Dustin Charles Wilmer v. State , 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 3999 ( 2015 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-14-00266-CR
DUSTIN CHARLES WILMER, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 81st District Court
Atascosa County, Texas
Trial Court No. 12-07-0129-CRA, Honorable Stella Saxon, Presiding
April 21, 2015
OPINION
Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
Appellant, Dustin Charles Wilmer, appeals the trial court’s judgment by which he
was convicted of driving while intoxicated (DWI), a third or greater offense, and received
a seven-year suspended sentence and community supervision.1 On appeal from that
judgment, he contends the evidence is insufficient to prove that he was previously
convicted of two prior instances of DWI. We will affirm.
1
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.09(b)(2) (West Supp. 2014).
Factual and Procedural History
Following his collision with a tractor trailer in Atascosa County, Texas, and
obvious signs of intoxication, which were confirmed by later test results revealing blood
alcohol levels of .238 and .243, appellant was arrested for and charged with a third or
greater offense of DWI, a third-degree felony. At trial, the State introduced four exhibits
in an effort to prove appellant’s two prior DWI convictions. The trial court found
appellant guilty of felony DWI as charged, imposed a seven-year sentence, suspended
that sentence, and placed appellant on community supervision. On appeal from that
conviction, appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove the necessary
element of two prior DWI convictions.
Standard of Review
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “[O]nly that evidence which is sufficient in
character, weight, and amount to justify a factfinder in concluding that every element of
the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt is adequate to support a
conviction.” Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 917 (Cochran, J., concurring). We remain mindful
that “[t]here is no higher burden of proof in any trial, criminal or civil, and there is no
higher standard of appellate review than the standard mandated by Jackson.” Id.
When reviewing all of the evidence under the Jackson standard of review, the ultimate
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question is whether the jury’s finding of guilt was a rational finding. See id. at 906–07
n.26 (discussing Judge Cochran’s dissenting opinion in Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d
404, 448–50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), as outlining the proper application of a single
evidentiary standard of review). “[T]he reviewing court is required to defer to the jury’s
credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’
credibility and the weight to be given their testimony.” Id. at 899.
Applicable Law
A person may be charged with felony DWI if he has two previous convictions for
DWI. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.09(b)(2). The two prior DWI convictions are
elements of the offense of felony DWI. See Martin v. State, 200 S.W.3d 635, 641 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006); Reyes v. State, 394 S.W.3d 809, 811 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2013, no
pet.). When, as here, proof of a prior conviction is a jurisdictional element, the fact of
the prior conviction, including the accused’s identity, must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Zimmer v. State, 989 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
1998, pet. ref’d). To establish that a defendant has been convicted of a prior offense,
the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a prior conviction exists and
(2) the defendant is linked to that conviction. Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 921
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Beck v. State, 719 S.W.2d 205, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
Generally, a certified copy of a judgment is not sufficient, standing alone, to link a
defendant to a prior conviction. Beck, 719 S.W.2d at 210. Instead, the State bears the
burden of proving that link with independent evidence showing that the defendant is the
same person named in the prior conviction. See id. The State is not required to
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produce a specific document or specific proof because “[t]here is no ‘best evidence’ rule
in Texas that requires that the fact of a prior conviction be proven with any document,
much less any specific document.” Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921. The State may prove
both that a prior conviction exists and that the defendant is linked to that conviction in a
number of different ways. See id. at 921–22. “Regardless of the type of evidentiary
puzzle pieces the State offers to establish the existence of a prior conviction and its link
to a specific defendant, the trier of fact determines if these pieces fit together sufficiently
to complete the puzzle.” Id. at 923. “If these two elements can be found beyond a
reasonable doubt, then the various pieces used to complete the puzzle are necessarily
legally sufficient to prove a prior conviction.” Id. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
has provided the following means as examples of ways in which the State may prove
both of these elements: (1) the defendant’s admission or stipulation, (2) testimony by a
person who was present when the person was convicted of the specified crime and can
identify the defendant as that person, or (3) documentary proof (such as a judgment)
that contains sufficient information to establish both the existence of a prior conviction
and the defendant’s identity as the person convicted. See id. at 921–22.
