Olson v. Olson , 2016 Ohio 149 ( 2016 )


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  • [Cite as Olson v. Olson, 2016-Ohio-149.]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    WOOD COUNTY
    Faith K. Olson                                       Court of Appeals No. WD-15-002
    Appellee                                    Trial Court No. 2014DV0133
    v.
    Kevin L. Olson                                       DECISION AND JUDGMENT
    Appellant                                   Decided: January 15, 2016
    *****
    Tonya M. Robinson, for appellant.
    *****
    PIETRYKOWSKI, J.
    {¶ 1} Appellant, Kevin Olson, appeals the judgment of the Wood County Court of
    Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, issuing a domestic violence civil protection
    order on behalf of appellee, Faith Olson.1 For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
    1
    Appellee has not filed a brief in this appeal.
    Facts and Procedural Background
    {¶ 2} Appellant and appellee have been married since 1981. For the past 20 years,
    appellant has suffered from chronic fatigue syndrome. Within the past two years, it has
    been diagnosed as bipolar disorder. When appellant is having an episode, he experiences
    a period of high anxiety lasting around seven days, during which time he tries to avoid
    people by staying in his room the entire time. Appellant then will experience a period of
    deep fatigue where he has difficulty staying awake, followed by a period of hyperactivity.
    Appellant testified that he typically has such an episode approximately once every six
    weeks, but has been having them more frequently due to stress.
    {¶ 3} According to the parties, the incident that ultimately began the movement
    towards the request for a domestic violence civil protection order occurred in June 2014.
    At that time, residing with appellant and appellee was their 32-year-old daughter, along
    with her husband and two children. One night, appellant was awake and playing his
    guitar at around 2:30 a.m. Appellant’s son-in-law came upstairs and confronted
    appellant, saying that the noise was disturbing the children. Appellant became agitated
    and woke up appellee, stating she should come between him and his son-in-law because
    they were going to have a yelling match. Appellant later realized what time it was, and
    was remorseful for his behavior. At the protection order hearing, appellant testified that
    the incident was a manifestation of his failure to take his medication for four or five days,
    which resulted in him feeling more irritable than usual.
    2.
    {¶ 4} After this incident, appellee told appellant that as a father’s day gift she
    wanted to send him to Utah to visit his family for three weeks. Appellant insisted that he
    could not be gone for that long given the frequency that he meets with his various
    doctors. Eventually, appellant agreed to travel to Utah for one week around Halloween.
    Appellee made the travel arrangements.
    {¶ 5} While appellant was in Utah, appellee filed for a divorce and for a domestic
    violence civil protection order. She then cancelled his return flight and sent all of his
    belongings, including his car, to him. She told him that she did not want him back in the
    state of Ohio.
    {¶ 6} On December 10, 2014, the hearing on the protection order was held. The
    daughter testified first. She testified that in the past two years she has witnessed angry,
    violent outbursts involving yelling. However, she has not seen any physical violence.
    The daughter testified that these outbursts made her afraid. She further stated that she
    fears for the safety of her children because appellant has loaded guns and she has heard
    them go off during the night within the past two years. Finally, she testified that she has
    noticed that appellant oftentimes has slurred speech, is confused, or is “just not mentally
    all there.”
    {¶ 7} Appellant was called as a witness next, as on cross-examination. Appellant
    testified that he has approximately six long guns and four or five pistols, that they are
    never loaded, and that they each have a safety trigger. Appellant also testified that he has
    a BB gun that he has shot in the house because he was having some trouble with it. He
    3.
    stated that he would put up two pieces of cardboard on the wall and fire into them, but he
    acknowledged that one of those pieces must have fallen because the wall was littered
    with marks from the impact of the projectiles. Appellant testified that he stopped
    shooting the BB gun indoors almost a year ago.
    {¶ 8} When asked if he had ever physically harmed his wife, appellant responded
    that he only ever pushed her onto a couch, and that was 20 years ago. He testified that he
    has never threatened to harm anyone in the house. He admitted that he did get angry on
    the night of the June 2014 confrontation, and may have cursed, but he did not tell anyone
    that he was going to harm them.
