Estate of Paul R. Galipeau v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ( 2016 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2016 ME 28
Docket: Ken-15-29
Argued: December 10, 2015
Decided: February 11, 2016
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ.
ESTATE OF PAUL R. GALIPEAU
v.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
MEAD, J.
[¶1] The Estate of Paul R. Galipeau (Estate) appeals from a summary
judgment entered by the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Murphy, J.) in favor of
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) on the Estate’s
complaint for wrongful denial of coverage concerning three of four vehicle
insurance policies owned by Paul Galipeau at the time of his death. The Estate
contends that State Farm was obligated to pay the uninsured motorist (UM)
coverage limit of each of the four policies, not just the UM coverage limit of the
policy naming the motorcycle Galipeau was riding when he was involved in a fatal
accident. State Farm contends that the court correctly ruled that coverage under
the three non-motorcycle policies was precluded by an “other-owned-vehicle”
exclusion that each policy contained. It further asserts that coverage was precluded
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by an “anti-stacking” provision in the policies, the applicability of which the Estate
disputes. We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The summary judgment record contains the following evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the Estate as the non-moving party. See
Brady v. Cumberland Cty., 2015 ME 143, ¶ 2, 126 A.3d 1145. On
August 15, 2012, Paul Galipeau was killed in a motor vehicle accident while riding
his motorcycle. With State Farm’s consent, the Estate settled a claim against the
tortfeasor for $50,000, the limit of the tortfeasor’s liability insurance policy.
[¶3] Galipeau and his wife Judith, the personal representative of his estate,
were insured under four vehicle policies issued by State Farm: one on the
motorcycle that Paul was riding when the accident occurred, and the others
covering three different vehicles. Each of the policies provided UM coverage with
a per-person limit of $100,000. The Estate demanded $350,000 from State Farm,
representing the aggregate of each policy’s UM coverage limit, less the $50,000
recovered from the tortfeasor. State Farm paid the $50,000 differential between
the motorcycle policy UM limit and the $50,000 already recovered by the Estate,
and otherwise refused the demand.
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[¶4] The parties dispute whether State Farm Policy Form 9819B or the
earlier Policy Form 9819A was in effect at the time of the accident. Each contains
an “other-owned-vehicle exclusion” as follows.
[¶5] Concerning UM coverage, Form 9819B provides:
THERE IS NO COVERAGE:
....
2. FOR AN INSURED WHO SUSTAINS BODILY INJURY:
a. WHILE OCCUPYING A MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY
YOU OR ANY RESIDENT RELATIVE IF IT IS NOT YOUR
CAR OR A NEWLY ACQUIRED CAR.
Pursuant to the policy definitions, “Your car means the vehicle shown under
‘YOUR CAR’ on the Declarations Page.” Each of the four policies owned by
Galipeau had a separate declarations page, each listing a different vehicle than the
others. None of the three policies under which State Farm refused to pay listed the
motorcycle on the declarations page.
[¶6] Form 9819A provided:
THERE IS NO COVERAGE:
....
2. FOR BODILY INJURY TO AN INSURED:
a. WHILE OCCUPYING A MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY OR
LEASED TO YOU, YOUR SPOUSE, OR ANY RELATIVE IF IT
IS NOT INSURED FOR THIS COVERAGE UNDER THIS
POLICY.
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In addition, Form 9819B contains an “anti-stacking” provision that Form 9819A
did not.
[¶7] In April 2013, the Estate filed a complaint against State Farm alleging
breach of the three policies on which it refused payment, seeking damages of
$300,000 as part of “compensatory damages . . . in excess of $400,000.”
State Farm moved for summary judgment on the grounds that coverage was
precluded by (1) the other-owned-vehicle exclusion; and (2) the anti-stacking
provision, which State Farm asserted was effective against Galipeau when the
accident occurred. The Estate moved for partial summary judgment on the
coverage issue, asserting the same grounds it advances in this appeal.
[¶8] Following a hearing, the court concluded that the other-owned-vehicle
exclusion precluded coverage under the three non-motorcycle policies. For that
reason, the court entered summary judgment for State Farm and denied the Estate’s
motion for partial summary judgment. The court did not reach the issue of whether
the anti-stacking provision also applied to the same end. The Estate appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶9] The Estate contends that State Farm was not entitled to summary
judgment because (1) other-owned-vehicle exclusions violate Maine’s UM statute,
24-A M.R.S. § 2902 (2015), notwithstanding our long-standing precedent to the
contrary; or (2) State Farm’s other-owned-vehicle exclusion does not apply in this
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case because Galipeau paid a premium for UM coverage on each of his four State
Farm policies. “We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the
summary judgment record in the light most favorable to the nonprevailing party to
determine whether it demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Allen v. McCann,
2015 ME 84, ¶ 8, 120 A.3d 90 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶10] Unless they are invalid, either Form 9819A or Form 9819B afforded
Galipeau UM coverage under the State Farm policy that listed the motorcycle on
the declarations page, but not under the three policies that did not list the
motorcycle. Concerning the three non-motorcycle policies, under Form 9819A the
motorcycle was not a vehicle “insured for this coverage under this policy,” and
under Form 9819B the motorcycle did not meet the definition of “your car or a
newly acquired car.”
[¶11] The Estate recognizes that our precedent is clear. Unless overruled, it
compels a conclusion that the other-owned-vehicle exclusion at issue in this case
was valid. As recently as 2014, we reaffirmed the applicability of an
other-owned-vehicle exclusion, saying, “We are unpersuaded by the . . . argument
that we should find . . . other-owned-vehicle exclusions unenforceable.” Estate of
Lewis v. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 ME 34, ¶ 12 & n.9, 87 A.3d 732. Our
statement in Estate of Lewis was supported by citations to our decisions dating
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back some thirty years.1 In one of the cited cases we discussed with approval a
decision of the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in which that court, construing
Maine law, upheld the validity of an other-owned-vehicle exclusion in saying that
“the applicability of [the] exclusion was ‘nose-on-the-face plain.’” Hall v. Patriot
Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 ME 104, ¶ 12, 942 A.2d 663 (quoting Maurice v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 235 F.3d 7, 9-10 (1st Cir. 2000)).
[¶12] The Estate invites us to depart from our clear and long-standing
precedent by inviting us to change Maine law. Its primary rationale for doing so
rests on its assertion that finding other-owned-vehicle exclusions to be invalid is a
growing national trend among courts, an assertion that State Farm disputes. A
review of the authorities cited by the parties shows that those authorities disagree
as to the existence or extent of a “national trend” concerning this area of law when
state courts are called upon to interpret their own UM statutes.
[¶13] The authors of the treatise Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist
Insurance reference courts in numerous jurisdictions that have upheld insurance
policies containing “other owned vehicle/household member” exclusions.
1 Alan I. Widiss & Jeffrey E. Thomas, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist
1
See Hall v. Patriot Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 ME 104, ¶¶ 11-12, 942 A.2d 663; Cash v. Green Mountain
Ins. Co., 644 A.2d 456, 457-58 (Me. 1994); Bear v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 519 A.2d 180, 182
(Me. 1986); Gross v. Green Mountain Ins. Co., 506 A.2d 1139, 1142 (Me. 1986). See also Hare v.
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 471 A.2d 1041, 1043 (Me. 1984).
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Insurance § 4.19(C) (3d ed. 2005). That treatise also recognizes that a majority of
jurisdictions have held that unless such exclusions are specifically authorized by
the state’s uninsured motorist legislation, the exclusions are against public policy
and are therefore void. Id. § 4.19(E). In many of the states where a court has held
the exclusions to be against public policy, the state’s legislature has subsequently
amended the uninsured motorist laws to allow such exclusions. See id. n.35. See
also Janet Boeth Jones, Annotation, Uninsured Motorist Coverage: Validity of
Exclusion of Injuries Sustained by Insured While Occupying “Owned” Vehicle Not
Insured by Policy, 30 A.L.R. 4th 172, §§ 3(a), 3(b) (2014) (collecting cases in
which other-owned-vehicle exclusions were held to be valid, and cases where such
exclusions were held to be invalid).
[¶14] Furthermore, we note that our well-settled acceptance of
other-owned-vehicle exclusions has a logical underpinning, in that a person
occupying a vehicle that he or she owns determines how much UM coverage to
carry on that vehicle. Accordingly, the vehicle owner can engage in a cost/benefit
analysis and purchase a self-selected amount of UM coverage that the owner
deems appropriate should he or she be injured in an accident in that vehicle. Given
that the validity of other-owned-vehicle exclusions has been clear in this state for
decades, it would fundamentally alter the bargain entered into by the Galipeaus and
State Farm when the Galipeaus purchased UM coverage to hold that although they
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made the decision to pay for $100,000 in coverage, State Farm is now liable to pay
the Estate up to $400,000 in benefits.
[¶15] For these reasons, we decline the Estate’s invitation. Whatever other
states may do pursuant to their statutes, the proper construction of 24-A M.R.S.
§ 2902 is a matter for us to determine. See Gardner v. Day, 95 Me. 558, 560,
50 A. 892 (1901) (stating that when there is an unresolved question concerning a
state statute “it becomes our duty to construe the statute and to ascertain its true
intent and meaning”). We recently reaffirmed the validity of other-owned-vehicle
exclusions, Estate of Lewis, 2014 ME 34, ¶ 12 & n.9, 87 A.3d 732, and we see no
compelling reason to depart from the principle of stare decisis and declare an
abrupt reversal of our long-standing jurisprudence. See Quirion v. Veilleux,
2013 ME 50, ¶ 6, 65 A.3d 1287 (“Guided by stare decisis, we will apply rules
articulated in our precedents unless the passage of time and changes in conditions
justify reexamining the law stated in our prior opinion and reaching a different
result.” (quotation marks omitted)); Maddocks v. Giles, 1999 ME 63, ¶ 11,
728 A.2d 150 (stating that “when the underpinnings of [] previous decisions are
disproved” the Law Court is not constrained by stare decisis). If a change in
settled Maine UM insurance law is warranted on public policy grounds, then that,
absent a more compelling rationale than the one presented here, is an argument
best addressed to the Legislature. See Maddocks, 1999 ME 63, ¶ 12, 728 A.2d 150
 9
(stating that concerning some issues it “is best left to the Legislature” to weigh
“heavy policy considerations” involved in a potential change in the law).
[¶16] Concerning the Estate’s second contention, that the Galipeaus’
payment of UM premiums on each of the four policies compels coverage for this
accident under all of them, we rejected that argument in a case involving facts very
similar to these. See Gross v. Green Mountain Ins. Co., 506 A.2d 1139
(Me. 1986). In Gross, the decedent was killed in a collision with another vehicle
while riding his motorcycle; at the time he was insured under two separate
Green Mountain policies, for which he paid separate premiums, one naming the
motorcycle and the other naming two automobiles. Id. at 1140. Concerning the
plaintiff estate’s argument that an other-owned-vehicle exclusion in the policies
violated the UM statute and was against public policy, we said:
As we noted in Dufour v. Metropolitan Property and Liability
Insurance Company, 438 A.2d 1290, 1292 (Me. 1982), the purpose of
the uninsured motorist statute is to afford to each owner of an
automobile liability insurance policy a minimum standard of
protection against the uninsured motorist. In Dufour, we concluded
that our uninsured motorist statute does not require “stacking” when
two or more cars are insured under a single policy, even though
separate premiums are paid, so long as the insurance contract clearly
and unambiguously restricts coverage to a specified amount greater
than the statutory minimum. . . . [T]he Plaintiff fails to offer any
rational basis for allowing a motorist who has insured two vehicles
under two separate policies to “stack” uninsured motorist coverage
when a motorist who has insured two vehicles under a single policy,
yet pays two premiums, cannot.
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Id. at 1142. The same reasoning is applicable here, yielding the same result.
[¶17] Because we conclude that the Superior Court did not err in entering
summary judgment for State Farm on the ground that the other-owned-vehicle
exclusion in the Galipeaus’ four policies precluded coverage under the three
non-motorcycle policies, we do not reach the Estate’s alternative argument that the
anti-stacking provision in Form 9819B was ineffective.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
On the briefs:
Steven D. Silin, Esq., and Robert H. Furbish, Esq., Berman &
Simmons, P.A., Lewiston, for appellant Estate of Paul R.
Galipeau
J. William Druary, Jr., Esq., and Gregory M. Patient, Esq.,
Marden Dubord, Bernier & Stevens, PA LLC, Waterville, for
appellee State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
At oral argument:
Robert H. Furbish, Esq., for appellant Estate of Paul R.
Galipeau
Gregory M. Patient, Esq., for appellee State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company
Kennebec County Superior Court docket number CV-2013-100
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY