Osprey Family Trust v. Town of Owls Head , 2016 Me. LEXIS 96 ( 2016 )


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  • 288MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT                                   Reporter of Decisions
    Decision:   
    2016 ME 89
    Docket:     Kno-15-288
    Submitted
    On Briefs: April 21, 2016
    Decided:    June 7, 2016
    Panel:       SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
    OSPREY FAMILY TRUST
    v.
    TOWN OF OWLS HEAD et al.
    MEAD, J.
    [¶1] The Osprey Family Trust appeals, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B, from a
    judgment of the Superior Court (Knox County, Billings, J.) affirming a decision of
    the Town of Owls Head Board of Appeals (BOA). The BOA’s decision overruled
    the decision of the Town’s Planning Board to grant the Trust a permit to remove an
    existing structure in the shoreland zone and replace it with a new structure that
    included an addition. We agree with the court’s finding that the Planning Board
    was required to initially consider the new structure’s compliance with the Town’s
    Shoreland Zoning Ordinance (SZO) absent the proposed addition; we conclude
    also that the Planning Board applied the wrong section of the SZO in considering
    the Trust’s permit application.     For that reason, we vacate the judgment and
    2
    remand with instructions that the court order the Planning Board to reconsider the
    application, applying the proper SZO provision.
    I. BACKGROUND
    [¶2] The facts are drawn from the administrative record before the Planning
    Board.   See M.R. Civ. P. 80B(f).      All parties agree that the Planning Board
    rendered “the operative decision of the municipality” to be reviewed on appeal
    because the SZO authorizes the BOA to act only in an appellate capacity, which it
    did in this case. See Fitanides v. City of Saco, 
    2015 ME 32
    , ¶ 8, 
    113 A.3d 1088
    (quotation marks omitted); Owls Head, Me., Zoning Ordinance § 1.6(B)(2)
    (March 4, 2013); Owls Head, Me., Shoreland Zoning Ordinance § 16(H)(1)
    (March 4, 2013).
    [¶3] On March 31, 2013, Douglas Johnson, as trustee of the Osprey Family
    Trust (hereinafter Johnson), filed an application for a building permit concerning
    his shorefront property in Owls Head. Johnson sought to replace a dilapidated
    minesweeper deckhouse that had been placed on the property in the 1950s and
    used as a cottage with a new, larger single-family residence. The existing structure
    is located partly within the SZO’s seventy-five-foot setback zone from the
    Atlantic Ocean.    See Owls Head, Me., Shoreland Zoning Ordinance § 15(B)
    (March 4, 2013). In addition to being bounded by the ocean, the rear of Johnson’s
    property contains a wetland of special significance that would necessitate a Maine
    3
    Department of Environmental Protection permit before being used as a building
    site.    06-096 C.M.R. ch. 310, § 4, amended by order 2009-32 (effective
    Jan. 26, 2009). Johnson proposed to replace the existing structure with one that
    would still be located partly within the seventy-five-foot setback zone, but farther
    back from the ocean than the old structure, along with an addition lying completely
    outside of the seventy-five-foot setback zone and not encroaching on the wetland.
    [¶4] The Planning Board took up Johnson’s proposal on several occasions
    between April 2013 and March 19, 2014, when it made findings of fact and
    unanimously approved Johnson’s plan. The Planning Board’s findings of fact
    included a finding that
    [u]nder Section 12 of the Town’s Shoreland Zoning Ordinance, this is
    a nonconforming structure and it may be re-located, further away
    from the ocean, but not into the wetland to the rear, to the greatest
    extent practical in the opinion of the Planning Board. . . . [T]he
    Planning Board believes the “compromise” location of the proposed
    new building—15’ back from its original proposed location . . . —best
    meets the applicable SZO standard, i.e., the proper balancing of the
    competing environmental interests.
    [¶5] The referenced SZO provision states, in part, that “[a] nonconforming
    structure may be relocated within the boundaries of the parcel on which the
    structure is located provided that the site of relocation conforms to all setback
    requirements to the greatest practical extent as determined by the Planning
    4
    Board.”      Owls Head, Me., Shoreland Zoning Ordinance § 12(C)(2)
    (March 4, 2013) (emphasis added).
