State v. Peterson , 2015 Ohio 4581 ( 2015 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Peterson, 
    2015-Ohio-4581
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 102428
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    DEANE PETERSON
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-14-586279-A
    BEFORE:            Boyle, J., Celebrezze, A.J., and Blackmon, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:                      November 5, 2015
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Thomas A. Rein
    700 W. St. Clair Avenue
    Suite 212
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Timothy J. McGinty
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    BY: Lon’Cherie’ D. Billingsley
    Brett Hammond
    Assistant County Prosecutors
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    MARY J. BOYLE, J.:
    {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Deane Peterson, appeals his sentence, raising the
    following single assignment of error:
    The trial court erred by ordering appellant to serve a consecutive
    sentence without making the appropriate findings required by R.C. 2929.14
    and H.B. 86.
    {¶2} Finding no merit to the appeal, we affirm but remand for correction.
    Procedural History and Facts
    {¶3} In November 2014, Peterson pleaded guilty to an amended indictment on a
    single count of robbery, a violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(3), a third-degree felony.
    Peterson further agreed to pay restitution to the victim in the amount of $800. One
    month later, the trial court held the sentencing hearing, following its referral of Peterson
    for a presentence investigation report.
    {¶4} After hearing from the prosecutor, defense counsel, and Peterson, the trial
    court ultimately concluded that Peterson should be afforded the opportunity to get help
    for his drug problem. Instead of imposing a prison term, the trial court imposed two
    years of community control sanctions, sentencing Peterson to 180 days in local
    incarceration with five days jail-time credit followed by six months in a community-based
    correctional facility.   The trial court further informed Peterson that if he violated the
    terms and conditions of his community control, which included among other things
    random drug tests, the trial court may impose more restrictive sanctions.
    {¶5} From this order, Peterson appeals, challenging his confinement in the local
    jail and a community-based correctional facility for a combined period of one year.1
    Application of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)
    to Imposition of Community Control Sanctions
    {¶6} In his sole assignment of error, Peterson argues that the trial court lacked
    the authority to order him to serve consecutive time when it failed to comply with R.C.
    2929.14(C)(4). Although Peterson acknowledges that the trial court did not impose a
    “prison” sentence, he nonetheless contends that the trial court lacked authority to impose
    six months jail time followed by six months in a community-based correctional facility
    without making the required findings for a consecutive sentence under R.C.
    2929.14(C)(4). This argument, however, has no merit.
    {¶7} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) authorizes a trial court to order multiple prison terms to
    be served consecutively if the trial court makes certain findings enumerated in the statute.
    If a trial court fails to make the required findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) to support
    the imposition of consecutive sentences, the sentence is contrary to law and cannot stand.
    Beachwood v. Chatmon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 101767 and 101768, 
    2015-Ohio-425
    ,
    ¶ 7-8, citing State v. Bonnell, 
    140 Ohio St.3d 209
    , 
    2014-Ohio-3177
    , 
    16 N.E.3d 659
    ,
    syllabus. But this statute has no application in the current case. The statute applies
    only to consecutive “prison terms” for convictions of “multiple offenses.”             See State v.
    According to the docket, Peterson has subsequently been found to have violated the terms of
    1
    his community control and has been sentenced to 18 months in prison. That case has been
    separately appealed and is currently pending.
    Barnhouse, 
    102 Ohio St.3d 221
    , 
    2004-Ohio-2492
    , 
    808 N.E.2d 874
    . Peterson was not
    sentenced to a prison term nor was he convicted of multiple offenses. See State v.
    Friesel, 
    168 Ohio App.3d 198
    , 
    2006-Ohio-3870
    , 
    858 N.E.2d 1266
    , ¶ 7 (6th Dist.), citing
    State v. Cook, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 77101, 2000 App. LEXIS 5712 (Dec. 7, 2000)
    (recognizing that “[s]erving time in a local ‘jail’ as part of community control sanctions is
    not the same as a prison sentence”).
    {¶8} Peterson cites to this court’s decision in State v. Purvis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
    No. 101608, 
    2015-Ohio-1149
    , in support of his claim that the trial court had to make
    findings under R.C. 2929.14(C). We find Purvis distinguishable because it dealt with
    multiple counts.
    {¶9} Accordingly, we find no merit to Peterson’s claim that the trial court had to
    make findings under R.C. 2929.14(C) prior to imposing the underlying sentence.
    Application of Barnhouse and Anderson
    {¶10} Peterson further argues that the Ohio Supreme Court’s decisions in State v.
    Barnhouse, 
    102 Ohio St.3d 221
    , 
    2004-Ohio-2492
    , 
    808 N.E.2d 874
    , and State v.
    Anderson, 
    143 Ohio St.3d 173
    , 
    2015-Ohio-2089
    , 
    35 N.E.3d 512
    , support his claim that
    the imposition of six months in jail, followed by six months in a community-based
    correctional facility, are not authorized under the law.   Specifically, he argues that both
    are terms of imprisonment and are subject to the general rule that “a sentence of
    imprisonment shall be served concurrently with any other * * * sentence of
    imprisonment.” R.C. 2929.41(A).
    {¶11} We find no basis to conclude that the trial court’s sentence in this case is
    unlawful according to the principles explained in Barnhouse or Anderson.
    {¶12} In Barnhouse, the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of nonsupport of a
    dependent.   In July 1999, the trial court imposed a one-year suspended prison term and
    “up to five years of community control.” Id. at ¶ 2.       One year later, the defendant was
    indicted on numerous counts of nonsupport of dependents and ultimately pleaded no
    contest to two counts. Upon finding defendant guilty of the two violations, the trial
    court again imposed a sentence of “up to five years of community control.” Id. at ¶ 3.
