Commonwealth v. Watson , 2016 Pa. Super. 111 ( 2016 )

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2016 Pa. Super. 111
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
THERION WATSON,
Appellant No. 1134 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 14, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0004265-2011
BEFORE: MUNDY, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 26, 2016
Therion Watson (“Appellant”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, which, sitting as
finder of fact in Appellant’s non-jury trial, convicted him of Robbery,
Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, Burglary, Conspiracy to Commit Burglary,
and Possession of a Firearm Prohibited.1 Appellant contends herein that the
court erred in dismissing his Motion for Relief pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule
of Criminal Procedure 600. We affirm.
The trial court provides an apt summary of relevant case history as
follows:
Appellant was arrested in connection with the attack and robbery
of one Terry Pullen on November 11, 2010. Mr. Pullen
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1
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii), 903(c), 3502(a), 903(c), and 6105(a)(1),
respectively.
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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approached Officer Deborah Ewing of the Harrisburg Bureau of
Police, who had been on patrol in a marked vehicle at
approximately 11:53 p.m. that night. Mr. Pullen reported that
two black males approached him outside of his rooming house as
he returned from work as a taxicab driver. He said that the
males forced him into his room at gun point and demanded he
open his safe where he kept cash and personal papers. When he
refused to open the safe, one of the men hit him in the head
with a hammer. Mr. Pullen was able to escape the men and flee
the rooming house, which is when he encountered Officer Ewing.
Mr. Pullen gave Officer Ewing a report of the incident and a
description of the perpetrators.
Detective Heffner of the HBP investigated the matter and
determined that Appellant was one of the suspects in the
robbery. After several months of searching for Appellant to no
avail, Detective Heffner filed a criminal complaint and obtained
an arrest warrant on June 15, 2011. Subsequently, on July 30,
2011, Appellant was located in North Carolina when he was
arrested by police when he was operating a vehicle that had
been reported stolen. After Appellant waived extradition and the
criminal proceeding in North Carolina was concluded, he was
transported back to Pennsylvania. Appellant appeared for
preliminary arraignment at a Night Court session on September
6, 2011. Appellant, who was represented by an attorney,
waived his preliminary hearing on October 17, 2011, and was
formally arraigned on December 15, 2011. As stated above,
Appellant did not stand trial until December 9, 2013.
***
Pre-trial, Appellant claimed that all of his criminal charges
should be dismissed with prejudice as the Commonwealth has
violated Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 by not bringing him to trial within
365(A)(2)(a). The Commonwealth countered Appellant’s
assertion by contending that most of the elapsed time between
the filing of the criminal complaint and the commencement of
trial was excludable and/or excusable as it is attributable to the
Appellant’s own actions. The Commonwealth also argued that
he had waived his “speedy trial” right by way of his legal
counsel. Th[e trial court] disagreed with Appellant’s position and
denied his Motion.
***
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[The trial court thereafter] commenced a waiver
trial.[]..That same day, [the trial court] found Appellant guilty of
all charges and deferred sentencing to February 14, 2014, for
the preparation of a Pre-Sentence Investigation. Appellant was
sentenced [to an aggregate sentence of not less than one-
hundred twenty months nor more than two-hundred forty
months’ incarceration plus fines and costs. This timely appeal
followed.]
Trial Court Opinion, filed May 30, 2014, at 3-4, 2.
Appellant presents one question for our review:
Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s Motion for
Relief Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600?
Appellant’s brief at 4.
Our standard and scope of review in analyzing a Rule 600 issue are
both well-settled.
In evaluating Rule 600 issues, our standard of review of a trial
court's decision is whether the trial court abused its discretion.
Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law, upon
facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after hearing
and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is not merely an
error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is
overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly
unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill
will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is
abused.
The proper scope of review ... is limited to the evidence on
the record of the Rule 600 evidentiary hearing, and the findings
of the trial court. An appellate court must view the facts in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party.
Additionally, when considering the trial court's ruling, this
Court is not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule
600. Rule 600 serves two equally important functions: (1) the
protection of the accused's speedy trial rights, and (2) the
protection of society. In determining whether an accused's right
to a speedy trial has been violated, consideration must be given
to society's right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both
to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those
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contemplating it. However, the administrative mandate of Rule
600 was not designed to insulate the criminally accused from
good faith prosecution delayed through no fault of the
Commonwealth.
So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of
the Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy
trial rights of an accused, Rule 600 must be construed in a
manner consistent with society's right to punish and deter crime.
In considering these matters ..., courts must carefully factor into
the ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the individual
accused, but the collective right of the community to vigorous
law enforcement as well.
Commonwealth v. Peterson, 19 A.3d 1131, 1134-35 (Pa.Super. 2011),
aff'd, 615 Pa. 587, 44 A.3d 655 (2012).
Rule 600 provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]rial in a court case in
which a written complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence
within 365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed.” Pa.R.Crim.P.
600(A)(2)(a). For purposes of computing when trial must commence,
“periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the
Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence
shall be included…. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the
computation.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1).
There is no dispute that Appellant was brought to trial 908 days after
the criminal complaint against him was filed, well beyond the 365-day
mechanical run date contemplated in Rule 600(A)(2)(a).2 Of the 908 days,
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2
For purposes of Rule 600, the “mechanical run date”:
is the date by which the trial must commence under Rule [600].
It is calculated by adding 365 days (the time for commencing
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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however, the trial court, pursuant to Rule 600(C)(1), excluded over 700
from the computation of time in which trial was required to commence
because such delay was attributable solely to defense counsel requests for
continuances. As such, the trial court concluded that trial commenced prior
to the adjusted run date and, accordingly, in compliance with Rule
600(A)(2)(a).
Appellant contends that the first 21 days after his August 15, 2011,
waiver of extradition plus an additional 177 thereafter 3—a total of 198
days—are attributable to the Commonwealth. In an apparent concession
that the Commonwealth’s conduct during such period did not contribute to
the belated commencement of his trial, Appellant transitions his argument
abruptly to posit that it was incumbent upon the Commonwealth to object to
defense counsel’s serial requests for continuance and demand that Appellant
be presented for trial as the mechanical run date drew near. In similar
fashion, Appellant also contends that it was error for the trial court to
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(Footnote Continued)
trial under Rule [600] ) to the date on which the criminal
complaint is filed. . . . The mechanical run date can be modified
or extended by adding to the date any periods of time in which
delay is caused by the defendant. Once the mechanical run date
is modified accordingly, it then becomes an adjusted run date.
Commonwealth v. Lynn, 815 A.2d 1053, 1056 (Pa.Super. 2003).
3
The Commonwealth accepts responsibility only for the 177 days’ delay.
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attribute to him the remaining 700-plus days’ delay comprising 17 defense
requests for continuance when he never authorized these continuances.
Addressing Appellant’s claim of trial court error first, we observe that
he directs us to no authority, and we are aware of none, to support his
contention that counsel must obtain a defendant’s permission prior to
requesting a continuance.4 To the contrary, we have recognized that
“[c]ontinuances are a matter of sound trial strategy within the reasonable
purview of counsel.” Commonwealth v. Wells, 521 A.2d 1388, 1391-92
(Pa.Super. 1987) (holding trial counsel has authority to agree to a
continuance without the defendant’s knowledge and consent). Appellant’s
claim of trial court error is without merit.
Likewise, Appellant fails to develop any argument, let alone one
substantiated by authority, to advance the theory that the Commonwealth
may be held accountable for delay caused by defense continuances. Our
jurisprudence has suggested the opposite. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234, 1244 (Pa.Super. 2004) (holding dismissal under Rule
600 unwarranted where most circumstances occasioning postponement—
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4
To the extent Appellant’s argument may be construed as alleging
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, he must defer such a claim to PCRA
review. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 563 (Pa. 2013)
(stating Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 738 (Pa. 2002) remains
pertinent law for timing of review for claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel).
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primarily defense continuances--were beyond control of Commonwealth).
Moreover, there is no indication in the record that the Commonwealth
engaged in dilatory practices either necessitating or contributing to the
continuances in question. Given the provision in Rule 600(C)(1) that any
delay other than that caused by the Commonwealth’s lack of due diligence in
bringing the case to trial shall be excluded from the computation of time
within which trial must commence, we find no error with the Rule 600
computation of time below that excluded delay attributable to defense
continuances over which the Commonwealth exercised no influence or
control.
Judgment of sentence is AFFIRMED.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/26/2016
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