Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , 136 S. Ct. 1540 ( 2016 )


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  • (Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2015                                       1
    Syllabus
    NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
    being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
    The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
    prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
    See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 
    200 U.S. 321
    , 337.
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    Syllabus
    SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS
    CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
    THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    No. 13–1339. Argued November 2, 2015—Decided May 16, 2016
    The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (FCRA) requires consumer re-
    porting agencies to “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum
    possible accuracy of” consumer reports, 
    15 U.S. C
    . §1681e(b), and
    imposes liability on “[a]ny person who willfully fails to comply with
    any requirement [of the Act] with respect to any” individual,
    §1681n(a).
    Petitioner Spokeo, Inc., an alleged consumer reporting agency, op-
    erates a “people search engine,” which searches a wide spectrum of
    databases to gather and provide personal information about individ-
    uals to a variety of users, including employers wanting to evaluate
    prospective employees. After respondent Thomas Robins discovered
    that his Spokeo-generated profile contained inaccurate information,
    he filed a federal class-action complaint against Spokeo, alleging that
    the company willfully failed to comply with the FCRA’s require-
    ments.
    The District Court dismissed Robins’ complaint, holding that he
    had not properly pleaded injury in fact as required by Article III. The
    Ninth Circuit reversed. Based on Robins’ allegation that “Spokeo vio-
    lated his statutory rights” and the fact that Robins’ “personal inter-
    ests in the handling of his credit information are individualized,” the
    court held that Robins had adequately alleged an injury in fact.
    Held: Because the Ninth Circuit failed to consider both aspects of the
    injury-in-fact requirement, its Article III standing analysis was in-
    complete. Pp. 5–11.
    (a) A plaintiff invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of es-
    tablishing the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing by
    demonstrating (1) an injury in fact, (2) fairly traceable to the chal-
    lenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) likely to be redressed by a
    2                      SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS
    Syllabus
    favorable judicial decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    , 560–561. Pp. 5–6.
    (b) As relevant here, the injury-in-fact requirement requires a
    plaintiff to show that he or she suffered “an invasion of a legally pro-
    tected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or
    imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” 
    Lujan, supra, at 560
    .
    Pp. 7–11.
    (1) The Ninth Circuit’s injury-in-fact analysis elided the inde-
    pendent “concreteness” requirement. Both observations it made con-
    cerned only “particularization,” i.e., the requirement that an injury
    “affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way,” 
    Lujan, supra, at 560
    , n. 1, but an injury in fact must be both concrete and particu-
    larized, see, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. ___,
    ___. Concreteness is quite different from particularization and re-
    quires an injury to be “de facto,” that is, to actually exist. Pp. 7–8.
    (2) The Ninth Circuit also failed to address whether the alleged
    procedural violations entail a degree of risk sufficient to meet the
    concreteness requirement. A “concrete” injury need not be a “tangi-
    ble” injury. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 
    555 U.S. 460
    .
    To determine whether an intangible harm constitutes injury in fact,
    both history and the judgment of Congress are instructive. Congress
    is well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum
    Article III requirements, but a plaintiff does not automatically satisfy
    the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a right and
    purports to authorize a suit to vindicate it. Article III standing re-
    quires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.
    This does not mean, however, that the risk of real harm cannot satis-
    fy that requirement. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568
    U. S. ____. The violation of a procedural right granted by statute can
    be sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury in fact; in
    such a case, a plaintiff need not allege any additional harm beyond
    the one identified by Congress, see Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins,
    
    524 U.S. 11
    , 20–25. This Court takes no position on the correctness
    of the Ninth Circuit’s ultimate conclusion, but these general princi-
    ples demonstrate two things: that Congress plainly sought to curb
    the dissemination of false information by adopting procedures de-
    signed to decrease that risk and that Robins cannot satisfy the de-
    mands of Article III by alleging a bare procedural violation. Pp. 8–
    11.
    
    742 F.3d 409
    , vacated and remanded.
    ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
    and KENNEDY, THOMAS, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J.,
    filed a concurring opinion. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
    which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined.
    Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)                              1
    Opinion of the Court
    NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
    preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
    notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
    ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
    that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 13–1339
    _________________
    SPOKEO, INC., PETITIONER v. THOMAS ROBINS
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
    APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    [May 16, 2016]
    JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
    This case presents the question whether respondent
    Robins has standing to maintain an action in federal court
    against petitioner Spokeo under the Fair Credit Reporting
    Act of 1970 (FCRA or Act), 84 Stat. 1127, as amended, 
    15 U.S. C
    . §1681 et seq.
    Spokeo operates a “people search engine.” If an individ-
    ual visits Spokeo’s Web site and inputs a person’s name, a
    phone number, or an e-mail address, Spokeo conducts a
    computerized search in a wide variety of databases and
    provides information about the subject of the search.
    Spokeo performed such a search for information about
    Robins, and some of the information it gathered and then
    disseminated was incorrect. When Robins learned of these
    inaccuracies, he filed a complaint on his own behalf and on
    behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals.
    The District Court dismissed Robins’ complaint for lack
    of standing, but a panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed. The
    Ninth Circuit noted, first, that Robins had alleged that
    “Spokeo violated his statutory rights, not just the statu-
    tory rights of other people,” and, second, that “Robins’s
    personal interests in the handling of his credit information
    2                      SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS
    Opinion of the Court
    are individualized rather than collective.” 
    742 F.3d 409
    ,
    413 (2014). Based on these two observations, the Ninth
    Circuit held that Robins had adequately alleged injury in
    fact, a requirement for standing under Article III of the
    Constitution. 
    Id., at 413–414.
      This analysis was incomplete. As we have explained in
    our prior opinions, the injury-in-fact requirement requires
    a plaintiff to allege an injury that is both “concrete and
    particularized.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
    Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 
    528 U.S. 167
    , 180–
    181 (2000) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit’s analysis
    focused on the second characteristic (particularity), but it
    overlooked the first (concreteness). We therefore vacate
    the decision below and remand for the Ninth Circuit to
    consider both aspects of the injury-in-fact requirement.
    I
    The FCRA seeks to ensure “fair and accurate credit
    reporting.” §1681(a)(1). To achieve this end, the Act
    regulates the creation and the use of “consumer report[s]”1
    by “consumer reporting agenc[ies]”2 for certain specified
    ——————
    1 The
    Act defines the term “consumer report” as:
    “any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a
    consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness,
    credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal
    characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or
    collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in
    establishing the consumer’s eligibility for—
    “(A) credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or
    household purposes;
    “(B) employment purposes; or
    “(C) any other purpose authorized under section 1681b of this title.”
    
    15 U.S. C
    . §1681a(d)(1).
    2 “The term ‘consumer reporting agency’ means any person which, for
    monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly
    engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating
    consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the
    purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses
    Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)                   3
    Opinion of the Court
    purposes, including credit transactions, insurance, licens-
    ing, consumer-initiated business transactions, and em-
    ployment. See §§1681a(d)(1)(A)–(C); §1681b. Enacted
    long before the advent of the Internet, the FCRA applies to
    companies that regularly disseminate information bearing
    on an individual’s “credit worthiness, credit standing,
    credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal
    characteristics, or mode of living.” §1681a(d)(1).
    The FCRA imposes a host of requirements concerning
    the creation and use of consumer reports. As relevant
    here, the Act requires consumer reporting agencies to
    “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible
    accuracy of ” consumer reports, §1681e(b); to notify provid-
    ers and users of consumer information of their responsibil-
    ities under the Act, §1681e(d); to limit the circumstances
    in which such agencies provide consumer reports “for
    employment purposes,” §1681b(b)(1); and to post toll-free
    numbers for consumers to request reports, §1681j(a).
    The Act also provides that “[a]ny person who willfully
    fails to comply with any requirement [of the Act] with
    respect to any [individual3] is liable to that [individual]”
    for, among other things, either “actual damages” or statu-
    tory damages of $100 to $1,000 per violation, costs of the
    action and attorney’s fees, and possibly punitive damages.
    §1681n(a).
    Spokeo is alleged to qualify as a “consumer reporting
    agency” under the FCRA.4 It operates a Web site that
    allows users to search for information about other individ-
    uals by name, e-mail address, or phone number. In re-
    sponse to an inquiry submitted online, Spokeo searches a
    ——————
    any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of prepar-
    ing or furnishing consumer reports.” §1681a(f ).
    3 This statutory provision uses the term “consumer,” but that term is
    defined to mean “an individual.” §1681a(c).
    4 For purposes of this opinion, we assume that Spokeo is a consumer
    reporting agency.
    4                  SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS
    Opinion of the Court
    wide spectrum of databases and gathers and provides
    information such as the individual’s address, phone num-
    ber, marital status, approximate age, occupation, hobbies,
    finances, shopping habits, and musical preferences. App.
    7, 10–11. According to Robins, Spokeo markets its ser-
    vices to a variety of users, including not only “employers
    who want to evaluate prospective employees,” but also
    “those who want to investigate prospective romantic part-
    ners or seek other personal information.” Brief for Re-
    spondent 7. Persons wishing to perform a Spokeo search
    need not disclose their identities, and much information is
    available for free.
    At some point in time, someone (Robins’ complaint does
    not specify who) made a Spokeo search request for infor-
    mation about Robins, and Spokeo trawled its sources and
    generated a profile. By some means not detailed in Rob-
    ins’ complaint, he became aware of the contents of that
    profile and discovered that it contained inaccurate infor-
    mation. His profile, he asserts, states that he is married,
    has children, is in his 50’s, has a job, is relatively affluent,
    and holds a graduate degree. App. 14. According to Rob-
    ins’ complaint, all of this information is incorrect.
    Robins filed a class-action complaint in the United
    States District Court for the Central District of California,
    claiming, among other things, that Spokeo willfully failed
    to comply with the FCRA requirements enumerated
    above.
    The District Court initially denied Spokeo’s motion to
    dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, but later
    reconsidered and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
    App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a. The court found that Robins
    had not “properly pled” an injury in fact, as required by
    Article III. 
    Ibid. The Court of
    Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.
    Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)                   5
    Opinion of the Court
    Relying on Circuit precedent,5 the court began by stating
    that “the violation of a statutory right is usually a suffi-
    cient injury in fact to confer 
    standing.” 742 F.3d, at 412
    .
    The court recognized that “the Constitution limits the
    power of Congress to confer standing.” 
    Id., at 413.
    But
    the court held that those limits were honored in this case
    because Robins alleged that “Spokeo violated his statutory
    rights, not just the statutory rights of other people,” and
    because his “personal interests in the handling of his
    credit information are individualized rather than collec-
    tive.” 
    Ibid. (emphasis in original).
    The court thus con-
    cluded that Robins’ “alleged violations of [his] statutory
    rights [were] sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact re-
    quirement of Article III.” 
    Id., at 413–414.
       We granted certiorari. 575 U. S. ___ (2015).
    II
    A
    The Constitution confers limited authority on each
    branch of the Federal Government. It vests Congress with
    enumerated “legislative Powers,” Art. I, §1; it confers upon
    the President “[t]he executive Power,” Art. II, §1, cl. 1; and
    it endows the federal courts with “[t]he judicial Power of
    the United States,” Art. III, §1. In order to remain faithful
    to this tripartite structure, the power of the Federal Judi-
    ciary may not be permitted to intrude upon the powers
    given to the other branches. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v.
    Cuno, 
    547 U.S. 332
    , 341 (2006); Lujan v. Defenders of
    Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    , 559–560 (1992).
    Although the Constitution does not fully explain what is
    meant by “[t]he judicial Power of the United States,”
    Art. III, § 1, it does specify that this power extends only to
    ——————
    5 See  Edwards v. First American Corp., 
    610 F.3d 514
    (CA9 2010),
    cert. granted sub nom. First American Financial Corp. v. Edwards, 
    564 U.S. 1018
    (2011), cert. dism’d as improvidently granted, 567 U. S. ___
    (2012) ( per curiam).
    6                         SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS
    Opinion of the Court
    “Cases” and “Controversies,” Art. III, §2. And “ ‘[n]o prin-
    ciple is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in
    our system of government than the constitutional limita-
    tion of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or contro-
    versies.’ ” Raines v. Byrd, 
    521 U.S. 811
    , 818 (1997).
    Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in the traditional
    understanding of a case or controversy. The doctrine
    developed in our case law to ensure that federal courts do
    not exceed their authority as it has been traditionally
    understood. See 
    id., at 820.
    The doctrine limits the cate-
    gory of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in
    federal court to seek redress for a legal wrong. See Valley
    Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separa-
    tion of Church and State, Inc., 
    454 U.S. 464
    , 473 (1982);
    Warth v. Seldin, 
    422 U.S. 490
    , 498–499 (1975). In this
    way, “[t]he law of Article III standing . . . serves to prevent
    the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of
    the political branches,” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568
    U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 9); 
    Lujan, supra, at 576
    –
    577, and confines the federal courts to a properly judicial
    role, see 
    Warth, supra, at 498
    .
    Our cases have established that the “irreducible consti-
    tutional minimum” of standing consists of three elements.
    
    Lujan, 504 U.S., at 560
    . The plaintiff must have (1)
    suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the
    challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely
    to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. 
    Id., at 560–561;
    Friends of the Earth, 
    Inc., 528 U.S., at 180
    –181.
    The plaintiff, as the party invoking federal jurisdiction,
    bears the burden of establishing these elements.
    FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 
    493 U.S. 215
    , 231 (1990). Where,
    as here, a case is at the pleading stage, the plaintiff must
    “clearly . . . allege facts demonstrating” each element.
    
    Warth, supra, at 518
    .6
    ——————
    6 “That   a suit may be a class action . . . adds nothing to the question
    Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)                   7
    Opinion of the Court
    B
    This case primarily concerns injury in fact, the “[f ]irst
    and foremost” of standing’s three elements. Steel Co. v.
    Citizens for Better Environment, 
    523 U.S. 83
    , 103 (1998).
    Injury in fact is a constitutional requirement, and “[i]t is
    settled that Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing
    requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a
    plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.” 
    Raines, supra, at 820
    , n. 3; see Summers v. Earth Island Institute,
    
    555 U.S. 488
    , 497 (2009); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of
    Bellwood, 
    441 U.S. 91
    , 100 (1979) (“In no event . . . may
    Congress abrogate the Art. III minima”).
    To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he
    or she suffered “an invasion of a legally protected interest”
    that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or immi-
    nent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” 
    Lujan, 504 U.S., at 560
    (internal quotation marks omitted). We discuss the
    particularization and concreteness requirements below.
    1
    For an injury to be “particularized,” it “must affect the
    plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Ibid., n. 1; see
    also, e.g., 
    Cuno, supra, at 342
    (“ ‘plaintiff must allege
    personal injury’ ”); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 
    495 U.S. 149
    ,
    155 (1990) (“ ‘distinct’ ”); Allen v. Wright, 
    468 U.S. 737
    ,
    751 (1984) (“personal”); Valley 
    Forge, supra, at 472
    (stand-
    ing requires that the plaintiff “ ‘personally has suffered
    some actual or threatened injury’ ”); United States v.
    Richardson, 
    418 U.S. 166
    , 177 (1974) (not “undifferenti-
    ated”); Public Citizen, Inc. v. National Hwy. Traffic Safety
    Admin., 
    489 F.3d 1279
    , 1292–1293 (CADC 2007) (collect-
    ——————
    of standing, for even named plaintiffs who represent a class ‘must
    allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury
    has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which
    they belong.’ ” Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 
    426 U.S. 26
    , 40, n. 20 (1976) (quoting 
    Warth, 422 U.S., at 502
    ).
    8                     SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS
    Opinion of the Court
    ing cases).7
    Particularization is necessary to establish injury in fact,
    but it is not sufficient. An injury in fact must also be
    “concrete.” Under the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, however,
    that independent requirement was elided. As previously
    noted, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Robins’ complaint
    alleges “concrete, de facto” injuries for essentially two
    
    reasons. 742 F.3d, at 413
    . First, the court noted that
    Robins “alleges that Spokeo violated his statutory rights,
    not just the statutory rights of other people.” 
    Ibid. Sec- ond, the
    court wrote that “Robins’s personal interests in
    the handling of his credit information are individualized
    rather than collective.” 
    Ibid. (emphasis added). Both
    of
    these observations concern particularization, not con-
    creteness. We have made it clear time and time again
    that an injury in fact must be both concrete and particu-
    larized. See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573
    U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 8); 
    Summers, supra, at 493
    ; Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc.,
    
