RALPH L. CLARK, JR. v. UNITED STATES , 2016 D.C. App. LEXIS 104 ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •                              District of Columbia
    Court of Appeals
    No. 14-CO-1393
    APR 21 2016
    RALPH L. CLARK, JR.,
    Appellant,
    v.                                               CF3-7495-10
    UNITED STATES,
    Appellee.
    On Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia
    Criminal Division
    BEFORE: WASHINGTON, Chief Judge; THOMPSON, Associate Judge, and
    FERREN, Senior Judge.
    JUDGMENT
    This case was submitted to the court on the transcript of record and the
    briefs filed, and without presentation of oral argument. On consideration whereof, and
    for the reasons set forth in the opinion filed this date, it is now hereby
    ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the judgment of the trial court is
    affirmed.
    For the Court:
    Dated: April 21, 2016.
    Opinion by Senior Judge John M. Ferren.
    Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
    Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the
    Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound
    volumes go to press.
    DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
    4/21/16
    No. 14-CO-1393
    RALPH L. CLARK, JR., APPELLANT,
    v.
    UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.
    Appeal from the Superior
    Court of the District of Columbia
    (CF3-7495-10)
    (Hon. Ann O. Keary, Trial Judge)
    (Submitted February 2, 2016                                 Decided April 21, 2016)
    William T. Morrison was on the brief for appellant.
    Vincent H. Cohen, Jr., Acting United States Attorney at the time the brief
    was filed, and Elizabeth Trosman, and Candice C. Wong, Assistant United States
    Attorneys, were on the brief for appellee.
    Before WASHINGTON, Chief Judge, THOMPSON, Associate Judge, and
    FERREN, Senior Judge.
    FERREN, Senior Judge: This is the second time this case has come before
    this court, a collateral attack on the conviction we affirmed in Clark I.1 Alleging
    1
    Clark v. United States, 
    51 A.3d 1266
    (D.C. 2012) (Clark I).
    2
    ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant asks us to reverse the trial court‟s
    denial, without a hearing, of his motion to vacate his conviction and sentence
    pursuant to D.C. Code § 23-110 (c). After reviewing the record, we agree that
    appellant‟s representation was constitutionally deficient, but we conclude that he
    suffered no prejudice as a result. Accordingly, we must affirm.
    I. Facts and Proceedings
    Appellant Ralph L. Clark was convicted of committing an armed robbery at
    Starbucks in the Howard University book store. He accepted the government‟s
    plea offer, which provided in relevant part that “[a]lthough the [g]overnment
    reserves the right to allocute at [Clark‟s] sentence in this case, it agrees not to
    allocute for a sentence greater than 10 years incarceration.”2 In its Memorandum
    in Aid of Sentencing, however, the government — in three places —
    recommended that Clark receive twenty years of incarceration.3
    2
    
    Id. at 1267.
          3
    
    Id. 3 “At
    the sentencing, the trial judge, having reviewed the plea agreement,
    mentioned the error in the government‟s memorandum.                    The prosecutor
    immediately acknowledged the error, explaining that she had forgotten the “cap”
    and agreeing that the twenty-year recommendation was „off the table.‟”4 Defense
    counsel responded that she “didn‟t have a chance to talk to Mr. Clark about this.”5
    She added that, because the government had filed a document vigorously arguing
    for a sentence that violates the plea agreement, the government should file another
    one with a retraction indicating that “they‟re vigorously arguing for the sentence
    that they agreed that they would.”6 The trial judge agreed with counsel but did not
    delay the sentencing. She advised counsel, after reviewing the plea agreement, that
    she had “immediately noticed the error” upon reading the government‟s sentencing
    memorandum; that “everyone‟s ready for sentencing today”; and that it would be
    “sufficient with the confession of error” if the prosecutor were to file “an amended
    document and we vacate the other one.”7 Defense counsel concurred, “[a]s long as
    the error is corrected.”8
    4
    
    Id. at 1268.
          5
    
    Id. 6 Id.
          7
    
    Clark, 51 A.3d at 1268
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    (continued . . .)
    4
    During allocution, after reviewing Clark‟s “violent criminal history,” the
    prosecutor concluded by saying that “a ten-year sentence is very generous in this
    case.”9 Defense counsel asked for leniency but did not object to the prosecutor‟s
    allocution. After permitting Clark to speak, the judge sentenced him to prison for
    ten years, a sentence, we later observed, that “was consistent with the prosecutor‟s
    obligations under the plea agreement.”10
    II. Direct Appeal (Clark I)
    On direct appeal (Clark I), Clark‟s new counsel argued that the prosecutor
    had violated the plea agreement not only by recommending a twenty-year sentence
    after promising to cap the allocution at ten years, but also by compounding the
    violation by arguing that a ten year sentence would be “very generous.”11 Counsel
    _________________________________
    (. . . continued)
    8
    
    Id. The corrected
    memorandum was filed the day after sentencing. See 
    id. 9 Id.
    (emphasis omitted).
    10
    
