Matthew Burgess v. Lamoille Housing Partnership, Town of Morristown, Mary Ann Wilson as Collector of Taxes and Sharon Green, Esq. , 201 Vt. 450 ( 2016 )

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal
revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions by email at: JUD.Reporter@vermont.gov or by mail at: Vermont Supreme Court,
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2016 VT 31No. 2015-221
Matthew Burgess Supreme Court
On Appeal from
v. Superior Court, Lamoille Unit,
Civil Division
Lamoille Housing Partnership, Town of Morristown, October Term, 2015
Mary Ann Wilson as Collector of Taxes and
Sharon Green, Esq.
Timothy B. Tomasi, J. (motion to dismiss); Dennis R. Pearson, J. (final judgment)
Matthew A. Burgess, Pro Se, Morristown, Plaintiff-Appellant.
Graham Hayes Govoni of Black & Govoni, PLLC., Morrisville, for Defendant-Appellee
Lamoille Housing Partnership, Inc.
James R. Dean Mahoney of Polow Polow & Mahoney, PLLC, Hyde Park, for
Defendants-Appellees Town of Morristown and Wilson.
Thomas M. Higgins of Pierson Wadhams Quinn Yates & Coffrin, LLP, Burlington, for
Defendant-Appellee Green.
PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.
¶ 1. REIBER, C.J. Plaintiff Matthew Burgess appeals decisions of the superior
court’s civil division dismissing certain defendants and granting summary judgment to another
defendant with respect to plaintiff’s claim that he is entitled to either a tax collector’s deed
conveying him property he redeemed from foreclosure or damages compensating him for not
being conveyed the deed. We affirm.
¶ 2. In September 2001, plaintiff’s parents, John and Virginia Burgess, mortgaged
property located in defendant Town of Morristown through defendant Lamoille Housing
Partnership, Inc. (LHP), a nonprofit corporation that assists people in finding affordable housing.
The Burgesses purchased the property through LHP’s Home Land Program, by which ownership
of the underlying land was severed from ownership of the house in which the Burgesses resided.
Under the arrangement, a warranty deed from the U.S. Department of Agriculture Rural
Development conveyed the land and improvements to the Burgesses, who granted a mortgage
deed to the USDA Rural Development encumbering both the land and improvements. The
Burgesses then conveyed the land to LHP, retaining only the title to the improvements. LHP and
the Burgesses then entered into a ground lease granting the Burgesses a leasehold interest in the
land for a ninety-nine-year term subject to certain terms and conditions, including that the
Burgesses pay the property taxes on the entire property.
¶ 3. The Burgesses later disputed their obligation to pay property taxes and, in August
2009, filed a declaratory judgment action against the Town and LHP, claiming that their
residential home should be exempt from real estate taxes and that the taxes they had paid entitled
them to an ownership interest in the land itself, thereby extinguishing LHP’s rights. A three-
justice panel of this Court upheld the trial court’s determinations that the Burgesses lacked
standing to challenge the Town’s taxation of the property and that their payment of taxes on the
land, pursuant to their agreement with LHP, did not give them an ownership interest in the land.
See Burgess v. Lamoille Housing Project, No. 2010-396, 2011 WL 4975238, at *3-4 (Vt. April
21, 2011) (unpub. mem.), http://www.vermontjudiciary.org/LC/unpublishedeo.aspx.
¶ 4. When that litigation concluded, the Burgesses’ property taxes were delinquent. In
2012, the Morristown town clerk, defendant Mary Ann Wilson, in her role as delinquent tax
collector, hired defendant Attorney Sharon Green to conduct a tax sale of certain properties,
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including the Burgess property. On February 2, 2012, the tax sale was conducted by Attorney
Green acting as counsel for the Town. Plaintiff, acting in his own right rather than as an agent
for his parents, made a bid at the tax sale, but his bid was not the highest. The property was
purchased by Winston Jennison Investments, LLC, for $2500, subject to its possible redemption.
LHP, the record owner, apparently did not attend or participate in the tax sale. Two weeks after
the tax sale, plaintiff tendered a check for $1373 to Attorney Green. Plaintiff’s letter
accompanying the check stated that the check was being “tendered in reliance on your
representations that said enclosed amount is full and final satisfaction for redemption of subject
property located at 352 Jersey Heights, in Morristown, Vermont.” After the check was
delivered, the town clerk’s office issued plaintiff a certificate of redemption stating that the
amount required to redeem the property owned by LHP was paid on February 21, 2012. The
certificate was then recorded in the Town land records. As the result of the redemption, the
Burgesses continued to reside at their home pursuant to their lease with LHP.
¶ 5. In December 2013, plaintiff filed a complaint against the Town and the town clerk
(municipal defendants), LHP, and Attorney Green, listing as counts declaratory judgment and
equitable relief, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel. The
complaint alleged that on February 21, 2012, Attorney Green, in her capacity as attorney and
agent for the municipal defendants, told plaintiff that if he submitted to her $1373 he would
acquire a right to receive a tax collector’s deed to the subject parcel one year and a day after the
date of the tax sale. It further stated that in reliance upon Attorney Green’s representation,
plaintiff issued Attorney Green a check for that amount, and that she gave him a certificate of
redemption, but declined to have the Town deliver to him a tax collector’s deed one year and a
day after the tax sale, as promised. The complaint asked the court to enter a declaratory
judgment that he is entitled either to a tax collector’s deed conveying the subject property to him
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or damages in an amount equal to the value of the subject property, which he indicated was
$50,000.
¶ 6. On April 24, 2014, the superior court: (1) denied plaintiff’s request for injunctive
or declaratory relief against the municipal defendants because they were not legally authorized
under Vermont law to transfer the property to him; (2) dismissed LHP as a party because
plaintiff had failed to state any legally cognizable claim against it; (3) denied the municipal
defendants’ motion to dismiss on immunity grounds, concluding that although the municipal
defendants were entitled to immunity based on plaintiff’s allegations, plaintiff should be allowed
limited discovery on the issue of whether the Town had purchased insurance that covered his
claims and thus waived its immunity pursuant to 29 V.S.A. § 1403; (4) denied Attorney Green’s
motion to dismiss based on her claim of qualified immunity; and (5) granted Attorney Green’s
motion to dismiss plaintiff’s breach-of-contract and promissory-estoppel counts, but denied her
motion to dismiss plaintiff’s negligent-misrepresentation count.
¶ 7. On February 6, 2015, the superior court, with a different judge presiding, granted
the municipal defendants’ renewed motion to dismiss based on its determination that the Town
had not waived its municipal immunity and that plaintiff failed to state any specific facts in his
complaint that would make the town clerk personally and independently liable on any recognized
legal theory. On May 20, 2015, the superior court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider the
dismissal of LHP as a defendant and granted Attorney Green’s motion for summary judgment on
plaintiff’s negligent representation claim, ruling that Attorney Green’s legal duty was to the
Town and not plaintiff, and that plaintiff’s reliance upon Attorney Green’s alleged
misrepresentation was not reasonable. That same day, the superior court entered a final
judgment in favor of all of the defendants.
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¶ 8. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the superior court erred by granting LHP’s and the
municipal defendants’ motions to dismiss and by granting Attorney Green’s motion for summary
judgment. Plaintiff first argues that the court should have kept LHP in the case pursuant to the
equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment. According to plaintiff, LHP was unjustly enriched by
retaining title to the subject property after he redeemed the property. He states that the superior
court should have kept LHP in the case until a factfinder determined whether his complaint was
proven so that the property could be held in a constructive trust for his benefit.
¶ 9. We agree with LHP that plaintiff failed to raise any equitable claim of unjust
enrichment in his complaint and thus has not preserved this claim of error for appeal. See Bull v.
Pinkham Eng’g Assocs., 170 Vt. 450, 459, 752 A.2d 26, 33 (2000) (“Contentions not raised or
fairly presented to the trial court are not preserved for appeal.”).
