Theme Promotions, Inc. v. News America Marketing FSI , 546 F.3d 991 ( 2008 )


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  •                   FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    THEME PROMOTIONS, INC., a              
    California corporation, dba Theme
    Co-op Promotions,
    Plaintiff-counter-defendant-         No. 06-16230
    Appellee,
    v.                          D.C. No.
    CV-97-04617-VRW
    NEWS AMERICA MARKETING FSI, a
    Delaware corporation,
    Defendant-counter-claimant-
    Appellant.
    
    THEME PROMOTIONS, INC., a              
    California corporation, dba Theme
    Co-op Promotions,
    Plaintiff-counter-defendant-         No. 06-16341
    Appellant,
    v.                          D.C. No.
    CV-97-04617-VRW
    NEWS AMERICA MARKETING FSI, a                  OPINION
    Delaware corporation,
    Defendant-counter-claimant-
    Appellee.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Vaughn R. Walker, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    April 14, 2008—San Francisco, California
    Filed August 20, 2008
    11057
    11058          THEME PROMOTIONS v. NEWS AMERICA
    Before: Stephen S. Trott, Sidney R. Thomas, and
    Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges.1
    Opinion by Judge Thomas
    1
    Judge Paez was drawn to replace Judge Ferguson pursuant to General
    Order 3.2 (g).
    11062        THEME PROMOTIONS v. NEWS AMERICA
    COUNSEL
    Nancy L. Tompkins, Townsend And Townsend And Crew
    LLP, San Francisco, California; Theodore T. Herhold, Town-
    send and Townsend and Crew LLP, Palo Alto, California, for
    the plaintiff/appellee/cross-appellant.
    Gary J. Malone, Constantine Cannon, New York, New York,
    for the defendant/appellant.
    OPINION
    THOMAS, Circuit Judge:
    This appeal presents the question of whether right of first
    refusal agreements between a publisher of advertising tools
    and packaged goods companies violate California antitrust
    and tort law. We conclude that the jury verdict in favor of
    Plaintiff was supported by substantial evidence in the record,
    and we affirm.
    I
    News America Marketing FSI, Inc. (“News”) is one of two
    publishers of an advertising tool called a free-standing insert
    (“insert”). An insert is a multi-colored advertising booklet
    inserted into a Sunday newspaper that contains coupons pro-
    moting products—like cereal and soft drinks—sold by pack-
    aged goods companies. Although packaged goods companies
    advertise and promote their products with a variety of adver-
    tising tools, inserts are the primary tool that packaged goods
    companies use to distribute coupons nationally. The other
    major company that sells, publishes, and distributes inserts is
    Valassis Communications (“Valassis”).
    It is common for a packaged goods company to enter into
    a right of first refusal agreement with either News or Valassis
    THEME PROMOTIONS v. NEWS AMERICA             11063
    to meet its insert needs. In an right of first refusal agreement
    with News, a packaged goods company agrees to first offer all
    (if the agreement is a “100% right of first refusal agreement”)
    or a set percentage (if the agreement is a “share right of first
    refusal agreement”) of its insert business to News. Under the
    agreement, News must accept this business unless it cannot
    accommodate the date requested by the packaged goods com-
    pany. In return for the greater volume of sales promised by
    the right of first refusal agreement, News discounts the insert
    prices.
    Theme Promotions, Inc. (“Theme”) is an advertising com-
    pany that offers promotional programs to packaged goods
    companies. Theme specializes in related-item merchandising,
    or “tie-ins”, that involve the joint promotion of complemen-
    tary products from two different packaged goods companies
    (for example, a particular brand of popcorn with a particular
    brand of cola). Theme often uses inserts in its related-item
    promotions. Because Theme is contractually bound to two or
    more packaged goods companies for each related-item pro-
    motion, and because Theme is responsible for the execution
    of the promotions, Theme—and not the packaged goods
    companies—often purchases the inserts from either News or
    Valassis.
    Theme itself has entered into right of first refusal agree-
    ments with News (before 1996) and Valassis (since 1996) to
    get lower insert prices. In June 1995, Theme entered into a
    right of first refusal agreement with News for its insert busi-
    ness. When a dispute arose between the parties, the agreement
    was voided, and Theme entered into a right of first refusal
    agreement with Valassis. News subsequently sued Theme and
    Valassis for intentional interference with contractual relations.
    The lawsuit settled in 1997. Since 1996, Theme’s preferred
    supplier of inserts has been Valassis, in part because Valassis
    offers Theme “extras” like better page position for its cou-
    pons, and rebates for promotional programs brought to Valas-
    sis.
    11064         THEME PROMOTIONS v. NEWS AMERICA
    During the course of the litigation with Theme and Valas-
    sis, News took the position that any right of first refusal
    agreements applied not only to inserts purchased directly by
    packaged goods companies for their own single product pro-
    motions, but also to inserts purchased indirectly by third-party
    suppliers of promotional services such as Theme. News com-
    municated this position to packaged goods companies
    (Benevia and Van de Kamp, in particular) that had been told
    by Theme that they were free to place their orders with Valas-
    sis as long as the orders were placed through Theme. News
    advised these packaged goods companies that placing an
    order with Valassis would be a breach of contract and could
    embroil the packaged goods company in the lawsuit between
    News and Theme. Theme characterizes this as News’ “ag-
    gressive [right of first refusal] enforcement strategy.”
    In 1997, News formalized its position that its right of first
    refusal agreements with packaged goods companies applied to
    inserts purchased by third-party suppliers such as Theme.
    News added language to its right of first refusal contracts pro-
    viding that the packaged goods company “agrees that it will
    abide by terms and pay the rates set forth in this agreement
    for all [inserts] placed with News America irrespective of
    whether client places such advertisements directly through an
    advertising agent or another third-party compiler.”
    Between 1997 and 1999, Theme’s preference to purchase
    inserts from Valassis, and News’ right of first refusal agree-
    ments with packaged goods companies, clashed in at least 9
    instances. In 1997, Theme put together an insert tie-in pro-
    gram between Benevia’s sugar substitute Equal and Maxwell
    House Coffee. Benevia had a 100% right of first refusal
    agreement with News. Although Theme preferred to purchase
    the inserts from Valassis, News told Benevia that under the
    right of first refusal agreement, the inserts had to be pur-
    chased from News. The insert program was ultimately placed
    with News. Benevia did not participate in additional Theme
    programs. Similar issues arose in tie-in programs with Van de
    THEME PROMOTIONS v. NEWS AMERICA             11065
    Kamp, Nabisco, Smuckers, Campbells, Hormel, and Interna-
    tional Home Foods. In some cases, the insert order was ulti-
    mately placed with News; in others, it was placed with
    Valassis. In most cases, the packaged goods company did no
    further business with Theme after the contested promotion.
    On December 18, 1997, Theme brought an action against
    News in the district court for the Northern District of Califor-
    nia, for violations of, inter alia, federal antitrust laws, the
    Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16720, and the
    Unfair Competition Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, and
    for tortious interference with prospective economic advan-
    tage. The district court dismissed Theme’s federal and state
    antitrust claims with prejudice, and eventually granted sum-
    mary judgment in favor of News. Theme appealed to this
    Court, and we reversed the dismissal of the federal and state
    antitrust and unfair competition claims, and the state law tor-
    tious interference claim. See Theme Promotions, Inc. v. News
    America FSI, 35 Fed. Appx. 463 (9th Cir. 2002).
    On remand, Theme filed a motion for leave to amend, seek-
    ing to substitute a declaratory judgment claim for its antitrust
    claims. The district court denied the motion. Theme eventu-
    ally withdrew all of its federal antitrust claims with prejudice.
    The case went to trial in August, 2005 on claims of restraint
    of trade and monopolization in violation of the Cartwright
    Act, unlawful and unfair business practices in violation of the
    Unfair Competition Act, negligent interference with prospec-
    tive economic advantage, and intentional interference with
    prospective economic advantage. During the trial, Theme
    attempted to assert a boycott claim, but the district court
    granted News’ motion for judgment as a matter of law
    (“JMOL”) with respect to that claim.
    After a three-week trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor
    of Theme, finding that: (1) two provisions of News’ right of
    first refusal agreements unreasonably restrained trade in vio-
    lation of the Cartwright Act, and that Theme was entitled to
    11066         THEME PROMOTIONS v. NEWS AMERICA
    $1,000,000 in damages (before trebling); (2) News had
    engaged in unlawful and unfair business practices in violation
    of the Unfair Competition Act; (3) News had negligently
    interfered with Theme’s prospective economic advantage
    regarding relationships with Benevia, Van de Kamp, and
    Campbells, and that Theme was entitled to damages in the
    amounts of $154,111, $1, and $496,023; (4) News had inten-
    tionally interfered with Theme’s prospective economic advan-
    tage regarding relationships with Benevia and Van de Kamp,
    and that Theme was entitled to damages in the amounts of
    $132,992 and $800,353. The jury also assessed punitive dam-
    ages totaling $2,500,000 against News for threats of litigation
    against Van de Kamp and Benevia. The jury returned a ver-
    dict against Theme on its combination to monopolize claim as
    well as its intentional and negligent interference claims with
    respect to Nabisco, Smuckers, Hormel, and International
    Home Foods, and its intentional interference claims with
    respect to Campbells.
    Following trial, News renewed its motion for JMOL, or in
    the alternative, for a new trial. Theme moved for a permanent
    injunction prohibiting News’ further enforcement of its right
    of first refusal agreements and for an award of restitution
    under the Unfair Competition Act. The district court set aside
    the jury verdict on the intentional interference claims and the
    related punitive damages award, holding the alleged threats of
    litigation were privileged. It also set aside the negligent inter-
    ference claim relating to Benevia. The court denied JMOL on
    the Cartwright Act claim and otherwise affirmed the jury ver-
    dict. The court denied Theme’s post-trial motions.
    The parties subsequently submitted a joint proposed form
    of judgment, but disagreed about whether the remaining jury
    award for negligent interference regarding Theme’s relation-
    ship with Campbells was duplicative of the award for the
    Cartwright Act violation. In an order dated May 25, 2006, the
    district court ruled that the awards were not duplicative.
    THEME PROMOTIONS v. NEWS AMERICA           11067
    On June 1, 2006, final judgment was entered, awarding
    Theme a total of $3,496,024 in damages. News appealed,
    challenging the district court’s order denying in part News’
    motion for JMOL or new trial and the order resolving the
    issue of duplicative recovery. Theme cross-appealed, chal-
    lenging the order granting in part News’ motion for JMOL,
    the trial ruling granting News’ motion for JMOL on Theme’s
    boycott claim, the order denying Theme’s motion for leave to
    amend its complaint, and the order denying injunctive relief
    and restitution. These issues are before us now.
    II
    We review the district court’s grant or denial of a renewed
    motion for JMOL de novo. See Josephs v. Pac. Bell, 
    443 F.3d 1050
    , 1062 (9th Cir. 2006); Johnson v. Paradise Valley Uni-
    fied Sch. Dist., 
    251 F.3d 1222
    , 1226 (9th Cir. 2001). We must
    decide whether the evidence, construed in the light most
    favorable to the nonmoving party, permits only one reason-
    able conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the jury’s
    verdict. See Pavao v. Pagay, 
    307 F.3d 915
    , 918 (9th Cir.
    2002). Antitrust standing is a question of law we review de
    novo. Glen Holly Entm’t Inc. v. Tektronix Inc., 
    343 F.3d 1000
    , 1005 (9th Cir. 2003).
    We review the district court’s denial of a motion to amend
    a complaint, evidentiary rulings, award of damages, and rul-
    ing on a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion. See
    Chappel v. Lab. Corp., 
    232 F.3d 719
    , 725 (9th Cir. 2000)
    (motion to amend); Obrey v. Johnson, 
    400 F.3d 691
    , 694 (9th
    Cir. 2005) (evidentiary rulings); McLean v. Runyon, 
    222 F.3d 1150
    , 1155 (9th Cir. 2000) (award of damages); Dorn v. Bur-
    lington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 
    397 F.3d 1183
    , 1189 (9th Cir.
    2005) (injunctive relief).
    Likewise, we review the district court’s choice of remedies,
    decision to deny equitable relief, and decision to deny perma-
    nent injunctive relief for abuse of discretion. See United
    11068         THEME PROMOTIONS v. NEWS AMERICA
    States v. Alisal Water Corp., 
    431 F.3d 643
    , 654 (9th Cir.
    2005) (choice of remedies); Rabkin v. Oregon Health Scis.
    Univ., 
    350 F.3d 967
    , 977 (9th Cir. 2003) (equitable relief);
    Cummings v. Connell, 
    316 F.3d 886
    , 897 (9th Cir. 2003).
    III
    The district court did not err in declining to grant JMOL in
    favor of News on Theme’s Cartwright Act restraint of trade
    claim, or on Theme’s negligent interference with prospective
    economic advantage claim. The district court also did not err
    in refusing to grant News’ alternative motion for a new trial.
    Nor did the district court err in holding that the jury’s awards
    of antitrust and tort damages were not duplicative.
    A
    The district court did not err in denying News’ motion for
    JMOL on Theme’s Cartwright Act restraint of trade claim. In
    reviewing the district court’s denial of the motion, our role is
    to evaluate whether the evidence of a Cartwright Act viola-
    tion, construed in the light most favorable to Theme, permits
    only one reasonable conclusion: that News did not violate the
    Cartwright Act. See 
    Pavao, 307 F.3d at 918
    . In order to bene-
    fit from the favorable inferences available to the nonmoving
    party under a motion for JMOL, Theme must have presented
    “substantial evidence”—defined as “such relevant evidence as
    a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
    conclusion”—that News violated the Cartwright Act. See
    Syufy Enter. v. Am. Multicinema, Inc., 
    793 F.2d 990
    , 992 (9th
    Cir. 1986).
    [1] The Cartwright Act makes unlawful a “trust,” defined
    as a combination of capital, skill, or acts by two or more per-
    sons or businesses to restrict trade, limit production, increase
    or fix prices, or prevent competition. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
    §§ 16702, 16720 et seq. The California Supreme Court has
    stated that the purpose of the Cartwright Act is to prevent any
    THEME PROMOTIONS v. NEWS AMERICA                     11069
    action which “has as its Purpose or Effect an unreasonable
    restraint of trade.” Corwin v. Los Angeles Newspaper Serv.
    Bureau, Inc., 
    583 P.2d 777
    , 784 (Cal. 1978).
    California courts have determined that vertical restraints of
    trade, including exclusive dealing contracts, are not per se
    unreasonable but instead are subject to a “rule of reason” analy-
    sis.2 See Fisherman’s Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Ct.,
    
    7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628
    , 649 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). The rule of rea-
    son analysis “measures whether the anticompetitive aspect of
    a vertical restraint outweighs its procompetitive effects.”
    Exxon Corp. v. Superior Ct., 
    60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 195
    , 200 (Cal.
    Ct. App. 1997). This approach recognizes that exclusive deal-
    ing contracts may harm competition, but may also have the
    effect of enhancing competition. See Omega Envtl., Inc. v.
    Gilbarco, Inc., 
    127 F.3d 1157
    , 1162 (9th Cir. 1997).3 Under
    the rule of reason analysis, an exclusive dealing contract is
    “proscribed when it is probable that performance of the con-
    tract will foreclose competition in a substantial share of the
    affected line of commerce.” Fisherman’s Wharf, 
    7 Cal. Rptr. 3d
    at 649.
    A rule of reason analysis requires a threshold inquiry into
    the defendant’s market power. 
    Roth, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 712
    . Evi-
    dence of restricted output and supracompetitive prices is
    direct evidence of market power. Forsyth v. Humana, Inc.,
    
    114 F.3d 1467
    , 1475 (9th Cir. 1997). To establish circumstan-
    2
    Theme argues that even if News’ actions were legal under a rule of rea-
    son analysis, they were illegal per se as a secondary boycott under section
    16721.5 of the Cartwright Act. Because there is no evidence in the record
    that News required packaged goods companies to refuse to do business
    with Theme if Theme purchased Inserts from Valassis, the district court
    was correct in concluding that this argument fails. See Cal. Bus. & Prof.
    Code § 16721.5.
    3
    Because California’s Cartwright Act is patterned after federal antitrust
    acts like the Sherman Antitrust Act, California courts often cite federal
    antitrust cases when interpreting the Cartwright Act. See Roth v. Rhodes,
    
