Pontiac National Bank v. Vales ( 2013 )

ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appellate Court
Pontiac National Bank v. Vales, 2013 IL App (4th) 111088
Appellate Court PONTIAC NATIONAL BANK, Administrator of the Estate of Christian
Caption Rivera, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMES VALES, KAREN B.
HARRIS, Cotrustee of the James B. Harris Residual Trust, and OSF
HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, d/b/a St. Joseph PromptCare and d/b/a OSF
Medical Group, Defendants-Appellees.
District & No. Fourth District
Docket No. 4-11-1088
Filed May 24, 2013
Modified upon
denial of rehearing August 19, 2013
Held The verdict for all defendants in an action alleging medical negligence in
(Note: This syllabus the treatment of the mediastinal tumor suffered by plaintiff’s deceased
constitutes no part of was reversed and the cause was remanded for a new trial on the ground
the opinion of the court that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing defense counsel to
but has been prepared question plaintiff’s expert about his earnings from expert testimony for
by the Reporter of the eight years prior to the trial, rather than the prior two years ordinarily
Decisions for the accepted under the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Trower, and
convenience of the in refusing to allow plaintiff an opportunity to show that defense counsel
reader.)
had used plaintiff’s expert as a witness in prior cases.
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County, No. 05-L-58; the Hon.
Review Paul G. Lawrence, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Reversed and remanded.
Counsel on James P. Ginzkey, of Bloomington, for appellant.
Appeal
Joshua G. Vincent, Paul C. Estes, and Jesse A. Placher, all of Hinshaw
& Culbertson LLP, of Chicago, for appellees.
Panel JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Welch and Goldenhersh concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The plaintiff, Pontiac National Bank, administrator of the estate of Christian Rivera,
deceased, filed a wrongful death and survival action, asserting theories of medical negligence
and institutional negligence, against the defendants, James Vales, Karen B. Harris, cotrustee
of the James B. Harris Residual Trust, and OSF Healthcare System, d/b/a St. Joseph
PromptCare and d/b/a OSF Medical Group. Following a trial, the jury returned verdicts in
favor of all defendants. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that (a) the trial court issued
erroneous rulings regarding the scope of cross-examination and the rehabilitation of one of
its expert witnesses, (b) the trial court erred in hearing and granting an untimely motion for
a summary judgment, and (c) the trial court erred in allowing a defense expert witness to
offer opinions that were not disclosed more than 60 days before the trial. For reasons to be
stated, we reverse the judgment and remand this case for a new trial.
¶2 During the evening of July 23, 2003, Christian Rivera, a three-year-old boy, was at his
home with his grandparents when he collapsed and stopped breathing. Christian’s
grandparents called 9-1-1 and began cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Medics responded,
assumed resuscitation efforts, and treated Christian during transport to St. Joseph Medical
Center. Christian was evaluated in the emergency department. A chest X-ray revealed a
massive mediastinal tumor. The tumor was wrapped around Christian’s airway, compressing
it. The tumor compromised the airway, causing respiratory failure and cardiac arrest. A
biopsy of the tumor confirmed a diagnosis of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. Neurological testing
of Christian’s brain revealed that he had suffered hypoxic, ischemic encephalopathy, a severe
brain injury caused by oxygen deprivation, as a result of the cardiopulmonary arrest.
Christian did not survive these injuries, and he passed away on August 18, 2003.
¶3 During the six-month period preceding the cardiopulmonary arrest, Christian had been
evaluated and treated for respiratory symptoms at St. Joseph PromptCare (PromptCare), an
urgent care clinic, and OSF Medical Group, a primary care center. At that time, OSF
Healthcare System (OSF) owned both facilities.
¶4 On January 12, 2003, Christian presented to PromptCare with left ear pain and a history
of a cough that increased at night. James Vales, M.D., a family practice physician employed
by OSF, evaluated Christian that day. Dr. Vales noted that Christian’s tonsils were red and
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swollen, that his left eardrum was red and had fluid behind it, and that his cervical lymph
nodes were swollen. Dr. Vales diagnosed tonsillitis, otitis media, and bronchitis. He
prescribed an antibiotic and instructed Christian’s mother to follow up with Christian’s
primary care physician at OSF Medical Group if his condition changed or worsened. Five
weeks later, Christian returned to PromptCare with a history of a weeklong cold with nasal
congestion, a cough of two days’ duration, and a right ear ache. Dr. Vales evaluated Christian
and diagnosed bilateral otitis media. He prescribed an antibiotic and instructed Christian’s
mother to follow up with the primary care physician.
