Chatmon v. State , 473 S.W.3d 542 ( 2015 )

Cite as 2015 Ark. 417
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CR-13-1006
ROLANDIS LARENZO CHATMON Opinion Delivered November 5, 2015
PETITIONER
PRO SE PETITION TO REINVEST
V. JURISDICTION IN THE CIRCUIT
COURT TO CONSIDER A PETITION
FOR WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS
STATE OF ARKANSAS AND AMENDED PETITION
RESPONDENT [FAULKNER COUNTY CIRCUIT
COURT, NO. 23CR-12-571]
PETITIONS DENIED.
PER CURIAM
This court affirmed a judgment reflecting petitioner Rolandis Larenzo Chatmon’s
convictions on three counts of aggravated robbery and one count of theft of property. Chatmon
v. State, 2015 Ark. 28. Chatmon was sentenced, as a habitual offender with a firearm
enhancement, to an aggregate term of three consecutive life sentences plus 360 months’
imprisonment. Id. Chatmon has now filed a pro se petition in this court in which he seeks to
reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to proceed with a petition for writ of error coram nobis.
After the State filed a response to the petition to reinvest jurisdiction, Chatmon filed an
amended petition. We deny the petitions.
A prisoner who appealed his judgment and who wishes to attack his conviction by means
of a petition for writ of error coram nobis must first request that this court reinvest jurisdiction
in the trial court. Noble v. State, 2015 Ark. 141, 460 S.W.3d 774. Where the record for the
Cite as 2015 Ark. 417
underlying proceedings remains in this court, the circuit court is deprived of jurisdiction, and
leave from this court is required before the circuit court may consider a petition for the writ.
Id. This court will grant permission to proceed with a petition for the writ only when it appears,
looking to the reasonableness of the allegations of the proposed petition and the existence of
the probability of the truth of those allegations, that the proposed attack on the judgment is
meritorious. Isom v. State, 2015 Ark. 225, 462 S.W.3d 662. This court is not required to accept
at face value the allegations of the petition. Penn v. State, 282 Ark. 571, 670 S.W.2d 426 (1984).
Error coram nobis is an extraordinarily rare remedy, more known for its denial than its
approval. White v. State, 2015 Ark. 151, 460 S.W.3d 285. The remedy is exceedingly narrow and
appropriate only when an issue was not addressed or could not have been addressed at trial
because it was somehow hidden or unknown. Clark v. State, 358 Ark. 469, 192 S.W.3d 248
(2004). The function of the writ is to secure relief from a judgment rendered while there existed
some fact that would have prevented its rendition if it had been known to the trial court and
that, through no negligence or fault of the defendant, was not brought forward before rendition
of the judgment. White, 2015 Ark. 151, 460 S.W.3d 285.
Coram-nobis proceedings are attended by a strong presumption that the judgment of
conviction is valid. Westerman v. State, 2015 Ark. 69, 456 S.W.3d 374. This court has recognized
four categories of error for which the writ is available: (1) insanity at the time of trial; (2) a
coerced guilty plea; (3) material evidence withheld by the prosecutor; (4) a third-party confession
to the crime during the time between conviction and appeal. Noble, 2015 Ark. 141, 460 S.W.3d
774. The writ is issued only under compelling circumstances to achieve justice and to address
2
Cite as 2015 Ark. 417
errors of the most fundamental nature. White, 2015 Ark. 151, 460 S.W.3d 285.
Chatmon proposes only two grounds as a basis for the writ in both petitions. In the first,
he alleges that the judge in his case was biased. In the second, he alleges prosecutorial
misconduct. Chatmon alleges misconduct that includes the State’s use of perjured testimony;
the fabrication, alteration, and mishandling of evidence; the suppression of investigative reports
of an interview with Chatmon’s codefendant and a witness; and the prosecution’s introduction
of evidence of other crimes during the sentencing phase of Chatmon’s trial.
Chatmon first alleges that the judge, who had later entered a guilty plea to bribery charges
concerning an unrelated civil case, was biased in favor of the prosecution. Chatmon asserts that
the judge’s failure to act on his pro se motion to have trial counsel relieved and new counsel
appointed was evidence of this judicial bias. In his amended petition, Chatmon further
elaborates on this claim, pointing to what he labels as additional instances of bias demonstrated
by the judge.
To state a ground for the writ on the basis of judicial bias, a petitioner must show that
there was a reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted if an unbiased judge
had served, and an allegation of the mere appearance of impropriety is not sufficient. Turner v.
State, 2012 Ark. 357 (per curiam). A petitioner does not make the necessary showing of
fundamental error to support relief where there is no demonstration of actual bias. Id.; see also
Trimble v. State, 316 Ark. 161, 871 S.W.2d 562 (1994) (holding that it was not error to decline to
issue the writ where there was an appearance of impropriety but the petitioner demonstrated no
prejudice from the alleged bias).
3
Cite as 2015 Ark. 417
Here, as this court noted in its opinion on direct appeal, there was substantial evidence
of Chatmon’s guilt. Chatmon points to only two specific actions by the trial judge, the failure
of the judge to grant his motion for new counsel and the judge’s failure to appoint counsel for
a posttrial hearing on the issue of counsel’s ineffective assistance, that would have had any
bearing on the outcome of his trial. The remainder of this claim, including those allegations
raised in the amended petition, sets forth only generalized assertions that Chatmon’s trial was
not fair because the judge exhibited an appearance of bias in favor of the prosecution through
his actions in the unrelated civil case and through inappropriate comments made in social media.