    Id. at 1269.
          11
    
    Id. 5 on
    appeal therefore asked this court to vacate Clark‟s sentence and arrange for
    resentencing before a different judge. Counsel also argued that if the new sentence
    were to exceed ten years, Clark should be permitted to withdraw his plea.12
    This court agreed that the government‟s breach of the plea agreement in the
    sentencing memorandum “was both grave and inexcusable,” indeed that this
    “blatant breach” had “potentially devastating consequences” for two reasons: the
    prosecutor initially requested twice the level of incarceration — “ten more years”
    — than the plea agreement allowed, and the prosecutor argued at sentencing that
    even the ten years called for by the agreement was “very generous.”13          This
    allocution, we said, “was anything but an emphatic retreat from the impropriety”; it
    was an “implied dissatisfaction with that agreement.”14 We acknowledged no
    reason to question the judge‟s assurance that she would be guided by the plea
    agreement, not by the government‟s noncompliance; but, we stressed: “the judge
    had read what she had read and had heard what she had heard, and the combination
    of what the prosecutor wrote and what the prosecutor said could hardly have left
    12
    
    Clark, 51 A.3d at 1269
    .
    13
    
    Id. at 1269-70.
          14
    
    Id. at 1270.
                                              6
    the judge in doubt that the level of the prosecutor‟s commitment to the plea
    agreement was quite modest.”15
    All this said, we noted that when the judge decided to go ahead with
    sentencing, defense counsel replied, “Okay.”16 Furthermore, counsel did not object
    to the judge‟s decision to keep the case for sentencing, rather than referring it to
    another judge; nor did counsel object to the prosecutor‟s allocution.17 This left us,
    we said, no alternative to reviewing the record for “plain error affecting substantial
    rights,” a review focused exclusively on the actions of the trial judge.18 This meant
    that, to prevail, “Clark would have to demonstrate that the judge committed plain
    error by failing to recuse herself sua sponte, so that the case could be reassigned to
    another judge who would not be apprised of the recommendation made by the
    government in its initial sentencing memorandum.” 19
    15
    
    Id. 16 Id.
    at 1271.
    17
    
    Id. 18 Id.
    at 1272.
    19
    
    Id. 7 We
    concluded that, on direct appeal, Clark had satisfied none of the four
    requirements to establish plain error by the trial judge, as prescribed by the
    Supreme Court in Olano.20 Our opinion ended as follows:
    In reaching the foregoing conclusion, we do not
    minimize the gravity of the government‟s initial breach,
    or the alarming potential of that breach for causing the
    defendant to serve ten years of unwarranted additional
    imprisonment, in contravention of the plea agreement.
    We also emphasize that when such a serious violation of
    a plea agreement has occurred, it is our obligation to
    scrutinize the record with appropriate care in order to
    assure that even where, as here, the breach has been
    formally corrected, it will not have continuing
    consequences that may be contrary to the interests of
    justice.21
    Having conducted the requisite scrutiny, this court affirmed Clark‟s conviction.
    III. § 23-110 Collateral Attack (Clark II)
    20
    United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 732-36 (1993) (claims of
    unpreserved error should be reviewed for (1) “an error,” (2) that is “plain,” (3) that
    affects “substantial rights,” and (4) “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or
    public reputation of judicial proceedings.”).
    21
    Clark 
    I, 51 A.3d at 1272-73
    .
    8
    Two months after this court issued its decision, but before the mandate
    issued, counsel in Clark I filed a motion with the sentencing judge pursuant to D.C.
    Code § 23-110 (a)(1), asking the judge to vacate Clark‟s convictions and sentence.
    Counsel alleged, fundamentally, that Clark‟s plea attorney had provided
    constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel by electing, as a “tactical
    decision,” to continue with sentencing without adequately informing Clark of the
    government‟s breach of the plea agreement.         More particularly, to quote the
    motion, Clark‟s plea attorney had
    fail[ed] to consult with him during sentencing about the
    government‟s violation of the plea agreement or to
    explain to him what legal options were available to
    remedy the breach and the risks that each entailed,
    including the assignment of his case to a different judge
    for a new sentencing.
    These were counseling deficiencies, said the motion, that prejudiced Clark by
    “realistically eliminating any possibility that he would receive a sentence of less
    than ten years as his plea counsel had allocuted for at sentencing.”
    In support of the motion, counsel proffered an affidavit by Clark, who
    averred that plea counsel had “stated on the record that she had not had an
    opportunity to discuss this [plea breach] with me.” And, “without conferring with
    me about my legal options, she agreed that[] . . . the judge could proceed to
    9
    sentence me.” Clark added: “[S]he failed to explain to me that even if I did not
    wish to withdraw my plea, I was still entitled to have my case assigned to a
    different judge who would sentence me without having any personal knowledge of
    the government‟s recommendation of a 20-year sentence.          She also failed to
    discuss the advantages or disadvantages to me of being sentenced by a different
    judge. . . .” In sum, Clark and his counsel contended that plea counsel had usurped
    from Clark his right, as the defendant, to decide, among available “options,” which
    one to pursue.
    The government, in reply, submitted a declaration by plea counsel, who
    noted that she had requested a seven-year sentence, the “bottom of the sentencing
    guidelines”; had advised Clark that “a ten-year sentence would not be unexpected”;
    had decided to “wait to see the Court‟s reaction to the breach of the plea
    agreement” before deciding on a „course of action”‟; had seen how “very upset”
    the judge was about the government‟s breach; had thus made a “tactical decision”
    not to ask for the judge‟s recusal, because the judge “was upset with the
    government‟s actions” and had said that the “sentencing memorandum would not
    affect” the judge‟s decision; that there was a “significant risk that another judge,
    not as familiar with Mr. Clark and the progress he had recently made, might
    sentence Mr. Clark to more than ten years‟ imprisonment”; and that counsel‟s
    10
    “professional opinion,” based on the judge‟s actions in this case and others, had led
    counsel to believe that the risk of Clark‟s receiving a sentence longer than ten
    years before a different judge was greater than the chance of his receiving a lesser
    sentence from the present judge.
    Plea counsel‟s declaration did not dispute Clark‟s affidavit. She had no
    recollection as to whether she had spoken to her client before the sentencing
    proceeding began, although she was “confident” that she had advised Clark of the
    plea breach “at least during” that proceeding. She then had advised Clark that “we
    should proceed with sentencing” because of the judge‟s displeasure with the
    government and the judge‟s indication that she would not be influenced by the
    breach. Nowhere in counsel‟s declaration did she say she had told Clark that
    sentencing before another judge might be an option or that, alternatively, he could
    attempt to withdraw his plea.
    The sentencing judge, applying Strickland criteria,22 denied Clark‟s motion.
    The judge accepted plea counsel‟s reasoning, and justified counsel‟s judgment as a
    legitimate “tactical decision,” not a deficiency in performance. Nor was Clark
    22
    See Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    (1984).
    11
    prejudiced by counsel‟s actions, concluded the judge, because this court had ruled
    in Clark I that “the government‟s breach did not affect [Clark‟s] substantial rights,”
    thereby equating the absence of Strickland “prejudice” with a ruling of “no plain
    error.”
    IV. Appeal of Clark II: Procedural Matters
    In this second appeal (Clark II), Clark argues that, in denying his motion
    alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, the sentencing judge abused her
    discretion by refusing to hold a hearing, which Clark contends the judge was
    required to conduct under D.C. Code § 23-110 (c) and related case law. This
    appeal, more specifically, is premised on plea counsel‟s alleged failure, upon
    becoming fully informed about the breach, to ask the judge for time, before
    sentencing, (1) to thoroughly inform Clark about the government‟s actions in
    breach of the plea agreement, and (2) to “explain to Clark his legal options,”
    including a request to withdraw of his guilty plea.23
    23
    See Santobello v. New York, 
    404 U.S. 257
    , 262 (1971); White v. United
    States, 
    425 A.2d 616
    , 618 (D.C. 1980).
    12
    Having lost on direct appeal in Clark I, based on our plain error review of
    the trial judge‟s actions, the same appellate counsel now asks us to review Clark‟s
    sentence again, this time on collateral attack, focused on the actions of plea
    counsel, not the trial judge, in response to the prosecutor‟s undisputed violations of
    the plea agreement. Acknowledging that Clark I forecloses a second challenge to
    the court‟s failure to reassign the case for resentencing by a different judge, Clark
    limits his contention to counsel‟s failure to advise him of the possibility of seeking
    withdrawal of his guilty plea.
    A. Shepard Issue
    Before we address the merits, there is a procedural matter we should
    acknowledge. In our Shepard decision, we held:
    [I]f an appellant does not raise a claim of ineffective
    assistance of counsel during the pendency of the direct
    appeal, when at that time appellant demonstrably knew or
    should have known of the grounds for alleging counsel‟s
    ineffectiveness, that procedural default will be a barrier
    to this court‟s consideration of appellant‟s claim.[24]
    24
    Shepard v. United States, 
    533 A.2d 1278
    , 1280 (D.C. 1987).
    13
    We added that “an appellant may surmount the barrier created by the procedural
    default” by showing both “cause” for the failure to bring a timely collateral
    challenge and “prejudice” to his claim as a result of that failure.25
    In this case, Clark filed his § 23-110 motion after we had announced our
    decision in Clark I but before we issued the mandate. Neither the government nor
    the court raised a timeliness issue when the motion was filed, nor does the
    government do so in this appeal. More specifically, the government does not
    challenge Clark‟s failure to ask for a stay of the mandate in Clark I so that, if the
    § 23-110 motion were denied, the appeal from that denial could be consolidated
    with the direct appeal.26 Accordingly, we do not recognize a Shepard barrier here.
    B. Standard of Review
    We turn now to the criteria governing our review. Under Strickland, in
    order to obtain a new trial by establishing constitutionally ineffective assistance of
    25
    
    Id. at 1281.
          26
    See id, at 1280.
    14
    counsel, the defendant must demonstrate, first, that “counsel‟s performance was
    deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel
    was not functioning as the „counsel‟ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
    Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance
    prejudiced the defense.”27 To demonstrate prejudice, an appellant must show “a
    reasonable probability that, but for counsel‟s unprofessional errors, the result of the
    proceeding would have been different.”28
    “In evaluating counsel‟s performance, the reviewing court must indulge a
    strong presumption that counsel‟s conduct fell within a wide range of reasonable
    professional assistance.”29 Tactical decisions at trial “generally do not result in a
    finding of ineffective assistance of counsel[;] thus, [a]ppellant bears the burden of
    overcoming the presumption of counsel‟s competence.”30 The appellant, however,
    is entitled to an ample opportunity to challenge that competence. The statute under
    which we review for ineffectiveness, D.C. Code § 23-110, “creates a presumption
    27
    
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687
    .
    28
    
    Id. at 694.
    In Harrington v. Richter, 
    562 U.S. 86
    , 112 (2011), the
    Supreme Court characterized Strickland prejudice as a “substantial likelihood of a
    different result.”
    29
    Chatmon v. United States, 
    801 A.2d 92
    , 107 (D.C. 2002) (internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    30
    
    Id. 15 that
    a hearing should be held, especially where the allegations of ineffectiveness
    relate to facts outside the trial record.31 The statute emphasizes that “[u]nless the
    motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is
    entitled to no relief, the [trial] court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon
    the prosecuting authority, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues,
    and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto.”32
    Although the decision whether to hold a hearing is committed to the trial
    court‟s sound discretion, we have said that “the scope of that discretion is . . . quite
    narrow.     Any question regarding the appropriateness of a hearing should be
    resolved in favor of holding a hearing. We will affirm the trial court‟s denial of a
    § 23-110 motion without a hearing” — as occurred in this case — “only if the
    claims (1) are palpably incredible; (2) are vague and conclusory; or (3) even if true,
    do not entitle the movant to relief.”33 Accordingly, we must remand this case for a
    31
    Long v. United States, 
    910 A.2d 298
    , 308 (D.C. 2006) (internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    32
    
    Id. (quoting D.C.
    Code § 23-110 (c) (emphasis added).
    33
    
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    16
    hearing unless we are “satisfied that under no circumstances could [Clark]
    establish facts warranting relief.”34
    In addressing this matter, we follow our time-honored standard of review.
    “A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents mixed questions of law and
    fact. We defer to any relevant findings of fact if they are supported by the
    evidence but owe no deference on the ultimate question of law.”35
    V. Appeal of Clark II: The Merits
    In this collateral attack on Clark‟s sentence, counsel essentially argues that,
    if the sentencing judge was not required sua sponte to protect Clark‟s right to
    remedy a violation of his plea agreement, then assuredly his trial counsel should be
    held constitutionally accountable for withholding relevant considerations from
    Clark.
    34
    
    Id. 35 Chatmon
    v. United States, 
    801 A.2d 92
    , 102 (D.C. 2002) (citations
    omitted).
    17
    A. Alleged Constitutional Deficiency of Counsel
    According to the Supreme Court in Florida v. Nixon, “[a] guilty plea . . . is
    an event of signal significance in a criminal proceeding.”36
    [C]ertain decisions regarding the exercise or waiver of
    basic trial rights are of such moment that they cannot be
    made for the defendant by a surrogate. A defendant . . .
    has the ultimate authority to determine whether to plead
    guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or
    take an appeal. . . . Concerning those decisions, an
    attorney must both consult with the defendant and obtain
    consent to the recommended course of action.[37]
    As to guilty pleas in particular, the Supreme Court in Santobello, as well as
    this court in White, has noted that two remedies are commonly available to a
    defendant when the government breaches a plea agreement: withdrawal of the plea
    or, at a minimum, sentencing by a judge unaware of the breach. 38 It follows from
    this case law that, before sentencing, the defendant must be advised of the breach
    
    36 Fla. v
    . Nixon, 
    543 U.S. 175
    , 187 (2004).
    37
    
    Id. 38 See
    Santobello, 
    404 U.S. 257
    at 262; see White, 
    425 A.2d 616
    at 618.
    18
    and of all available options, including advice from counsel as to whether the
    defendant may wish to withdraw the plea if the trial court were to grant that option.
    Otherwise, the defendant will have no informed basis for making a decision crucial
    to his liberty interest.
    In this case, however, by plea counsel‟s own admission,39 Clark never
    received word of the breach until the sentencing proceeding was underway, and
    thus he had no opportunity to consider the possibility of sentencing by a different
    judge (the issue resolved in Clark I) or of withdrawing his plea (the issue now
    before us). Clark instead was the recipient of his counsel‟s “tactical decision”40 to
    proceed to sentencing before Judge Keary, who was aware of the breach and the
    government‟s lingering, negative views of Clark, in conflict with its concessions
    under the plea agreement.
    Fundamental to Clark‟s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, therefore,
    is the contention that his plea counsel was constitutionally deficient in failing to
    advise him of the government‟s breach and of all his possible remedies, in time for
    39
    See supra Part III.
    40
    See supra Part III.
    19
    Clark to make a considered decision and for counsel to present his position to the
    court before sentencing. As an abstract proposition, that contention is sound. A
    lawyer is an agent; the client is the principal. When it comes to electing among
    options before sentencing that will determine the client‟s prison time, a lawyer
    cannot ethically or lawfully interdict that choice by acting as the client‟s principal
    and justifying that preemptive role as a legitimate tactical decision.41
    We have no doubt that plea counsel acted conscientiously in what she
    considered Clark‟s best interest, but evidence of good faith cannot supplant
    counsel‟s obligation to consult with the client before acting for him on a plea
    bargain decision. We also have no reason to doubt that, if counsel had asked the
    judge for time before sentencing to consult with Clark about the options available
    after the government‟s breach of a plea agreement, that request would have been
    granted.
    41
    See American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice (3d. 1993),
    “Control and Direction of Case,” 4-5.2.; 
    id. at 4-8.1;
    Nixon, 543 U.S. at 187
    ; Jones
    v. Barnes, 
    463 U.S. 745
    , 751 (1983) (“[T]he accused has the ultimate authority to
    make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead
    guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal. . . .”).
    20
    The government, however, embraces the sentencing judge‟s contrary
    conclusion that plea counsel‟s decision to continue with sentencing under all the
    circumstances was a sound “tactical” choice of a sort that traditionally is left to a
    defendant‟s lawyer. The government, for example, equates plea counsel‟s decision
    with the common, tactical decision not to call a particular witness. We, however,
    cannot agree that a mere tactical decision is involved here. The government‟s
    characterization of Clark‟s complaint against plea counsel as “peripheral” and
    “immaterial”, when compared to the “reasonableness” of counsel‟s tactical
    decision to go forward — without first asking for time to consult with her client
    about the plea breach — is just plain wrong.42 That decision is for a counseled
    client, not the lawyer, to make, no matter how improvident a plea withdrawal
    would be.43
    In his § 23-110 motion, Clark alleged at least five times that counsel had
    been obliged — and failed — to explain “what legal options were available,” and
    “the risks that each entailed, including assignment of his case to a different
    judge. . . .” (Emphasis added). Moreover, in plea counsel‟s declaration filed by the
    government, there is clear recognition that Clark was seeking relief from counsel‟s
    42
    See supra note 41.
    43
    See supra note 41.
    21
    failure, prior to sentencing, to “explore Mr. Clark‟s options” and “consult” with
    him about them (emphasis added). Because withdrawal of the plea, in addition to
    resentencing before a different judge, was a traditional option, and further because
    counsel was obliged to counsel-in-full, even if advising that one or more options
    would be ill advised, we are satisfied that Clark‟s motion sufficiently alleged a
    constitutional deficiency.
    The government maintains, to the contrary, that Clark has waived his
    argument that “counsel was deficient for failing to advise him about whether to
    withdraw his plea altogether.”44 It is true, as the government points out, that in
    Clark‟s § 23-110 motion he emphasized, explicitly, only one option: “assignment
    of his case to a different judge for a new sentencing,” the same option addressed in
    Clark I. Indeed, Clark did so at least seven times. (He adverted to plea withdrawal
    44
    Clark appears to concede, at least for purposes of this appeal (to which we
    confine the point) that counsel‟s decision as to sentencing — whether by Judge
    Keary or a substitute judge — fell within counsel‟s prerogative of making tactical
    decisions. “Mr. Clark does not dispute that, had [counsel] consulted with her client
    about the full panoply of his legal options, including whether or not he desired to
    withdraw his guilty plea because of the government‟s breach, she would have
    retained the authority over the tactical decision as to whether to proceed before
    Judge Keary or to seek the appointment of a different judge.” This contention is at
    odds with Clark‟s contention that, as a fully advised client, he would be entitled to
    make all final decisions with respect to the breached plea agreement, without a
    “tactical” override by his lawyer. See supra note 42.
    22
    once, not in the text as part of his argument but in a footnote collecting examples
    of a counsel‟s ethical duty to consult.)45
    From Clark‟s motion limited in emphasis to only one option (transfer to a
    different judge), we can understand why the government argues waiver of the
    deficiency issue based on plea withdrawal. But the issue immediately before us is
    not, directly, whether the allegations in Clark‟s motion are insufficient, as a matter
    of law, to raise the deficiency issue as to plea withdrawal. In resolving that issue,
    we must inquire first whether Clark is entitled to a § 23-110 hearing on his motion
    or has forfeited that opportunity by failing to specify the withdrawal option.
    45
    In addition to language referring to options in the plural, appellant Clark,
    in the affidavit in support of his motion (quoted above in Part III.), expressly
    complained about counsel‟s failure to explain reassignment to a different judge
    “even if I did not wish to withdraw my plea” — language the government cites to
    suggest that Clark actually had no interest in a plea withdrawal. Perhaps not, but,
    without a hearing, who can be sure? His words may have indicated no more than
    his understanding that plea withdrawal was among the options about which he
    required advice to compare potential consequences; the words are not necessarily
    an implicit admission that he no longer had interest in plea withdrawal as a
    potentially available option.
    23
    Clark has a right to a hearing, in the words of § 23-110 (c), “[u]nless the
    motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is
    entitled to no relief.”46 Because of the multiple references to “options,” as well as
    to a “different judge,” there appears to be a disconnect within the motion that
    requires resolution, with some language embracing all available remedies, and
    other language appearing to limit the remedy sought. For purposes of resolving
    this ambiguity, the statute, § 23-110 (c), requires the reviewing judge to consider
    not only the motion itself but also the “files and records” of the case.47 In doing so,
    the judge would have noted in Clark‟s handwritten, pro se letter to the trial judge,
    headed “Notice of Appeal,” a request to “vacate any and all decisions which
    directly relate[] to this flawed plea agreement” — language that arguably embraces
    vacation of the plea itself. Furthermore, although Clark characterized his letter as
    a “Notice of Appeal,” he presumably was aware that, in the plea agreement (as this
    court noted in Clark I),48 he had waived the right of appeal, suggesting that his
    letter could just as easily have been construed as a § 23-110 motion directed at
    46
    D.C. Code § 23-110 (c) (2012 Repl.) (emphasis added).
    47
    
    Id. 48 Clark
    I, 51 A.3d at 1269
    .
    24
    undoing his agreement with the government.49 Under these circumstances, we
    would not be comfortable concluding as a matter of law, without a hearing, that
    Clark limited his § 23-110 motion to the judicial transfer option.
    The government, however, would have us reject any need for a hearing on
    the scope of the deficiency issue in Clark‟s motion. It argues that plea counsel did
    “not defy prevailing professional norms by failing to raise for discussion a
    palpably incredible prospect that would have manifestly increased, not decreased,”
    Clark‟s chances for “a sentence of greater than 10 years‟ imprisonment.” With that
    statement, the government improperly diminishes counsel‟s professional
    obligation. Clark contends that his motion claims the unquestionable right to
    advice from his lawyer about all available options, including plea withdrawal, not
    just those that his lawyer deems prudent. The government, however, appears to
    believe that plea counsel‟s professional obligation will be satisfied if that advice is
    limited to options that would only permit the client to make a decision reflecting
    sound, not dubious, judgment. Thus, by allowing counsel to narrow the universe
    49
    The government argues that, because Clark chose to treat his letter to
    Judge Keary as a notice of appeal, rather than a § 23-110 motion, he cannot have it
    serve double duty as, potentially, a motion justifying a challenge to his counsel.
    We do not agree that a convicted defendant, acting pro se at the time, cannot rely
    on this motion as evidence of his intent as to plea withdrawal.
    25
    of options based solely on counsel‟s own judgment, the government would leave to
    Clark‟s lawyer a slice of the decision that Clark, the client, is ultimately entitled to
    make. It may well be that after full disclosure to the client of all options required
    of effective counsel, one option (including, perhaps, a plea withdrawal) might be
    so irrational, if exercised, that the claim to relief would be “palpably incredible”
    and, despite full disclosure, would not “entitle [Clark] to relief”50 — thereby
    justifying denial of a § 23-110 hearing.51 But that possibility is not part of the
    deficiency analysis; it would go to an alleged failure to show the required
    prejudice.
    B. Alleged Prejudice from Counsel’s Deficiency
    We turn, therefore, to prejudice. In denying Clark‟s § 23-110 motion, Judge
    Keary concluded, and the government agrees, that the prejudice analysis was
    resolved by our decision in Clark I, where we found no plain error — no error
    50
    Long v. United States, 
    910 A.2d 298
    , 308 (D.C. 2002) (quoting two of
    three situations which this court has said will justify denial of a § 23-110 (c)
    motion without a hearing.); 
    see supra
    Part IV.B.
    51
    Given the mix of specificity and generalization in Clark‟s motion, we
    cannot uphold its dismissal as “vague or conclusory,” the third situation we have
    said that will justify denial of a § 23-110 (c) motion without a hearing. See 
    id. The government
    does not suggest otherwise.
    26
    affecting Clark‟s “substantial rights” — in the trial judge‟s failure sua sponte to
    transfer the case to a different judge for sentencing.52 This conclusion, we are told,
    has preclusive effect here: absent the loss of substantial rights, there can be no
    Strickland prejudice — no “reasonable probability that, but for counsel‟s
    unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”53
    This preclusion argument, however, is overstated when based on Clark I, because
    Clark I concerned the alleged loss of substantial rights only from failure to reassign
    the case for sentencing. We did not consider in Clark I (because the issue was not
    presented on direct appeal) whether counsel‟s alleged deficiency in failing to
    advise about the possibility of a plea withdrawal prejudiced Clark. That issue is
    now before us.
    If Clark had received counsel about plea withdrawal, was there a
    “reasonable probability that . . . the result of the proceeding would have been
    different”54 — “a substantial likelihood of a different result”?55 Judge Keary did
    52
    See Clark 
    I, 51 A.3d at 1272
    .
    53
    United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 
    542 U.S. 74
    , 82 (2004).
    54
    