¶5 On June 18, 2003, Christian presented to PromptCare with a history of coughing at night.
Dr. Vales evaluated Christian. He noted fluid behind both ears, redness of the eardrums, and
nasal congestion. Dr. Vales diagnosed bilateral otitis media and an upper respiratory
infection. He prescribed an antibiotic and a cough syrup, and he instructed Christian’s mother
to follow up with the primary care physician if Christian’s condition changed or worsened.
¶6 On July 9, 2003, Christian returned to PromptCare with symptoms of wheezing and an
occasional cough. Dr. Vales examined Christian and noted tightness in the chest, but no
wheezing. Dr. Vales did not order a chest X-ray or any other diagnostic tests. He diagnosed
left otitis media and bronchospasm. He prescribed a different antibiotic and albuterol syrup.
¶7 On July 14, 2003, Christian presented to OSF Medical Group with a cough and continued
wheezing. He was evaluated by James Harris, a certified physician assistant (PA) employed
by OSF. PA Harris noted scattered rhonchi with bilateral inspiratory-expiratory wheezing in
the lungs. He did not order a chest X-ray or other diagnostic tests. PA Harris administered
an albuterol treatment. He noted that the treatment resolved the wheezing, but the rhonchi
remained. He diagnosed acute persistent bronchitis. PA Harris continued the albuterol syrup
and the antibiotic, and he added a prescription for pediatric prednisone. He instructed
Christian’s mother to follow up as needed. Nine days later, Christian suffered the
cardiopulmonary arrest.
¶8 The plaintiff filed a wrongful death and survival action on behalf of Christian Rivera,
deceased, alleging theories of medical negligence and institutional negligence against the
defendants. The plaintiff claimed that Dr. Vales was negligent in that he failed to order a
chest X-ray, he failed to order diagnostic tests to assess Christian’s chronic respiratory
symptoms, he failed to obtain an infectious disease or pulmonary consultation, and he failed
to review or appreciate the medical significance of Christian’s recent medical history of
chronic respiratory disease. The plaintiff claimed that PA Harris was negligent in that he
failed to order a chest X-ray, he prescribed a steroid without first obtaining a chest X-ray, he
failed to order diagnostic tests to assess Christian’s chronic respiratory symptoms, he failed
to obtain an infectious disease consultation or pulmonary consultation, and he failed to
review and/or failed to appreciate the significance of Christian’s past medical history of
chronic respiratory disease. The plaintiff theorized that given Christian’s symptoms of
wheezing, a nocturnal cough, and ongoing upper respiratory ailments, a reasonably careful
family physician or physician assistant would have obtained a chest X-ray in June or July
2003, that a chest X-ray would have shown that a mediastinal mass was compromising
Christian’s airway, and that Christian’s condition would have been timely diagnosed and
successfully treated.
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¶9 The plaintiff’s institutional negligence claims centered on OSF’s failure to make primary
care records from OSF Medical Group accessible to PromptCare physicians, OSF’s policy
restricting PromptCare physicians from providing longitudinal care, and OSF’s failure to
advise PromptCare patients of those policies and procedures.
¶ 10 Following a trial in July 2011, the jury returned a verdict in favor of all defendants. The
plaintiff’s posttrial motion was denied and this appeal followed.
¶ 11 In its first point, the plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
permitting the defense to question its expert, Dr. Finley Brown, about his annual earnings
from expert witness services for an eight-year period, from 2003 through 2011. The plaintiff
argues that inquiry into the income earned by Dr. Brown in providing expert testimony
should have been limited to his annual earnings during the two-year period prior to the trial.
