Ricks v. Commonwealth , 290 Va. 470 ( 2015 )

PRESENT: Lemons, C.J., Mims, McClanahan, Powell, Kelsey, and Roush, JJ., and Millette, S.J.
TALMAGE DONNELL RICKS
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 141650 JUSTICE CLEO E. POWELL
November 12, 2015
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
v. Record No. 141820
EDWARD CHILTON
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
We consider these two appeals together because they present similar assignments of error
regarding the wounding or bodily injury element necessary to prove the crime of strangulation in
violation of Code § 18.2-51.6. In each case, we consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in
its findings regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to prove bodily injury.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Ricks
Talmage Donnell Ricks (“Ricks”) was convicted by the Circuit Court of Southampton
County (“Southampton Circuit Court”) of strangulation resulting in bodily injury in violation of
Code § 18.2-51.6. At trial, the evidence showed that Ricks lived with his girlfriend, Nichole
Hyman (“Hyman”). On May 11, 2013, Ricks returned home drunk after an altercation with a
neighbor and awakened Hyman. Ricks was angry and told Hyman that he was going to shoot
someone. Hyman asked him “to leave it alone, [and] to go to sleep.” Hyman testified that Ricks
became angrier and hit her in the side with a belt while she was in bed. Hyman tried to get out of
bed, but Ricks got on top of her and held her neck down with one hand. Hyman testified that she
could not breathe and that Ricks held her neck for approximately four seconds. Hyman kicked
Ricks, he fell off the bed on to the floor, and she ran. Ricks caught Hyman near the bathroom
door and again choked her. Hyman explained that Ricks had one hand over her neck, cutting off
her breathing completely. Hyman testified she was able to get to the front door where Ricks
choked her for a third time and said, “‘B, I’m’a leave you for dead tonight.’” Hyman kicked
Ricks and ran next door to call the police.
Hyman testified she did not yell for help because she did not have a voice and she could
not talk when she went next door. Hyman testified her voice returned a “couple of days” later.
Hyman testified she had bruises on her neck from the incident, but no permanent injuries and she
did not seek medical attention. When Deputy Blythe arrived to investigate, he testified that he
saw a faint red mark on Hyman’s neck.
Ricks testified that he never choked Hyman and did not hit her with a belt. He admitted
he hit Hyman with his forearm when she tried to prevent him from leaving. He testified Hyman
told him she was leaving the house to “get some air.”
At the conclusion of the evidence, the Southampton Circuit Court stated that Hyman’s
testimony was “very credible.” The court found that Hyman’s respiratory process was stopped
by Ricks’s hand and that she was unable to yell for help as a result of Ricks’s actions. Finally,
the court ruled that Hyman sustained a bodily injury due to the red mark on her neck and she
testified that she had a bruise on her neck and was unable to speak the next day.
Ricks filed a petition for appeal with the Court of Appeals asserting the Southampton
Circuit Court erred in finding him guilty of strangulation because the Commonwealth failed to
prove Hyman suffered a “bodily injury” within the meaning of Code § 18.2-51.6. On October
15, 2014, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for appeal by per curiam order. See Ricks v.
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Commonwealth, Record No. 0293-14-1 (Oct. 15, 2014) (unpublished). The Court of Appeals
held,
[i]n this case, Hyman testified [Ricks] held her neck with one
hand, preventing her from breathing. She kicked [Ricks] because
she was unable to call for help. As Hyman left the area, [Ricks]
choked her. After Hyman was able to leave her house to get help,
she was unable to speak and she was unable to speak the following
day. Hyman testified she had a bruise on her neck. From this
evidence, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that [Ricks]
applied pressure to Hyman’s neck which impeded her respiration
and/or blood flow and that the bruise on Hyman’s neck and her
inability to speak constituted bodily injury that resulted from
[Ricks] applying pressure to her neck. Dawson [v.
Commonwealth], 63 Va. App. [429,] 437, 758 S.E.2d [94,] 98
[(2014)].
Ricks, slip op. at 3. We awarded Ricks this appeal.