    554 U.S. 269
    , 274 (2008); Massachusetts v. EPA, 
    549 U.S. 497
    , 517 (2007).
    A “concrete” injury must be “de facto”; that is, it must
    actually exist. See Black’s Law Dictionary 479 (9th ed.
    2009). When we have used the adjective “concrete,” we
    have meant to convey the usual meaning of the term—
    “real,” and not “abstract.” Webster’s Third New Interna-
    tional Dictionary 472 (1971); Random House Dictionary of
    the English Language 305 (1967). Concreteness, there-
    fore, is quite different from particularization.
    2
    “Concrete” is not, however, necessarily synonymous with
    ——————
    7 The
    fact that an injury may be suffered by a large number of people
    does not of itself make that injury a nonjusticiable generalized griev-
    ance. The victims’ injuries from a mass tort, for example, are widely
    shared, to be sure, but each individual suffers a particularized harm.
    Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)            9
    Opinion of the Court
    “tangible.” Although tangible injuries are perhaps easier
    to recognize, we have confirmed in many of our previous
    cases that intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete.
    See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 
    555 U.S. 460
    (2009) (free speech); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
    Hialeah, 
    508 U.S. 520
    (1993) (free exercise).
    In determining whether an intangible harm constitutes
    injury in fact, both history and the judgment of Congress
    play important roles. Because the doctrine of standing
    derives from the case-or-controversy requirement, and
    because that requirement in turn is grounded in historical
    practice, it is instructive to consider whether an alleged
    intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that
    has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a
    lawsuit in English or American courts. See Vermont
    Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Ste-
    vens, 
    529 U.S. 765
    , 775–777 (2000). In addition, because
    Congress is well positioned to identify intangible harms
    that meet minimum Article III requirements, its judgment
    is also instructive and important. Thus, we said in Lujan
    that Congress may “elevat[e] to the status of legally cog-
    nizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previ-
    ously inadequate in 
    law.” 504 U.S., at 578
    . Similarly,
    Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in that case explained that
    “Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate
    chains of causation that will give rise to a case or contro-
    versy where none existed before.” 
    Id., at 580
    (opinion
    concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
    Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible
    harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically satis-
    fies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute
    grants a person a statutory right and purports to author-
    ize that person to sue to vindicate that right. Article III
    standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a
    statutory violation. For that reason, Robins could not, for
    example, allege a bare procedural violation, divorced from
    10                 SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS
    Opinion of the Court
    any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact require-
    ment of Article III. See 
    Summers, 555 U.S., at 496
    (“[D]eprivation of a procedural right without some con-
    crete interest that is affected by the deprivation . . . is
    insufficient to create Article III standing”); see also 
    Lujan, supra, at 572
    .
    This does not mean, however, that the risk of real harm
    cannot satisfy the requirement of concreteness. See, e.g.,
    Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U. S. ____. For exam-
    ple, the law has long permitted recovery by certain tort
    victims even if their harms may be difficult to prove or
    measure. See, e.g., Restatement (First) of Torts §§569
    (libel), 570 (slander per se) (1938). Just as the common
    law permitted suit in such instances, the violation of a
    procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in
    some circumstances to constitute injury in fact. In other
    words, a plaintiff in such a case need not allege any addi-
    tional harm beyond the one Congress has identified. See
    Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 
    524 U.S. 11
    , 20–25
    (1998) (confirming that a group of voters’ “inability to
    obtain information” that Congress had decided to make
    public is a sufficient injury in fact to satisfy Article III);
    Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 
    491 U.S. 440
    , 449
    (1989) (holding that two advocacy organizations’ failure to
    obtain information subject to disclosure under the Federal
    Advisory Committee Act “constitutes a sufficiently distinct
    injury to provide standing to sue”).
    In the context of this particular case, these general
    principles tell us two things: On the one hand, Congress
    plainly sought to curb the dissemination of false infor-
    mation by adopting procedures designed to decrease that
    risk. On the other hand, Robins cannot satisfy the de-
    mands of Article III by alleging a bare procedural viola-
    tion. A violation of one of the FCRA’s procedural require-
    ments may result in no harm. For example, even if a
    consumer reporting agency fails to provide the required
    Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)                 11
    Opinion of the Court
    notice to a user of the agency’s consumer information, that
    information regardless may be entirely accurate. In addi-
    tion, not all inaccuracies cause harm or present any mate-
    rial risk of harm. An example that comes readily to mind
    is an incorrect zip code. It is difficult to imagine how the
    dissemination of an incorrect zip code, without more, could
    work any concrete harm.8
    Because the Ninth Circuit failed to fully appreciate the
    distinction between concreteness and particularization, its
    standing analysis was incomplete. It did not address the
    question framed by our discussion, namely, whether the
    particular procedural violations alleged in this case entail
    a degree of risk sufficient to meet the concreteness re-
    quirement. We take no position as to whether the Ninth
    Circuit’s ultimate conclusion—that Robins adequately
    alleged an injury in fact—was correct.
    *     *    *
    The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and
    the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this
    opinion.
    It is so ordered.
    ——————
    8 We express no view about any other types of false information that
    may merit similar treatment. We leave that issue for the Ninth Circuit
    to consider on remand.
    Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)            1
    THOMAS, J., concurring
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 13–1339
    _________________
    SPOKEO, INC., PETITIONER v. THOMAS ROBINS
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
    APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    [May 16, 2016]
    JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring.
    The Court vacates and remands to have the Court of
    Appeals determine “whether the particular procedural
    violations alleged in this case entail a degree of risk suffi­
    cient to meet the concreteness requirement.” Ante, at 11.
    In defining what constitutes a concrete injury, the Court
    explains that “concrete” means “ ‘real,’ ” and “not ‘ab­
    stract,’ ” but is not “necessarily synonymous with ‘tan-
    gible.’ ” Ante, at 8–9.
    I join the Court’s opinion. I write separately to explain
    how, in my view, the injury-in-fact requirement applies to
    different types of rights. The judicial power of common-
    law courts was historically limited depending on the na­
    ture of the plaintiff ’s suit. Common-law courts more
    readily entertained suits from private plaintiffs who al­
    leged a violation of their own rights, in contrast to private
    plaintiffs who asserted claims vindicating public rights.
    Those limitations persist in modern standing doctrine.
    I
    A
    Standing doctrine limits the “judicial power” to “ ‘cases
    and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to,
    and resolved by, the judicial process.’ ” Vermont Agency of
    Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 
    529 U.S. 765
    , 774 (2000) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
    2                  SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS
    THOMAS, J., concurring
    Better Environment, 
    523 U.S. 83
    , 102 (1998)). To under­
    stand the limits that standing imposes on “the judicial
    Power,” therefore, we must “refer directly to the traditional,
    fundamental limitations upon the powers of common-
    law courts.” Honig v. Doe, 
    484 U.S. 305
    , 340 (1988) (Scalia,
    J., dissenting). These limitations preserve separation
    of powers by preventing the judiciary’s entanglement in
    disputes that are primarily political in nature. This con­
    cern is generally absent when a private plaintiff seeks to
    enforce only his personal rights against another private
    party.
    Common-law courts imposed different limitations on a
    plaintiff ’s right to bring suit depending on the type of
    right the plaintiff sought to vindicate.         Historically,
    common-law courts possessed broad power to adjudicate suits
    involving the alleged violation of private rights, even when
    plaintiffs alleged only the violation of those rights and
    nothing more. “Private rights” are rights “belonging to
    individuals, considered as individuals.” 3 W. Blackstone,
    Commentaries *2 (hereinafter Blackstone).            “Private
    rights” have traditionally included rights of personal
    security (including security of reputation), property rights,
    and contract rights. See 1 
    id., at *130–*139;
    Woolhander
    & Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 
    102 Mich. L
    . Rev. 689, 693 (2004). In a suit for the violation of
    a private right, courts historically presumed that the
    plaintiff suffered a de facto injury merely from having his
    personal, legal rights invaded. Thus, when one man
    placed his foot on another’s property, the property owner
    needed to show nothing more to establish a traditional
    case or controversy. See Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils.
    K. B. 275, 291, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (1765). Many tradi­
    tional remedies for private-rights causes of action—such
    as for trespass, infringement of intellectual property, and
    unjust enrichment—are not contingent on a plaintiff ’s
    allegation of damages beyond the violation of his private
    Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)                   3
    THOMAS, J., concurring
    legal right. See Brief for Restitution and Remedies Schol­
    ars as Amici Curiae 6–18; see also Webb v. Portland Mfg.
    Co., 
    29 F. Cas. 506
    , 508 (No. 17,322) (Me. 1838) (stating
    that a legal injury “imports damage in the nature of it”
    (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    Common-law courts, however, have required a further
    showing of injury for violations of “public rights”—rights
    that involve duties owed “to the whole community, consid­
    ered as a community, in its social aggregate capacity.” 4
    Blackstone *5. Such rights include “free navigation of
    waterways, passage on public highways, and general
    compliance with regulatory law.” Woolhander & Nelson,
    