The plaintiff claims that an inquiry into the past expert earnings for a two-year period prior
to the trial is sufficient to expose any bias on the part of the expert. The plaintiff also
contends that it should have been allowed to rehabilitate Dr. Brown with evidence that he
had been retained as an expert by the defendants’ law firm and that his earnings from
providing expert testimony on behalf of physicians were lucrative.
¶ 12 The defendants argue that the trial court’s ruling permitting them to ask Dr. Brown about
his earnings for the period from two years prior to the time he was retained as an expert
through the time of trial, a period of almost eight years, was proper and within its discretion.
The defendants also argue that the plaintiff waived any objections to the court’s rulings
because the earnings information was elicited by the plaintiff during the direct examination
of Dr. Brown.
¶ 13 Initially, we address the defendants’ waiver contention. The record shows that the trial
court heard arguments on the issue of the extent to which Dr. Brown could be examined
about his past earnings as an expert witness on the second day of testimony, after the jury had
been excused for the day. The parties had submitted trial memoranda on the issue to the court
earlier that day. The plaintiff argued that inquiry into the past expert earnings for a period of
two years is sufficient to expose any bias on the part of the expert. The defendants countered
that in order to explore Dr. Brown’s biases as a professional witness, they should be
permitted to inquire about his earnings for the period from two years prior to the time he was
retained as an expert through the time of trial, a period of almost eight years. After
considering the arguments of counsel, the trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to limit the
inquiry on expert earnings to the two-year period prior to the trial. The court ruled that the
defense could question Dr. Brown about his earnings for the period from 2003 through the
date of the trial. During the hearing, the trial court also confirmed a pretrial ruling and
ordered the plaintiff to refrain from presenting evidence that Dr. Brown had been previously
retained as an expert witness and paid a substantial fee by the law firm which was currently
representing the defendants. Immediately after the trial court issued these rulings, the
plaintiff moved for a mistrial. That motion was denied. The plaintiff then issued a trial
subpoena to defense counsel directing their law firm to produce copies of all 1099 forms
issued to Dr. Brown from 1998 to the present. The plaintiff noted that it sought the
documents for purposes of rebutting the defendants’ position that Dr. Brown was biased in
favor of plaintiffs and making an offer of proof. Pursuant to the defendants’ motion, the trial
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court quashed the subpoena.
¶ 14 The record shows that Dr. Brown was the plaintiff’s first witness the next morning.
During the direct examination, the plaintiff asked Dr. Brown about his credentials and his
compensation for working on the case at bar. The plaintiff then asked about Dr. Brown’s
earnings throughout his years as an expert witness, and Dr. Brown noted that early on he had
primarily testified for physicians and then later for plaintiffs.
¶ 15 During cross-examination, the defense elicited more detailed information from Dr.
Brown about his earnings as an expert witness from 2003, two years before this case was
filed, through the trial in July 2011. The defense attempted to show that Dr. Brown’s
opinions were tainted by bias and were the product of partisanship and financial interests. At
one point during cross-examination, defense counsel referred to Dr. Brown as a “go-to-guy
for expert opinions.” On redirect, the plaintiff was denied the opportunity to rehabilitate Dr.
Brown with evidence showing that he had been regularly retained by the law firm
representing the defendants in this case during that same time period. During closing
argument, the defense described Dr. Brown as a multimillionaire who had been making
“these great dollars” by testifying for the plaintiff 90% of the time over the last several years.
The defense pointedly stated that Dr. Brown had a very strong financial incentive to produce
a particular opinion in this case and that his credentials were sorely deficient.
¶ 16 In this case, the record clearly establishes that the challenged evidentiary rulings on the
scope of the expert’s earnings were made during the trial and were not interlocutory, in
limine rulings that were subject to reconsideration as the evidence unfolded during the trial.
The record also shows that the plaintiff made a contemporaneous objection and sought a
ruling the evening before its expert took the witness stand. When the court overruled the
plaintiff’s objection, the plaintiff immediately moved for a mistrial, which was denied. At
that point, the plaintiff had to choose between introducing information about Dr. Brown’s
expert earnings during direct examination and allowing the defendants to elicit the
information during cross-examination, thereby suggesting that the plaintiff was hiding
information about its expert from the jury. Where the plaintiff’s exclusionary motion was
denied and its anticipatory disclosure was designed to reduce the prejudicial effect of the
evidence, the plaintiff did not forfeit its challenge to the evidentiary rulings. See People v.