    {¶ 9} Finally, appellee testified. She stated that she was afraid of appellant
    because he is not diligent in taking his medication, and sometimes over- or under-
    medicates, and she worries because she has been told that his bipolar disorder will only
    get worse as he ages. She also noted that appellant gets angry, and has pushed her down
    to the floor within the past six or seven years. Furthermore, she testified that she was
    concerned for her safety because appellant has not demonstrated a lot of regard for the
    dangers of firearms, recounting two instances where appellant accidentally dropped a
    loaded gun onto the floor.
    4.
    {¶ 10} Following the hearing, the trial court granted the domestic violence civil
    protection order, effective through June 10, 2015.2 In its entry, the court specifically
    found,
    [Appellant] is diagnosed with bipolar disorder. He has told
    [appellee] at times that he does not always take his medication as it is
    prescribed. [Appellant] admitted that he may overreact to certain things
    such as the time this summer when his son-in-law confronted him about
    playing the guitar at 2:30 a.m. [Appellant] went and got [appellee] out of
    bed to help with the confrontation that he was having with his son-in-law.
    [Appellant]’s daughter, her husband and their 2 children live in the same
    house. She has heard [appellant] shots fired (sic) upstairs while she had the
    children in the home. [Appellant] admitted that he shot holes in the wall
    from his air gun, including some aimed at an interior wall. [Appellant]’s
    daughter cried and testified that she and her family stay in the basement
    because they are afraid of [appellant]. He has angry outbursts that have
    been directed at her and her mother ([appellee]). [Appellant] admitted that
    he has angry outbursts directed to his wife - including before his trip to
    Utah in October. [Appellant] is 6’2, 250 # and bigger than his family
    2
    Appellee moved to dismiss this appeal on the grounds that it had become moot
    following the expiration of the civil protection order. On August 6, 2015, we denied
    appellee’s motion, reasoning that there were collateral consequences to the issuance of
    the civil protection order that continued to exist after its expiration, including issues
    regarding appellant’s concealed firearm permit, obtaining housing, and his credit report.
    5.
    members. He had 6 long guns and 5 pistols at the home. It is clear that
    [Appellant] has engaged in a pattern of behavior that has caused mental
    distress to the family members and the family members need protection.
    Assignment of Error
    {¶ 11} Appellant has timely appealed the issuance of the protection order, and
    now assigns one error for our review:
    I. The Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations,
    abused its discretion when it granted Petitioner/Appellee a Domestic
    Protection Order against the Respondent/Appellant as such was against the
    manifest weight of the evidence and an abuse of the Court’s discretion
    when there was no evidence of domestic violence.
    Analysis
    {¶ 12} “When granting a protection order, the trial court must find that petitioner
    has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that petitioner or petitioner’s family or
    household members are in danger of domestic violence. R.C. 3113.31(D).” Felton v.
    Felton, 
    79 Ohio St. 3d 34
    , 
    679 N.E.2d 672
    (1997), paragraph two of the syllabus. “The
    decision to grant or dismiss a request for a civil protection order is within the discretion
    of the trial court.” Rangel v. Woodbury, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-09-1084, 2009-Ohio-
    4407, ¶ 11, citing Deacon v. Landers, 
    68 Ohio App. 3d 26
    , 31, 
    587 N.E.2d 395
    (4th
    Dist.1990). “An appellate court will not reverse a trial court’s decision regarding a civil
    protection order absent an abuse of discretion.” 
    Id., citing Parrish
    v. Parrish, 
    146 Ohio 6
    .
    App.3d 640, 646, 
    767 N.E.2d 1182
    (4th Dist.2000). An abuse of discretion connotes that
    the trial court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v.
    Blakemore, 
    5 Ohio St. 3d 217
    , 219, 
    450 N.E.2d 1140
    (1983). “If the trial court’s decision
    is supported by credible and competent evidence, the appellate court will not reverse the
    decision as an abuse of discretion.” Rangel at ¶ 11, citing Jarvis v. Jarvis, 7th Dist.
    Jefferson No. 03-JE-26, 2004-Ohio-1386, ¶ 13.
    {¶ 13} Pursuant to R.C. 3113.31, a person who is subject to domestic violence
    may petition a court for a protection order. Relevant here, domestic violence means
    “Placing another person by the threat of force in fear of imminent serious physical harm,”
    or “[E]ngaging in a pattern of conduct [that knowingly causes] [a family or household
    member] to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person or
    cause mental distress to the other person.” R.C. 3113.31(A)(1)(b) and 2903.211(A)(1).