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694
    .
    55
    
    Harrington, 562 U.S. at 112
    .
    27
    not address that question because she understood Clark‟s § 23-110 motion to seek
    only one form of relief — a transfer for resentencing — and concluded that
    Strickland prejudice, as the government argued in response to Clark‟s motion, was
    “equivalent to” the “third prong of the plain error test.”56 As a result, Judge Keary
    ruled that Clark‟s claimed prejudice was foreclosed by this court‟s decision in
    Clark I finding no loss of “substantial rights” and thus no plain error from the
    failure to reassign sentencing.
    On appeal, the government agrees with Judge Keary but insists in its brief
    that, even if Clark I does not foreclose a prejudice inquiry here (because only a
    sentencing transfer, not a plea withdrawal, was involved), the judge‟s “purported
    failure to discuss alternatives” to going ahead with sentencing “had no material
    effect on [Clark‟s] rights or the outcome.” The likelihood of Clark‟s withdrawing
    his plea, even if offered the opportunity to do so, was “palpably incredible,”57 says
    the government in its brief, if only because a trial would have confronted Clark
    with a “10-year mandatory minimum [sentence] on the first count (which his plea
    cut by half).” By way of comparison, the sentence he received pursuant to his
    56
    See supra note 20.
    57
    Long, 
    910 A.2d 298
    at 308.
    28
    plea, fully in conformity with the plea agreement, was only three more years of
    incarceration than his counsel had asked for.
    The Supreme Court‟s decision in Dominguez Benitez58 affords the
    government a compelling argument. When accepting the defendant‟s guilty plea,
    the district court judge had given most of the warnings required by Federal
    Criminal Rule 11, but “the judge failed to mention that [the defendant] could not
    withdraw his plea if the court did not accept the Government‟s recommendation.”59
    Without objection, the judge sentenced the defendant to a term that exceeded the
    limit in the plea agreement. In rejecting the defendant‟s request to withdraw his
    plea, the Supreme Court found no plain error. The Court held that “a defendant
    who seeks reversal of his conviction after a guilty plea, on the ground that the
    district court committed plain error under Rule 11, must show a reasonable
    probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea,”60 the same
    standard applicable to ineffectiveness claims in Strickland. To get there the Court
    58
    See supra note 51.
    59
    
    Id. at 78.
          60
    
    Id. at 76.
                                             29
    first quoted Kotteakos,61 observing that, “[t]o affect „substantial rights,‟ . . . an
    error must have a „substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
    the . . . verdict.‟”62 The Court then cited its more recent decision in Bagley,63
    which held that when the burden is on the defendant to show prejudice (instead of
    on the government to demonstrate harmlessness), the Court “invoke[s] a standard”
    somewhat different from, but “with similarities to,” Kotteakos, namely the
    Strickland standard.64 In Bagley, the Court applied Strickland‟s prejudice analysis
    to Brady65 claims; in Dominguez Benitez, the Court extended that analysis to plea
    withdrawals.
    Clark‟s case ostensibly differs from Dominguez Benitez in one significant
    respect. Clark‟s claim concerns a deficiently counseled defendant; Dominguez
    Benitez did not. Indeed, plea counsel‟s alleged deficiency in advising Clark was
    halfway toward constitutional error, whereas the trial judge‟s Rule 11 error in
    61
    Kotteakos v. United States, 
    328 U.S. 750
    (1946).
    62
    Dominguez 
    Benitez, 542 U.S. at 81
    .
    63
    United States v. Bagley, 
    473 U.S. 667
    (1985).
    64
    Dominguez 
    Benitez, 542 U.S. at 81
    .
    65
    Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
    (1963).
    30
    Dominguez Benitez did not implicate the Constitution.66 Ultimately, however, this
    distinction makes no difference. By importing Strickland’s constitutional standard
    for prejudice into plain error review of attempted plea withdrawals based on trial
    court error, the Supreme Court did no more than equate plain error review with the
    standard already applicable when requesting plea withdrawals generated by
    constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. In Dominguez Benitez, therefore,
    prejudice was determined by whether there was a “reasonable probability” that, but
    for the trial court‟s Rule 11 error, the defendant would not have entered his guilty
    plea.67 Similarly, in this case, prejudice will be determined by whether there was a
    “reasonable probability” that, “but for counsel‟s professional errors,” Clark would
    have sought to withdraw his plea. Thus comes our specific question: is there a
    reasonable probability that, if counsel had fully informed Clark of all possible
    options after the breach, would Clark have asked Judge Keary to permit
    withdrawal of his guilty plea.
    66
    In Dominguez Benitez, Justice Souter observed: “[I]n this case . . . [it is]
    worth repeating[] that the violation claimed was of Rule 11, not of due 
    process.” 542 U.S. at 83
    .
    67
    
