Quarles v. Courtyard Gardens Health and Rehabilitation LLC , 2016 Ark. LEXIS 98 ( 2016 )

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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CV-15-711
KENNY QUARLES, AS SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF Opinion Delivered: March 17, 2016
BENNIE JEAN QUARLES, DECEASED,
AND ON BEHALF OF THE WRONGFUL APPEAL FROM THE CLARK
DEATH BENEFICIARIES OF BENNIE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
JEAN QUARLES, DECEASED [CV-2011-11]
APPELLANT
HONORABLE ROBERT
V. MCCALLUM, JUDGE
COURTYARD GARDENS HEALTH AND
REHABILITATION, LLC A/K/A
COURTYARD GARDENS HEALTH AND
REHABILITATION; ARKADELPHIA
HOLDINGS, LLC; SLC OPERATIONS
MASTER TENANT, LLC; SLC
OPERATIONS, LLC; SLC
PROFESSIONALS OF ARKANSAS, LLC;
SLC ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES OF
ARKANSAS, LLC; CAPITAL
SENIORCARE VENTURES, LLC; SLC
PROPERTIES, LLC; 2701 TWIN RIVERS
DRIVE, LLC; SENIOR VANTAGE POINT,
LLC; SENIOR LIVING COMMUNITIES OF
ARKANSAS, LLC; EOR GROUP, LTD;
EOR, LLC; EOR-ARK, LLC; VAJ, LLC;
QUALITY REVIEW, LLC; ANGELA
MARLAR, IN HER CAPACITY AS
ADMINISTRATOR/EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR OF GOLDEN
LIVINGCENTER – ARKADELPHIA N/K/A
COURTYARD GARDENS HEALTH AND
REHABILITATION, LLC; AND DEBORAH
THORNTON, IN HER CAPACITY AS
ADMINISTRATOR OF COURTYARD
GARDENS HEALTH AND AFFIRMED.
REHABILITATION, LLC F/K/A GOLDEN
LIVINGCENTER - ARKADELPHIA
APPELLEES
COURTNEY HUDSON GOODSON, Associate Justice
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Appellant Kenny Quarles, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Bennie Jean
Quarles, deceased, and on behalf of the wrongful-death beneficiaries of Bennie Jean Quarles,
deceased (the Estate) appeals the order entered by the Circuit Court of Clark County
granting the motion for summary judgment filed by appellees Courtyard Gardens Health
and Rehabilitation, LLC, and others (Courtyard Gardens). For reversal, the Estate contends
that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment and by failing to grant its motion
for reconsideration. We affirm.
I. Factual Background
The record reflects that Bennie Jean Quarles, the decedent, was a resident of
Courtyard Gardens, a long-term-care facility in Arkadelphia, from June 2009 to March
2010, when she transferred to another nursing home. On June 4, 2010, Bennie Jean
purportedly executed a durable power of attorney in favor of her son, Kenny Quarles. On
January 27, 2011, Kenny, as “Power of Attorney for Bennie Jean Quarles, an incapacitated
person,” filed suit against Courtyard Gardens alleging claims of negligence, medical
malpractice, and violations of the Arkansas Long-Term Care Residents’ Rights Act. 1 Kenny
filed an amended complaint in that same capacity on May 3, 2011.
On June 27, 2011, Courtyard Gardens filed a motion to compel arbitration of the
claims contained in the amended complaint. Subsequently, on July 8, 2011, Kenny filed a
1
The facility in Arkadelphia where Bennie Jean resided was under previous
ownership when she first entered the nursing home in February 2009. The lawsuit also
named the prior owner and other related entities as defendants. However, the circuit court
subsequently entered an order dismissing those defendants upon the settlement of the claims
against them.
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“Statement of Fact of Death” giving notice that Bennie Jean had died on May 17, 2011.
On July 20, 2011, the circuit court entered an order substituting as the nominal plaintiff
“Kenny Quarles, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Bennie Jean Quarles, deceased,
and on behalf of the wrongful death beneficiaries of Bennie Jean Quarles, deceased.”
On July 6, 2012, the circuit court issued an order denying Courtyard Gardens’
motion to compel arbitration. Courtyard Gardens appealed that decision, and the Estate
also filed a cross-appeal of the circuit court’s order. This court affirmed on direct appeal
and considered the cross-appeal moot. Courtyard Gardens Health & Rehab., LLC v. Quarles,
2013 Ark. 228, 428 S.W.3d 437. We held that the arbitration agreement failed because the
evidence did not establish that Bennie Jean’s son, Ronald Quarles, who had signed the
agreement, had the actual authority to bind her to arbitration.