B. Chilton
Edward Chilton (“Chilton”) was convicted by the Circuit Court of the City of Lynchburg
(“Lynchburg Circuit Court”) of strangulation resulting in bodily injury in violation of Code
§ 18.2-51.6. The evidence presented at trial showed that on October 23, 2012, Chilton went to
the home of his ex-girlfriend, Ebony Dickerson (“Dickerson”). At the end of the visit, the two
began to argue. Chilton and Dickerson “pushed each other,” then Chilton left. Dickerson sat on
the sofa with her infant daughter and watched the television. Less than ten minutes later,
Dickerson heard “[a] lot of commotion,” that is, “screaming” and “hollering” outside her front
door. Dickerson got up and looked out the window of her front door to see that it was Chilton,
visibly upset, kicking at her door. Dickerson then opened the door and let him in. Once inside,
Chilton continued in his rant and eventually pushed and hit Dickerson.
Dickerson testified that Chilton pushed her onto the couch. Chilton and Dickerson
proceeded to hit each other, while Dickerson was trying to get Chilton off of her. Dickerson
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testified that Chilton was “holding [her] down and at one point, he may have grabbed around
[her] throat briefly.” The questioning proceeded as follows:
[Prosecutor:] As he grabbed you around your throat, did you ever
lose consciousness? Did you ever black out?
[Dickerson:] I saw black but it wasn't like I completely and totally
lost conscious [sic].
[Prosecutor:] Okay. So when you say you saw black, were your
eyes open?
[Dickerson:] I closed my eyes.
[Prosecutor:] Okay.
[Dickerson:] And when I opened my eyes, he was still there but he
wasn't causing any harm to me then.
On cross-examination of Dickerson, the following exchange occurred:
[Defense Counsel:] And did his hands actually go around your
throat or was he just lying on you? Is that what caused you to
close your eyes?
[Dickerson:] He was in that general area.
[Defense Counsel:] But you can't say he actually put his hands
around your throat?
....
[Dickerson:] It wasn’t a choking motion.
The evidence at trial was that, after the altercation described above, Chilton then got up and left
on his own accord. Dickerson said that she did not require any medical attention following the
altercation and did not complain of any injury. Officer A.J. Johnson testified that he took photos
of Dickerson’s neck, but did not notice any bruising or other injury.
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The Lynchburg Circuit Court found the victim credible, noting, “I observed the witnesses
on the stand and I found . . . Ms. Dickerson credible [and] that there was a personal injury[,] and
I find the Commonwealth proved all the elements of that charge beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Defense counsel noted his objection to the ruling, and Chilton was convicted of strangulation
pursuant to Code § 18.2-51.6.
Chilton filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals asserting that the Lynchburg Circuit
Court erred in finding that the evidence sufficiently showed Dickerson suffered a bodily injury.
Relying on its previous decisions in Dawson; English v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 711, 715
S.E.2d 391 (2011); Luck v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 827, 531 S.E.2d 41 (2000); and
Campbell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 476, 405 S.E.2d 1 (1991) (en banc), the Court of
Appeals reversed Chilton’s conviction in an unpublished opinion, Chilton v. Commonwealth,
Record No. 1531-13-3, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 379 (Nov. 18, 2014) (unpublished). We awarded
the Commonwealth this appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Bodily Injury
We have not previously construed the term “bodily injury” in the context of the
strangulation statute. To that extent, these cases present an issue of first impression for the
Court.
Code § 18.2-51.6, enacted in 2012, provides: “Any person who, without consent, impedes
the blood circulation or respiration of another person by knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully
applying pressure to the neck of such person resulting in the wounding or bodily injury of such
person is guilty of strangulation, a Class 6 felony.”
[U]nder basic rules of statutory construction, we determine the
General Assembly’s intent from the words contained in the statute.
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When the language of a statute is unambiguous, courts are bound
by the plain meaning of that language and may not assign a
construction that amounts to holding that the General Assembly
did not mean what it actually has stated.
Elliott v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 457, 463, 675 S.E.2d 178, 182 (2009) (citation omitted).
“Furthermore, ‘[t]he plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is to be preferred over any
curious, narrow, or strained construction,’ and a statute should never be construed in a way that
leads to absurd results.” Meeks v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 798, 802, 651 S.E.2d 637, 639
(2007) (quoting Commonwealth v. Zamani, 256 Va. 391, 395, 507 S.E.2d 608, 609 (1998)).