Chatmon’s claim that the judge exhibited bias by failing to provide a ruling on his motion
for new counsel is contradicted by Chatmon’s own statements on the record. During the
sentencing phase of his trial, Chatmon took the stand and attempted to testify about his claims
that counsel had been ineffective and should have been relieved. He noted in his testimony that
he had filed the motion for new counsel, and, after the court indicated that the issue had already
been addressed in previous hearings, Chatmon acknowledged as much.
Chatmon additionally asserts that the trial court should have appointed other counsel to
represent him during a posttrial hearing on his pro se motion alleging that counsel was
ineffective. In its opinion on direct appeal, this court held that the motion was deemed denied
before the order was entered. Chatmon, 2015 Ark. 28. Even if the trial court had acted with bias,
Chatmon did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that a different outcome would have
resulted.
To the extent that Chatmon contends that the court’s denial of the motion for new
4
Cite as 2015 Ark. 417
counsel was incorrect and demonstrated bias, the issue was not one that was hidden, and it was
addressed by the trial court. Such issues could have been addressed on appeal or in a proceeding
under Criminal Procedure Rule 37.1. See Westerman, 2015 Ark. 69, 456 S.W.3d 374; see also Echols
v. State, 354 Ark. 414, 125 S.W.3d 153 (2003). Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or
claims that concern counsel operating under a conflict of interest are not cognizable in a coram-
nobis proceeding. Nelson v. State, 2014 Ark. 91, 431 S.W.3d 852. Chatmon failed to demonstrate
a basis for the writ in his allegations.
Chatmon next alleges prosecutorial misconduct as a basis for the writ. Chatmon’s
allegations are largely conclusory. He states no facts aside from those noted below that support
his claims that the prosecution used perjured testimony; that the prosecution mishandled,
fabricated, or tampered with evidence; or that evidence was withheld from the defense. An
application for coram-nobis relief must make a full disclosure of specific facts relied upon, and
this court is not required to take claims in the petition at face value without substantiation. Fudge
v. State, 2015 Ark. 230, 463 S.W.3d 292 (per curiam); see also Cloird v. State, 357 Ark. 446, 182
S.W.3d 477 (2004).
Chatmon alleges that the prosecution withheld reports concerning two statements.
Suppression of material, exculpatory evidence by a prosecutor falls within one of the four
categories of coram-nobis relief. Barker v. State, 2010 Ark. 354, 373 S.W.3d 865. The evidence
at trial was that Chatmon and Rodney Chambers were found in the parking lot of an apartment
complex near the scene of the crime. The men were sitting in an SUV that matched the
description of a suspicious vehicle seen by one of the victims. A gun also consistent with the
5
Cite as 2015 Ark. 417
victims’ descriptions of the weapon used in the robbery was found in the SUV, along with a hat
like the one worn by the robber. A wallet taken in the robbery was found in a nearby dumpster.
Chatmon first asserts that the prosecution withheld a report concerning Chambers’s statement
to the police.
Chatmon contends that Chambers made statements to the police that exonerated him.
Even if Chambers had made the statements as Chatmon contends, the defense was clearly aware
that Chambers had made a statement. There was discussion on the record before the trial
commenced about the prosecution’s inability to locate Chambers for trial, and it is clear from
that discussion that trial counsel was aware of the statement and what Chatmon contends
Chambers said in it.
The second report that Chatmon contends was withheld is the transcript of an interview
of Monette Solomon. Solomon testified that Chatmon had confessed to him in jail. Chatmon
indicates that he was told that the recording is inaudible, and he states no facts in support of his
allegations that a transcript was prepared and suppressed. He makes only conclusory statements
that the contents of the transcript would indicate that Solomon committed perjury and was
coached by the prosecution. The defense was aware of, and utilized on cross-examination,
information concerning Chatmon’s claim that he had altercations with Solomon. The facts that
Chatmon alleged in the petition are not sufficient to establish that the prosecution withheld
material evidence with which the defense could have further impeached Solomon. Chatmon’s
conclusory allegations, without more, do not demonstrate a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
6
Cite as 2015 Ark. 417
See id.
Chatmon’s remaining claims allege that the prosecution used perjured testimony, that the
prosecution fabricated some evidence, and that the prosecution mishandled or misrepresented
other evidence. In these claims, Chatmon alleged that the prosecution failed to preserve and
perform certain testing on the wallet, and that the prosecution misrepresented evidence of other
crimes that was admitted during sentencing. Chatmon points to the record in support of these
claims.
The writ of error coram nobis does not lie to correct an issue of fact that has been
adjudicated, even though wrongly determined, or for alleged false testimony at trial. Bass v. State,
191 Ark. 860, 88 S.W.2d 74 (1935). When an issue could have been raised at trial or is
cognizable in some other legal proceeding, that issue is not cognizable in a later error-coram-
nobis proceeding. Howard v. State, 2012 Ark. 177, 403 S.W.3d 38. These final allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct are the type that could have been raised at trial, and the claims are
therefore not the type that provide grounds for the writ. Chatmon has not demonstrated that
the proposed attack on the judgment is meritorious.
Petitions denied.
WOOD, J., not participating.
7