    Thereafter, the defendant violated multiple conditions of his community control and the
    trial court subsequently sentenced him to serve two six-month jail terms pursuant to R.C.
    2929.16(A) and ordered them consecutive.           The defendant appealed, and the issue
    before the Ohio Supreme Court was whether a trial court may impose consecutive jail
    sentences under R.C. 2929.16(A).     Id. at ¶ 8.
    {¶13} The Ohio Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the trial court lacked the
    authority to order the jail sentences consecutive because the presumption of concurrent
    sentences as stated in R.C. 2929.41 governed.      Id. at ¶ 18.   Specifically, the court found
    that none of the exceptions to concurrent sentences as stated in R.C. 2929.41(A) applied,
    which would warrant the imposition of consecutive sentences.         Id.
    {¶14} We find Barnhouse, 
    102 Ohio St.3d 221
    , 
    2004-Ohio-2492
    , 
    808 N.E.2d 874
    ,
    distinguishable from the instant case for a simple reason: this case involves a singular
    sentence — not multiple sentences.     The presumption of concurrent sentences contained
    in R.C. 2929.41(A) applies when a trial court is imposing “multiple sentences.” This
    case does not involve the imposition of multiple sentences on multiple counts. Instead,
    the trial court sentenced Peterson to two years community control sanctions on a single
    count.
    {¶15} A “community control sanction” is defined by R.C. 2929.01(E) as a sanction
    that is not a prison term and is described in R.C. 2929.15 (community control), 2929.16
    (residential sanctions), 2929.17 (nonresidential sanctions), and 2929.18 (financial
    sanctions).    State v. Farner, 5th Dist. Ashland No. 2011-COA-025, 
    2012-Ohio-317
    , ¶
    12. R.C. 2929.15(A) provides as follows in relevant part:
    If in sentencing an offender for a felony the court is not required to
    impose a prison term, a mandatory prison term, or a term of life
    imprisonment upon the offender, the court may directly impose a sentence
    that consists of one or more community control sanctions authorized
    pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code.
    {¶16} Under R.C. 2929.16 (residential sanctions), “the court imposing a sentence
    for a felony upon an offender who is not required to serve a mandatory prison term may
    impose any community residential sanction or combination of community residential
    sanctions under this section.” (Emphasis added.) Specifically, R.C. 2929.16 authorizes
    the trial court to impose a term of up to six months at a community-based correctional
    facility that serves the county and a term of up to six months in jail. R.C. 2929.16(A)(1),
    (2). Under the plain language of R.C. 2929.16, the trial court was expressly authorized
    to impose six months in jail, followed by six months in a community-based correctional
    facility.   Because this case does not involve multiple sentences being served
    consecutively, Barnhouse is distinguishable.
    {¶17} In this case, the crucial issue is not whether a jail sentence or a sentence to a
    community-based correctional facility is a sentence of imprisonment.            According to
    Barnhouse, 
    102 Ohio St.3d 221
    , 
    2004-Ohio-2492
    , 
    808 N.E.2d 874
    , and its reliance of
    R.C. 1.05(A), they are. But the need to define “imprisonment” in Barnhouse arose only
    because the court was determining whether the presumption of concurrent sentences
    applied as stated in R.C. 2929.41. Again, this statute only applies when a court is
    imposing multiple sentences.       This case falls outside of the Barnhouse holding but
    squarely under R.C. 2929.15 and 2929.16.           And given that these statutes expressly
    authorize a trial court to impose a combination of community controlled sanctions, which
    includes up to six months in jail and up to six months in a community-based correctional
    facility for the same offense, we find that the sentence is not contrary to law.
    {¶18} For the same reason, we find no basis to conclude that Anderson, 
    143 Ohio St.3d 173
    , 
    2015-Ohio-2089
    , 
    35 N.E.3d 512
    , supports Peterson’s claim that the sentence
    cannot stand. In Anderson, the Ohio Supreme Court reiterated the longstanding rule that
    “‘the only sentence which a trial judge may impose is that provided for by statute * * *.’”
    Id. at ¶ 12, quoting State v. Beasley, 
    14 Ohio St.3d 74
    , 75, 
    471 N.E.2d 774
     (1984),
    quoting Colegrove v. Burns, 
    175 Ohio St. 437
    , 438, 
    195 N.E.2d 811
     (1964). As to the
    ultimate issue of whether a trial court could impose both a prison term and a community
    controlled sanction for the same offense, the court held that, “absent an express
    exception, the court must impose either a prison term or a community-control sanction or
    sanctions.”    Id. at ¶ 31.
    {¶19} Having already found that the sentence imposed is expressly authorized by
    statute, we find that the trial court’s actions in this case is consistent with the holding in
    Anderson, 
    143 Ohio St.3d 173
    , 
    2015-Ohio-2089
    , 
    35 N.E.3d 512
    .
    {¶20} Accordingly, we find no merit to Peterson’s sole assignment of error and
    overrule it.
    {¶21} We note, however, that the journal entry fails to specify Peterson’s term at
    the community-based correctional facility, despite the trial court stating so at sentencing
    in accordance with R.C. 2929.16(A)(1).      Therefore, we remand the matter for the limited
    purpose of issuing a nunc pro tunc entry to correct the sentence in accordance with R.C.
    2929.16(A)(1).     State v. Moore, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102242, 
    2015-Ohio-3233
    , ¶ 8,
    citing State v. Lester, 
    130 Ohio St.3d 303
    , 
    2011-Ohio-5204
    , 
    958 N.E.2d 142
    , ¶ 17-20.
    {¶22} Judgment affirmed and case remanded to the lower court for further
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into
    execution.     The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is
    terminated.    Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE
    FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., A.J., and
    PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR