State v. Horvath , 2015 Ohio 4729 ( 2015 )

[Cite as State v. Horvath, 2015-Ohio-4729.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
SENECA COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 13-15-10
v.
DANIEL E. HORVATH, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court
Trial Court No. CRB1401162
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Decision: November 16, 2015
APPEARANCES:
Michael D. Weikle for Appellant
Richard H. Palau for Appellee
Case No. 13-15-10
ROGERS, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Daniel Horvath, appeals the judgment of the
Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court convicting him of one count of theft. On appeal,
Horvath argues that the trial court erred by: (1) finding him guilty in absence of an
explanation of circumstances as required under R.C. 2937.07; (2) violating his
right to a speedy trial; and (3) denying his motion to suppress alleged hearsay
testimony. For the reasons set forth herein, we reverse the judgment of the trial
court.
{¶2} On September 9, 2014, a criminal complaint was filed against Horvath
alleging one count of theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), a misdemeanor of
the first degree. On September 12, 2014, Horvath entered a plea of not guilty.
{¶3} On October 20, 2014, Horvath moved for an extension of time to file
pre-trial motions, and a hearing was held on October 31, 2014. At the hearing, the
trial court stated that it would grant Horvath’s request so long as he waived his
right to a speedy trial. Horvath complied, and his request for an extension was
granted.
{¶4} On November 10, 2014, Horvath moved to suppress, inter alia, alleged
hearsay statements and photographic evidence. A hearing was held on January 19,
2015, where the following testimony was heard:
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{¶5} Officer Douglas Skornicka of the Tiffin Police Department testified
that on June 30, 2014 he spoke with Alicia Burnat regarding a complaint that her
wallet had been stolen. Officer Skornicka stated that on June 28, 2014, Ms.
Burnat visited a local Wal-Mart in Tiffin, Ohio to purchase supplies for a camping
trip. After paying for the supplies, Ms. Burnat left her shopping cart near the
store’s entrance. Unbeknownst to Ms. Burnat, her wallet, containing her driver’s
license and $180.00, remained in the cart’s upper basket. According to Officer
Skornicka, Ms. Burnat was told by a Wal-Mart employee that a man, later
identified as Horvath, had used the shopping cart immediately after her. Officer
Skornicka testified that he reviewed Wal-Mart’s security footage and obtained
three still photographs depicting Horvath entering the store, retrieving a shopping
cart, and leaving the premise. Officer Skornicka added that Wal-Mart had
inadvertently destroyed the security footage prior to issuing a copy to the Tiffin
Police Department. Officer Skornicka further testified that he spoke with Horvath
regarding the alleged theft and that Horvath had admitted to leaving the premise
with Ms. Burnat’s wallet.
{¶6} At the suppression hearing, Horvath argued, inter alia, that all
testimony and photographic evidence concerning the contents of the unavailable
security footage was hearsay and subject to exclusion under the Ohio Rules of
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Evidence. Upon the conclusion of the testimony, the trial court denied Horvath’s
motion.
{¶7} In the interim, the State moved to amend the complaint. Specifically,
the State sought to clarify the extent of the alleged stolen property. By way of
Entry dated February 9, 2015, the trial court granted the State’s motion, noting that
the charge of theft was limited to a “dark blue butterfly wallet.” (Docket No. 58).
{¶8} On February 23, 2015, Horvath moved to dismiss the case on speedy
trial grounds. Specifically, Horvath argued that his earlier waiver was invalid
because the trial court improperly required a waiver of speedy trial as a condition
precedent to granting his request for an extension of time. At a hearing held later
that day, the trial court denied Horvath’s motion.
{¶9} Immediately thereafter, Horvath entered a plea of no contest. After
accepting Horvath’s plea, the trial court stated that “[b]ased on an earlier review of
the complaint and [Horvath’s] plea of no contest there will be a finding of guilty.”
Feb. 23 Hrg., p. 8. The case proceeded immediately to sentencing where the trial
court imposed a 30-day suspended jail sentence, a $250.00 fine, and a one year
period of community control. The trial court furthered ordered Horvath to pay
restitution to Ms. Burnat in the amount of $205.00.
{¶10} It is from this judgment that Horvath appeals, presenting the
following assignments of error for our review.
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Case No. 13-15-10
Assignment of Error No. I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN FINDING THE DEFENDANT GUILTY AFTER
DEFENDANT’S VERBAL ENTRY OF A PLEA OF NO
CONTEST WITHOUT FIRST HAVING THE STATE READ
INTO THE RECORD AN EXPLANATION OF THE FACTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES SUPPORTING ALL OF THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED AS
REQUIRED UNDER OHIO REVISED CODE SECTION
2937.07.
Assignment of Error No. II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
DENYING THE DEFENDANT’S SPEEDY TRIAL MOTION
WHEN THE DEFENDANT’S WAIVER OF HIS SPEEDY
TRIAL WAS INVALID; AND THE RECORD IS NOT CLEAR
AS TO THE TRIAL COURT’S BASIS FOR DENYING THE
MOTION BECAUSE NO FINDINGS WERE MADE BY THE
TRIAL COURT AND THE STATE FAILED TO MEET ITS
BURDEN TO ESTABLISH SUFFICIENT SPEEDY TRIAL
DAYS HAD BEEN TOLLED TO BRING THE HEARING
WITHIN THE SPEEDY TRIAL DATE AFTER THE
DEFENDANT PRESENTED A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR
DISCHARGE.
Assignment of Error No. III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT’S PRE-TRIAL MOTION
TO SUPPRESS ALL TESTIMONY REGARDING THE
CONTENTS OF A JUNE 28, 2014 WAL-MART
SURVEILLANCE VIDEO RECORDING WHEN THE STATE
FAILED TO OBTAIN A COPY OF THE VIDEO BEFORE IT
WAS DESTROYED (RECORDED OVER) BY WAL-MART IN
THE NORMAL COURSE OF ITS VIDEO SURVEILLANCE
OPERATIONS AND THERE WAS NO EYEWITNESS TO
THE CRIME CHARGED OR THE EVENTS RECORDED.
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Assignment of Error No. I
{¶11} In his first assignment of error, Horvath argues that the trial court
erred in making a finding of guilt in absence of an explanation of circumstances
pursuant to R.C. 2937.07. We agree.
{¶12} R.C. 2937.07 provides, in pertinent part, “A plea to a misdemeanor
offense of ‘no contest’ or words of similar import shall constitute an admission of
the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint and that the judge or magistrate may
make a finding of guilty or not guilty from the explanation of the circumstances of
the offense.” An explanation of circumstances is found where the record includes
a statement of the facts sufficient to support all of the essential elements of the
offense. State v. Provino, 175 Ohio App.3d 283, 2007-Ohio-6974, ¶ 5 (3d Dist.);
City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Bowers, 9 Ohio St.3d 148 (1984). “This rule prevents
the trial court from finding offenders guilty in a ‘perfunctory fashion.’ ” Provino
at ¶ 5. When a trial court makes a finding of guilt in the absence of an explanation
of circumstances, the plea must be vacated. Bowers at 151.
{¶13} Here, Horvath was charged with one count of theft in violation of
R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), which provides that “[n]o person, with purpose to deprive the
owner of property or services, shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either
the property or services * * * [w]ithout the consent of the owner or person
authorized to give consent.”
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{¶14} The amended complaint set forth the following facts:
[Horvath] at 2801 W. Sr. 18, Tiffin, Ohio on or about 6/28/2014 did,
with purpose to deprive Alicia Burnat, the owner, of her property,
did knowingly obtain and exert control over said property to wit: a
dark blue butterfly wallet, without the consent of Alicia Burnat, the
owner, or person authorized to give consent.
On 6/30/14 the Tiffin P.D. was advised of a theft complaint which
occurred on 6/28/14 at Walmart located at 2801 W. Sr. 18, Seneca
County, Ohio. The victim, Alicia Burnat, had already consulted with
Walmart management and the security footage was reviewed. [Ms.
