sufficient evidence to support any of his convictions. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
{¶10} A sufficiency challenge of a criminal conviction presents a question of law, which
we review de novo. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d 380, 386 (1997). In carrying out this
review, our “function * * * is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether
such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
After such an examination and taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we
must decide whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Although we conduct de novo review when considering
a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, we “neither resolve evidentiary conflicts nor assess the
credibility of witnesses, as both are functions reserved for the trier of fact.” State v. Jones, 1st
Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-120570, C-120571, 2013-Ohio-4775, ¶ 33.
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B. Kidnapping Convictions
{¶11} Jarvis was convicted on two counts of kidnapping, one for violating R.C.
2905.01(B)(1) and one for violating R.C. 2905.01(B)(2). These provisions pertinently provide as
follows:
No person, by force, threat, or deception * * * shall knowingly do any of the
following, under circumstances that create a substantial risk of serious physical
harm to the victim * * *:
(1) Remove another from the place where the other person is found;
(2) Restrain another of the other person’s liberty.
Jarvis challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the “substantial risk of serious
physical harm to the victim” element of kidnapping. As a result, we limit our review of the
evidence to this element.
{¶12} R.C. 2901.01(A)(8) defines “substantial risk” as “a strong possibility, as
contrasted with a remote or significant possibility, that a certain result may occur or that certain
circumstances may exist.” “Serious physical harm,” meanwhile, is relevantly defined as
including the following:
(b) Any physical harm that carries a substantial risk of death;
***
(e) Any physical harm that involves acute pain of such duration as to result in
substantial suffering or that involves any degree of prolonged or intractable pain.
R.C. 2901.01(A)(5).
{¶13} M.A. testified at length to the incident that gave rise to this matter and the fear
that Jarvis’s actions caused. After getting into the truck the second time, she described Jarvis
refusing to take her back to her vehicle and punching her as follows:
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Like, this guy is a psycho. Like, he just hit me like a man, like, in my eye. You
know, it wasn’t – it wasn’t gentle at all. * * * [I]t wasn’t just a punch. It was
like, you know, “B[----], I’m an ex-Navy SEAL.” I felt like, oh my God. What
the hell?
***
I felt like he was trying to warn me or tell me, like, he’s not one to mess with.
You know, I felt like he was trying to give me a warning or tell me, like, how
much of a man he is or how strong he is.
M.A. further testified as follows regarding her reaction to Jarvis’s actions of punching her,
refusing to stop, and turning down the side street towards the woods:
I really kind of just was thinking like he’s going to kill me. I thought he was
going to rape me, really. I felt like he was going to rape me, beat the s[---] out of
me, choke me. I was imaging [sic] – I don’t know what’s going to happen. * * *
I’m going to die. I’m going to die unless I get * * * out of this truck.
This fear led M.A. to jump out of the moving truck, which caused “excruciating” pain to the
shoulder on which she landed. And, M.A.’s fear did not dissipate when she jumped out of
Jarvis’s moving truck, either, since she saw the truck’s backup lights activated before the truck
hit her shoulder blade. This action led M.A. to conclude that “he’s going to run me over, that
he’s mad that I got out of the truck and now he’s just going to finish whatever he wants to do.”
{¶14} This testimony establishes that Jarvis restrained M.A.’s liberty, drove her far past
the location where she requested, punched her, and caused her to fear death or other serious
injury. Indeed, his actions caused M.A. to sustain excruciating pain when she jumped out of the
truck to escape from him and landed on her shoulder. In light of this, we determine that there is
sufficient evidence in the record to demonstrate that there was a substantial risk of serious
physical harm to M.A. Consequently, we must conclude that sufficient evidence supports both
of Jarvis’s kidnapping convictions.
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C. Felonious Assault Conviction
{¶15} Jarvis was convicted on felonious assault for violating R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), which
pertinently provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly * * * [c]ause serious physical harm to
another[.]” Jarvis challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his felonious assault conviction
on two grounds: (1) there is no evidence showing that Jarvis knew M.A. would jump out of the
truck; and (2) there is no evidence that she suffered serious physical harm. We reject both of
these contentions.
{¶16} “An accused is presumed to intend the natural, reasonable, and probable
consequences of his act.” State v. Jackson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80879, 2002-Ohio-5851, ¶
60, citing State v. Carter, 64 Ohio St. 3d 218, 226 (1992). We have previously determined that
“[a] natural consequence of assaulting someone in an automobile is that she may attempt to
escape the attack by escaping the vehicle.” State v. Bromley, 9th Dist. Lorain Nos.
93CA005738, 93CA005739, 1994 WL 273259, * 2 (June 22, 1994). We see no reason to
disregard this principle here. The record reflects that Jarvis kidnapped M.A. and punched her
twice in the face, which allows a rational trier of fact to infer that he knew of his action’s natural
consequences, including that it would cause M.A. to escape the truck by jumping out of the
truck. Thus, there is sufficient evidence in the record to show that Jarvis acted knowingly.
{¶17} There is also sufficient evidence to establish that M.A. suffered serious physical
harm after she jumped from the truck. See id. (“[T]he injuries [the victim] suffered while
escaping the car could be considered when determining whether she suffered serious physical
harm.”). M.A. testified that when she jumped from the truck, she landed on her shoulder, which
caused “excruciating” pain that caused her to scream and cry. M.A. further testified that she was
transported from the scene via ambulance and diagnosed with a fractured collarbone. Her
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medical records were also entered into evidence. According to her testimony, her pain continued
for months, prevented her from reaching behind her back, and affected her work as a hairdresser
and as the caretaker for her young children. As a result, we conclude that Jarvis’s felonious
assault conviction is supported by sufficient evidence.
{¶18} In sum, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support Jarvis’s kidnapping
and felonious assault convictions. Accordingly, we overrule his first and second assignments of
error.
Assignment of Error III
The verdicts were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶19} In his third assignment of error, Jarvis contends that all of his convictions are
against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
{¶20} A manifest weight of the evidence challenge is legally distinct from a sufficiency
challenge. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d at 387. Accordingly, when applying the manifest weight
standard, we are required to consider the whole record, “weigh the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in
the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of
justice that the convictions must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Otten, 33 Ohio
App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.1986). Courts are cautioned to only reverse a conviction on manifest
weight grounds “in exceptional cases,” State v. Carson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26900, 2013-Ohio-
5785, ¶ 32, citing Otten at 340, when the evidence “weighs heavily against the conviction,”
Thompkins at 387.
{¶21} Jarvis’s manifest weight challenge is based solely on “the multiple versions of
events and lack of credibility of the complaining witness [M.A.].” However, after reviewing the
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record, we cannot second-guess the jury’s determination of credibility. The jury was free to
believe M.A.’s testimony and it could resolve any inconsistencies in her favor. Moreover, the
jury heard Detective Morris’s testimony that Jarvis made a number of incriminating statements
during his police interview, including that he punched M.A., restrained her, and possibly hit her
with his truck. Indeed, Detective Morris explicitly testified that Jarvis’s statements during the
interview corroborated M.A.’s version of events. Consequently, we determine that Jarvis’s
convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶22} Accordingly, we overrule Jarvis’s third assignment of error.
III.
{¶23} Having overruled all of Jarvis’s assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of
the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
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Costs taxed to Appellant.
JULIE A. SCHAFER
FOR THE COURT
WHITMORE, P.J.
MOORE, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
NICHOLAS J. HANEK, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and MARY R. SLANCZKA, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for Appellee.