Following our decision, the parties engaged in discovery, and the circuit court set
trial dates but granted several continuances. The court entered a scheduling order on August
27, 2014, setting a two-week trial to begin on June 22, 2015. In addition, this order
required the parties to participate in mediation. The record also reflects that Courtyard
Gardens deposed Kenny and his wife, Oleater Quarles, on October 9, 2014. It also took
the deposition of Dr. Ferdinand Roda, Bennie Jean’s treating physician, on December 22,
2014.
On January 30, 2015, the day scheduled for mediation, Courtyard Gardens filed the
motion for summary judgment that is the subject of this appeal. Citing Rhuland v. Fahr,
356 Ark. 382, 155 S.W.3d 2 (2004), Courtyard Gardens asserted that the complaint and the
amended complaint filed by Kenny under the power of attorney given to him by Bennie
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Jean were nullities because the power of attorney executed in June 2010 was invalid.
According to Courtyard Gardens, the power of attorney was invalid for two reasons. First,
based on Bennie Jean’s medical records, and the depositions of Dr. Roda, Kenny, and
Oleater, it argued that Bennie Jean did not possess the legal capacity to execute the power
of attorney. Courtyard Gardens also claimed that the Estate was barred by principles of
judicial estoppel from contesting Bennie Jean’s incapacity because the Estate had maintained
in previous filings with the circuit court, as well as those filed with this court on appeal of
the arbitration matter, that Bennie Jean lacked the capacity to delegate authority to her son
to execute the arbitration agreement. Second, citing Jones v. Owen, 2009 Ark. 505, 342
S.W.3d 265, 2 Courtyard Gardens argued that the power of attorney had not been properly
acknowledged. In support of these assertions, Courtyard Gardens included as exhibits
Bennie Jean’s medical records from April, May, and June 2010 showing that she suffered
from advanced Alzheimer’s disease and Parkinson’s disease. An assessment dated March 16,
2010, reflected a diagnosis of dementia, and all of the boxes on the form were marked “no”
for the categories of “able to understand,” “able to communicate,” “memory recall,” and
“alert and oriented.” Courtyard Gardens also relied on excerpts from Dr. Roda’s deposition
to say that Bennie Jean’s dementia rendered her incapacitated during her residency. In
addition, Courtyard Gardens pointed to Kenny’s deposition in which he stated that, when
2
In Jones, this court held that a notary public has properly taken an acknowledgment
when he or she witnesses the signing of an instrument or when the signer subsequently
appears before the notary and acknowledges his or her signature on the instrument. In that
case, we held that a power of attorney was invalid because it was not properly acknowledged
when the notary signed the certificate before the signer placed his signature on the
document.
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Bennie Jean executed the power of attorney, he placed the pen in Bennie Jean’s hand and
that he held her arm and “helped her arm” sign the document. Finally, it relied on Oleater’s
deposition testimony that she took the signed power of attorney to the notary public for
acknowledgment after Bennie Jean had purportedly signed the instrument. Courtyard
Gardens maintained that the circuit court should dismiss the action with prejudice because
the statute of limitations on the Estate’s claims had expired.
In response, the Estate argued that the provisions of Rule 17(a) of the Arkansas Rules
of Civil Procedure required that it be allowed a reasonable time to ratify the complaints or
to substitute the real party in interest. It maintained that these things had already been
accomplished when Kenny, as the duly appointed special administrator of the estate, had
been substituted as the real party in interest prior to the expiration of the statute of
limitations. Further, the Estate argued that Rhuland, supra, did not apply because it was
based on the requirements of the wrongful-death statute as to who could bring suit. The
Estate also argued that the doctrine of judicial estoppel was not applicable because it had not
taken inconsistent positions. Alternatively, the Estate asserted that the doctrine of equitable
estoppel barred Courtyard Gardens’ argument because it had waited four years to question
Kenny’s standing to bring suit. In addition, it contended that the question whether Bennie
Jean had sufficient capacity to execute the power of attorney was a disputed question of fact
that was not suited for summary disposition.
