Genevieve Flores v. Hazen Otis , 125 A.3d 721 ( 2015 )


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  • MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT                                        Reporter of Decisions
    Decision:   
    2015 ME 132
    Docket:     Yor-15-79
    Submitted
    On Briefs: September 28, 2015
    Decided:    October 15, 2015
    Panel:          SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
    GENEVIEVE FLORES
    v.
    HAZEN OTIS
    PER CURIAM
    [¶1]    Genevieve Flores appeals from a judgment of the District Court
    (Springvale, Janelle, J.) granting her motion to modify a parental rights and
    responsibilities order in part, but leaving unchanged her obligation to pay Hazen
    Otis $100 per week in child support for their minor daughter. Flores contends that
    the court miscalculated the child support due. We dismiss the appeal as untimely
    filed.
    I. BACKGROUND
    [¶2] In August 2010, Flores filed a complaint for determination of parental
    rights and responsibilities concerning the parties’ daughter. In a series of orders
    that followed, Otis was awarded sole parental rights and responsibilities
    concerning the child, and Flores was ordered to pay Otis $170 per week in child
    2
    support. In February 2012, Flores filed a motion to modify the parental rights and
    responsibilities judgment, requesting, inter alia, a recalculation of child support.
    Pending a hearing on the motion to modify, and by agreement, the court reduced
    Flores’s child support obligation to $100 per week.
    [¶3]      Following     a   hearing,    the   court   issued   an   order   dated
    September 5, 2013, that left in place Flores’s $100 weekly child support obligation.
    In its order, the court noted that “[a]t the request of both counsel, the Court kept
    the record open until September 4, 2013 to allow counsel to submit proposed
    orders as well as updated child support worksheets and orders. Notwithstanding
    their request, neither counsel submitted updated proposed orders or updated child
    support worksheets and child support orders.”
    [¶4] Flores moved for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law
    pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(b).           The court made additional findings, dated
    January 23, 2014, and entered in the docket on January 29, 2014. Concerning the
    issue of child support, the court said:
    In its September 5, 2013 Order the Court explained that it left in place
    its . . . Child Support Order because counsel failed to submit updated
    Child Support Affidavits. Prior to entering the Courtroom, Counsel,
    in chambers, had represented to the Court that they would address the
    issue of child support by submitting updated child support affidavits
    for the Court’s consideration. They did not. The Court continues to
    be willing to re-address child support if both parties submit, within
    15 days of the docketing of these findings, updated Child Support
    Affidavits as previously discussed.
    3
    Accordingly, in order to have the court reconsider her child support obligation,
    Flores’s updated child support affidavit was due by February 13, 2014.
    [¶5] On February 20, 2014, one week after the court’s deadline, Flores’s
    attorney filed a letter dated February 18, 2014. The letter did not include an
    updated child support affidavit as directed by the court; rather, it attached a
    proposed order that “[r]eferenced . . . child support worksheets and affidavits that
    were admitted at the August 27, 2013 hearing by Ms. Flores.” Thus, Flores
    directed the court’s attention to affidavits that predated both the court’s
    September 5, 2013, order and its additional findings of fact.
    [¶6] In August 2014 and November 2014, Flores’s attorneys filed letters
    with the court contending that the issue of child support was still pending a
    decision.   On January 14, 2015, the court wrote on the August 2014 letter:
    “Reconsideration denied.”
    [¶7] On February 11, 2015, Flores filed a notice of appeal stating that she
    was appealing “from the judgment, order or ruling entered in this proceeding on
    September 5, 2013.”
    II. DISCUSSION
    [¶8] Pursuant to M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3), “[t]he time within which an appeal
    may be taken in a civil case shall be 21 days after entry of the judgment or order
    appealed from.” The twenty-one-day period begins anew “from the entry of an
    4
    order . . . granting or denying . . . a motion under M.R. Civ. P. 52(b) to amend or
    make additional findings of fact.” 
    Id.
    [¶9] Here, the operative event from which to calculate the twenty-one-day
    appeal period is the docketing of the court’s additional findings on
    January 29, 2014, meaning that Flores had until February 19, 2014, to notice her
    appeal.1 Because she did not do so until February 11, 2015, almost a full year after
    the deadline, her appeal is untimely and must be dismissed. See Collins v. Dep’t of
    Corr., 
    2015 ME 112
    , ¶ 10, --- A.3d --- (“Strict compliance with the time limits of
    M.R. App. P. 2(b) . . . is a prerequisite to the Law Court entertaining an appeal.”
    (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted)).
    [¶10] Flores points to the February, August, and November 2014 letters
    from her attorneys, as well as the court’s “[r]econsideration denied” notation on the
    August letter, as relevant events occurring after the court’s entry of additional
    findings. They are not, however, relevant to the calculation of the deadline for
    filing her notice of appeal. There was no motion to reconsider pending after the
    additional findings were docketed, making the court’s notation no more than a
    shorthand way of saying that it would not revisit the February 13, 2014, deadline
    that Flores had missed for filing an updated child support affidavit. Furthermore, a
    1
    By rule, “[a] judgment or order is entered within the meaning of [M.R. App. P. 2] when it is entered
    in the docket.” M.R. App. P. 2(b)(1).
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    letter written to the court is not the equivalent of a pleading or a motion, and
    therefore it carries no weight in calculating or tolling time periods set forth in the
    rules.2 See M.R. Civ. P. 7.
    The entry is:
    Appeal dismissed.
    On the briefs:
    Genevieve Flores, appellant pro se
    Wendy Moulton Starkey, Esq., Rose Law, LLC, York, for
    appellee Hazen Otis
    Springvale District Court docket number FM-2010-350
    FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY
    2
    Even if it were otherwise, the first letter was filed on February 20, 2014, a day after the deadline for
    Flores to notice her appeal.