David L. Taft Jr. v. Iowa District Court for Linn County , 2016 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 62 ( 2016 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 14–0207
Filed May 27, 2016
DAVID L. TAFT JR.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR LINN COUNTY,
Defendant.
Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Ian K.
Thornhill, Judge.
A person committed under the Sexually Violent Predator Act
alleges statutory criteria for suitability for placement in a transitional
release program violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Iowa and the United States Constitutions. AFFIRMED.
Philip B. Mears of Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for plaintiff.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jeffrey S. Thompson, Solicitor
General, and John B. McCormally, Assistant Attorney General, for
defendant.
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CADY, Chief Justice.
In this case, we consider the constitutionality of statutory
conditions on the suitability of a civilly committed sexually violent
predator for the transitional release program. As part of an annual
review, the district court denied a final hearing for discharge or
suitability for placement in a transitional release program to David Taft
based in part on his failure to fulfill statutory criteria for a finding of
suitability for a transitional release program. Taft challenges two of the
criteria as violating his due process rights and denying him equal
protection under the Iowa and United States Constitutions. We conclude
the issues are not ripe for consideration under the posture of this case.
On our review, we affirm the order of the district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Taft was convicted in 1987 for lascivious acts with a minor. He
received one two-year and two five-year sentences. The sentences were
ordered to be served concurrently. Taft was discharged in 1991. He was
arrested for reoffending one week later with two more children. He was
convicted and served a sentence of incarceration until discharged on
January 10, 2005. On March 30, 2005, district court proceedings were
initiated to commit Taft as a sexually violent predator under the
Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act, Iowa Code chapter 229A
(2005). The jury found Taft suffered from a mental abnormality that
made it more likely than not that he would reoffend. Taft was committed
to the Civil Commitment Unit for Sexual Offenders (CCUSO).
CCUSO provides a mandatory treatment program for committed
persons. The program is focused on the treatment and rehabilitation of
repeat sexual offenders. It has five phases, beginning with an
introductory first phase and ending with Phase V transitional release.
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Phase V prepares committed persons for reentry into society. Progress
through the program is measured by evaluating ten treatment areas as
well as the committed person’s attitude, behavior, and personal risk
factors. The treatment areas evaluated include the realization,
acquisition, and demonstration of skills relating to the following:
disclosure; insight; personal victimization; empathy; health, hygiene, and
leisure skills; cognitive coping strategies; sexual behaviors; relapse
prevention; intimacy; and problem solving.
Committed persons are entitled to an annual review to determine
whether the person’s circumstances have sufficiently changed to warrant
a final hearing for the court to determine if the committed person should
be discharged or is suitable for placement in a transitional release
program. Iowa Code § 229A.8(5)(e) (2013). Discharge or release is
conditioned on a change in the mental abnormality making the
committed person not likely to engage in sexually violent offenses, while
suitability for placement in transitional release is based on the statutory
criteria laid out in Iowa Code section 229A.8A. Id. Each annual review
starts with “a rebuttable presumption . . . that the commitment should
continue.” Id. § 229A.8(1). The court considers evidence provided by
both sides, but the committed person bears the burden “to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that there is relevant and reliable evidence
to rebut the presumption” and thereby generate a jury question on the
need for continued commitment. Id. § 229A.8(5)(e)(1).
In 2013, Taft petitioned this court for certiorari based on the
outcome of his 2011 annual review, which denied him a final hearing.
Taft v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 828 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Iowa 2013). We examined
the effect of a 2009 amendment to Iowa Code section 229A.8(5)(e)
specifying the legal standard of evidence—by a preponderance that
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relevant and reliable evidence exists—a committed person must offer at
an annual review hearing to establish entitlement to a requested final
hearing before the court or a jury. Id. at 317–18. We held the
amendment expanded the evidence considered by the court to include
evidence from both sides and directed the court to only weigh reliable
evidence rather than all admissible evidence. Id. at 318. In other words,
the court is to determine whether the committed person generates a fact
question on either a change in their mental abnormality or their
suitability for transitional release placement. Id. Taft additionally raised
a claim that the transitional release program criterion in section
229A.8A(2)(e) requiring the offender be issued no major discipline reports
for six months imposed an unconstitutional precondition on release
unrelated to his dangerousness or mental abnormality, but we held the
claim had not been properly raised or decided at the trial court level and
dismissed the constitutional challenge as not preserved. Id. at 322–23.
On August 2, 2013, the district court held a hearing for Taft’s first
annual review following our decision. During the hearing, Taft raised
and argued his constitutional challenge to the statute along with his
petition for discharge or placement in the transitional release program.
In particular, Taft challenged paragraphs (d) and (e) of Iowa Code section
229A.8A(2), which require a treatment-provider-accepted relapse
prevention plan and a six-month period with no major disciplinary
reports, as unconstitutional. The parties argued before the court at the
annual review hearing on the issue and submitted written briefs.
In order for committed persons to be suitable for placement in the
transitional release program, the person must meet nine requirements
set forth by the legislature. Iowa Code § 229A.8A(2).
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A committed person is suitable for placement in the
transitional release program if the court finds that all of the
following apply:
a. The committed person’s mental abnormality is no
longer such that the person is a high risk to reoffend.
b. The committed person has achieved and
demonstrated significant insights into the person’s sex
offending cycle.
c. The committed person has accepted responsibility
for past behavior and understands the impact sexually
violent crimes have upon a victim.
d. A detailed relapse prevention plan has been
developed and accepted by the treatment provider which is
appropriate for the committed person’s mental abnormality
and sex offending history.
e. No major discipline reports have been issued for the
committed person for a period of six months.
f. The committed person is not likely to escape or
attempt to escape custody pursuant to section 229A.5B.
g. The committed person is not likely to engage in
predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses while in
the program.
h. The placement is in the best interest of the
committed person.
i. The committed person has demonstrated a
willingness to agree to and abide by all rules of the program.
Id. A different subsection adds a tenth condition requiring committed
persons to agree to register as a sex offender to be eligible for placement
in the transitional release program. Id. § 229A.8A(4).
The court examined two annual reports from 2012 and 2013
regarding Taft’s progress through treatment and making
recommendations on whether Taft should be considered for discharge or
would be eligible for a transitional release program. The first report,
offered by the State, was written by CCUSO psychologist Dr. Tracy
Thomas based on Taft’s treatment records, documents from Taft’s 2005
commitment proceeding, and personal interviews with Taft and CCUSO
staff. Treatment records, dated February 19, 2013, showed Taft had not
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progressed from Phase II of the treatment program during his eight years
in the program and detailed Taft’s struggles with multiple treatment
areas. The annual report concluded Taft continued to show
characteristic signs of antisocial personality disorder, continued to
engage in behaviors that were part of his past offense cycle, and was
“more likely than not to reoffend.” The report recommended Taft not be
discharged from CCUSO. The report also concluded Taft did not meet
seven of the ten statutory criteria requirements for placement in
transitional release.
Taft submitted an independent progress review report prepared by
clinical psychologist Dr. Craig Rypma. Dr. Rypma’s report indicated that
Taft’s pedophilia diagnosis was based on past behavior without current
indicators. He concurred in the diagnosis of antisocial personality
disorder but did not believe the condition necessarily affected the ability
of a person to control their sexual behavior. 1 Dr. Rypma indicated Taft
met nine out of the ten requirements for the transitional release program
and that the requirement he did not meet, regarding major discipline
reports, did not relate to sexual violence and was not relevant to Taft’s
transfer to the transitional release program. Dr. Rypma concluded Taft
was ready for discharge. He found it was “reasonable to assume” Taft’s
risk to reoffend had fallen below the more-likely-than-not threshold
because he was now forty-three-years old and his last sexual crime had
occurred over twenty years earlier. If not discharged, Dr. Rypma
1Wenote that we have determined that antisocial personality disorder may be a
sufficient mental abnormality on its own to support civil commitment if it affects the
individual person’s likelihood to commit a sexually violent offense, a determination
made in an individualized inquiry. In re Det. of Barnes, 689 N.W.2d 455, 459–60 (Iowa
2004).
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recommended “with a reasonable degree of professional certainty” that
Taft should move to transitional release.
In response to Taft’s request for discharge, the court found that
while some improvement had occurred since the prior review’s reports,
more work remained to be done. The court found Taft had failed to
present evidence showing progress in several important areas of his
mental abnormalities and therefore had not rebutted the presumption of
continued confinement. The court noted that even Taft’s expert appeared
to equivocate on whether he should be discharged or moved to the
transitional release program and did not clearly address Taft’s antisocial
personality disorder. The court found inconsistencies between the
descriptions in Dr. Rypma’s report of Taft’s treatment records and the
actual treatment records. The court further noted a heavy reliance on
statistical studies of recidivism rather than Taft’s actual treatment.
In this petition, Taft does not challenge the ruling against a final
review hearing for discharge or the reliability determination made by the
district court concerning Dr. Rypma’s report. The district court ruled
Taft’s challenge to the constitutionality of two of the criteria in section
229A.8A(2) was not ripe for adjudication because he failed to meet
several other criteria for a final hearing on transitional release and
determined the totality of the evidence showed Taft still at risk to
reoffend.
Taft petitioned for certiorari based on the district court’s
application of the Taft evidentiary burden and the constitutionality of two
criteria in paragraphs (d) and (e) of Iowa Code section 229A.8A(2). We
granted certiorari review on this case on May 22, 2014. After certiorari
was granted, the district court held an annual review hearing for Taft’s
2014 annual report. The court granted Taft a final hearing on the
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questions of discharge and transitional relief, and a jury trial followed.
Taft withdrew his challenge in this case based on the court’s application
of Taft I after he was granted a final review hearing from his 2014 annual
review. However, he continued to pursue his constitutional claim from
the 2013 review based on the transitional release program statutory
criteria, asserting the criteria could impede his right to liberty in the
future. This is the claim now before us.
II. Scope of Review.
“We review certiorari actions for correction of errors at law.” Taft,
828 N.W.2d at 312. We examine the court’s jurisdiction and the legality
of its actions, including the proper application of law and evidentiary
support for factual findings. Id. “We review constitutional challenges
de novo.” In re Det. of Matlock, 860 N.W.2d 898, 901 (Iowa 2015).
Statutes are presumed constitutional, and “[t]he challenger bears a
heavy burden, because it must prove the unconstitutionality beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 226, 233
(Iowa 2002). The challenging party “must negate every reasonable basis
upon which the court could hold the statute constitutional.” State v.
Quinn, 691 N.W.2d 403, 407 (Iowa 2005) (quoting State v. Biddle, 652
N.W.2d 191, 200 (Iowa 2002)).
III. Ripeness.
“[J]usticiability doctrines define the judicial role; they determine
when it is appropriate for the . . . courts to review a matter and when it is
necessary to defer to the other branches of government.” Erwin
Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 49 (4th ed.
2011). “The constitutional requirement of ripeness is basically a
manifestation of the rule that courts should not address hypothetical
questions.” 3 Chester James Antieau & William J. Rich, Modern
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Constitutional Law § 48.30, at 610 (2d ed. 1997). “A case is ripe for
adjudication when it presents an actual, present controversy, as opposed
to one that is merely hypothetical or speculative.” State v. Wade, 757
N.W.2d 618, 627 (Iowa 2008) (quoting State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 616 § 575,
578 (Iowa 2000)). We seek to avoid issuing advisory opinions on possible
future injuries, though we may find our present-controversy requirement
“satisfied by a ‘direct threat of personal detriment.’ ” State v. Sluyter, 763
N.W.2d 575, 579–80, 579 n.4 (Iowa 2009) (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179, 188, 93 S. Ct. 739, 745, 35 L. Ed. 2d 201, 210 (1973)).
Taft challenges the constitutionality of two statutory criteria used
to determine suitability for the transitional release program under Iowa
Code section 229A.8A. He argues these criteria pose unconstitutional
impediments to his due process right to be free from confinement. In
considering this claim, we first observe that the statutory criteria only
limit who the court can find suitable for placement in a transitional
release program. Therefore, the statute does not necessarily guarantee
placement in the program even if the criteria for suitability are met. See
Iowa Code § 229A.8A(2).
Instead, the CCUSO treatment program rules limit placement in
transitional release to those persons in Phase V of the treatment
program, with the suitability determination by the court as one of several
criteria to be met before the committed person qualifies for the
advancement to Phase V. Taft’s current placement in Phase II of the
program is based on his evaluations and the professional judgment of
those treating him within the CCUSO program, and he has not
challenged that placement. We have previously found that failure to
progress through the treatment program due to behavioral reports is “an
integral part of the treatment under a cognitive-behavioral model,” not an
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adverse action violating due process rights. Swanson v. Civil
Commitment Unit for Sex Offenders, 737 N.W.2d 300, 307, 309–10 (Iowa
2007). It is conceivable there could be a statutory right to placement in a
transitional release program upon the court finding all criteria have been
met without a move to Phase V within the program, but that case is not
before us now. We decline to make any such determination absent facts
supporting a claim to the right.
Even assuming arguendo we determined the challenged criteria
violate Taft’s substantive due process liberty interests, such a
determination would not have any effect on the district court’s
determination at the annual review. The district court denied Taft’s
request for a final hearing based on equivocation about his suitability for
release, questions on the reliability of Dr. Rypma’s report, and the
findings by the CCUSO expert that Taft needed to demonstrate
significant improvement in several treatment areas and had not met his
burden to show he was a suitable candidate for transitional release or
discharge.
At argument, Taft agreed he would not qualify under the statute
for the transitional release program even if he were not required to meet
the challenged criteria. Resolution in his favor would not result in any
change in the court’s evaluation of the reliability of Dr. Rypma’s report or
make any change in Taft’s circumstances after this annual review and,
thus, would resolve no controversy. Accordingly, we decline to address
his substantive due process and equal protection challenges to the
statutory criteria regarding major discipline reports and treatment
provider approval of his relapse prevention plan as not ripe. We decline
to evaluate the constitutionality of the criteria until a live controversy is
before us.
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IV. Conclusion.
We conclude that on this record, the issue of whether the statutory
criteria for suitability for placement in a transitional release program
found in paragraphs (d) and (e) of Iowa Code section 229A.8A(2) are
unconstitutional under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the United States and Iowa Constitutions is not ripe for adjudication.
AFFIRMED.