    30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 706
    , 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
    11070             THEME PROMOTIONS v. NEWS AMERICA
    tial evidence of market power, a plaintiff must first define the
    relevant market and then show that the defendant plays
    enough of a role in the market to impair competition signifi-
    cantly. 
    Exxon, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 201
    .
    The district court instructed the jury that for Theme to pre-
    vail on its Cartwright Act restraint of trade claim, it would
    have to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1)
    News agreed to provisions constituting an unreasonable
    restraint of trade;4 (2) the purpose and effect of these provi-
    sions was to restrain competition; (3) the anticompetitive
    effect of the provisions outweighed any beneficial effect on
    competition; (4) Theme was harmed; and (5) News’ conduct
    was a substantial factor in causing Theme’s harm. The court
    instructed the jury on how it should identify the relevant mar-
    ket and how it should determine whether News’ right of first
    refusal agreements foreclosed competition in a substantial
    share of that market.
    News now argues that Theme failed to provide sufficient
    evidence to support the jury’s relevant market definition and
    the jury’s conclusion that News foreclosed competition in a
    substantial share of that market. News also argues that there
    is insufficient evidence in the record of an antitrust injury, a
    standing requirement, and of causation. Because antitrust
    injury and proximate cause are closely related concepts, we
    address both issues together. The record includes sufficient
    evidence that News foreclosed competition in the relevant
    4
    The specific contractual provisions identified by the district court were:
    (1) “News America FSI, Inc (‘News’) and Client agree that in
    consideration for News’ offering the rates set forth below Client
    shall give News a right of first refusal to contract all free standing
    insert programs (Co-op or Solo) of Client for [time period]” and
    (2) “Client agrees that it will abide by the terms and pay the rates
    set forth in this Agreement for all free standing insert advertise-
    ments placed with News, irrespective of whether Client places
    such advertisements directly, through an advertising agent or
    another third party compiler.”
    THEME PROMOTIONS v. NEWS AMERICA            11071
    market, and that Theme suffered an antitrust injury as the
    result of News’ anticompetitive actions.
    1
    [2] The district court instructed the jury that for Theme to
    succeed on its Cartwright Act claim, it had to prove by a pre-
    ponderance of the evidence that the relevant market is the sale
    of inserts to packaged goods companies. The definition of the
    relevant market is a question of fact for the jury. 
    Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1476
    . A relevant market is identified by considering
    “commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for
    the same purposes.” 
    Exxon, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 201
    (quoting
    United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 
    351 U.S. 377
    ,
    395 (1956)). Put another way, the relevant market includes all
    sellers or producers who have actual or potential ability to
    deprive each other of significant levels of business. 
    Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1476
    (citing Thurman Indus., Inc. v. Pay ‘N Pak
    Stores, Inc., 
    875 F.2d 1369
    , 1374 (9th Cir. 1989)).
    [3] Determining the relevant market can involve a compli-
    cated economic analysis, including concepts like cross-
    elasticity of demand, and “small but significant nontransitory
    increase in price” (“SSNIP”) analysis. See United States v.
    Oracle Corp., 
    331 F. Supp. 2d 1098
    (N.D. Cal. 2004)
    (Walker, C.J.). Cross-elasticity of demand measures the per-
    centage change in quantity that consumers will demand of one
    product in response to a percentage change in the price of
    another. 
    Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1483
    (Wallace, J., concurring).
    When demand for the commodity of one producer shows no
    relation to the price for the commodity of another producer,
    it supports the claim that the two commodities are not in the
    same relevant market. 
    Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1477
    .
    Similarly, a SSNIP analysis asks whether a monopolist in
    the proposed market could profitably impose a small but sig-
    nificant and nontransitory price increase. Oracle, 
    331 F. Supp. 2d
    at 1112. If a significant number of customers would
    11072         THEME PROMOTIONS v. NEWS AMERICA
    respond to a SSNIP by purchasing substitute products, the
    SSNIP would not be profitable for the hypothetical monopo-
    list. 
    Id. If a
    monopolist could not profitably impose a SSNIP,
    the market definition should be expanded to include those
    substitute products that constrain the monopolist’s pricing. 
    Id. [4] The
    evidence of the relevant market for Theme’s Cart-
    wright Act claim is substantial enough that we cannot hold
    that the jury reached an unreasonable conclusion. To support
    the jury’s finding, Theme highlights record testimony that
    inserts are the single most important promotional vehicle used
    to distribute coupons, and that inserts have unique benefits
    including reaching a large national audience. Theme also
    emphasizes that in 1994, when the price of inserts rose from
    approximately $4.00 per thousand to around $7.00 per thou-
    sand, the percentage of inserts in the coupon market also rose.
    This evidence—when viewed in the light most favorable to
    Theme—supports the jury’s finding. We conclude that a rea-
    sonable jury could infer that the relevant market is the sale of
    inserts to packaged goods companies.
    2
    [5] The district court also instructed the jury that for Theme
    to succeed on its Cartwright Act claim, it had to prove by a
    preponderance of the evidence that News’ right of first refusal
    agreements “foreclose competition in a substantial share of
    that relevant market.” California courts have instructed that “a
    market share of 16 percent fails ‘conspicuously to pass the
    threshold test establishing the defendant’s market power.’ ”
    
    Roth, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 713
    (quoting Redwood Theatres, Inc.
    v. Festival Enter., Inc., 
    248 Cal. Rptr. 189
    , 199 (Cal. Ct. App.
    1988)). We have determined that a 45-70% market share may
    be enough to establish a substantial share of the relevant mar-
    ket where it is accompanied by other factors like fragmenta-
    tion of competition and high entry barriers. 
    Syufy, 793 F.2d at 995
    . Whether an exclusive dealing arrangement substantially
    forecloses competition cannot be determined by a rigid math-
    THEME PROMOTIONS v. NEWS AMERICA             11073
    ematical analysis alone; the analysis must take into account
    other factors. Fisherman’s Wharf, 
    7 Cal. Rptr. 3d
    at 650-51.
    [6] The best evidence supporting the jury’s conclusion that
    News foreclosed competition in a substantial share of the
    market is testimony by expert witnesses, News executives,
    and Theme’s president, that News held 40-60% of the
    national insert publishing market between the late 1990s and
    2004. Theme also points to evidence—primarily the testi-
    mony of its own president about Theme’s decision not to
    enter the insert publishing business—that there were signifi-
    cant barriers to entrance into the insert market. This testimony
    suggests that the large capital investments and high econo-
    mies of scale necessary to reach an efficient level of output,
    coupled with the existence of current right of first refusal con-
    tracts, would prohibit new entrants into the market. Theme
    also submitted evidence that when a third insert supplier
    briefly entered the market in the 1990s, it was marginalized
    by News and Valassis and eventually purchased by News.
    [7] News did not effectively counter this evidence. There-
    fore, we conclude that a reasonable jury could determine that
    News’ actions affected a substantial share of the relevant mar-
    ket.
    3
    News argues that Theme failed to produce substantial evi-
    dence of antitrust injury and causation, which are closely
    related concepts. See Kolling v. Dow Jones & Co., 187 Cal.
    Rptr. 797, 807 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Morales-Villalobos v.
    Garcia-Llorens, 
    316 F.3d 51
    , 55 (1st Cir. 2003). Several fac-
    tors are relevant in considering whether a plaintiff has estab-
    lished antitrust standing. The most important is whether the
    plaintiff has established an antitrust injury. Amarel v. Connell,
    
    102 F.3d 1494
    , 1507 (9th Cir. 1997).
    “Antitrust injury is defined not merely as injury caused by
    an antitrust violation, but more restrictively as injury of the
    11074         THEME PROMOTIONS v. NEWS AMERICA
    type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows
    from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.” Glen
    
    Holly, 343 F.3d at 1007-08
    (internal quotation marks omit-
    ted). In order to find that an antitrust injury exists, we must
    examine both the nature of the injury and whether the injury
    is causally related to the antitrust violation. Datagate, Inc. v.
    Hewlett-Packard Co., 
    941 F.2d 864
    , 867 (9th Cir. 1991).
    [8] An injury will not qualify as an antitrust injury unless
    it is attributable to an anti-competitive aspect of the practice
    under scrutiny, “since it is inimical to [the antitrust laws] to
    award damages for losses stemming from continued competi-
    tion.” 
    Amarel, 102 F.3d at 1508
    (quoting Atl. Richfield Co. v.
    USA Petroleum Co., 
    495 U.S. 328
    , 334 (1990)). If the injury
    flows from aspects of a defendant’s conduct that are benefi-
    cial or neutral to competition, there is no antitrust injury, even
    if the defendant’s conduct is illegal. Glen 
    Holly, 343 F.3d at 1008
    . Coercive activity that prevents choice between market
    alternatives, including agreements to restrain trade, is one
    form of antitrust injury. 
    Id., 343 at
    1011; 
    Amarel, 102 F.3d at 1509
    .
    [9] To support its claim that it suffered an antitrust injury,
    Theme points to evidence that News’ right of first refusal
    agreements forced Theme to purchase inserts from News
    instead of from Valassis (to which it would have paid lower
    prices). Theme argues that this restriction of choice between
    market alternatives resulted in financial harm. Theme also
    argues that it was harmed by a general increase in insert
    prices caused by the reduction of Theme’s own competitive
    presence in the market. Specifically, Theme points to testi-
    mony that its programs increased insert output while reducing
    insert costs, and that News’ conduct resulted in fewer pack-
    aged goods companies running programs with Theme. News
    argues that the evidence actually shows that the reduction in
    Theme’s business was caused by Theme’s own poor business
    practices, and that Theme was harmed by News’ procompeti-
    tive actions. Although both parties are able to point to evi-
    THEME PROMOTIONS v. NEWS AMERICA              11075
    dence supporting their positions, the evidence of restricted
    choice between market alternatives is sufficient to establish
    that the injury suffered by Theme was the type the antitrust
    laws were intended to prevent.
    [10] For an injury to be an antitrust injury, it must also be
    causally related to the antitrust violation. The harm may not
    be “derivative and indirect” or “secondary, consequential, or
    remote.” 
    Amarel, 102 F.3d at 1511-12
    ; 
    Kolling, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 808
    (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the evidence
    establishes that Theme would have placed all of its insert
    orders with Valassis were it not for News’ right of first refusal
    agreements with the packaged goods companies. The antitrust
    injury suffered by Theme—the reduction in choice of market
    alternatives causing reduced output of inserts and higher
    prices—was the direct result of News’ antitrust violation.5 As
    a result, we affirm the district court’s denial of JMOL in favor
    of News on Theme’s Cartwright Act claim.
    B
    [11] The district court did not err in denying News’ motion
    for JMOL on Theme’s negligent interference with prospective
    economic advantage claim. The district court instructed the
    jury that to establish negligent interference with prospective
    economic advantage, Theme would have to prove by a pre-
    ponderance of the evidence that: (1) Theme and a particular
    packaged goods company were in an economic relationship
    that probably would have resulted in an economic benefit to
    Theme; (2) News knew of the relationship; (3) News knew or
    should have known that the relationship would be disrupted
    if it failed to act with reasonable care; (4) News failed to act
    with reasonable care; (5) News engaged in independent
    wrongful conduct apart from the interference itself; (6) the
    relationship was actually disrupted; (7) Theme was harmed;
    5
    Theme presents alternative causation theories, which we need not
    address.
    11076           THEME PROMOTIONS v. NEWS AMERICA
    and (8) News’ wrongful conduct was a substantial factor in
    causing Theme’s harm. See Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed
    Martin Corp., 
    63 P.3d 937
    , 950 (Cal. 2003) (identifying ele-
    ments of the tort of intentional interference with prospective
    economic advantage). News argues that there is insufficient
    evidence in the record to establish that News engaged in inde-
    pendent wrongful conduct.
    [12] A plaintiff seeking to recover damages for interference
    with prospective economic advantage must plead and prove
    that the defendant’s conduct was “wrongful by some legal
    measure other than the fact of interference itself.” 
    Id. at 950
    (quoting Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 
    45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 436
    , 438, 442 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)). The district
    court instructed the jury that conduct is wrongful “if it is pro-
    scribed by some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common
    law, or other determinable legal standard.” Because the jury’s
    verdict on Theme’s Cartwright Act claim was supported by
    substantial evidence in the record, this element is satisfied.6
    C
    News argues that regardless of whether the jury’s verdict
    was supported by substantial evidence in the record, a new
    trial is required because its substantial rights were affected by
    an evidentiary error. Specifically, News argues that the testi-
    mony of Theme’s president as to the internal decisions of
    packaged goods companies regarding whether to do repeat
    business with Theme lacked foundation and was speculative.
    In addition, News argues that the testimony of Theme’s presi-
    dent was the only evidence Theme supplied on the element of
    6
    Because the independent wrongful conduct element is satisfied by the
    Cartwright Act violation, we need not address Theme’s argument that
    News made an actionable misrepresentation to the packaged goods com-
    panies, and that the actionable misrepresentation is independent wrongful
    conduct. We therefore do not address News’ argument that Theme was not
    harmed by any misrepresentation.
    THEME PROMOTIONS v. NEWS AMERICA            11077
    causation, and that therefore its admission could not have
    been harmless error.
    To succeed on this issue, News must establish that the dis-
    trict court abused its discretion by allowing the contested tes-
    timony. 
    Obrey, 400 F.3d at 693
    . This it cannot do. While
    Theme’s president testified repeatedly that he was under the
    impression that Theme had a good relationship with the pack-
    aged goods companies, and that he could think of no reason
    the packaged goods companies would not continue to do busi-
    ness with Theme, he did not actually comment on the internal
    decisions of packaged goods companies or their executives.
    This testimony was neither lacking in foundation nor specula-
    tive.
    [13] Had the district court’s decision to admit the testimony
    of Theme’s president been error, a new trial would have been
    appropriate only if the verdict was more probably than not
    tainted by the error. 
    Id. at 699-700.
    While Theme did rely
    heavily on its president’s testimony to establish the causation
    element of its antitrust claim, other evidence—including the
    “before and after” picture of Theme’s business provided by
    Theme’s damages expert—also helped to establish causation.
    News has not shown that any error more probably than not
    tainted the jury’s verdict. As a result, we affirm the district
    court’s denial of the motion for a new trial.
    D
    Finally, News argues that the district court erred by ruling
    that the jury’s awards of antitrust damages and tort damages
    were not duplicative. The jury awarded Theme $1,000,000 in
    compensatory damages under the Cartwright Act, and
    $496,023 in compensatory damages on its negligent interfer-
    ence with prospective economic advantage claim regarding
    Campbells. News argues that these awards were impermiss-
    ibly duplicative because both were based on the loss of future
    profits with respect to the relationship with Campbells.
    11078         THEME PROMOTIONS v. NEWS AMERICA
    The general rule of compensatory damages bars double
    recovery for the same wrong. Krusi v. Bear, Stearns, & Co.,
    
    192 Cal. Rptr. 793
    , 798 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). The California
    Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff is not entitled to more
    than a single recovery for each distinct item of compensable
    damage supported by the evidence. Tavaglione v. Billings,
    
    847 P.2d 574
    , 580 (Cal. 1993). We have held that one act by
    a defendant may create two legal harms; where the statutes
    forbidding the act were enacted for different purposes, and
    where they prescribe different types of damages, there is no
    double recovery. Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Dragon Pac. Int’l,
    
    40 F.3d 1007
    , 1011 (9th Cir. 1994).
    The $1,000,000 damages figure and the $496,023 damages
    figure are for separate legal harms: an antitrust violation and
    a tort. The two injuries did not arise from the same act: one
    was the result of anticompetitive right of first refusal agree-
    ments; the other was the result of intentional misrepresenta-
    tions. The laws proscribing these acts serve different
    purposes. News argues, however, that both awards were
    intended to compensate for the same economic harm: loss of
    future profits from the interruption of business relationships.
    The record, however, does not establish that the two awards
    were intended to compensate for the same economic harm. To
    reach that conclusion would require speculation about the jury
    verdict.
    [14] Theme’s damages expert provided the court with one
    analysis of the profits Theme would have earned from its rela-
    tionships with Nabisco, Benevia, Van de Kamp, Smuckers,
    Campbells, Hormel, and International Home Foods, “but for
    the conduct complained of:” $2,797,600. The particular num-
    ber attributed to the relationship with Campbells was
    $496,000. The jury returned a verdict of $496,023 specifically
    relating to the tort of interference with the Campbells relation-
    ship, and a verdict of $1,000,000 for the harm arising from
    anticompetitive behavior. Given these separate awards, the
    THEME PROMOTIONS v. NEWS AMERICA            11079
    district court did not commit reversible error in denying
    News’ motion.
    IV
    We next address the issues raised in Theme’s cross-appeal.
    Theme argues that the district court erred in vacating the
    jury’s verdict on Theme’s intentional interference with pro-
    spective economic advantage claims on privilege grounds.
    Theme also argues that the district court erred in denying
    Theme’s motion for restitution and its motion for an injunc-
    tion. Finally, Theme argues that the district court erred in
    denying Theme’s motion to amend its complaint to add an
    action for declaratory relief, and in terminating the related
    motion for summary judgment. We affirm the district court on
    each issue.
    A
    The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Theme on its inten-
    tional interference with prospective economic advantage
    claims with respect to its relationships with Benevia and Van
    de Kamp, and awarded damages of $700,353 and $132,992
    respectively, as well as punitive damages of $1,250,000 on
    each claim. The district court dismissed these claims and
    damage awards on the grounds that News’ conduct—
    threatening litigation against Benevia and Van de Kamp—
    was privileged under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Theme
    argues that the district court erred in applying the Noerr-
    Pennington doctrine instead of California privilege law.
    Theme also argues that News’ conduct was not privileged
    under either doctrine. We disagree.
    [15] The essence of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is that
    those who petition any department of the government for
    redress are immune from statutory liability for their petition-
    ing conduct. Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 
    437 F.3d 923
    , 929 (9th
    Cir. 2006). The doctrine derives from two Supreme Court
    11080         THEME PROMOTIONS v. NEWS AMERICA
    cases holding that the First Amendment Petition Clause
    immunizes acts of petitioning the legislature from antitrust
    liability. 
    Id. (citing Eastern
    R.R. Presidents Conference v.
    Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 
    365 U.S. 127
    (1961) and United
    Mine Workers v. Pennington, 
    381 U.S. 657
    (1965)). The doc-
    trine has since been applied to actions petitioning each of the
    three branches of government, and has been expanded beyond
    its original antitrust context. 
    Id. at 930;
    Amarel, 102 F.3d at
    1518
    .
    [16] We have previously declined to reach the question of
    whether the Noerr-Pennington doctrine applies to state law
    tort claims. Lexicon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes &
    Lerach, 
    102 F.3d 1524
    , 1538 n.15 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The time
    may come when this circuit must speak directly on the ques-
    tion.”). Other circuits, however, have been more decisive. See,
    e.g., Video Int’l Prod., Inc. v. Warner-Amex Cable Commc’ns,
    Inc., 
    858 F.2d 1075
    , 1084 (5th Cir. 1988). In explaining its
    decision to extend Noerr-Pennington to tortious interference
    with contracts, the Fifth Circuit stated, “There is simply no
    reason that a common-law tort doctrine can any more permis-
    sibly abridge or chill the constitutional right of petition than
    can a statutory claim such as antitrust.” 
    Id. at 1084.
    We agree,
    and we hold that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine applies to
    Theme’s state law tortious interference with prospective eco-
    nomic advantage claims.
    [17] Theme argues that Noerr-Pennington cannot appropri-
    ately be applied here because choice of law principles set
    forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 501 establish that state priv-
    ilege law must be applied in a diversity action where sate law
    provides the rule of decision. See Star Editorial, Inc. v. U.S.
    Dist. Ct., 
    7 F.3d 856
    , 859 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that in a
    civil action in which state law provides the rule of decision,
    the privilege of a witness shall be determined in accordance
    with state law). Although Theme is correct, it misses the
    point. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine has been articulated as
    a principle of statutory construction rather than as a privilege.
    THEME PROMOTIONS v. NEWS AMERICA             11081
    See 
    Sosa, 437 F.3d at 930-32
    . More importantly, because
    Noerr-Pennington protects federal constitutional rights, it
    applies in all contexts, even where a state law doctrine
    advances a similar goal. See Video 
    Int’l, 858 F.2d at 1084
    .
    There is no reason that Noerr-Pennington and California priv-
    ilege law cannot both apply to Theme’s intentional interfer-
    ence claims, and we hold that the district court properly
    considered both doctrines.
    [18] Conduct incidental to a lawsuit, including a pre-suit
    demand letter, falls within the protection of the Noerr-
    Pennington doctrine. 
    Sosa, 437 F.3d at 936-38
    . Pre-suit letters
    threatening legal action may nevertheless be restricted by law
    where they include representations so baseless that the threat-
    ened litigation would fall into the “sham litigation” exception.
    
