United States v. Fields , 823 F.3d 20 ( 2016 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-2137
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ERNEST FIELDS,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Denise J. Casper, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lynch, and Barron,
Circuit Judges.
Judith H. Mizner, Assistant Federal Public Defender, with
whom the Federal Public Defender Office was on brief, for
appellant.
Mark T. Quinlivan, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
May 13, 2016
BARRON, Circuit Judge. Ernest Fields ("Fields") pleaded
guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition.
On appeal he contends that his conviction must be overturned
because the police obtained the firearm and ammunition in
consequence of a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Fields also
appeals his sentence. He contends that it must be vacated because
the District Court mistakenly concluded that a United States
Sentencing Guidelines (the "Guidelines") enhancement for career
offenders applied to him. We affirm the conviction but vacate and
remand the sentence.
I.
On April 10, 2013, Fields was indicted under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) on one count of being a felon in possession of a
firearm and ammunition. The indictment arose out of an encounter
between Fields and the Boston police in the early morning hours of
September 12, 2012. The encounter occurred near Madison Park High
School in the Roxbury neighborhood of Boston. It lasted several
minutes.
At first, the encounter involved only Fields and one
Boston police officer. But that officer eventually called for
backup, and four additional officers arrived on the scene. At
some point after those officers arrived, the police conducted a
pat-frisk of Fields. The police acquired the firearm and
ammunition during that frisk.
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Following the indictment, Fields sought to suppress the
firearm and ammunition on the ground that the police had acquired
that evidence only because they had seized Fields without a legally
sufficient basis for doing so. The District Court, after holding
a hearing, denied Fields's motion. United States v. Fields, No.
13–10097–DJC, 2014 WL 2616636 (D. Mass. June 11, 2014).
The District Court ruled that Fields was seized neither
when the officer that he initially encountered spoke with him nor
when the four officers later arrived as backup. The District Court
did hold that the police seized Fields later on in the encounter,
when the police physically subdued Fields in order to conduct a
pat-frisk of him. At that time, the District Court concluded, the
police had a lawful basis to seize and search Fields because the
police had probable cause to arrest him for assault and battery on
a police officer.1
On June 12, 2014, Fields pleaded guilty to the felon-
in-possession count. In doing so, he reserved his right to
challenge on appeal the District Court's denial of his motion to
suppress.
1 The District Court also ruled in the alternative that
suppression was not warranted because even if the seizure did occur
at the time the four backup officers arrived on the scene, the
police would have inevitably discovered the firearm and the
ammunition.
- 3 -
On October 22, 2014, the District Court sentenced Fields
to a term of imprisonment of 60 months, to be followed by three
years of supervised release. In selecting the sentence, the
District Court referenced the Guidelines sentencing range that had
been set forth in Fields's pre-sentence report ("PSR").
The PSR calculated that range as follows. The PSR
assigned Fields a base offense level ("BOL") under the Guidelines
of 24. In calculating Fields's BOL, the PSR applied U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(a)(2). That guideline provides for an enhancement to the
defendant's BOL if the defendant satisfies certain career offender
requirements. Under that enhancement, "if the defendant committed
any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining at least
two felony convictions of . . . a crime of violence," the defendant
shall be assigned a BOL of 24.2 U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2) (emphases
added).
The PSR identified the following two prior felony
convictions of Fields as convictions of a "crime of violence": his
conviction for resisting arrest for which he was sentenced in
September 2010, and at least one of a set of convictions that arose
out of a single incident and for which Fields had received a single
2 The total offense level was calculated to be 21 after a
three-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b).
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sentence in July 2010.3 Those July 2010 convictions included
convictions under Massachusetts law for assault with a dangerous
weapon ("ADW"), assault and battery with a dangerous weapon
("ABDW"), assault and battery on a police officer ("ABPO"), and
resisting arrest.4
The District Court concluded that the Guidelines range
reflected in the PSR was properly calculated at 70-87 months, which
was consistent with Fields's having a BOL of 24 and a criminal
history category of V. But the District Court also concluded that
a downward departure in Fields's criminal history category was
warranted because that category, although properly calculated,
substantially overrepresented the seriousness of Fields's criminal
history. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b). That departure translated to
a Guidelines range of 60-71 months, which was consistent with
applying a BOL of 24 and a criminal history category of IV to
Fields. The District Court then sentenced Fields to a term of
3 The record does not disclose the dates of conviction for
the convictions referenced. References to the "September 2010
conviction" and the "July 2010 convictions" thus refer to the dates
of sentencing.