¶ 10. Plaintiff points out that in denying his motion to reconsider the dismissal of LHP,
the superior court addressed plaintiff’s claim of unjust enrichment, stating that LHP did not
unfairly receive any benefit that it should be forced to give up or pay compensation for, but
rather was simply restored to the position it always had—continued ownership of the underlying
parcel of land. To the extent that the superior court’s statement in its ruling on plaintiff’s motion
for reconsideration preserved this claim of error by plaintiff, we agree with the superior court’s
assessment. The fact that LHP may have benefitted from plaintiff’s decision to redeem the
property—even assuming that plaintiff redeemed the property because Attorney Green informed
him that he could obtain a tax collector’s deed by doing so—does not suggest that LHP was
unjustly enriched. See Legault v. Legault, 142 Vt. 525, 529, 459 A.2d 980, 983 (1983) (stating
that, in determining whether to impose constructive trust based on equitable doctrine of unjust
enrichment, “the true question” is not whether party has received benefit, but rather whether
party can retain benefit with “a safe conscience” (quotation omitted)); see also Brookside
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Memorials, Inc. v. Barre City, 167 Vt. 558, 560, 702 A.2d 47, 50 (1997) (mem.) (“In
determining whether a quasi-contract should be implied under an equitable theory of unjust
enrichment, the inquiry is whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances, equity and good
conscience demand that defendant return that which the plaintiff seeks to recover.”). As we
conclude below, plaintiff was not entitled to any declaratory or injunctive relief from the
municipal defendants. Accordingly, there is no possible relief impacting LHP’s retention of title
to the land.
¶ 11. Next, plaintiff challenges the superior court’s decision to dismiss the municipal
defendants. He argues that towns are not immune from declaratory or injunctive relief and both
the Town and the town clerk are necessary parties to his action seeking a declaration that he
should be issued a tax collector’s deed for the subject property. We find no merit to these
arguments. As the superior court concluded, plaintiff has no right to the injunctive and
declaratory relief he seeks against the municipal defendants—issuing him a tax collector’s deed
to the subject property—because neither the Town nor the town clerk are legally authorized
under Vermont law to transfer the property to him. Following the tax sale of real property, the
owner or mortgager of the property, or his or her representative or assigns, has a year and a day
to redeem the property, 32 V.S.A. § 5260, during which period the purchaser at the tax sale has
only a contingent interest in the property. It is only when a property is not redeemed within the
statutory period that a tax collector “shall execute to the purchaser a deed, which shall convey to
him or her a title against the person for whose tax it was sold and those claiming under him or
her.” 32 V.S.A. § 5261. On the other hand, if the property is timely redeemed, it is restored to
the original owner free and clear of any claims of the person who “purchased” it at the tax sale.
Redemption extinguishes the contingent interest of the tax sale purchaser—nothing more. 32
V.S.A. § 5260 (providing that when property is redeemed following tax sale, “a deed of the land
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shall not be made to the purchaser”). In short, even accepting as true that Attorney Green made
the statements alleged in plaintiff’s complaint, no legal or equitable theory would permit the
superior court to declare plaintiff the owner of the subject property or order transfer of the
property to him.
¶ 12. Plaintiff also sought monetary damages against the municipal defendants in the
alternative.1 In its April 24, 2014 decision, the superior court concluded that the municipal
defendants were immune from plaintiff’s lawsuit for their actions related to the tax sale of the
subject property, unless the Town had waived its immunity under 29 V.S.A. § 1403, which
provides that a municipality waives its immunity to the extent of coverage available under a
policy of liability insurance that it has purchased. See Graham v. Town of Duxbury, 173 Vt.
498, 499, 787 A.2d 1229, 1232 (2001) (mem.) (stating that municipal immunity shields
municipalities “from tort liability in cases where the municipality fulfills a governmental rather
than a proprietary function”). In that April 24 decision, the superior court permitted plaintiff
limited discovery solely on the issue of whether the Town had purchased insurance that provided
coverage against his claims.
¶ 13. More than nine months later, in its February 6, 2015 decision, the superior court
treated defendants’ motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment and concluded that the
Town had not waived its immunity because: (1) on the record before it, the Town’s insurance
policy did not specifically cover plaintiff’s claims; and (2) no waiver resulted simply from the
Town purchasing general liability insurance from the Vermont League of Cities and Towns
(VLCT) pursuant to subchapter Chapter 121, Subchapter 6, of Title 24 concerning intermunicipal
1
We note that, although plaintiff sought $50,000 in damages representing his assessment
of the value of the subject property, the maximum liability that could be imposed based on his
negligent misrepresentation claim is his pecuniary loss, which appears to be $1372.43. See
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552B (1977) (stating that damages for negligent
misrepresentation are limited to pecuniary loss caused by misrepresentation, including
consequential damages, but do not include damages for benefit of contract).
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insurance agreements. See 24 V.S.A. § 4946 (stating that participation in intermunicipal
insurance agreement under statutory scheme shall not “constitute a waiver of sovereign
immunity under 29 V.S.A. § 1403”). The Town submitted an affidavit stating that it had
received a December 20, 2013 letter from VLCT advising that the Town was not specifically
insured for the claims asserted by plaintiff. The court stated that the letter and the underlying
policy had been provided to plaintiff in late January 2014, but plaintiff had not requested any
further discovery on the subject. The court rejected plaintiff’s bare assertion that there was a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Town’s insurance covered his claims, ruling that,
as it stands, the record establishes that the Town’s insurance policy does not cover plaintiff’s
claims. See White v. Quechee Lakes Landowners’ Ass’n, 170 Vt. 25, 28, 742 A.2d 734, 736
(1999) (stating that party opposing summary judgment may not rest upon “mere allegations,” but
must set forth specific facts showing that there is genuine issue for trial).
¶ 14. Plaintiff does not challenge the superior court’s reasoning, but rather argues that
Towns are not immune from declaratory or injunctive relief and that the municipal defendants
are necessary parties under 12 V.S.A. § 4721, which provides that “[w]hen declaratory relief is
sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected
by the declaration.” Towns may not be generally immune from declaratory or injunctive relief,
but as the superior court concluded, the Town had no authority to provide the declaratory and
injunctive relief plaintiff sought in his complaint. Nor does § 4721 help plaintiff’s cause. This
statute does not apply because, as discussed above, the superior court had already properly
dismissed plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief when it dismissed the municipal
defendants from the case. In short, declaratory relief was not available to plaintiff, and thus
§ 4721 is inapplicable. In any event, the Town’s liability hinges on that of Attorney Green, and
we agree with the superior court that she has no liability to plaintiff.
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¶ 15. We now turn to plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim against Attorney
Green. In its May 20, 2015 decision, the superior court granted summary judgment to Attorney
Green on this claim, ruling, as a matter of law, that Attorney Green owed no duty to plaintiff and
that plaintiff could not justifiably rely upon her alleged misrepresentation. The court labeled
plaintiff’s claim a professional negligence claim, which, according to the court, required plaintiff
to establish privity between Attorney Green and himself, unless he could show that the Town
intended that he was to directly benefit from her employment and therefore could reasonably rely
upon her professional representations. The court concluded that it was undisputed that Attorney
Green was hired solely to act on behalf of the Town, with no intent to benefit plaintiff, and thus
no duty was owed and plaintiff’s reliance upon her alleged misrepresentation was not reasonable.
¶ 16. On appeal, plaintiff argues that there are disputed material facts that preclude
summary judgment on this claim, principally that Attorney Green made the alleged statement
and that he justifiably relied upon it. He also argues that considerations of equity compel denial
of Attorney Green’s motion for summary judgment because LHP retained title to the subject
property without defending its title interest even though he redeemed the property based on
Attorney Green’s statement that he would be issued a tax collector’s deed if he did so. In
addition, he argues that the court erred by granting summary judgment to Attorney Green—after
a previous judge had declined to dismiss the negligent misrepresentation count—by
mischaracterizing his claim as a professional negligence claim and by considering the affidavit
of Attorney Green’s expert in the context of the summary judgment motion. Attorney Green
responds by arguing that: (1) she owed no duty of care to plaintiff; (2) plaintiff could not have
reasonably relied upon the alleged misrepresentation; (3) plaintiff failed to disclose an expert to
support his claim; (4) she is protected by qualified immunity; and (5) the undisputed facts do not
support a claim of negligent misrepresentation.
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¶ 17. In reviewing a decision granting summary judgment, this Court applies the same
standard as that applied by the trial court—the decision will be upheld if, viewing the evidence
most favorably to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine disputed issues of material fact and
the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Glassford v. Dufresne & Assocs.,
2015 VT 77, ¶ 10, ___ Vt. ___, 124 A.3d 822. “Summary judgment is mandated . . . where, after
an adequate time for discovery, a party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to [the party’s] case and on which [the party] has the burden of
proof at trial.” Poplaski v. Lamphere, 152 Vt. 251, 254-55, 565 A.2d 1326, 1329 (1989)
(quotation omitted). Although the party opposing summary judgment is given the benefit of all
reasonable doubts and inferences in determining whether there are disputed genuine issues of
material fact, the moving party may not “rely on bare allegations alone to meet the burden of
demonstrating a disputed issue of fact.” Webb v. Leclair, 2007 VT 65, ¶ 14, 182 Vt. 559, 933
A.2d 177 (mem.).
¶ 18. As an initial matter, we agree with the superior court that a previous decision by
another judge denying Attorney Green’s motion to dismiss did not preclude the court from
granting Attorney Green’s motion for summary judgment. In denying Attorney Green’s motion
to dismiss in its April 24, 2014 decision, the superior court held that, with respect to her claimed
qualified immunity, there were factual disputes as to whether Attorney Green was acting within
the scope of her employment and in good faith,2 and that plaintiff’s assertions of negligent
misrepresentation were sufficient to avoid dismissal on the pleadings under Vermont law. More
2
In its May 20, 2015 decision, the superior court did not consider the issue of qualified
immunity, perhaps because, assuming Attorney Green made the alleged misrepresentation, her
good faith would be in doubt. See Murray v. White, 155 Vt. 621, 630, 587 A.2d 975, 980 (1991)
(stating that good faith depends “on the objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct, as
measured by reference to clearly established law” (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (1982))).
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than a year later, a different presiding superior court judge granted Attorney Green’s motion for
summary judgment.
¶ 19. As the superior court pointed out in rejecting plaintiff’s argument that the earlier
ruling was the “law of the case” and could not be disturbed, the standards for dismissing a case
on the pleadings and granting summary judgment are distinct. See Mello v. Cohen, 168 Vt. 639,
641, 724 A.2d 471, 474 (1998) (mem.) (explaining different standards for reviewing motions to
dismiss as opposed to motions for summary judgment, and stating that “[e]ven though a
plaintiff’s allegations present a cognizable claim sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, the
same allegations may well prove insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment”); see
also Huntley v. Young, 462 S.E.2d 860, 861 (S.C. 1995) (per curiam) (“The denial of a Rule
12(b)(6) motion does not establish the law of the case nor does it preclude a party from raising
the issue at a later point or points in the case. Since the order denying the Rule 12(b)(6) motion
does not finally decide any issue, it is not directly appealable.”). Indeed, even if the previous
judge had denied an earlier motion for summary judgment based on the same information, we
have explicitly held that a second judge may grant a motion for summary judgment or judgment
on the pleadings after denial of a similar motion by another judge. Morrisseau v. Fayette, 164
Vt. 358, 363, 670 A.2d 820, 823-24 (1995) (explaining that judges should not be required to
perpetuate error or take more roundabout way to arrive at necessary judgment); see also
Converse v. Town of Charleston, 158 Vt. 166, 169, 605 A.2d 535, 537 (1992) (stating that “law
of the case” doctrine did not preclude trial judge from directing verdict for town at trial even
though pretrial judge denied town’s motion summary judgment on same issue).
¶ 20. Plaintiff also contends that the superior court erred by transforming his negligent
misrepresentation claim into a professional malpractice claim. We need not address this
contention because we agree with the superior court that, apart from the issue of whether
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Attorney Green owed a duty to plaintiff, plaintiff cannot prevail on his negligent
misrepresentation claim because, under the circumstances of this case, he cannot show that he
justifiably relied upon the statements he alleges that Attorney Green made.