In Flowers, the Texas Court of Criminals Appeals was called on to determine
whether the intermediate appellate court had erred “in holding a computer printout to be
the functional equivalent of a judgment and sentence constituting proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of a valid final conviction.” Id. at 920. Flowers had been charged
with DWI, and the State had alleged a prior DWI conviction in an enhancement
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paragraph.2 See id. In response to the State’s request for certified copies of the
judgment, information, revocation, orders, and fingerprints in the enhancement offense,
the county clerk’s office explained that the file was missing and sent, in lieu of the
requested documents, a certified computer printout of appellant’s conviction record. Id.
The State also requested and received a certified copy of Flowers’s driver’s license
record from the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS). Id. The DPS record was
admitted as Exhibit 10 and included appellant’s name, sex, date of birth, age, address,
driver’s license number, and a copy of his driver’s license photograph. Id. It also
identified a DWI conviction by date, county, convicting court, and docket number. See
id. As Exhibit 11, the State offered the clerk’s office’s certified computer printout of
Flowers’s conviction record. Id. This record included Flowers’s name, date of birth,
address, social security number, date of arrest, charged offense, finding of guilt,
sentence, and the judicial case identification number. Id. at 921. The court noted that
the information included on Exhibits 10 and 11 matched. See id. An investigator for the
State testified that the information on the records matched and that both exhibits
referred to the same individual. See id. On appeal, Flowers challenged the
admissibility of the certified computer printout from the clerk’s office and also maintained
that the evidence was insufficient to prove his prior conviction. See id.
The Flowers court distinguished a case on which Flowers relied: Gentile v. State,
848 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993, no pet.) (per curiam). See Flowers, 220
S.W.3d at 923–24. The court noted that, in Gentile, the State offered only a certified
2
We recognize the apparent distinction between Flowers and the instant case in that Flowers
reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence to prove an enhancement allegation rather than, as in the instant
case, an element of felony DWI. We note, however, that the same burden of proof applies below and the
same standard of review applies on appeal.
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driver’s license report as proof of a prior conviction whereas, in Flowers, the State
offered a driver’s license report in addition to the certified printout of his conviction
record from the clerk’s office, the custodian of the original judgment for the prior DWI
conviction. See id. at 924. Flowers also distinguished Blank v. State, 172 S.W.3d 673
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, no pet.) (op. on reh’g), in which the State had offered
only a printout of a cryptic case synopsis to prove a prior, out-of-state conviction. See
Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 924 & n.21. Flowers noted that the San Antonio court
concluded that “nothing in the record supports the State’s contention that the synopsis
represents a judgment of conviction.” See id. at 924 (quoting Blank, 172 S.W.3d at
675). While careful to note that a certified copy of a judgment is not the only means of
proving a prior conviction, the court in Blank concluded that the case synopsis was
insufficient on its own to prove the prior conviction alleged as punishment enhancement.
See Blank, 172 S.W.3d at 675–76.
Emphasizing the matching identification information on the two exhibits and the
photograph that the trial court could use to compare to the person standing before it, the
Flowers court ultimately concluded that a reasonable trier of fact could view Exhibits 10
and 11 and, based on the information therein, find beyond a reasonable doubt that (1)
the alleged prior DWI conviction existed and (2) this prior conviction is linked to
appellant. See Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 924–25.