    Id. at 940-41.
    The Supreme Court has endorsed a two-part test
    for sham litigation. First, the lawsuit must be objectively
    baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could reason-
    ably expect success on the merits. Liberty Lake Invs., Inc. v.
    Magnuson, 
    12 F.3d 155
    , 157 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Prof’l
    Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc.,
    
    508 U.S. 49
    (1993)). Only if the challenged litigation is objec-
    tively baseless may we consider the litigant’s subjective moti-
    vation. 
    Id. The question
    then is “whether the baseless lawsuit
    conceals an attempt to interfere directly with the business
    relationships of a competitor, through the use of the govern-
    mental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process—
    as an anticompetitive weapon.” 
    Id. In rendering
    its verdict for Theme on the intentional inter-
    ference claims, the jury based its determination solely on a
    finding that News had threatened litigation against Benevia
    and Van de Kamp. The only evidence in the record supporting
    this aspect of the jury’s verdict is the letters from News to the
    packaged goods companies indicating that if the packaged
    goods companies failed to place their insert orders with News,
    they could become embroiled in then-ongoing litigation
    11082           THEME PROMOTIONS v. NEWS AMERICA
    between News and Theme. The question then is whether these
    pre-suit letters threatened “sham litigation.”
    [19] We begin by analyzing whether the underlying litiga-
    tion was objectively baseless. The letters from News to the
    packaged goods companies can be understood as threatening
    litigation in two ways. First, the letters can be interpreted as
    threats to include the packaged goods companies in the ongo-
    ing litigation between News and Theme. The fact that this
    ongoing litigation settled suggests that the original suit was
    not objectively baseless. Second, the letters can be interpreted
    as threats of some contemplated future lawsuit against the
    packaged goods companies for breach of contract. We agree
    with the district court that a suit by News to enforce its right
    of first refusal agreements was potentially meritorious.
    Because the threatened litigation was not objectively baseless,
    we do not analyze News’ subjective motivation. See 
    id. at 157.
    As a result, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that
    Noerr-Pennington bars Theme’s intentional interference
    claims.7
    B
    In rendering its verdict for Theme, the jury found that
    News had engaged in an unfair competitive practice under
    California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”).8 Cal. Bus. &
    Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. Theme subsequently moved for an
    award of “restitution” under section 17203 of the UCL. The
    district court denied the motion for restitution, finding that the
    requested amount—News’ insert profits from nine transac-
    7
    California Civil Code section 47(b), which creates an absolute privi-
    lege for statements made in a judicial proceeding regardless of malice,
    might also apply here. See Laffer v. Levinson, Miller, Jacobs, & Phillips,
    
    40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 233
    , 237 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). Because we hold that the
    Noerr-Pennington doctrine bars Theme’s intentional interference claim,
    we need not address this question.
    8
    News does not challenge this verdict.
    THEME PROMOTIONS v. NEWS AMERICA             11083
    tions in which Theme was forced to purchase inserts from
    News as a result of News’ right of first refusal agreements
    with packaged goods companies—was not “restitutionary in
    nature.” We agree.
    [20] The UCL prohibits unlawful and unfair business prac-
    tices. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. Section 17200
    “borrows” violations of other laws and makes them indepen-
    dently actionable as unfair competitive practices. Korea Sup-
    ply 
    Co., 63 P.3d at 943
    . In addition, a practice may be
    proscribed under section 17200 as “unfair” even if it is not
    specifically proscribed by some other law. 
    Id. While the
    scope
    of conduct covered by the UCL is broad, the remedies are
    limited. 
    Id. Section 17203,
    in part, allows courts to make
    orders or judgments “to restore to any person in interest any
    money or property, real or personal, which may have been
    acquired by means of such unfair competition.” The Califor-
    nia Supreme Court has determined that this phrase allows
    awards of restitution, but not awards of non-restitutionary dis-
    gorgement. 
    Id. at 949.
    The California Supreme Court has explained that restitution
    orders are “orders compelling a UCL defendant to return
    money obtained through an unfair business practice to those
    persons in interest from whom the property was taken, that is,
    to persons who had an ownership interest in the property or
    those claiming through that person.” Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt.
    Servs., Inc., 
    999 P.2d 718
    , 725 (Cal. 2000). While disgorge-
    ment orders may include a restitutionary component, they
    may be impermissibly broad because they require the “surren-
    der of all profits earned as a result of an unfair business prac-
    tice regardless of whether those profits represent money taken
    directly from persons who were victims of the unfair prac-
    tice.” 
    Id. The California
    Supreme Court has held that nonres-
    titutionary disgorgement is akin to a damages remedy: relief
    that is not allowed under the UCL. Korea Supply 
    Co., 63 P.3d at 948
    .
    11084         THEME PROMOTIONS v. NEWS AMERICA
    Theme requested “restitution” in the amount of $929,187:
    the amount by which its damages expert determined that
    News had profited on nine insert orders that Theme placed
    with News because of News’ right of first refusal agreements
    with packaged goods companies. The district court deter-
    mined that an award of this amount would not be restitution-
    ary in nature because had Theme not purchased the inserts
    from News, it would have had to purchase them from Valas-
    sis, and Valassis presumably would have profited from the
    sales as well. Because the profits would have gone to either
    News or Valassis, the district court concluded that Theme
    could not claim an ownership interest in the profits.
    [21] We agree with the district court, to an extent. We
    agree that the “restitution” amount identified by Theme is not
    entirely restitutionary in nature. However, the more salient
    question is whether News’ profits were property taken from
    Theme, or—as News argues—property taken from the pack-
    aged goods companies. Evidence in the record suggests that,
    on some occasions, the packaged goods companies paid News
    directly; on other occasions, Theme paid News for the pack-
    aged goods companies. The evidence is insufficient to support
    a finding that Theme had a property interest in all of News’
    profits from the nine disputed insert orders. For this reason,
    we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
    denying Theme’s motion for restitution.
    C
    Following trial, Theme moved for a permanent injunction
    against News based on both its Cartwright Act and UCL
    claims. Theme’s requested injunction would have prevented
    News from enforcing its right of first refusal agreements. The
    district court denied the motion. Theme again moved for an
    injunction pending appeal; the district court again denied the
    injunction.
    [22] California law provides for injunctive relief under both
    the Cartwright Act and the UCL. The United States Supreme
    THEME PROMOTIONS v. NEWS AMERICA             11085
    Court has stated that courts faced with an antitrust violation
    are required to take action to restore competition in the mar-
    ket. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
    