“Bodily” is defined as “of or relating to the body.” Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 245 (1993). “Injury” is defined as “an act that damages, harms, or hurts.” Id. at
1164. In interpreting the phrase “bodily injury” in the context of malicious wounding, Virginia
courts have long applied the interpretation that “‘[b]odily injury comprehends, it would seem,
any bodily hurt whatsoever.’” Bryant v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 310, 316, 53 S.E.2d 54, 57
(1949) (citation omitted) (defining “bodily injury” in the context of maiming under former Code
§ 4402, now malicious wounding under Code § 18.2-51). 1
We find persuasive authority both from the Court of Appeals and other jurisdictions. The
Court of Appeals has given “the phrase ‘bodily injury’ its ‘everyday, ordinary meaning,’ which
1
“Under the rule of statutory construction of statutes in pari materia, statutes are not to
be considered as isolated fragments of law, but as a whole, or as parts of a great, connected
homogeneous system, or a single and complete statutory arrangement.” Lillard v. Fairfax
County Airport Auth., 208 Va. 8, 13, 155 S.E.2d 338, 342 (1967) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). “It is a common canon of statutory construction that when the legislature uses
the same term in separate statutes, that term has the same meaning in each unless the General
Assembly indicates to the contrary.” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 276 Va. 184, 194, 661 S.E.2d
810, 815 (2008) (citing Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 226 Va. 382, 387-
88 309 S.E.2d 308, 311 (1983) (courts “interpret the several parts of a statute as a consistent and
harmonious whole so as to effectuate the legislative goal”); Prillaman v. Commonwealth, 199
Va. 401, 405, 100 S.E.2d 4, 7 (1957) (“[S]tatutes are not to be considered as isolated fragments
of law, but as a whole, or as parts of a great connected, homogeneous system, or a single and
complete statutory arrangement.”)).
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needs no technical, anatomical definition.” English, 58 Va. App. at 718, 715 S.E.2d at 395
(quoting Luck, 32 Va. App. at 832, 531 S.E.2d at 43). “To prove a bodily injury, the victim need
not experience any observable wounds, cuts, or breaking of the skin. Nor must she offer proof of
‘broken bones or bruises.’” Id. at 719, 715 S.E.2d at 395 (quoting Luck, 32 Va. App at 831-32,
531 S.E.2d at 43). “[I]nternal injuries—no less than external injuries—fall within the scope of
Code § 18.2-51.” Id.
The United States Code defines “bodily injury” as “a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn, or
disfigurement; physical pain; illness; impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or
mental faculty; or any other injury to the body, no matter how temporary.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 1515(a)(5)(A-E). Other states have broadly defined “bodily injury.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-109
(2015) (“physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition”); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 39-11-106(a)(2) (“a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn or disfigurement, and physical pain or
temporary illness or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty”);
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(a)(i) (“‘Bodily injury’ means: (A) A cut, abrasion, burn or temporary
disfigurement; (B) Physical pain; or (C) Impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ or
mental faculty.”).
Finding the foregoing authorities persuasive, and in light of our broad definition of bodily
injury when applying Code § 18.2-51, today we hold that “bodily injury” within the scope of
Code § 18.2-51.6 is any bodily injury whatsoever and includes an act of damage or harm or hurt
that relates to the body; is an impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental
faculty; or is an act of impairment of a physical condition.
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B. Ricks
The evidence presented to the Southampton Circuit Court showed that Ricks held the
victim down with his hand on her neck, that she was unable to yell and/or talk as a result of his
actions, that the victim stated that she could not breathe when Ricks’ hand was on her neck, and
she had a red mark on her neck.
“The plain, obvious, and rational meaning” of bodily injury is much broader than that
asserted by Ricks. Meeks, 274 Va. at 802, 651 S.E.2d at 639 (quoting Zamani, 256 Va. at 395,
507 S.E.2d at 609). Construing “bodily injury” more narrowly would lead to “absurd results.”
Id. “To prove a bodily injury, the victim need not experience any observable wounds, cuts, or
breaking of the skin. Nor must she offer proof of ‘broken bones or bruises.’” English, 58
Va. App. at 719, 715 S.E.2d at 395 (quoting Luck, 32 Va. App at 831-32, 531 S.E.2d at 43).