    102 Mich. L
    . Rev., at 693. Generally, only the government
    had the authority to vindicate a harm borne by the public
    at large, such as the violation of the criminal laws. See
    
    id., at 695–700.
    Even in limited cases where private
    plaintiffs could bring a claim for the violation of public
    rights, they had to allege that the violation caused them
    “some extraordinary damage, beyond the rest of the [com­
    munity].” 3 Blackstone *220 (discussing nuisance); see
    also Commonwealth v. Webb, 
    27 Va. 726
    , 729 (Gen. Ct.
    1828).* An action to redress a public nuisance, for exam­
    ple, was historically considered an action to vindicate the
    violation of a public right at common law, lest “every
    subject in the kingdom” be able to “harass the offender
    with separate actions.” 3 Blackstone *219; see also 4 
    id., at *167
    (same). But if the plaintiff could allege “special
    damage” as the result of a nuisance, the suit could pro­
    ceed. The existence of special, individualized damage had
    the effect of creating a private action for compensatory
    relief to an otherwise public-rights claim. See 3 
    id., at ——————
      * The well-established exception for qui tam actions allows private
    plaintiffs to sue in the government’s name for the violation of a public
    right. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel.
    Stevens, 
    529 U.S. 765
    , 773–774 (2000).
    4                  SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS
    THOMAS, J., concurring
    *220. Similarly, a plaintiff had to allege individual dam­
    age in disputes over the use of public lands. E.g., Robert
    Marys’s Case, 9 Co. Rep. 111b, 112b, 77 Eng. Rep. 895,
    898–899 (K. B. 1613) (commoner must establish not only
    injuria [legal injury] but also damnum [damage] to chal­
    lenge another’s overgrazing on the commons).
    B
    These differences between legal claims brought by pri­
    vate plaintiffs for the violation of public and private rights
    underlie modern standing doctrine and explain the Court’s
    description of the injury-in-fact requirement. “Injury in
    fact” is the first of three “irreducible” requirements for
    Article III standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    , 560 (1992). The injury-in-fact requirement
    often stymies a private plaintiff ’s attempt to vindicate the
    infringement of public rights. The Court has said time
    and again that, when a plaintiff seeks to vindicate a public
    right, the plaintiff must allege that he has suffered a
    “concrete” injury particular to himself. See Schlesinger v.
    Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 
    418 U.S. 208
    , 221–223
    (1974) (explaining this where plaintiffs sought to enforce
    the Incompatibility Clause, Art. I, §6, cl. 2, against Mem­
    bers of Congress holding reserve commissions in the
    Armed Forces); see also 
    Lujan, supra, at 572
    –573 (evaluat­
    ing standing where plaintiffs sought to enforce the Endan­
    gered Species Act); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
    Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 
    528 U.S. 167
    , 183–
    184 (2000) (Clean Water Act). This requirement applies
    with special force when a plaintiff files suit to require an
    executive agency to “follow the law”; at that point, the
    citizen must prove that he “has sustained or is immediately
    in danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of that
    [challenged] action and it is not sufficient that he has
    merely a general interest common to all members of the
    public.” Ex parte Levitt, 
    302 U.S. 633
    , 634 (1937) ( per
    Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)            5
    THOMAS, J., concurring
    curiam). Thus, in a case where private plaintiffs sought to
    compel the U. S. Forest Service to follow certain proce­
    dures when it regulated “small fire-rehabilitation and
    timber-salvage projects,” we held that “deprivation of a
    procedural right without some concrete interest that is
    affected by the deprivation . . . is insufficient to create
    Article III standing,” even if “accorded by Congress.”
    Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 
    555 U.S. 488
    , 490,
    496–497 (2009).
    But the concrete-harm requirement does not apply as
    rigorously when a private plaintiff seeks to vindicate his
    own private rights. Our contemporary decisions have not
    required a plaintiff to assert an actual injury beyond the
    violation of his personal legal rights to satisfy the “injury­
    in-fact” requirement. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 
    435 U.S. 247
    , 266 (1978) (holding that nominal damages are appro­
    priate when a plaintiff ’s constitutional rights have been
    infringed but he cannot show further injury).
    The separation-of-powers concerns underlying our public-
    rights decisions are not implicated when private indi-
    viduals sue to redress violations of their own private
    rights. But, when they are implicated, standing doctrine
    keeps courts out of political disputes by denying private
    litigants the right to test the abstract legality of govern­
    ment action. See 
    Schlesinger, supra, at 222
    . And by
    limiting Congress’ ability to delegate law enforcement
    authority to private plaintiffs and the courts, standing
    doctrine preserves executive discretion. See 
    Lujan, supra, at 577
    (“ ‘To permit Congress to convert the undifferenti­
    ated public interest in executive officers’ compliance with
    the law into an ‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts is
    to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the
    courts the Chief Executive’s most important constitutional
    duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’ ”).
    But where one private party has alleged that another
    private party violated his private rights, there is generally
    6                  SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS
    THOMAS, J., concurring
    no danger that the private party’s suit is an impermissible
    attempt to police the activity of the political branches or,
    more broadly, that the legislative branch has impermissi­
    bly delegated law enforcement authority from the execu­
    tive to a private individual. See Hessick, Standing, Injury
    in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 275, 317–
    321 (2008).
    C
    When Congress creates new private causes of action to
    vindicate private or public rights, these Article III princi­
    ples circumscribe federal courts’ power to adjudicate a suit
    alleging the violation of those new legal rights. Congress
    can create new private rights and authorize private plain­
    tiffs to sue based simply on the violation of those private
    rights. See Warth v. Seldin, 
    422 U.S. 490
    , 500 (1975). A
    plaintiff seeking to vindicate a statutorily created private
    right need not allege actual harm beyond the invasion of
    that private right. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,
    