    366 U.S. 316
    , 326 (1961). The Supreme Court has also recog-
    nized that the purpose of antitrust laws “is not to protect busi-
    nesses from the working of the market; it is to protect the
    public from the failure of the market.” Spectrum Sports, Inc.
    v. McQuillan, 
    506 U.S. 447
    , 458 (1993). Thus, we have rec-
    ognized that a district court might appropriately deny a
    motion for injunctive relief where the injunction would hin-
    der, rather that promote, competition in the market. Pac.
    Coast Agric. Export Ass’n v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 
    526 F.2d 1196
    , 1209 (9th Cir. 1975).
    [23] In denying Theme’s motions, the district court noted
    that the record “was sufficiently ambiguous with respect to
    the market definition [and] sufficiently ambiguous with
    respect to the antitrust injury, that it would not reasonably
    support an injunction going forward.” The court was not con-
    vinced that allowing News to enforce its right of first refusal
    agreements in the future would injure competition, or that an
    injunction would protect competition. The record supports the
    district court’s conclusions. News supplied evidence that right
    of first refusal agreements result from competition between
    News and Valassis, and that an injunction would only serve
    to put News at a competitive disadvantage. The district court
    therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying Theme’s
    motions for permanent injunction.
    D
    After we reversed the initial dismissal of Theme’s claims
    and remanded to the district court, Theme filed a motion for
    leave to amend its complaint (for the second time) to replace
    its antitrust claims with a cause of action for declaratory
    relief, seeking a judicial statement that Theme is not bound by
    News’ right of first refusal agreements with packaged goods
    companies. Simultaneously, Theme filed a motion for sum-
    11086         THEME PROMOTIONS v. NEWS AMERICA
    mary judgment, arguing that the issue was a pure question of
    contract law. The district court denied the motion for leave to
    amend, holding that the amendment would be futile, and ter-
    minated the related motion for summary judgment as moot.
    [24] A party may amend its complaint with the court’s
    leave, and leave shall be freely given where “justice so
    requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. We apply this policy liberally,
    but leave to amend will not be granted where an amendment
    would be futile. DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 
    833 F.2d 183
    , 186 (9th Cir. 1987). A court may only grant a declaratory
    judgment where there is an “actual controversy within its
    jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). In addition, the Supreme
    Court has stated that a declaratory judgment is only appropri-
    ate where it would completely resolve the concrete contro-
    versy. Calderon v. Ashmus, 
    523 U.S. 740
    , 749 (1998).
    [25] Theme’s motion for leave to amend made plain that
    there was no actual case or controversy. As the district court
    noted, Theme admitted that there was no controversy over
    whether Theme was contractually bound by right of first
    refusal agreements to which it was not a party. Moreover, a
    declaration that Theme was not contractually bound by any of
    News’ right of first refusal agreements with the packaged
    goods companies would not have completely resolved the
    controversy between News and Theme. Because declaratory
    relief was not available, Theme’s amendment would have
    been futile. As a result, the district court did not abuse its dis-
    cretion in denying the motion for leave to amend or in termi-
    nating the related motion for summary judgment.
    V
    We affirm the judgment of the district court in its entirety.
    The district court appropriately rejected News’ motions for
    JMOL, new trial, and damage reduction. The district court
    correctly set aside the jury verdict in favor of Theme on its
    claim of intentional interference with prospective economic
    THEME PROMOTIONS v. NEWS AMERICA            11087
    advantage because that claim was barred by the Noerr-
    Pennington doctrine. The district court properly denied
    Theme’s request for restitution and injunctive relief. It appro-
    priately denied as futile Theme’s motion to amend its com-
    plaint to include a claim for declaratory relief.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-16230, 06-16341

Citation Numbers: 546 F.3d 991, 2008 WL 4531453

Judges: Paez, Richard, Sidney, Stephen, Thomas, Trott

Filed Date: 8/19/2008

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

Authorities (34)

Harolyn Pavao, as Special Administratrix of the Estate of ... , 307 F.3d 915 ( 2002 )

1997-2-trade-cases-p-71963-97-cal-daily-op-serv-8296-97-daily-journal , 127 F.3d 1157 ( 1997 )

john-m-rabkin-md-plaintiff-appelleecross-appellant-v-oregon-health , 350 F.3d 967 ( 2003 )

1997-1-trade-cases-p-71818-97-cal-daily-op-serv-3865-97-daily-journal , 114 F.3d 1467 ( 1997 )

United States v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. , 81 S. Ct. 1243 ( 1961 )

Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan , 113 S. Ct. 884 ( 1993 )

liberty-lake-investments-inc-successor-in-interest-to-wells-b-mccurdy , 12 F.3d 155 ( 1993 )

in-re-american-continental-corporationlincoln-savings-loan-securities , 102 F.3d 1524 ( 1996 )

Corwin v. Los Angeles Newspaper Service Bureau, Inc. , 22 Cal. 3d 302 ( 1978 )

Linda Johnson v. Paradise Valley Unified School District , 251 F.3d 1222 ( 2001 )

Datagate, Inc., a Corporation v. Hewlett-Packard Co., a ... , 941 F.2d 864 ( 1991 )

Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor ... , 81 S. Ct. 523 ( 1961 )

Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. , 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 29 ( 2003 )

Video International Production, Inc., Cross-Appellee v. ... , 858 F.2d 1075 ( 1988 )

Dcd Programs, Ltd. v. Michael W. Leighton, Hill, Farrer & ... , 833 F.2d 183 ( 1987 )

Rodney McLean v. Marvin T. Runyon, in His Official Capacity ... , 222 F.3d 1150 ( 2000 )

Laffer v. Levinson, Miller, Jacobs & Phillips , 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 233 ( 1995 )

Kristi W. Dorn, Personal Representative Est Larry M. Dorn v.... , 397 F.3d 1183 ( 2005 )

Krusi v. Bear, Stearns & Co. , 192 Cal. Rptr. 793 ( 1983 )

Tavaglione v. Billings , 4 Cal. 4th 1150 ( 1993 )

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