Spates, 77 Ill. 2d 193, 199-200, 395 N.E.2d 563, 566 (1979); Brown v. Baker, 284 Ill. App.
3d 401, 406, 672 N.E.2d 69, 72 (1996). The plaintiff adequately preserved its objections for
review. We now consider the merits of those objections.
¶ 17 Ordinarily, in a medical negligence case, a jury must decide whether a defendant
physician deviated from the applicable standard of care based upon the expert medical
testimony given during the trial. In such cases, expert testimony has been tested through
traditional tools of cross-examination. In response to the prevalence of expert testimony in
modern-day litigation and the difficulty of disproving an expert’s opinion testimony, the
Illinois Supreme Court decided to expand the permissible bounds of expert cross-
examination. See Trower v. Jones, 121 Ill. 2d 211, 217, 520 N.E.2d 297, 300 (1988); Sears
v. Rutishauser, 102 Ill. 2d 402, 407, 466 N.E.2d 210, 212-13 (1984). In those cases, the
supreme court held that it is permissible to cross-examine an expert witness about the
amount and percentage of income that he generates from his work as an expert witness, the
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frequency with which he testifies as an expert, and the frequency with which he testifies for
a particular side, in order to expose any bias, partisanship, or financial interest that may taint
his testimony and opinions. Trower, 121 Ill. 2d at 217, 520 N.E.2d at 300; Sears, 102 Ill. 2d
at 407, 466 N.E.2d at 212-13. Nevertheless, cross-examination is not a “free-for-all.” It is not
a proper function of cross-examination to harass expert witnesses or to unnecessarily invade
their legitimate privacy. Such unbridled cross-examination discourages reputable
professionals from testifying during trial, making it difficult for parties to obtain the expert
testimony necessary to meet their burden of proof.
¶ 18 In Trower, our supreme court did not set an outside limit on the number of years of
earnings that can be discussed during the cross-examination of an expert to show financial
interest, but found “no impropriety in inquiring into such income for the two years
immediately preceding trial.” Trower, 121 Ill. 2d at 218, 520 N.E.2d at 300. Mindful that the
relevant question is whether the expert witness has some personal or financial incentive to
produce a particular opinion, and applying the reasoning in Trower, we conclude that
permitting inquiry into the amount of income an expert witness has earned from expert
services during the two-year period immediately preceding the trial would, under ordinary
circumstances, serve the legitimate purposes for this type of cross-examination. We
recognize that the trial court has discretion to oversee the trial process and that it must have
some leeway to reasonably extend the bounds of this type of cross-examination should the
individual facts in a case so require. Having said that, we find that such an extended inquiry
was unnecessary and unreasonable under the facts of this case.
¶ 19 After a careful review of the record, we find that the trial court’s decision to permit the
defense to inquire into Dr. Brown’s earnings from expert testimony for the eight-year period
prior to the trial was a clear abuse of its discretion. The record shows that the legitimate
bounds of cross-examination were trampled and that the plaintiff’s case was so unfairly
prejudiced that a new trial is required. While cross-examination is permissible to expose bias,
partisanship, or financial interest of the expert witness, there is a point beyond which the
inquiry amounts to harassment or invasion of privacy and diverts the proceedings into the
trial of a collateral matter. In this case, we believe that the bias or financial interests of each
party’s experts can be adequately explored and exposed, without undue harassment or
unnecessary invasion of privacy, if each party is permitted to question its opponents’ experts
about their annual earnings from expert services for the two-year period preceding the new
trial date.