    455 U.S. 363
    , 373–374 (1982) (recognizing standing for a
    violation of the Fair Housing Act); Tennessee Elec. Power
    Co. v. TVA, 
    306 U.S. 118
    , 137–138 (1939) (recognizing
    that standing can exist where “the right invaded is a legal
    right,—one of property, one arising out of contract, one
    protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a
    statute which confers a privilege”). A plaintiff seeking to
    vindicate a public right embodied in a federal statute,
    however, must demonstrate that the violation of that
    public right has caused him a concrete, individual harm
    distinct from the general population. See 
    Lujan, supra, at 578
    (noting that, whatever the scope of Congress’ power to
    create new legal rights, “it is clear that in suits against the
    Government, at least, the concrete injury requirement
    must remain”). Thus, Congress cannot authorize private
    plaintiffs to enforce public rights in their own names,
    absent some showing that the plaintiff has suffered a
    Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)             7
    THOMAS, J., concurring
    concrete harm particular to him.
    II
    Given these principles, I agree with the Court’s decision
    to vacate and remand. The Fair Credit Reporting Act
    creates a series of regulatory duties. Robins has no stand­
    ing to sue Spokeo, in his own name, for violations of the
    duties that Spokeo owes to the public collectively, absent
    some showing that he has suffered concrete and particular
    harm. 
    See supra, at 4
    –5. These consumer protection
    requirements include, for example, the requirement to
    “post a toll-free telephone number on [Spokeo’s] website
    through which consumers can request free annual file
    disclosures.” App. 23, First Amended Complaint ¶74; see
    
    15 U.S. C
    . §1681j; 16 CFR §610.3(a)(1) (2010).
    But a remand is required because one claim in Robins’
    complaint rests on a statutory provision that could argu-
    ably establish a private cause of action to vindicate the
    violation of a privately held right. Section 1681e(b) re­
    quires Robins to “follow reasonable procedures to assure
    maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning
    the individual about whom the report relates.” §1681e(b)
    (emphasis added). If Congress has created a private duty
    owed personally to Robins to protect his information, then
    the violation of the legal duty suffices for Article III injury
    in fact. If that provision, however, vests any and all con­
    sumers with the power to police the “reasonable proce­
    dures” of Spokeo, without more, then Robins has no stand­
    ing to sue for its violation absent an allegation that he has
    suffered individualized harm. On remand, the Court of
    Appeals can consider the nature of this claim.
    Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)                   1
    GINSBURG, J., dissenting
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 13–1339
    _________________
    SPOKEO, INC., PETITIONER v. THOMAS ROBINS
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
    APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    [May 16, 2016]
    JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR
    joins, dissenting.
    In the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (FCRA or Act),
    
    15 U.S. C
    . §1681 et seq., Congress required consumer
    reporting agencies, whenever preparing a consumer re-
    port, to “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum
    possible accuracy of the information concerning the indi-
    vidual about whom the report relates.” §1681e(b). To
    promote adherence to the Act’s procedural requirements,
    Congress granted adversely affected consumers a right
    to sue noncomplying reporting agencies. §1681n (willful
    noncompliance); §1681o (negligent noncompliance).1
    Thomas Robins instituted suit against Spokeo, Inc., alleg-
    ing that Spokeo was a reporting agency governed by the
    FCRA, and that Spokeo maintains on its Web site an
    inaccurate consumer report about Robins. App. 13.
    In particular, Robins alleged that Spokeo posted “a
    picture . . . purport[ing] to be an image of Robins [that]
    was not in fact [of him],” and incorrectly reported that
    Robins “was in his 50s, . . . married, . . . employed in a
    professional or technical field, and . . . has children.” 
    Id., at 14.
    Robins further alleged that Spokeo’s profile of him
    continues to misrepresent “that he has a graduate degree,
    ——————
    1 Congress added the right of action for willful violations in 1996 as
    part of the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act, 110 Stat. 3009–426.
    2                     SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS
    GINSBURG, J., dissenting
    that his economic health is ‘Very Strong[,]’ and that his
    wealth level [is in] the ‘Top 10%.’ ” 
    Ibid. Spokeo displayed that
    erroneous information, Robins asserts, when he was
    “out of work” and “actively seeking employment.” 
    Ibid. Because of the
    misinformation, Robins stated, he encoun-
    tered “[imminent and ongoing] actual harm to [his]
    employment prospects.” Ibid.2 As Robins elaborated on
    brief, Spokeo’s report made him appear overqualified for
    jobs he might have gained, expectant of a higher
    salary than employers would be willing to pay, and less
    mobile because of family responsibilities. See Brief for
    Respondent 44.
    I agree with much of the Court’s opinion. Robins, the
    Court holds, meets the particularity requirement for
    standing under Article III. See ante, at 8, 11 (remanding
    only for concreteness inquiry). The Court acknowledges
    that Congress has the authority to confer rights and delin-
    eate claims for relief where none existed before. Ante, at
    9; see Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 
    524 U.S. 11
    , 19–
    20 (1998) (holding that inability to procure information to
    which Congress has created a right in the Federal Election
    Campaign Act of 1971 qualifies as concrete injury satisfy-
    ing Article III’s standing requirement); Public Citizen v.
    Department of Justice, 
    491 U.S. 440
    , 449 (1989) (holding
    that plaintiff advocacy organizations’ inability to obtain
    information that Congress made subject to disclosure
    under the Federal Advisory Committee Act “constitutes a
    sufficiently distinct injury to provide standing to sue”);
    Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 
    455 U.S. 363
    , 373 (1982)
    ——————
    2 Because this case remains at the pleading stage, the court of first
    instance must assume the truth of Robins’ factual allegations. In
    particular, that court must assume, subject to later proof, that Spokeo
    is a consumer reporting agency under 
    15 U.S. C
    . §1681a(f ) and that, in
    preparing consumer reports, Spokeo does not employ reasonable
    procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy, in violation of the
    FCRA.
    Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)                   3
    GINSBURG, J., dissenting
    (identifying, as Article III injury, violation of plaintiff ’s
    right, secured by the Fair Housing Act, to “truthful infor-
    mation concerning the availability of housing”).3 Con-
    gress’ connection of procedural requirements to the pre-
    vention of a substantive harm, the Court appears to agree,
    is “instructive and important.” Ante, at 9; see Lujan v.
    Defenders of Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    , 580 (1992) (KENNEDY,
    J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“As
    Government programs and policies become more complex
    and far reaching, we must be sensitive to the articulation
    of new rights of action . . . .”); Brief for Restitution and
    Remedies Scholars et al. as Amici Curiae 3 (“Congress
    cannot authorize individual plaintiffs to enforce general-
    ized rights that belong to the whole public. But Congress
    can create new individual rights, and it can enact effective
    remedies for those rights.”). See generally Sunstein,
    Informational Regulation and Informational Standing:
    Akins and Beyond, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 613 (1999).
    I part ways with the Court, however, on the necessity of
    a remand to determine whether Robins’ particularized
    injury was “concrete.” See ante, at 11. Judged by what we
    have said about “concreteness,” Robins’ allegations carry
    him across the threshold. The Court’s opinion observes
    that time and again, our decisions have coupled the words
    “concrete and particularized.” Ante, at 8 (citing as exam-
    ples, Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. ___, ___
    (2014) (slip op., at 8); Summers v. Earth Island Institute,
    
    555 U.S. 488
    , 493 (2009); Sprint Communications Co. v.
    APCC Services, Inc., 
    554 U.S. 269
    , 274 (2008); Massachu-
    setts v. EPA, 
    549 U.S. 497
    , 517 (2007)). True, but true
    ——————
    3 Just as the right to truthful information at stake in Havens Realty
    Corp. v. Coleman, 
    455 U.S. 363
    (1982), was closely tied to the Fair
    Housing Act’s goal of eradicating racial discrimination in housing, so
    the right here at stake is closely tied to the FCRA’s goal of protecting
    consumers against dissemination of inaccurate credit information about
    them.
    4                  SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS
    GINSBURG, J., dissenting
    too, in the four cases cited by the Court, and many others,
    opinions do not discuss the separate offices of the terms
    “concrete” and “particularized.”
    Inspection of the Court’s decisions suggests that the
    particularity requirement bars complaints raising general-
    ized grievances, seeking relief that no more benefits the
    plaintiff than it does the public at large. See, e.g., 
    Lujan, 504 U.S., at 573
    –574 (a plaintiff “seeking relief that no
    more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the
    public at large does not state an Article III case or contro-
    versy” (punctuation omitted)); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.,
    
    310 U.S. 113
    , 125 (1940) (plaintiffs lack standing because
    they failed to show injury to “a particular right of their
    own, as distinguished from the public’s interest in the
    administration of the law”). Robins’ claim does not pre-
    sent a question of that character. He seeks redress, not
    for harm to the citizenry, but for Spokeo’s spread of misin-
    formation specifically about him.
    Concreteness as a discrete requirement for standing, the
    Court’s decisions indicate, refers to the reality of an injury,
    harm that is real, not abstract, but not necessarily tangi-
    ble. See ante, at 8–9; ante, at 1 (THOMAS, J., concurring).
    Illustrative opinions include 
    Akins, 524 U.S., at 20
    (“[C]ourts will not pass upon abstract, intellectual prob-
    lems, but adjudicate concrete, living contests between
    adversaries.” (internal quotation marks and alterations
    omitted)); Diamond v. Charles, 
    476 U.S. 54
    , 67 (1986)
    (plaintiff ’s “abstract concern does not substitute for the
    concrete injury required by Art[icle] III” (internal quota-
    tion marks and ellipsis omitted)); Los Angeles v. Lyons,
    
    461 U.S. 95
    , 101 (1983) (“Plaintiffs must demonstrate a
    personal stake in the outcome . . . . Abstract injury is not
    enough.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Babbitt v.
    Farm Workers, 
    442 U.S. 289
    , 297–298 (1979) (“The differ-
    ence between an abstract question and a ‘case or contro-
    versy’ is one of degree, of course, and is not discernable by
    Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)              5
    GINSBURG, J., dissenting
    any precise test. The basic inquiry is whether the conflict-
    ing contentions of the parties present a real, substantial
    controversy between parties having adverse legal inter-
    ests, a dispute definite and concrete, not hypothetical or
    abstract.” (citation, some internal quotation marks, and
    ellipsis omitted)); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
    Organization, 
    426 U.S. 26
    , 40 (1976) (“organization’s
    abstract concern . . . does not substitute for the concrete
    injury required by Art. III”); California Bankers Assn. v.
    Shultz, 
    416 U.S. 21
    , 69 (1974) (“There must be . . . con-
    crete adverseness”; “[a]bstract injury is not enough.” (in-
    ternal quotation marks omitted)); Railway Mail Assn. v.
    Corsi, 
    326 U.S. 88
    , 93 (1945) (controversy must be “defi-
    nite and concrete, not hypothetical or abstract”); Coleman
    v. Miller, 
    307 U.S. 433
    , 460 (1939) (opinion of Frankfur-
    ter, J.) (“[I]t [is] not for courts to pass upon . . . abstract,
    intellectual problems but only . . . concrete, living con-
    test[s] between adversaries call[ing] for the arbitrament of
    law.”).
    Robins would not qualify, the Court observes, if he
    alleged a “bare” procedural violation, ante, at 10, one that
    results in no harm, for example, “an incorrect zip code,”
    ante, at 11. Far from an incorrect zip code, Robins com-
    plains of misinformation about his education, family situa-
    tion, and economic status, inaccurate representations that
    could affect his fortune in the job market. See Brief for
    Center for Democracy & Technology et al. as Amici Curiae
    13 (Spokeo’s inaccuracies bore on Robins’ “ability to find
    employment by creating the erroneous impression that he
    was overqualified for the work he was seeking, that he
    might be unwilling to relocate for a job due to family
    commitments, or that his salary demands would exceed
    what prospective employers were prepared to offer him.”);
    Brief for Restitution and Remedies Scholars et al. as Amici
    Curiae 35 (“An applicant can lose [a] job for being over-
    qualified; a suitor can lose a woman if she reads that he is
    6                SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS
    GINSBURG, J., dissenting
    married.”). The FCRA’s procedural requirements aimed to
    prevent such harm. See 115 Cong. Rec. 2410–2415 (1969).
    I therefore see no utility in returning this case to the
    Ninth Circuit to underscore what Robins’ complaint al-
    ready conveys concretely: Spokeo’s misinformation
    “cause[s] actual harm to [his] employment prospects.”
    App. 14.
    *     *   *
    For the reasons stated, I would affirm the Ninth Cir-
    cuit’s judgment.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13–1339.

Citation Numbers: 194 L. Ed. 2d 635, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3046, 84 U.S.L.W. 4263, 26 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 128

Judges: Alitodelivered, Thomas

Filed Date: 5/16/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

Authorities (24)

Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War , 94 S. Ct. 2925 ( 1974 )

Federal Election Commission v. Akins , 118 S. Ct. 1777 ( 1998 )

Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co. , 60 S. Ct. 869 ( 1940 )

Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union , 99 S. Ct. 2301 ( 1979 )

Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for ... , 102 S. Ct. 752 ( 1982 )

Whitmore Ex Rel. Simmons v. Arkansas , 110 S. Ct. 1717 ( 1990 )

Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi , 65 S. Ct. 1483 ( 1945 )

United States v. Richardson , 94 S. Ct. 2940 ( 1974 )

Warth v. Seldin , 95 S. Ct. 2197 ( 1975 )

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 112 S. Ct. 2130 ( 1992 )

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment , 118 S. Ct. 1003 ( 1998 )

Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States Ex Rel.... , 120 S. Ct. 1858 ( 2000 )

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno , 126 S. Ct. 1854 ( 2006 )

Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency , 127 S. Ct. 1438 ( 2007 )

Coleman v. Miller , 59 S. Ct. 972 ( 1939 )

United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co. , 26 S. Ct. 282 ( 1906 )

Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood , 99 S. Ct. 1601 ( 1979 )

Raines v. Byrd , 117 S. Ct. 2312 ( 1997 )

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental ... , 120 S. Ct. 693 ( 2000 )

Allen v. Wright , 104 S. Ct. 3315 ( 1984 )

View All Authorities »

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Randall Winslow v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ( 2021 )

Woodland Drive LLC v. Courtovich ( 2021 )

Mr. Eddie I. Sierra v. City of Hallandale Beach Florida ( 2021 )

Cason v. National Football League Players Association ( 2021 )

Episcopal Church in South Carolina v. Church Insurance ... ( 2021 )

Maddox v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co. ( 2021 )

Bruce & Tanya & Associates v. Board of Supervisors, Fairfax ( 2021 )

Campaign Legal Center v. FEC ( 2021 )

Denece Thomas v. TOMS King (Ohio), LLC ( 2021 )

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