4 The PSR also assigned Fields a criminal history score of 12
under the Guidelines, which translated to a criminal history
category of V. In calculating Fields's criminal history score,
the PSR applied a sentencing enhancement that resulted in Fields's
receiving three criminal history points because his July 2010
convictions for ABDW, ABPO, and resisting arrest were classified
as convictions of a crime of violence under the career offender
guideline. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e).
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imprisonment -- 60 months -- that was at the low end of that lower
range.
On appeal, Fields challenges both his conviction and his
sentence. He challenges his conviction on the ground that the
District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress the firearm
and ammunition. Fields challenges his sentence on the ground that
the District Court erred in classifying his prior convictions as
convictions of a crime of violence for purposes of calculating his
BOL under the Guidelines.
We first consider Fields's challenge to his conviction.
We then turn to his challenge to his sentence.
II.
Fields argues that his conviction must be vacated
because the District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress
the firearm and ammunition. "When reviewing a challenge to the
district court's denial of a motion to suppress, we view the facts
in the light most favorable to the district court's ruling on the
motion, and we review the district court's findings of fact and
credibility determinations for clear error." United States v.
Fermin, 771 F.3d 71, 76 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v.
Camacho, 661 F.3d 718, 723 (1st Cir. 2011)). We review conclusions
of law, including the ultimate conclusion whether a seizure
occurred, de novo. Camacho, 661 F.3d at 724. Fields bears the
burden of establishing that he was seized. Id.
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A.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches
and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. "The protections of the
Fourth Amendment apply not only to traditional arrests, but also
to those brief investigatory stops generally known as Terry stops."
Camacho, 661 F.3d at 724. An officer may ordinarily execute a
Terry stop without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment if the
officer "reasonably suspects that the person apprehended is
committing or has committed a crime." Id. at 726 (quoting Arizona
v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 323 (2009)).
The police need not have taken physical custody of a
person in order to be deemed to have effected a Terry stop for
which at least reasonable suspicion is required. Such a stop
instead may occur merely upon law enforcement making what the
Supreme Court has termed a "show of authority." See United States
v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980). Such a "show of
authority" occurs, however, only when "in view of all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave." Id. at 554. And,
further, the show of authority effects a seizure only when the
defendant actually yields or submits to the show of authority.
See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628-29 (1991).
We appreciate "that few people . . . would ever feel
free to walk away from any police question." United States v.
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Cardoza, 129 F.3d 6, 16 (1st Cir. 1997). But that reality
obviously does not mean that every police-citizen encounter
results in a show of authority for Fourth Amendment purposes. See
id. The "free to leave" test thus focuses on whether the conduct
of law enforcement "objectively communicate[s] that [law
enforcement] is exercising [its] official authority to restrain
the individual's liberty of movement." Id. (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has identified several characteristics
of an encounter with law enforcement that might indicate that there
was a show of authority. These characteristics include: "[1] the
threatening presence of several officers, [2] the display of a
weapon by an officer, [3] some physical touching of the person of
the citizen, or [4] the use of language or tone of voice indicating
that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled."
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
B.
Fields's challenge to the District Court's ruling on his
suppression motion rests on his contention that he was not "free
to leave" -- and thus that a seizure occurred due to a "show of
authority" -- when the four officers arrived at the scene in
response to a call for backup from the officer Fields initially
encountered. According to Fields, the five officers at that point
made the requisite show of authority even though they lacked a
lawful basis to seize him.
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The government responds in part by arguing that it does
not matter whether the arrival of the officers did result in a
show of authority, because the police had reasonable suspicion to
justify Fields's seizure even at that point in the encounter. To
support this conclusion, the government argues that the first
officer who encountered Fields reasonably suspected that Fields
had previously trespassed on public property and thus that this
officer had reasonable suspicion to detain Fields even at that
time.
There is a question whether the government is right that
the police would have been justified under the Fourth Amendment in
seizing Fields on the basis of reasonable suspicion that he had
committed that trespassing offense, given that it was a completed
non-felony offense. Compare Gaddis v. Redford Township, 364 F.3d
763, 771 n.6 (6th Cir. 2004) ("Police . . . may make a stop when
they have reasonable suspicion of a completed felony, though not
of a mere completed misdemeanor [or lesser infraction]."), with
United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d 1135, 1141 (10th Cir. 2007)
(noting the circuit split on whether reasonable suspicion of a
completed non-felony offense can justify a Terry stop under the
Fourth Amendment and declining to adopt the Sixth Circuit's per se
rule). But we need not decide that question. And that is because
we affirm the District Court's conclusion that no show of
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authority -- and thus no seizure -- had occurred as of the time
that the four backup officers arrived on the scene.
To explain why we reach this conclusion, we first
describe the encounter between Fields and the police in some
detail, as the determination of the point at which a show of
authority occurs is necessarily dependent on the particular facts
in each case. We then explain why there was no error in the
District Court's conclusion that the facts do not suffice to
demonstrate that Fields has met his burden of showing that there
was a show of authority -- and thus a seizure -- at the time that
the backup officers arrived on the scene.
C.
In describing what happened that night, "we relate the
facts 'as the trial court found them, consistent with record
support.'" United States v. Ford, 548 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2008)
(quoting United States v. Ruidiaz, 529 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir.
2008)). The encounter began in the early hours of September 12,
2012. Officer Steven Dodd and other police officers were
investigating a complaint that a group of people had gathered near
Madison Park High School and had intended to engage in drug
activity.
Following the receipt of that complaint, Officer Dodd
and his team briefly caught sight of a group of eight to ten
individuals in that area. But the officers lost track of the
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group. Officer Dodd therefore radioed to other officers in the
area to seek their help in locating a group that he reported was
heading from the front of the high school toward Roxbury Heritage
State Park and Roxbury Street.
Officer Joseph Fisher, who was working a routine patrol
at the time, responded to the call. He parked his police cruiser
on the east end of Roxbury Street so that it was facing the
direction of the Roxbury Heritage State Park. Soon thereafter,
Officer Fisher observed a group of six to eight individuals
traveling from the state park area to Roxbury Street.
At that point, Fields appeared to break off from the
group that had just emerged onto Roxbury Street. Fields then
headed in the direction of Officer Fisher while the rest of the
group headed in the opposite direction. As Fields passed Officer
Fisher's police cruiser, Officer Fisher got out of the car.
Officer Fisher then proceeded to the rear of the vehicle (driver's
side), and called out to Fields in a conversational tone, "Hey,
what's going on tonight?"
Upon hearing Officer Fisher's question, Fields turned
around, walked back a few steps toward the rear of the cruiser
(passenger's side), and proceeded to speak with Officer Fisher.
Officer Fisher at that point made a few general inquiries of
Fields, including asking Fields where he was coming from and where
he was going.
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The conversation quickly became "one-sided," however.
Fields asserted that he was not comfortable with the police; that
police made him nervous; that police had killed someone in the
South End; and that Officer Fisher would need a reason to search
him.
Officer Fisher observed that Fields was becoming
increasingly agitated. "At this point, [Officer Fisher] had made
no commands to Fields, had not requested any identification, had
no physical contact with [Fields], had not blocked [Fields's] path
down the street and . . . had kept his firearm holstered throughout
the exchange." Fields, 2014 WL 2616636, at *2.
According to the District Court, Officer Fisher became
concerned about the "nature and tone" of Fields's comments and
Fields's general behavior, and so the officer called for backup by
using the radio in his tactical vest. Id. Specifically, Officer
Fisher radioed that he was "off with one on Roxbury Street by
myself."
Within about a minute, four other police officers
(including Officer Dodd) arrived on the scene. They emerged from
an area near the front of the cruiser.
According to Officer Fisher's account, the officers
positioned themselves at the sides of his police cruiser, such
that neither the officers nor the police cruiser blocked Fields
from proceeding down Roxbury Street toward Malcolm X Boulevard,
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which was the direction in which Fields was originally traveling.
Officer Dodd's testimony, although different in some respects from
Officer Fisher's testimony, was also that none of the officers
"stood directly in front of Fields." Id. Thus, according to
Officer Dodd's account, too, Fields could have continued down
Roxbury Street toward Malcolm X Boulevard.
None of the backup officers spoke to Fields. Fields
reiterated his nervousness and displayed more agitation during
this portion of the encounter. It was not until Fields lifted his
shirt and inadvertently revealed that he had a knife on his person
that the officers moved toward Fields and that Officer Dodd
indicated that he was going to conduct a pat-frisk of Fields.
Fields resisted the pat-frisk by pushing Officer Dodd's hands away
twice. Officer Fisher and Officer Andrew Hunter then moved in to
assist Officer Dodd by pinning Fields's arms to his side, thereby
enabling Officer Dodd to conduct a pat-frisk of Fields.5
D.
Fields contends that the presence of multiple officers,
the formation of the officers, and the calling of backup by Officer
Fisher in Fields's presence, in combination, constituted a "show
of authority" and thus converted the encounter at that point into
5 Officers Dodd and Hunter were wearing plainclothes with
Boston Police badges while Officers Fisher, Jose Dias, and Michael
MacDougall were in uniform at the time in question.
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a Terry stop for which reasonable suspicion was required. But the
District Court concluded otherwise on the basis of all the
circumstances of the encounter described by the testimony at the
suppression hearing. We do not see a basis for overturning the
District Court's ruling.
It is well established that the absence of police
commands or any sort of verbal demonstration of authority weighs
against the conclusion that there has been a show of authority
sufficient to effect a seizure. Compare United States v. Drayton,
536 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2002) ("Law enforcement officers do not
violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable
seizures merely by approaching individuals on the street or in
other public places and putting questions to them if they are
willing to listen."), and Cardoza, 129 F.3d at 16 (noting as
significant in finding no seizure the fact that the officer did
not ask defendant to stop or to approach police car), with United
States v. Espinoza, 490 F.3d 41, 49 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding
seizure where single officer approached defendant's vehicle and
asked defendant, in a commanding tone, to shut off engine). It is
thus significant that the District Court found that there were no
such demonstrations here.
The testimony at the hearing supports the finding by the
District Court that the verbal exchange between Fields and Officer
Fisher was, on the whole, dominated and perpetuated by Fields
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himself. Moreover, the District Court supportably found that
Officer Fisher, to the extent he did speak to Fields, merely asked
general questions in a conversational way.
Similarly, the record supports the District Court's
finding that, prior to the sighting of the knife, none of the four
backup officers spoke to Fields at all. Thus, although the backup
officers were on the lookout for illegal group activity, the record
accords with the District Court's finding that -- at the relevant
time -- none of those officers made any comments to Fields that
indicated that they were treating Fields as a potential suspect
or, more directly, that Fields should not leave.
The record also backs up the District Court's findings
that none of the officers physically touched Fields, brandished
their weapons, or, after arriving on the scene, moved toward Fields
at any point prior to the sighting of the knife. These factors,
too, weigh against the conclusion that a seizure occurred at the
time that Fields contends one occurred. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
at 554.
To be sure, the presence of five police officers and the
formation of these officers are certainly "important" features of
the encounter. See United States v. Berryman, 717 F.2d 651, 655
(1st Cir. 1983). And we have said in dicta that "[i]t is not clear
that a reasonable person, surrounded by five police officers, would
believe that he was free to leave." Fermin, 771 F.3d at 77. But
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whether a person is "surrounded" is itself a judgment to be made
from the facts of each case. After all, "the presence of multiple
officers does not automatically mean that a stop has occurred."
United States v. Goddard, 491 F.3d 457, 461 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (per
curiam); see also Ford, 548 F.3d at 5.
In this case, the District Court supportably found that
Fields was not meaningfully restricted in his field of movement in
consequence of the arrival of the backup officers.6 In making that
finding, the District Court relied in part on our decision in
United States v. Smith, 423 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2005). There, we
held that the defendant was not "surrounded" by officers, because
the officers -- in approaching the defendant while he was sitting
on a wall with a telephone pole in front of him -- stood "where
they had to" and because the defendant "could have moved in a
variety of directions." Smith, 423 F.3d at 30.
Here, Fields, who was standing in front of a parked
police cruiser at the time the backup officers arrived, appears to
have had fewer points of departure from the scene than the
defendant had in Smith. But the officers' testimony about the
6
The District Court concluded that, whether Officer Dodd's
or Officer Fisher's account of the positioning of the officers
controls, "it remains the case that the officers, to assist Officer
Fisher, had to stand somewhere in [Fields's] vicinity and could
only do so around or behind the car and Fields still had point of
egress either up or down, respectively, the street." Fields, 2014
WL 2616636, at *3.
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positioning of the various parties, as well as the diagrams that
the officers supplied depicting where the parties stood, accords
with the District Court's determination that the positioning of
the officers did not restrict Fields from walking in the direction
in which he was originally traveling. For that reason, the
formation of the police officers in this case does not compel a
finding that Fields was "surrounded" or that law enforcement
objectively communicated to him that he was not free to leave the
scene. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 575 (1988)
(finding no seizure in part because officers did not "block
[defendant's] course [of travel] or otherwise control the
direction or speed of his movement"); Camacho, 661 F.3d at 725
(finding seizure in part because officers "intentionally blocked"
the path on which defendant was traveling with their Crown
Victoria); Ford, 423 F.3d at 25 (finding no seizure in part because
defendant, though restricted in his field of movement by the
presence of two police officers and a telephone police, "could
have moved in a variety of directions").
Of course, Fields did not actually leave the scene
despite the available path afforded him and the absence of any
verbal signals from the police that he was obliged to stay. But
that is not determinative of whether the police objectively
communicated to Fields that he was required to stay. See Hodari
D., 499 U.S. at 628 ("[T]he test for existence of a 'show of
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authority' is an objective one: not whether the citizen perceived
that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but whether
the officer's words and actions would have conveyed that to a
reasonable person."). In fact, Fields similarly did not leave
when he was initially in the presence only of Officer Fisher, yet
Fields concedes that there was no show of authority at that point.
There remains Fields's contention that a show of
authority occurred at the time he asserts because Officer Fisher
called for backup and that call, coupled with the actual arrival
of the four backup officers, objectively communicated to Fields
that law enforcement was targeting him as a suspect and thus that
he was not free to leave. But the principal case upon which Fields
relies for this contention, United States v. Beauchamp, 659 F.3d
560, 566-67 (6th Cir. 2011), involved very different facts.
The court in that case concluded that a seizure occurred
only after the defendant "walk[ed] away from the police two times"
and was told to stop, turn around, and walk toward the police.
Id. at 566. The Sixth Circuit, quite reasonably, determined that
the police officers' persistence in pursuing the defendant
notwithstanding the defendant's attempts to walk away, in
combination with the request by one of the officers that the
defendant stop, objectively communicated to the defendant that he
was under investigation and thus that he was not free to leave.
See id. at 567.
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Unlike in Beauchamp, however, the police did not follow
Fields after he had walked away. The police also did not at any
point tell Fields not to leave. The testimony at the suppression
hearing reveals only that Officer Fisher asked Fields some general
questions and that Officer Fisher, after becoming concerned with
Fields's statements and seeming agitation, radioed that he was
"off with one on Roxbury Street by myself." The backup officers
never spoke to Fields after they arrived. Thus, "the police
conduct involved here would not have communicated to the reasonable
person an attempt to capture or otherwise intrude upon [the
defendant's] freedom of movement" for the purpose of investigating
criminal wrongdoing. Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 575.
Moreover, in a given encounter, there may be legitimate
reasons for an officer to summon and maintain backup, such as
ensuring the officer's safety, that do not relate to the
investigation (let alone detention) of a suspect. The arrival of
backup officers in response to a call for assistance thus may
signal, depending on the facts, only that backup will remain on
the scene in the event that the person who has encountered a lone
police officer chooses to stay, rather than that such a person is
not free to leave. See State v. Thomas, 246 P.3d 678, 686 (Kan.
2011) (noting that "a mere call for back-up does not automatically
transform all citizen-law enforcement encounters into
investigatory detentions"); State v. Green, 826 A.2d 486, 499 (Md.
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2003) ("That [law enforcement] called for back-up as a safety
measure did not suddenly transform the consensual encounter into
a seizure.").
Here, during the radio call, even if heard by Fields (a
point on which the District Court made no finding and on which the
record is unclear), Officer Fisher did not state that he was asking
for other officers to assist him in an effort to investigate
whether Fields had been engaged in criminal activity. Instead,
Officer Fisher appeared to be communicating only a concern for his
safety -- as evidenced by the words "by myself" -- due to the
agitation that Fields was exhibiting in his presence. So while a
reasonable person in Fields's shoes could perceive that the four
officers who arrived did so on his account and not due to pure
happenstance, it does not follow that their arrival therefore
objectively communicated to Fields that the police were targeting
him in the Beauchamp sense.
Indeed, a conclusion that the summoning and subsequent
arrival of backup automatically -- and without regard to other
facts that bear on the nature of the encounter as a
whole -- constitutes a show of authority could have a distorting
effect on an officer's decision about whether to take a precaution
for his own safety. Such an automatic rule would import into an
officer's calculus about whether to call for backup a determination
about whether there is a lawful basis to detain the person the
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officer has encountered. But the decision to detain someone so
that he or she may not leave may be distinct from the decision to
call for backup in order to ensure an officer's safety in the event
that the person in question chooses to stay. We thus decline to
adopt a per se approach in this context. Cf. Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 1052 (1983) (noting, in concluding that police
officers may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, sometimes
search the passenger compartments of a car for weapons during a
lawful Terry stop, "we have not required that officers adopt
alternate means to ensure their safety in order to avoid the
intrusion involved in a Terry encounter").
E.
The totality of the circumstances test for assessing
whether a show of authority has occurred "does not produce a
crystalline landscape in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence."
Ford, 548 F.3d at 7. "Th[at] test is necessarily imprecise,
because it is designed to assess the coercive effect of police
conduct, taken as a whole, rather than to focus on particular
details of that conduct in isolation." Chesternut, 486 U.S. at
573.