Analysis
Here, there are two prior DWI convictions alleged as jurisdictional elements of
the felony offense of DWI. We will refer to them as the Harris County conviction and the
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Bexar County conviction. Introduced as Exhibit 4 in this case is a certified copy of the
Harris County information and judgment, which identifies appellant by his full name, his
date of birth, and his address and which contains the date of the judgment and offense,
the trial court cause number, and an imprint of appellant’s fingerprint. Introduced as
Exhibit 5 is the DPS’s certified driver’s license record which contains the following data:
appellant’s full name, address, date of birth, sex, personal descriptor of eye color, and
driver’s license number. This record also lists all of the events associated with
appellant’s driving history, including a reference to the Harris County DWI conviction,
which identifies the conviction by offense date, judgment date, cause number, location,
and convicting court. Introduced as State’s Exhibit 6 is a certified copy of booking
information from the Bexar County Sheriff’s Office, at the top of which is a very clear
color photograph of appellant and which goes on to identify the date of appellant’s
arrest, booking number, full name, date of birth, age, driver’s license number, gender,
race, height, weight, eye color, hair color, other personal descriptors, address, phone
number and includes a full set of fingerprints and full prints of both hands. State’s
Exhibit 7 is a certified copy of the judgment, information, complaint, docket sheet, plea
bargain terms, guilty plea admonitions, and trial court’s certification of right to appeal in
the Bexar County DWI conviction. Exhibit 7 contains appellant’s full name, cause
number, charged offense, date of the offense, date of the judgment, date of birth, and a
specific reference to the Harris County conviction by way of an allegation in the
information of a prior DWI conviction.
We have before us most, if not all, the same items of information and
identification that the Flowers court was called on to evaluate. See id. at 920–21. And,
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much like the puzzle pieces in Flowers, the information contained in these exhibits is
internally consistent. In the puzzle before us, we have certified copies of documents
that link appellant by date of birth, driver’s license number, and physical description to
both the Harris County and Bexar County DWI convictions in a manner that is
consistent with the relevant dates and cause numbers of those offenses. Notably, we
also have a clear color photograph of appellant, which includes said identifying data and
descriptors and which the trial court could use to compare to the individual standing
before it. See id. at 925. Unlike the case in Flowers, we do not have testimony from an
investigator that information on the records matched and that both exhibits referred to
the same individual. See id. at 921. However, our own review of the record leads us to
that same conclusion, as would a reasonable trier of fact’s own review of the evidence.
Based on the four exhibits introduced without objection as evidence of appellant’s two
prior DWI convictions, we conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could find that (1) the
alleged prior DWI convictions exist and (2) these prior DWI convictions are linked to
appellant. See id. at 924–25. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s contention on
appeal.
Modification of Judgment
Before we dispose of this appeal, however, we call attention to the fact that the
trial court’s original judgment of conviction—signed May 13, 2014—in the record before
us reflects that appellant pleaded guilty to the allegations in the instant case. The
reporter’s record reveals that this is inaccurate, that appellant, in fact, pleaded not guilty
to the allegations. Additionally, the judgment erroneously refers to conditions of a plea
bargain when it appears from the remainder of the record that this was a contested case
8
in which no plea bargain was reached. This Court has the authority to modify the
judgment to make the record speak the truth when the matter has been called to our
attention from any source. French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992) (en banc); see TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b). An appellate court may correct the
judgment on appeal when it has the necessary data and evidence before it for doing so.
See Banks v. State, 708 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Therefore, we
hereby modify the trial court’s original judgment of conviction to reflect that appellant
pleaded not guilty to the allegations lodged against him and to delete the reference to
terms of a plea bargain.
Further, the clerk’s record before us includes a subsequent order nunc pro
tunc—signed June 11, 2014—in which the trial court grants the State’s motion seeking
a correction to the original judgment regarding the sentence imposed, asking that the
record reflect that appellant was sentenced to an eight-year term which was then
suspended, rather than a seven-year term. This is, indeed, a perplexing development in
light of the reporter’s record which clearly indicates that the trial court orally pronounced
a seven-year suspended sentence, not an eight-year suspended sentence. When the
oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment differ, the oral
pronouncement controls. Ex parte Huskins, 176 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005) (en banc); Sauceda v. State, 309 S.W.3d 767, 769 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010,
pet. ref’d). The original judgment appears to accurately reflect the trial court’s oral
pronouncement of the term of punishment, and the order nunc pro tunc appears to
erroneously “correct” the original judgment of conviction. That said, we modify the nunc
pro tunc order to reflect the seven-year suspended sentence as indicated on the original
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judgment and as confirmed by the trial court’s oral pronouncement of punishment. See
French, 830 S.W.2d at 609.
Conclusion
Having overruled appellant’s sole point of error and with the modifications
aforementioned so reflected, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction. See TEX.
R. APP. P. 43.2(b).
Mackey K. Hancock
Justice
Publish.
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