In reply, Courtyard Gardens argued that the substitution of Kenny as the special
administrator was of no consequence because Rule 17 does not apply to complaints that are
nullities, citing Brewer v. Poole, 362 Ark. 1, 15, 207 S.W.3d 458, 466 (2005) (“Where the
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original complaint is a nullity, Rules 15 and 17 are inapplicable because the original
complaint never existed.”). It also argued that principles of estoppel did not bar it from
challenging Kenny’s standing to file suit because it could not have raised the issue before
the arbitration question was resolved without risking the waiver of its claimed right to
arbitrate. It also asserted that it had promptly raised the issue when problems concerning
the execution of the power of attorney came to light from the depositions of Kenny,
Oleater, and Dr. Roda taken in October and December 2014.
The circuit court held a hearing on April 30, 2015. On May 6, 2015, the circuit
court entered its order granting Courtyard Gardens’ motion for summary judgment. The
order recites,
On April 30, 2015, counsel presented oral arguments regarding the
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Based upon the argument of
counsel, the pleadings, submitted briefs and exhibits, the court finds that the
Defendants’ arguments are persuasive and correct. Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted.
On May 15, 2015, the Estate filed a motion for new trial and reconsideration. In this
motion, the Estate reiterated its position that the proper party, Kenny, as the administrator
of the estate, had been substituted as the party plaintiff before the statute of limitations had
expired. In addition, it continued to argue that principles of equitable estoppel precluded
Courtyard Gardens from asserting the lack of standing at this juncture. For the first time,
the Estate also asserted that, pursuant to Rule 17(b), it was the circuit court’s duty to ensure
that a case brought on behalf of an incompetent person proceeds. Also based on Rule 17(b),
it maintained that Bennie Jean was the real party in interest and that, regardless of the validity
of the power of attorney, the court had an obligation to recognize Kenny as Bennie Jean’s
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next friend to prosecute the action. For these propositions, the Estate cited Missouri State
Life Insurance Co. v. Holt, 186 Ark. 672, 55 S.W.2d 788 (1932) (holding that, even if the
appointment of the guardian had been void, the proper party was the insane person, and it
was the duty of the court to allow the guardian to proceed as next friend, or to appoint a
guardian ad litem, and not turn the insane person out of court), and Harral v. Helton, 230
Ark. 913, 327 S.W.2d 549 (1959) (recognizing the trial court’s duty to permit an
incompetent person to sue and to see that she is represented by a guardian or next friend).
Also, the Estate argued that Courtyard Gardens had waived the issue of standing by not
asserting it in a timely fashion or that Courtyard Gardens had waived it by not asserting the
defense in its answer or a timely filed amended answer. In its response, Courtyard Gardens
continued to assert that the complaints filed by Kenny were null and void, and it also argued
that the Estate was improperly raising issues for the first time in the motion for
reconsideration.
The circuit court did not rule on the motion for reconsideration; therefore, it was
deemed denied after a period of thirty days. Ark. R. App. P. Civ.–4(b)(1). The Estate filed
timely notices of appeal from the summary-judgment order and from the deemed-denial of
the motion to reconsider. This appeal followed.
II. Standards of Review
This case comes to us from an order granting summary judgment. The law is well
settled regarding the standard of review used by this court in reviewing a grant of summary
judgment. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Taylor, 2015 Ark. 78, 455 S.W.3d 811. A circuit court
will grant summary judgment only when it is apparent that no genuine issues of material
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fact exist requiring litigation and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Anderson’s Taekwondo Ctr. Camp Positive, Inc. v. Landers Auto Grp. No. 1, Inc., 2015
Ark. 268. Once the moving party has established a prima facie entitlement to summary
judgment, the opposing party must meet proof with proof and demonstrate the existence of
a material issue of fact. Hotel Assocs., Inc. v. Rieves, Rubens & Mayton, 2014 Ark. 254, 435
S.W.3d 488. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court determines if
summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidentiary items presented by
the moving party in support of the motion left a material question of fact unanswered. GSS,
LLC v. CenterPoint Energy Gas Transmission Co., 2014 Ark. 144, 432 S.W.3d 583. We view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was filed,
resolving all doubts and inferences against the moving party. Arloe Designs, LLC v. Ark.
Capital Corp., 2014 Ark. 21, 431 S.W.3d 277.
III. Material Question of Fact
The Estate first argues that the evidence is in material dispute regarding Bennie Jean’s
capacity at the time she executed the power of attorney. In support of this argument, the
Estate relies on the deposition testimony of Kenny and Oleater indicating that they
explained the power of attorney to Bennie Jean and that she both understood and agreed to
sign it. This argument, however, ignores Courtyard Gardens’ alternative contention that
the power of attorney was invalid as a matter of law because it was not properly
acknowledged by the notary public. Although the Estate appears to be under the impression
that the circuit court did not rule on the acknowledgment issue, it is mistaken. We have
previously recognized that when a circuit court denies a summary-judgment motion
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without expressly stating the basis for its ruling, that ruling encompasses the issues presented
to the circuit court by the briefs and arguments of the parties. Asset Acceptance, LLC v.
Newby, 2014 Ark. 280, 437 S.W.3d 119. This rule also applies when a circuit court grants
a motion for summary judgment. Hardin v. Bishop, 2013 Ark. 395, 430 S.W.3d 49. In this
case, the circuit court did not specify any particular basis for its decision. Instead, the court
found “that the Defendants’ arguments are persuasive and correct.” With this blanket
ruling, the circuit court is deemed to have accepted all of the arguments advanced by
Courtyard Gardens, including its contention that the power of attorney was invalid because
it was not properly acknowledged. Because the Estate does not raise an argument to contest
that finding in its opening brief, we do not address any issue regarding the circuit court’s
decision that the power of attorney was not valid. We have held that where the circuit
court bases its decision on two independent grounds and an appellant challenges only one
on appeal, this court will affirm without addressing the merits of either argument. English
v. Robbins, 2014 Ark. 511, 452 S.W.3d 566. Although the Estate maintains in its reply brief
that material questions of fact remain as to whether the power of attorney was properly
acknowledged, we have consistently ruled that issues cannot be raised for the first time in a
reply brief. See Jewel v. Fletcher, 2010 Ark. 195, 377 S.W.3d 176. We affirm the circuit
court’s ruling that the power of attorney is invalid.
IV. Ark. R. Civ. P. 17(b)
In this point on appeal, the Estate argues that Rule 17(b) and this court’s precedents
recognize the ability of an incompetent person to file suit by and through a next friend. It
argues that an incompetent’s right to bring suit is expressly recognized in Rule 17(b), which
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provides that an incompetent person who does not have a guardian “may sue by his next
friend or a guardian ad litem.” Under such circumstances, the Estate argues, the real party
in interest was Bennie Jean, and it asserts that, even if the power of attorney was invalid,
Kenny had standing to file suit as Bennie’s next friend. The Estate contends that the rule
places on the circuit court the duty to ensure that the incompetent’s rights are protected.
Further, the Estate argues that cases construing the requirements of the wrongful-death
statute, such as Rhuland, supra, are not instructive in cases involving an incompetent plaintiff.
It asserts that our precedents applying a former statute upon which Rule 17(b) is modeled
establish that the complaints filed by Kenny were not nullities, citing Holt, supra, Harral,
supra, and Scott v. Stephenson, 168 Ark. 763, 271 S.W.2d 714 (1925). In addition, the Estate
relies on those cases to argue that, because the complaints were not nullities, the substitution
of Kenny as the special administrator of Bennie Jean’s estate cured any deficiencies in the
original and amended complaints prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations.
The Estate’s arguments are based on the provisions of Rule 17(b) and our precedents,
and their success hinges on whether the complaints filed by Kenny under the invalid power
of attorney were nullities. As Courtyard Gardens correctly points out, the Estate first
mentioned Rule 17(b) and those precedents in its motion for new trial and reconsideration.
This court has repeatedly held that an objection first made in a motion for new trial is not
timely. Switzer v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 362 Ark. 419, 208 S.W.3d 792 (2005); Tate-Smith v.
Cupples, 355 Ark. 230, 134 S.W.3d 535 (2003); Lee v. Daniel, 350 Ark. 466, 91 S.W.3d 464
(2002). Any error argued on appeal must have first been directed to the circuit court’s
attention in some appropriate manner so that the court has an opportunity to address the
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issue. Stacks v. Jones, 323 Ark. 643, 916 S.W.2d 120 (1996). A party cannot wait until the
outcome of a case to bring an error to the circuit court’s attention. Jones v. Double “D”
Props., Inc., 352 Ark. 39, 98 S.W.3d 405 (2003). In the absence of an argument that is
preserved for appeal, we affirm the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment based on the
conclusion that the complaints were nullities.
V. Waiver
Next, the Estate contends that Courtyard Gardens waived any question of Kenny’s
standing to file suit by not asserting this defense in its responsive pleading. Failing that, it
also contends that Courtyard Gardens waived the issue of standing by waiting to assert this
claim nearly four years after the lawsuit had commenced because it had reason to know
from the available medical records that Bennie Jean may have lacked the capacity to execute
the power of attorney.