    {¶ 14} Expounding on those elements, “‘Pattern of conduct’ means two or more
    actions or incidents closely related in time, whether or not there has been a prior
    conviction based on any of those actions or incidents.” R.C. 2903.211(D)(1). “In
    determining what constitutes a pattern of conduct for purposes of R.C. 2903.211(D)(1),
    courts must take every action into consideration even if, * * * ‘some of the person’s
    actions may not, in isolation, seem particularly threatening.’” Ensley v. Glover, 6th Dist.
    Lucas No. L-11-1026, 2012-Ohio-4487, ¶ 10, quoting Middletown v. Jones, 167 Ohio
    App.3d 679, 2006-Ohio-3465, 
    856 N.E.2d 1003
    , ¶ 10 (12th Dist.).
    7.
    {¶ 15} “Mental distress” means “Any mental illness or condition that involves
    some temporary substantial incapacity,” or “Any mental illness or condition that would
    normally require psychiatric treatment, psychological treatment, or other mental health
    services, whether or not any person requested or received psychiatric treatment,
    psychological treatment, or other mental health services.” R.C. 2903.211(D)(2). “The
    statute, however, ‘does not require that the victim actually experience mental distress, but
    only that the victim believes the stalker would cause mental distress or physical harm.’”
    Ensley at ¶ 13, quoting Bloom v. Macbeth, 5th Dist. Ashland No. 2007-COA-050, 2008-
    Ohio-4564, ¶ 11. “Moreover, the testimony of the victim herself as to her fear is
    sufficient to establish mental distress.” 
    Id., citing State
    v. Horsley, 10th Dist. Franklin
    No. 05AP-350, 2006-Ohio-1208, ¶ 48. Notably, we recognize that “mental distress for
    purposes of the menacing by stalking statute is not mere mental stress or annoyance.”
    Fondessy v. Simon, 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-11-041, 2013-Ohio-3465, ¶ 19, quoting
    Caban v. Ransome, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 08 MA 36, 2009-Ohio-1034, ¶ 29.
    {¶ 16} Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion because there was
    no evidence showing a pattern of behavior that appellant knew would cause appellee to
    believe that appellant would cause her physical harm or mental distress. We agree. In
    the hearing below, there was testimony concerning four discreet events. The first
    occurred 20 years ago when appellant admitted to pushing appellee onto the couch.
    Then, within the past six or seven years, appellant pushed appellee down to the floor. For
    some time up until one year ago, appellant fired a BB gun inside the house at a target on
    8.
    the wall when no one else was present in the room. Finally, appellant got into an
    argument with his son-in-law in June 2014, which undisputedly did not lead to a physical
    altercation. In addition to these events, there was general testimony that appellant would
    sometimes get angry and yell at appellee or his daughter.
    {¶ 17} In our view, this was insufficient evidence to establish that appellant had
    knowingly engaged in a “pattern of conduct” “closely related in time” that caused
    appellee or the daughter to be in fear of mental distress or physical harm. The testimony
    from the hearing describes only one incident in the past several years that involved a
    confrontation with another person, and in that situation appellant did not threaten or exert
    physical force. Furthermore, general allegations that appellant would get angry and yell
    without providing the context or content of the outburst provides no basis for us to
    determine that appellee or the daughter feared mental distress or imminent physical harm.
    {¶ 18} Accordingly, finding insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
    issuance of a domestic violence civil protection order, the sole assignment of error is
    well-taken.
    {¶ 19} On consideration whereof, the court finds that substantial justice has not
    been done the party complaining and the judgment of the Wood County Court of
    Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, is reversed and vacated. Appellee is
    ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
    Judgment reversed.
    9.
    Olson v. Olson
    C.A. No. WD-15-002
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
    See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
    Mark L. Pietrykowski, J.                       _______________________________
    JUDGE
    Arlene Singer, J.
    _______________________________
    Thomas J. Osowik, J.                                       JUDGE
    CONCUR.
    _______________________________
    JUDGE
    This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
    Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
    version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
    http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.
    10.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: WD-15-002

Citation Numbers: 2016 Ohio 149

Judges: Pietrykowski

Filed Date: 1/15/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021