¶ 20 The trial court abused its discretion and compounded the prejudice when it denied the
plaintiff an opportunity to rebut the defendants’ attacks with evidence showing that the
defendants’ attorneys had retained Dr. Brown as an expert witness in several cases in the
past. When one party attacks the credibility of an expert in order to show that his testimony
is tainted by bias, partisanship, or financial interest, the party who presented that witness has
the right to rehabilitate the expert with evidence showing that the expert exercises
independent judgment. Shaheen v. Advantage Moving & Storage, Inc., 369 Ill. App. 3d 535,
544, 860 N.E.2d 375, 383 (2006). Evidence that the opposing party’s attorney also employed
the witness as an expert tends to rehabilitate the expert. Shaheen, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 544, 860
N.E.2d at 383. In this case, the defense was permitted to question the plaintiff’s expert
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witness about his earnings from expert services for an eight-year period immediately
preceding the trial, arguing that the expert’s testimony and opinions were tainted by bias,
partisanship, and financial interest. In doing so, the defense invited a rebuttal on those points,
but the trial court did not allow the plaintiff an opportunity to rebut the attacks and
rehabilitate its witness. As a result, the plaintiff was unfairly prejudiced.
¶ 21 After reviewing the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s erroneous rulings
regarding the cross-examination and the rehabilitation of the plaintiff’s expert had no impact
on the verdict. Therefore, we must reverse the judgment for all defendants and remand this
case for a new trial.
¶ 22 Although the resolution of this issue is dispositive of the appeal, we will briefly address
a few additional points raised on appeal that served to compound the prejudice to the
plaintiff’s case and are reasonably likely to recur on remand.
¶ 23 The plaintiff challenges the propriety of the use of a publication from the United States
Bureau of Labor Statistics during the cross-examination of Dr. Brown.
¶ 24 The record shows that when defense counsel commenced his cross-examination of Dr.
Brown, he produced an Internet copy of a publication entitled “Occupational Employment
and Wages, May 2010,” from the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, and he asked the
trial court to “take recognition” that it was a business record of the United States
government. The publication contains employment estimates and wage estimates as of May
2010 for physicians who practice family and general medicine. The plaintiff objected that the
data in the publication was irrelevant. Defense counsel argued that the data regarding the
annual earnings of a family practice physician was relevant to place Dr. Brown’s annual
earnings into perspective. The plaintiff countered that the publication did not include an
earnings category for family physicians who consult on medical-legal cases. The trial court
overruled the plaintiff’s objection, but there is no indication that it expressly ruled on defense
counsel’s request that the publication be recognized as a business record. Defense counsel
proceeded to use the publication to contrast the estimated mean annual wages and estimated
mean hourly wages earned by family practice physicians, nationally and in Chicago as of
May 2010, with Dr. Brown’s annual earnings for his medical-legal consulting work in the
years 2003, 2004, and 2005.
¶ 25 After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court erred in permitting the defense to
use this publication to cross-examine Dr. Brown about his earnings from his consulting
work. Initially, we note that the publication was not authenticated. To the extent that the
defense was asking the trial court to take judicial notice of the publication, it failed to lay any
foundation to establish that the publication contains the type of readily verifiable facts that
are proper for judicial notice in this type of case. Weekly v. Solomon, 156 Ill. App. 3d 1011,
1015, 510 N.E.2d 152, 155 (1987). Moreover, assuming that the data was subject to judicial
notice, it had little probative value for the purposes employed. The introduction of this type
of irrelevant material in an attempt to expose the financial interests or bias of an expert
witness serves to create rather than avoid a confusion of issues and to unduly lengthen the
trial, two matters about which the supreme court expressed policy and practical concerns in
its decisions to broaden the scope of cross-examination of expert witnesses. See Trower, 121
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Ill. 2d at 219, 520 N.E.2d at 301; Sears, 102 Ill. 2d 402, 466 N.E.2d 210. The use of this
publication to cross-examine Dr. Brown about his earnings from his consulting work was
improper and unfairly prejudicial, and it should not be permitted on retrial.
¶ 26 The plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in hearing and granting OSF’s untimely
motion for a summary judgment on an allegation of institutional negligence.
¶ 27 In the institutional negligence count against OSF, the plaintiff alleged in pertinent part
that OSF breached its duty to act as a reasonably careful hospital and healthcare facility, in
that (a) it had a policy wherein its primary healthcare patients who did not have appointments
were referred to PromptCare, but PromptCare was not given access to the primary care
records, (b) it had a policy restricting PromptCare physicians and physician assistants from
providing longitudinal care, thereby limiting the patients’ history and/or patients’ charting
to said physicians and physician assistants, (c) it had a policy restricting PromptCare
physicians from providing longitudinal care, thereby unreasonably interfering with its
employed physician’s exercise and execution of his or her professional judgment and
adversely affecting the physician’s ability to provide quality care to patients, in violation of
section 10.8 of the Hospital Licensing Act (Act) (210 ILCS 85/10.8 (West 2002)), and (d)
it failed to disclose these policies to patients and their families.