    Id. at 82.
                                             31
    Assuredly no one, including an attorney, can properly speak for a defendant
    in Clark‟s liberty-deprived situation without consulting him, and thus no one can
    be absolutely sure about how Clark would have addressed the situation with all the
    facts at hand. Indeed, Justice Souter acknowledged in Dominguez Benitez that a
    defendant may make “foolish” choices in going to trial, rather than accepting a
    plea bargain, even “absent the error” at issue.68 We cannot tell for sure how Judge
    Keary would have reacted to a request for a plea withdrawal if she had believed
    that issue was before her,69 but any effort to resolve what her likely decision would
    have been would be pointless, for that decision could not stand in the way of
    determining the “reasonable probability” of Clark‟s anterior decision whether to
    ask for withdrawal.
    68
    
    Id. at 85.
          69
    See Bennett v. United States, 
    726 A.2d 156
    , 165-66 (D.C. 1999)
    (explaining the criteria for pre-sentencing plea withdrawal under the “fair and just”
    standard; “[T]he factors a trial court must consider when evaluating a motion to
    withdraw a guilty plea include: (1) whether the defendant has asserted his or her
    legal innocence; (2) the length of the delay between entry of the guilty plea and the
    desire to withdraw it; and (3) whether the accused has had the full benefit of
    competent counsel at all relevant times. [N]one of these factors is controlling and
    the trial court must consider them cumulatively in the context of the individual
    case. Moreover, the circumstances of the individual case may reveal other factors
    which will affect the calculation . . . under the fair and just standard.) (internal
    quotation marks and citations omitted).
    32
    In discussing plea counsel‟s alleged deficiency, we have noticed the
    possibility from Clark‟s pro se Notice of Appeal that Clark may have been seeking
    a plea withdrawal — a matter involving allegedly deficient counsel not raised on
    direct appeal in Clark I. And of course we have concluded that, absent a hearing,
    we cannot say as a matter of law that Clark had not sufficiently alleged that
    deficiency in his § 23-110 motion. At most, however, the evidence suggests a
    possibility, not probability, that Clark — if properly counseled — would have
    asked to withdraw his plea. We agree with the government that if Clark, before
    sentencing, had been counseled about the plusses and minuses of asking to
    withdraw his plea, he presumably would have faced a formidable argument by his
    lawyer that withdrawal would be irrational, because a trial might well have led to a
    ten-year mandatory minimum sentence on the first count (which his plea cut in
    half), compared to the sentence he would receive pursuant to the plea agreement
    (only three more years of incarceration than his counsel had asked for). Although
    plea counsel‟s declaration in response to Clark‟s § 23-110 motion did not address
    plea withdrawal, it is difficult to imagine that counsel, advising rationally, would
    have supported withdrawal; in fact, counsel‟s moving quickly to retain sentencing
    before Judge Keary is evidence that counsel did not favor deep-sixing Clark‟s plea.
    33
    All things considered, we conclude that Clark has proffered no reasonable
    probability that, but for counsel‟s failure to advise about plea withdrawal, Clark
    would have sought to withdraw his plea. Admittedly, we are concluding as a
    matter of law, on the record here without a hearing, that Clark presumably would
    have followed what his lawyer presumably would have advised: stick with the
    guilty plea. On the face of it, reliance on these double presumptions might seem
    harsh. But, despite the fact that a defendant is entitled to make foolish judgments
    about pleading guilty and going to trial, we are not obliged under § 23-110 to
    honor the irrational over the rational. And we can safely say, on this record, that it
    is irresistibly clear that no reasonable counsel would have advised Clark to
    withdraw his plea.70 Nor does Clark proffer a reasonable argument as to why — in
    lieu of sentencing by Judge Keary, as his counsel advised — he would have
    wanted to walk away from his plea into the uncertainties of a trial, without an
    agreement capping an eventual sentence.71
    70
    We exclude the possibility of a deceased key witness for the prosecution,
    for in that case the likelihood of the judge‟s allowing a plea withdrawal would
    most likely be nil.
    71
    In Clark I, Clark argued that he should be entitled to withdraw his plea if
    — when sentenced by a different judge — “his new sentence exceeds ten 
    years.” 51 A.3d at 1268
    . Although the thrust of that appeal, as we have indicated above in
    Part II., was Clark‟s effort to achieve sentencing before a different judge, not
    withdrawal of his plea, this is some evidence that Clark recognized that a plea
    (continued . . .)
    34
    Having concluded that Clark has not shown Strickland prejudice from
    counsel‟s alleged deficiency, we must say that any need for a hearing on the
    deficiency allegations is now moot.
    *****
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is
    Affirmed.
    _________________________________
    (. . . continued)
    withdrawal, without the guarantees built into his plea bargain, would be too
    hazardous.