Burnat] stated that after making a purchase at the register, she
pushed her cart and left it with other shopping carts between the
entrance doors. In doing so, she left her wallet behind in the
shopping cart. [Officer Skornicka] later reviewed the video footage
with management which confirmed this incident. The video footage
also showed a male, later identified as [Horvath], entering the store
after [Ms. Burnat] and taking possession of the same shopping cart.
No one else prior to this time had come into contact with the
shopping cart and wallet. The cart was pushed through the store
while [Horvath] shopped. When [Horvath] checked out, the wallet
was no longer in the cart. During an interview, a verbal admission to
taking possession to the wallet and exiting Walmart was given by
[Horvath]. [Horvath] returned the wallet to [Officer Skornicka]. [Ms.
Burnat] identified the wallet as hers. The $180 and [Ms. Burnat’s]
driver’s license were not recovered.
(Docket No. 1). Ultimately, Horvath pleaded no contest, and the trial court found
him guilty. In doing so, the trial court relied solely on “[its] previous review of
Officer Skornicka’s report in the face of the complaint and [Horvath’s] plea[] of
no contest.” Feb. 23, 2015 Hrg., p. 8.
{¶15} The trial court’s basis for its finding of guilt presents two problems.
First, the record is silent as to any explanation of circumstances sufficient to find
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Horvath guilty of theft. Neither the State nor the trial court stated on the record an
explanation of the facts supporting each essential element of the offense as
required under R.C. 2937.07. Although the trial court indicated that it was relying,
in part, on its earlier review of the complaint, such measures are insufficient to
satisfy the statutorily required explanation of circumstances. See Bowers, 9 Ohio
St.3d at 151. Rather, the complaint must be read into the record. Id.
{¶16} The State argues that the trial court had more than sufficient
knowledge of the circumstances from which to render a finding of guilty based on
the testimony elicited from Officer Skornicka at the earlier suppression hearing.
We find this argument unpersuasive. See City of Cleveland v. Paramount Land
Holdings, LLC, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95448, 2011-Ohio-3383, ¶ 23 (an
explanation of circumstances is not satisfied by a presumption that the [trial] court
was aware of facts); State v. Keplinger, 2nd Dist. Greene No. 98-CA-24, 1998 WL
864837, *2 (Nov. 13, 1998) (an explanation of circumstances requires, at a
minimum, some positive recitation of facts). The relevant inquiry is not whether
the trial court could have rendered a sufficient explanation of circumstances based
on its knowledge of the case but whether the trial court actually made the
necessary explanation in this instance. Bowers at 151. Here, the trial court did
not.
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{¶17} Second, Horvath’s plea of no contest—in and of itself—is an
improper basis for a finding of guilt. Although Crim.R. 11 provides that a plea of
no contest is an admission of the truth of the facts in the complaint, R.C. 2937.07
provides a criminal defendant with the substantive right to require of the trial court
an explanation of circumstances following a plea of no contest. As such, R.C.
2937.07 supersedes Crim.R. 11. Bowers at 151. In considering Horvath’s plea of
no contest as a basis for its finding of guilt, the trial court erred.
{¶18} Under R.C. 2937.07, when a plea of no contest is accepted in a
misdemeanor case, the explanation of circumstances serves as the evidence upon
which the trial court is to base its finding of guilty or not guilty. Here, the
evidence was insufficient to support Horvath’s conviction. When a conviction is
reversed due to insufficient evidence, jeopardy attaches, and a remand for a new
determination of guilt or innocence is prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clauses
of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10
of the Ohio Constitution. State v. Kareski, 137 Ohio St.3d 92, 2013-Ohio-4008, ¶
14, citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978).
{¶19} Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court erred in finding
Horvath guilty in absence of an explanation of the circumstances pursuant to R.C.
2937.07. Accordingly, we sustain Horvath’s first assignment of error.
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Assignment of Error Nos. II & III
{¶20} In view of our disposition of Horvath’s First Assignment of Error,
his remaining assignments of error are rendered moot and need not be considered.
App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).
{¶21} Having found error prejudicial to Horvath, in the particulars assigned
and argued, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the matter for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment Reversed and
Cause Remanded
WILLAMOWSKI, J., concurs.
SHAW, J., dissents.
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