¶ 28 The record shows that OSF filed a motion for a summary judgment as to each of the
above allegations on the eve of the trial. The parties agree that the final pretrial scheduling
order did not include a deadline for filing dispositive motions. Thus, the summary judgment
motion was filed very late in the proceedings, but technically not filed out of time. OSF’s
eleventh-hour filing placed a heavy burden on the plaintiff because it did not have an
adequate opportunity to prepare a written brief, supported by pleadings, deposition excerpts,
and other documentation, in opposition prior to the hearing on the motion. The report of
proceedings indicates that the trial court recognized as much. Although OSF moved for a
summary judgment as to all four allegations of institutional negligence, the trial court granted
a summary judgment only on allegation (c). In denying summary judgment as to the other
allegations, the court noted that OSF could move for directed findings on the remaining
allegations at the close of the plaintiff’s case if it believed that there was insufficient
evidence for the jury’s determination. In our view, the summary judgment motion should
have been denied in its entirety where the record shows that OSF filed the motion on the eve
of trial, that the plaintiff was not provided with adequate notice of the motion, and that the
plaintiff was deprived of an opportunity to prepare a response.
¶ 29 Next, we consider whether the trial court erred in granting a summary judgment on
allegation (c). A summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, when viewed in a light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West
2008). Summary judgment is a drastic measure and should be granted only if the movant’s
right to judgment is clear and free from doubt. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102, 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (1992). The grant of a summary
judgment is reviewed de novo. Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 102, 607 N.E.2d at 1209.
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¶ 30 In regard to allegation (c), OSF acknowledged that it had a policy restricting PromptCare
physicians from providing longitudinal care, but it argued that its policy restricting
longitudinal care did not violate section 10.8 of the Act. OSF noted that subsection 10.8(a)(3)
provides, in part, that a hospital or hospital affiliate shall not unreasonably interfere with an
employed physician’s professional judgment, and that subsection 10.8(b) defines
professional judgment as the exercise of a physician’s independent clinical judgment in
providing medically appropriate diagnoses, care, and treatment to a particular patient at a
particular time. OSF concludes that the summary judgment was properly entered on
paragraph (c) because its policy prohibiting longitudinal care did not place limitations on the
care provided by a PromptCare physician to a particular patient at a particular time.
¶ 31 After reviewing the record, we find that OSF failed to show that it was entitled to a
summary judgment on paragraph (c) as a matter of law. If the jury accepts the plaintiff’s
position, it could reasonably find or infer that OSF’s policy restricting PromptCare
physicians from providing longitudinal care unreasonably interfered with PromptCare
physicians’ exercise of independent clinical judgment in diagnosing and treating patients, in
violation of section 10.8 of the Act, where that policy, taken together with OSF’s practice
of authorizing OSF Medical Group personnel to reroute its primary care patients who did not
have appointments to a PromptCare facility, effectively prevented PromptCare physicians
from accessing the primary care records of and providing continuity of care to returning
walk-in patients, such as Christian Rivera. Based on the record, the entry of a summary
judgment on allegation (c) was improper and is hereby set aside.
¶ 32 The plaintiff also challenges the timeliness of the disclosure of certain opinions of one
of the defense experts. We find it unnecessary to address the merits of this issue as it is not
likely to recur and would unnecessarily lengthen this opinion. We note, however, that the
issues regarding the timeliness of the summary judgment motion and the timeliness of the
disclosure of certain opinions of a defense expert might have been avoided had an order been
prepared in accordance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 218(c) (eff. Oct. 4, 2002). On
remand, the trial court and the parties will have an opportunity to set specific dates for the
completion of any additional discovery, the disclosure of opinions of witnesses, and the filing
of dispositive motions.
¶ 33 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of McLean County is reversed
and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
¶ 34 Reversed and remanded.
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