But the burden is on Fields to establish the show of
authority that is the necessary predicate for his claimed Fourth
Amendment violation. And under the totality of the circumstances
test that we must apply, we do not on these facts see a basis for
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overturning the District Court's conclusion that Fields failed to
demonstrate that there was a show of authority at the time the
four backup officers arrived on the scene -- a conclusion, we add,
that the District Court reached only after a thorough consideration
of the testimony and evidence presented at the suppression hearing.
We thus affirm the District Court's decision to deny Fields's
motion to suppress on the basis that there was no show of authority
and consequently no unlawful seizure at the time that Fields
contends one occurred.
III.
We now turn to Fields's challenge to his sentence.
Before we address the merits of his challenge, though, we need to
step back so that we can explain precisely what is in dispute --
and what is not.
Fields contends that the District Court erroneously
subjected him to a particular career offender enhancement under
the Guidelines, with the result that he was assigned too high of
a BOL and thus too high of a Guidelines sentencing range.
Specifically, Fields contends that the District Court erred in
applying the enhancement set forth in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2), which
provides for a BOL of 24 if the defendant has two prior convictions
of a crime of violence under the career offender guideline. Fields
argues that, in fact, none of his prior convictions qualified as
convictions of a crime of violence under the career offender
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guideline. Fields thus contends that his BOL should have been 14,
as that is the BOL that would have applied had Fields received no
career offender enhancement. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(6)(A).
In response, the government agrees that the District
Court's application of the sentencing enhancement set forth in
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2) was erroneous. The government takes that
position because the District Court classified Fields's September
2010 conviction for resisting arrest as a conviction of a crime of
violence under the career offender guideline, and the government
concedes on appeal that conviction cannot be so classified on this
record. The government also agrees with Fields that, in
consequence of this error, the case should be remanded for
resentencing.
The government does not agree with Fields, however, that
the BOL that should be applied to him on remand should be 14.
Rather, the government contends that the BOL that should be applied
to Fields on remand should be 20, which is the BOL that would apply
to a defendant subject to the enhancement set forth in U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). The government contends that the District Court
should apply that enhancement instead of the one set forth in
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2), which was the Guidelines provision that
the District Court applied below. The enhancement that the
government contends should apply on remand requires that the
defendant have only one prior conviction of a crime of violence,
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rather than the two such convictions required under U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(a)(2).
In practical terms, the dispute over the proper BOL to
apply to Fields on remand matters in the following way. Assuming
that the District Court will again sentence Fields on the basis of
a criminal history category of IV, Fields's Guidelines range would
be 37-46 months on the government's view, which is the range
consistent with a BOL of 20. On that same assumption, Fields's
Guidelines range would be 21-27 months on Fields's view, which is
the range consistent with a BOL of 14.
To support the application on remand of a BOL of 20, the
government contends that Fields's July 2010 convictions for ADW
and ABDW together "constitute one qualifying conviction [of] a
'crime of violence'" under the career offender guideline, Gov. Br.
55 (emphasis added), and that the enhancement set forth in U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) therefore should apply.7 Given the government's
argument, we need not decide whether both of Fields's July 2010
convictions for ADW and ABDW qualify as convictions of a crime of
violence. We need only decide whether one of them does, as the
7 The government does not ask us to conclude that Fields's
July 2010 convictions for ADW and ABDW each constitute a conviction
of a crime of violence and thus trigger the application of U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(a)(2). Nor does the government argue that Fields's July
2010 convictions for resisting arrest and ABPO, either
independently or together, constitute convictions of a crime of
violence.
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only career offender enhancement that the government contends
should apply would then be triggered.
The District Court, in assessing Fields's BOL, did not
pass on which of Fields's July 2010 convictions qualified as a
conviction of a crime of violence. The District Court thus did
not specifically pass on whether either of Fields's July 2010
convictions for ADW and ABDW qualified as a conviction of a crime
of violence. But the question is one of law, and the parties do
not ask us to remand so that the District Court can pass on the
question in the first instance. We thus proceed to analyze the
issue.
Fields did not object below to the classification of any
of his convictions as convictions of a crime of violence, see
United States v. Ríos–Hernández, 645 F.3d 456, 462 (1st Cir. 2011)
(noting that in such cases the plain-error standard of review
ordinarily applies), but the government does not appear to ask us
to apply the plain-error standard of review in evaluating Fields's
challenge. In any event, the standard of review is of little
consequence here because, as we next explain, it is clear that at
least one of Fields's July 2010 convictions for ADW and ABDW
qualifies as a conviction of a crime of violence.8
8 In his opening brief, Fields argued that the residual clause
of the career offender guideline was unconstitutional and thus
that his prior convictions did not qualify as convictions of a
crime of violence. As the government notes, Fields did not address
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A.
In undertaking our inquiry, we start with -- and, it
turns out, end with -- Fields's July 2010 conviction for ADW,
because we conclude that that conviction does qualify as a
conviction of a crime of violence. To explain why this is the
case, we must first provide some background.
The career offender guideline defines a "crime of
violence" as "any offense under federal or state law, punishable
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that (1) has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling,
arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise
the prospect that his prior convictions might nevertheless qualify
as convictions of a crime of violence under the force clause of
the career offender guideline. It was only in his reply brief
that Fields addressed that prospect. Ordinarily, we treat
arguments raised for the first time in an appellant's reply brief
as waived. See United States v. Eirby, 515 F.3d 31, 36 n.4 (1st
Cir. 2008). It is unclear whether the government urges us to
follow that practice here. In any event, we may make an exception
where "justice so requires" and where the opposing party would not
be unfairly prejudiced by our considering the issue. See United
States v. Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d 110, 116 (1st Cir. 2011). And
here, we believe such an exception is proper. Johnson v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (holding unconstitutional the
residual clause contained in the definition of "violent felony" in
the Armed Career Criminal Act), was decided after Fields's opening
brief was filed. That decision made the force clause loom larger
than otherwise would have been the case. Given that the government
does not clearly press for waiver and that the arguments concerning
whether Fields's prior convictions may qualify even under the force
clause have now been fully joined by both parties, we see no
prejudice to the government in considering such arguments.
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involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another." U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). The first subparagraph
of the career offender guideline is often referred to as the "force
clause." The trailing portion of the second subparagraph of that
guideline is often referred to as the "Guidelines' residual
clause."
The parties agree that, in light of Johnson v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) ("Johnson II"), the residual clause
of the career offender guideline is unconstitutional and thus may
not be relied upon to classify a conviction as a conviction of a
crime of violence under the career offender guideline. We assume
without deciding that the parties are correct in their
interpretation of the status of the residual clause. See United
States v. Soto-Rivera, 811 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2016). We
therefore consider only whether the July 2010 ADW conviction
qualifies as a conviction of a crime of violence under the force
clause of the career offender guideline.
To assess whether a conviction qualifies as a conviction
of a crime of violence under that clause, we must apply what is
known as the "categorical" approach. Under that approach, "we
compare the statutory elements of the crime for which the defendant
was previously convicted" -- "without regard to the specific facts"
or conduct underlying that conviction -- "with Congress's
definition of the type of crime that may serve as a predicate
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offense" (that is, a crime of violence). United States v. Fish,
758 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2014). The object is to determine "whether
the conduct criminalized by the statute, including the most
innocent conduct, qualifies as a crime of violence." Id.9
The Commonwealth's ADW statute is violated by
"[w]hoever, by means of a dangerous weapon, commits an assault
upon another." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 15B(b). Massachusetts
law recognizes two theories of assault: attempted battery and
threatened battery. Commonwealth v. Porro, 939 N.E.2d 1157, 1163
(Mass. 2010). Battery has been defined as "harmful [or] offensive
touching." See Commonwealth v. Burke, 457 N.E.2d 622, 624 (Mass.
1983). The crime of simple assault has thus been held to encompass
both attempted and threatened offensive touching. See United
States v. Martinez, 762 F.3d 127, 138 (1st Cir. 2014). ADW "adds
one additional element, namely, that the assault was perpetrated
by means of a dangerous weapon." United States v. Whindleton, 797
F.3d 105, 112 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Melton, 763
N.E.2d 1092, 1096 (Mass. 2002)); see Commonwealth v. Appleby, 402
N.E.2d 1051, 1056-57 (Mass. 1980) (explaining the dangerous weapon
element). Finally, under either the attempted battery form or the
9
In certain circumstances involving divisible state statutes,
the Court instructs us to apply what is known as the "modified
categorical" approach. See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct.
2276, 2281-82 (2013). The government does not ask us to apply
that approach here.
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threatened battery form of ADW, the mens rea is one of specific
intent, as the defendant must either intend to commit a battery or
intend to put the victim in fear of an imminent battery. See
Porro, 939 N.E.2d at 1163.
Fields contends that a conviction under the
Massachusetts ADW statute does not qualify as a conviction of a
crime of violence under the force clause because the Massachusetts
ADW statute criminalizes attempted or threatened offensive
touching.10 Fields bases that contention solely on Johnson v.