¶ 21. With respect to the common law tort of negligent misrepresentation, we have
adopted the Restatement (Second) of Tort § 552(1) (1977), which provides as follows:
One who, in the course of his [or her] business, profession or
employment, or in any other transaction in which he [or she] has a
pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of
others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the
information, if he [or she] fails to exercise reasonable care or
competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
Here, the superior court concluded in the alternative that, under the circumstances of this case, it
was not reasonable as a matter of law for plaintiff, who was attempting to take commercial
advantage of the opportunities allowed by the statutory tax sale procedures, to rely on statements
by the taxing authority’s attorney, particularly given plaintiff’s acknowledgement that he was
familiar with the tax sale redemption process. See Sain v. Cedar Rapids Cnty. Sch. Dist., 626
N.W.2d 115, 125 (Iowa 2001) (noting that tort of negligent representation “is generally thought
to only apply to business transactions”).3
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Related to questions of duty and reliance is the requirement in § 552(1) that the
defendant have a pecuniary interest with respect to the information given. “If [the defendant] has
no pecuniary interest and the information is given purely gratuitously, [the defendant] is under
no duty to exercise reasonable care and competence in giving it.” Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 552(1) cmt. c. Giving the information “in the course of the defendant’s business, profession or
employment is a sufficient indication that [the defendant] has a pecuniary interest in it, even
though [the defendant] receives no consideration for it,” but is not “conclusive.” Id. cmt. d. If
the information is supplied purely gratuitously, the recipient of the information is not justified in
relying upon it. Id. Here, plaintiff did not dispute the facts, as stated by Attorney Green in her
affidavit and by the Town in its statement of undisputed facts, that the town clerk hired Attorney
Green to conduct a tax sale of certain properties, including the subject property, and that she was
compensated immediately after the tax sale by receiving fifteen percent of the delinquent tax,
consistent with 32 V.S.A. § 5258 (allowing tax collector maximum of fifteen percent of
uncollected tax for expenses actually and reasonably incurred by tax collector for legal assistance
in preparation for and conduct of tax sale authorized by town selectboard). Attorney Green did
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¶ 22. We agree. Justifiable reliance is determined under an objective standard; we have
upheld a jury instruction stating that “[p]laintiffs may justifiably rely upon a representation when
the representation is not obviously false and the truth of the representation is not within the
knowledge of, or known by plaintiffs.” See McGee v. Vermont Fed. Bank, 169 Vt. 529, 531,
726 A.2d 42, 44-45 (1999) (mem.) (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). In McGee, we
held that the plaintiff homebuyers failed to state a cause of action for negligent representation
against the defendant bank because they did not indicate in their pleadings that they were unable
to verify information provided by the bank concerning the status of home insurance coverage or
that they could not have obtained that information directly from the sellers or the insurance
company. Id. at 531, 726 A.2d at 45.
¶ 23. Here, plaintiff does not dispute the superior court’s finding that he “asserted that
he was familiar with the tax sale redemption process, and thus was in a position to know, or at
least ascertain the falsity of any representation made to him by Attorney Green.” Nor does
plaintiff dispute Attorney Green’s statements, which were based on plaintiff’s resume and
deposition testimony, that plaintiff “has a college degree in legal assisting and has worked as a
paralegal for ten years” and “educated himself as to the tax sale and redemption process by
reading the relevant statutes and case law” during a seven-year period when he worked as the
credit manager for a gas company. As indicated above, the governing statutes plainly delineate
what redemption entails—extinguishment of the tax sale purchaser’s contingent interest in the
subject property—and the circumstances under which a tax collector’s deed can issue—when the
subject property is not redeemed. Thus, a simple review of the governing statutes reveals that
redemption of property sold at a tax sale does not entitle the redeeming party to a collector’s
deed. Indeed, the alleged statement attributed to Attorney Green makes no sense because it
not receive any further compensation in connection with the tax sale of the subject property or
her contact with plaintiff.
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would allow any person to obtain title to a property following a tax sale simply by paying the
back taxes plus interest and fees, thereby depriving delinquent taxpayers of their statutory right
to receive any overpayments and winning bidders of their contingent interest in the property.
Under these circumstances, plaintiff cannot demonstrate justifiable reliance on the alleged
statement made by Attorney Green. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552A (“The recipient
of a negligent misrepresentation is barred from recovery for pecuniary loss suffered in reliance
upon it if he is negligent in so relying.”).
Affirmed.
FOR THE COURT:
Chief Justice
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