The Estate’s claim that the issue of standing is lost unless made in answer to the
complaint was raised for the first time in its motion for new trial or reconsideration. As
such, that precise issue is not properly before us, because an argument made for the first
time in a new-trial motion is not timely. Switzer, supra. Although the Estate did not raise
any issue of waiver in its response to the motion for summary judgment, it did assert the
question of waiver generally, and briefly, at the hearing on the motion for summary
judgment. Counsel for the Estate argued,
And I understand, appreciate that they said that in May 2013 [when we
decided the arbitration appeal] is when they could’ve filed this thing that well,
they didn’t do it then either. They still waited another year and a half as we
went through litigation on all sorts of things when they had all the information
about the capacity as to Ms. Quarles. They had all the medical records. All
that information was available back in May of 2013. They didn’t do it. They
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wait another year and a half to raise this issue. So I do think there’s a waiver
here. I think there is estoppel. And we make that argument in our brief. But
I think that Your Honor can also find waiver of the argument.
Based on this argument, we are satisfied that the Estate’s general assertion of waiver is
preserved for appeal. However, the argument is not well taken.
Waiver is the voluntary abandonment or surrender by a capable person of a right
known to him to exist, with the intent that he shall forever be deprived of its benefits, and
it may occur when one, with full knowledge of the material facts, does something which is
inconsistent with the right or his intention to rely upon it. Cochran v. Bentley, 369 Ark. 159,
251 S.W.3d 253 (2007). As we have mentioned, Courtyard Gardens asserted, and the circuit
court found, that the power of attorney was invalid based on two independent grounds—
Bennie Jean’s lack of mental capacity and the absence of a proper acknowledgment. While
the question whether Courtyard Gardens may have waived the issue of capacity is debatable,
the same cannot be said regarding the issue of proper acknowledgment. Here, the record
shows that Courtyard Gardens did not have full knowledge of the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the power of attorney until the depositions of Kenny and
Oleater were taken in October 2014, when it was learned that the notary public did not
acknowledge Bennie Jean’s signature in her presence. Thereafter, Courtyard Gardens
promptly filed the motion for summary judgment on January 30, 2015. The Estate’s claim
of waiver is without merit.
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VI. Estoppel and Laches
For its final point on appeal, the Estate contends that the motion for summary
judgment filed nearly four years after Courtyard Gardens learned of the relevant facts is
precluded by the doctrine of laches and estoppel. Again, it argues that Courtyard Gardens
knew that Bennie Jean’s medical records indicated that she suffered from moderate to severe
dementia a year before the power of attorney was signed.
The elements of estoppel are (1) the party to be estopped knew the facts; (2) the
party to be estopped intended that the conduct be acted on; (3) the party asserting the
estoppel was ignorant of the facts; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel relied on the
other’s conduct and was injured by that reliance. Here, the estoppel argument fails for the
very simple reason that the third element is not satisfied. As with the previous issue, we
need only focus on the acknowledgment issue. On this record, we cannot conclude that
the Estate was ignorant of the facts because all of the evidence comes from sources to which
the Estate had superior access, such as the witnesses to the execution of the power of
attorney.
The defense of laches is based on the equitable principle that an unreasonable delay
by the party seeking relief precludes recovery when the circumstances are such as to make
it inequitable or unjust for the party to seek relief. Royal Oaks Vista, LLC v. Maddox, 372
Ark. 119, 271 S.W.3d 479 (2008). The laches defense requires a detrimental change in
position of the one asserting the doctrine, as well as an unreasonable delay by the one
asserting his rights against whom laches is invoked. Summit Mall Co., LLC v. Lemond, 355
Ark. 190, 132 S.W.3d 725 (2003). Considering, once again, only the issue of
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acknowledgment, Courtyard Gardens questioned the validity of the power of attorney on
that ground a few months after it learned that Bennie Jean’s signature was notarized outside
her presence after she signed the instrument. Because there was no unreasonable delay, we
cannot conclude that laches barred Courtyard Gardens from raising the issue.
Affirmed.
BRILL, C.J., DANIELSON and HART, JJ., concur.
PAUL E. DANIELSON, Justice, concurring. My analysis of this case differs from
the majority’s in that I would address the doctrine of laches as it pertains to Courtyard
Gardens’ argument that Bennie Jean Quarles lacked the requisite capacity to execute a
power of attorney. The Estate preserved its laches defense by raising it in response to
Courtyard Gardens’ motion for summary judgment.
The doctrine of laches is based on a number of equitable principles that are premised
on some detrimental change in position made in reliance upon the action or inaction of the
other party. See, e.g., Cochran v. Bentley, 369 Ark. 159, 251 S.W.3d 253 (2007). It is based
on the assumption that the party to whom laches is imputed has knowledge of his rights and
the opportunity to assert them, that by reason of his delay some adverse party has good
reason to believe that those rights are worthless or have been abandoned, and that because
of a change of conditions during this delay it would be unjust to the latter to permit him to
assert them. See id. The laches defense requires a detrimental change in the position of the
one asserting the doctrine, as well as an unreasonable delay by the one asserting his rights
against whom laches is invoked. See, e.g., Felton v. Rebsamen Med. Ctr., Inc., 373 Ark. 472,
284 S.W.3d 486 (2008). The application of the doctrine to each case depends on its
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particular circumstances. See, e.g., Royal Oaks Vista, L.L.C. v. Maddox, 372 Ark. 119, 271
S.W.3d 479 (2008). The issue of laches is one of fact, and a reviewing court does not reverse
a circuit court’s decision on a question of fact unless it is clearly erroneous. See id.
Kenny Quarles initiated this litigation on January 27, 2011, when he filed his initial
complaint as power of attorney for his mother, who was incapacitated at that time.
Courtyard Gardens proceeded to litigate the matter for four years before it finally filed its
motion for summary judgment on January 30, 2015, asserting for the first time that Kenny
Quarles did not have standing because his mother lacked capacity to execute the power of
attorney. During those four years, the parties engaged in discovery, scheduled trial dates
and mediation, and litigated Courtyard Gardens’ motion to compel arbitration. Courtyard
Gardens pursued an appeal on the issue of arbitration, and we issued an opinion holding
that there was no valid arbitration agreement. Courtyard Gardens Health & Rehab., LLC v.
Quarles, 2013 Ark. 228, 428 S.W.3d 437. In addition, upon his mother’s death, Kenny
Quarles filed a motion seeking to be substituted as party plaintiff in his capacity as special
administrator of her estate, which the circuit court granted without objection from
Courtyard Gardens. Still, during all of that time, Courtyard Gardens never asserted or
pursued the threshold defense of standing in spite of the fact that it had access to Bennie
Jean Quarles’s medical records, which called into question her capacity at the relevant time.
See Grand Valley Ridge, LLC v. Metro. Nat’l Bank, 2012 Ark. 121, at 9, 388 S.W.3d 24, 31
(stating that “[w]e treat the question of standing to sue as a threshold issue”). During the
long pendency of this litigation, Courtyard Gardens never argued that Kenny Quarles was
not the proper person to bring suit.
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Under the particular circumstances of this case, this constituted an unreasonable delay
on the part of Courtyard Gardens. Moreover, during that four-year period, the statute of
limitations on the Estate’s claims expired, which easily demonstrates prejudice. See Cochran,
369 Ark. at 170, 251 S.W.3d at 263 (stating that the doctrine of laches requires “a showing
of some sort that the party asserting the doctrine has suffered or changed its position as a
result of the lack of diligence or delay in assertion of rights”). In my view, Courtyard
Gardens’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of Bennie Jean Quarles’s capacity was
barred by laches because (1) Courtyard Gardens had knowledge of its potential standing
defense and its opportunity to assert it; (2) by reason of its delay, the Estate had good reason
to believe that the defense had been abandoned; and (3) because of the expiration of the
statute of limitations during the delay, it would be unjust to permit Courtyard Gardens to
assert the defense. See id.
However, in light of the fact that Courtyard Gardens raised an alternative,
independent ground to support summary judgment—namely, that the power of attorney
was invalid because it had not been properly acknowledged—and because laches does not
apply on that issue, I must concur in the result reached by the majority.
Brill, C.J., and Hart, J., join in this concurrence.
Wilkes & McHugh, P.A., by: Carl R. Wilander, John V. O’Grady, and William P.
Murracy III; and Appellate Solutions, PLLC d/b/a Riordan Law Firm, by: Deborah Truby
Riordan, for appellant.
Kutak Rock LLP, by: Mark W. Dossett, Scott Jackson, and Samantha B. Leflar, for
appellees.
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