Based on the facts presented to the Southampton Circuit Court, the evidence was sufficient to
prove strangulation resulting in bodily injury. See Elliott, 277 Va. at 462, 675 S.E.2d at 181
(“The credibility of witnesses and the weight accorded the evidence are matters solely for the
fact finder.”). The Court of Appeals did not err in refusing Ricks’ petition for appeal, nor did the
Southampton Circuit Court err in finding Ricks guilty of violating Code § 18.2-51.6.
C. Chilton
In its appeal of the Court of Appeals’ disposition in Chilton, the Commonwealth
specifically places the issue before us of whether a loss of consciousness alone constitutes bodily
injury under Code § 18.2-51.6. 2 “Conscious” is defined as “mentally active; fully possessed of
one’s mental faculties; having emerged from sleep, faint, or stupor.” Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 482. In light of our earlier discussion of bodily injury, we hold that
2
The Commonwealth’s second assignment of error reads: “The Court of Appeals erred in
finding there was no bodily injury where the victim was choked until she was unconscious.”
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intentionally impeding the flow of oxygen to another person resulting in unconsciousness,
however brief, does constitute a bodily injury within the meaning of Code § 18.2-51.6. Even a
“momentary ‘black out’” caused by pressure to the neck is sufficient to constitute a bodily
injury. 3 The Commonwealth need not present medical testimony to prove bodily injury resulting
from strangulation; however, if the Commonwealth presents evidence sufficient to prove that
unlawful pressure to the neck was applied to a victim and that such unlawful pressure resulted in
unconsciousness, that is sufficient to prove the element of bodily injury.
In addressing the issue of unconsciousness, the Court of Appeals held that
even if [Dickerson] suffered a momentary “black out,” there was
no evidence, medical or otherwise, that she suffered any physical
or mental impairment as a result. Simply put, by failing to
establish any observable external injuries, particularly in light of
the victim’s lack of complaint of injury, and without any evidence,
medical or otherwise, of any internal or soft tissue injuries, the
Commonwealth failed to establish that the application of pressure
to the neck of the victim resulted in bodily injury.
Chilton, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 379, at *10. While we do not agree with the Court of Appeals’
rationale in reversing Chilton’s conviction, we do agree that the evidence was insufficient to
prove Dickerson suffered a bodily injury. See Perry v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 572, 579, 701
S.E.2d 431, 435 (2010) (citing Whitehead v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 105, 115, 677 S.E.2d 265,
270 (2009)) (“In Whitehead, we properly embraced the correct focus of the right result for the
wrong reason doctrine when we stated that cases are only proper for application of the right
result for the wrong reason doctrine when the evidence in the record supports the new argument
3
Other states have also concluded that being rendered unconscious constitutes a bodily
injury. See, e.g., State v. Atkinson, 741 A.2d 991, 1001-02 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (“It may be
inferred that a loss of consciousness has been caused by a serious impairment of a bodily organ,
through an impairment of the function of the brain, known by common experience to be an organ
of the body requiring the use of oxygen to sustain its operation and activity . . . . a loss of
consciousness, however brief, may constitute a serious physical injury under [the state penal
code].”).
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on appeal, and the development of additional facts is not necessary.”). Here, Dickerson never
clearly testified that Chilton actually applied pressure to her neck. In fact, she testified that, “He
was in th[e] general area [of her throat]” but that “[i]t wasn’t a choking motion.” She also
testified that she “saw black” after she “closed [her] eyes.” Moreover, she testified that she
never completely and totally lost consciousness. The Commonwealth’s evidence was so
minimal that it failed to establish that Dickerson suffered a bodily injury in the form of a loss of
consciousness.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in
reversing Chilton’s conviction and dismissing the indictment against him.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals upholding the
conviction of Ricks in the Southampton Circuit Court. We will also affirm the Court of Appeals’
judgment in Chilton reversing that defendant’s conviction in the Lynchburg Circuit Court and
dismissing the indictment against him.
Record No. 141650 – Affirmed.
Record No. 141820 – Affirmed.
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