United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2015) ("Johnson I").11 In Johnson I,
the Court interpreted the force clause contained in the definition
of "violent felony" in the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). In doing so, the Court held that "the
phrase 'physical force' means violent force -- that is, force
10Fields does not contend that a conviction under the
Massachusetts ADW statute fails to qualify as a conviction of a
crime of violence because one may be convicted of that offense on
the basis of only a mens rea of recklessness. And for good reason.
As we recently concluded in the context of holding that "a
conviction under [the Massachusetts ADW statute] includes a mens
rea requirement sufficient to qualify the conviction as a predicate
under the [Armed Career Criminal Act's] force clause," "under
Massachusetts decisional law an ADW conviction requires that the
use or threat of physical force be intentional." United States v.
Hudson, No. 14–2124, 2016 WL 2621093, at *4-5 (1st Cir. May 9,
2016). To the extent Fields contends that we suggested otherwise
in United States v. Am, 564 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2009), Hudson
explains that "[a]lthough ABDW may be committed recklessly, we
made clear in Am that ADW cannot be." Id. at *4 n.8.
11 The references to Johnson I and Johnson II are for
convenience only, as these cases bear no meaningful relationship
to one another.
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capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person."
Id. at 140 (emphasis in original). The Court thus concluded that,
under the categorical approach, a conviction under a Florida simple
battery statute did not qualify as a conviction of a "violent
felony" within the meaning of the ACCA's force clause because that
statute criminalized offensive contact such as an unconsented-to
tap on the shoulder -- that is, conduct not involving "violent
force." Id. at 138.
Fields's argument, however, is foreclosed by our recent
decision in United States v. Whindleton, 797 F.3d 105 (1st Cir.
2015). There, we held that a conviction under the Massachusetts
ADW statute categorically qualified as a "violent felony" within
the meaning of the ACCA's force clause, because "the element of a
dangerous weapon imports the 'violent force' required by [Johnson
I] into the otherwise overbroad simple assault statute." Id. at
114. We reasoned that "the harm threatened by assault is far more
violent than offensive touching when committed with a weapon that
is designed to produce or used in a way that is capable of producing
serious bodily harm or death." Id. In other words, we concluded
that a conviction under the Massachusetts ADW statute
categorically qualified as a violent felony under the ACCA's force
clause because the minimum conduct criminalized by the statute
qualifies as such by virtue of the dangerous weapon element. See
also United States v. Hudson, No. 14–2124, 2016 WL 2621093, at *4
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(1st Cir. May 9, 2016) ("[W]e reaffirm that a Massachusetts ADW
conviction meets the physical force requirement under the force
clause of the ACCA.").
True, this case involves the career offender guideline
and the definition of "crime of violence" rather than the ACCA and
the definition of "violent felony." But we have expressly stated
that "the terms 'crime of violence' under the career offender
guideline and 'violent felony' under the ACCA are nearly identical
in meaning, s[uch] that decisions construing one term inform the
construction of the other." United States v. Willings, 588 F.3d
56, 58 n.2 (1st Cir. 2009). In fact, the force clause language of
these provisions is identical.
We thus conclude that, in light of Whindleton, Fields's
July 2010 ADW conviction qualifies as a conviction of a crime of
violence under the force clause of the career offender guideline.12
12Fields points out that in United States v. Fish, this Court
stated that a conviction under the Massachusetts ABDW statute would
not qualify as a conviction of a crime of violence under the force
clause of 18 U.S.C. § 16 because offensive touching does not (after
Johnson I) "have 'as an element' the use of physical force." 758
F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2014). Fields contends that Fish's logic
extends to describe the nature of a conviction under the
Massachusetts ADW statute, as that statute criminalizes attempted
and threatened offensive touching. But the discussion of the force
clause in Fish was dicta, as the Court based its holding on the
residual clause in § 16 rather than the force clause. See id.
(noting that the government in Fish declined to argue that the
defendant's prior conviction under the Massachusetts ABDW statute
qualified as a conviction of a crime of violence under the force
clause of § 16). Thus, Fish's holding provides no support for
Fields's argument.
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As a result, we vacate and remand Fields's sentence for
resentencing, in accordance with the government's request
regarding the application of the sentencing enhancement set forth
in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A).13
IV.
For the reasons stated, we AFFIRM the District Court's
denial of Fields's motion to suppress. But we VACATE and REMAND
for resentencing proceedings consistent with this opinion.
13Fields does not appear to challenge, either in his opening
brief or his reply brief, the District Court's classification of
his prior convictions as convictions of a crime of violence for
purpose of calculating his criminal history (as opposed to his
BOL).
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