    [¶6] On April 14, 2014, Owls Head residents Jill Delaney and Claire Perry
    appealed the Planning Board’s decision to the BOA, contending that the Planning
    Board erred in finding that Johnson’s project conformed with setback requirements
    “to the greatest practical extent.” The BOA met on May 6, 2014, and decided that
    (1) “the Planning Board was in error in their decision and [] the existing structure
    is not being relocated to the greatest extent practical,” and (2) “the decision of the
    Planning Board was clearly contrary to the Shoreland Zoning Ordinance.”
    [¶7] Johnson appealed to the Superior Court pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B.
    The court entered an order affirming the BOA’s decision after concluding that
    it was certainly reasonable and within the Planning Board’s discretion
    for the Board to take into consideration the location of the wetland
    and drainage swale and to decide that it was not practical to require
    that the building be relocated into the wetland or swale. However, it
    was not reasonable for the Planning Board to take into consideration
    the proposed addition before determining whether the relocation of
    the existing structure “conforms to all setback requirement[s] to the
    greatest practical extent.” The proper analysis would have been to
    first consider how the existing structure could be relocated on the
    property to conform . . . and to then consider whether an addition
    outside of the 75 foot setback area could be constructed. . . . The
    evidence in the record compels a finding that the existing structure
    could be relocated further from the ocean without encroaching on the
    wetland . . . if not for the proposed addition. Therefore, the Planning
    Board’s decision is unsupported by substantial evidence in the record
    and must be overturned.
    5
    [¶8] Johnson appealed and Delaney cross-appealed. We have considered
    the arguments made in the cross-appeal and find them to be unpersuasive.
    Accordingly, we turn to our review of the Planning Board’s decision to grant the
    permit. See Fitanides, 
    2015 ME 32
    , ¶ 8, 
    113 A.3d 1088
    .
    II. DISCUSSION
    [¶9] We review the Planning Board’s approval of the permit directly “for
    error of law, abuse of discretion or findings not supported by substantial evidence
    in the record.”    
    Id. (quotation marks
    omitted).      In doing so, we interpret
    Owls Head’s ordinances de novo.          Gensheimer v. Town of Phippsburg,
    
    2005 ME 22
    , ¶ 16, 
    868 A.2d 161
    . “Substantial evidence exists when a reasonable
    mind would rely on that evidence as sufficient support for a conclusion.” 
    Id. (quotation marks
    omitted). Although Johnson is the appellant here, Delaney bears
    the burden of persuasion on appeal because she seeks to vacate the Planning
    Board’s underlying decision. Fitanides, 
    2015 ME 32
    , ¶ 8, 
    113 A.3d 1088
    .
    [¶10] The Town’s ordinances are construed de novo, but
    [w]e review factual findings of the Planning Board with deference and
    may not substitute our own judgment for that of the Board. The
    Board’s decision is not wrong because the record is inconsistent or a
    different conclusion could be drawn from it. Further, a demonstration
    that no competent evidence supports the local board’s findings is
    required in order to vacate the board’s decision. . . . We are bound to
    uphold the Board’s decision unless the evidence before the Board
    would compel a positive finding for [the appellees].
    6
    Gensheimer, 
    2005 ME 22
    , ¶¶ 17-18, 
    868 A.2d 161
    (alteration, citations, and
    quotation marks omitted).
    [¶11] The Planning Board made four findings of fact, only one of which is
    at issue here. In that finding, the Planning Board determined that relocating the
    proposed structure fifteen feet farther back from the ocean to a site that did not
    intrude on the wetland struck a proper balance between Johnson’s interests and
    those of the SZO—that is, the relocation conformed to setback requirements not to
    the greatest theoretical extent, but rather “to the greatest practical extent.” That
    conclusion represents a mixed question of fact and law.                       The real question
    presented is whether the Planning Board was entitled to make its determination
    based on the project as proposed by Johnson, which included an addition to the
    original structure’s footprint, or whether, as the Superior Court concluded, the
    Planning Board was required to consider how the original structure’s footprint
    could be relocated before considering the proposed addition. We conclude that the
    Planning Board erred in its interpretation of the Ordinance and that the SZO
    supports the court’s determination.
    [¶12] Different sections of the SZO govern the relocation of nonconforming
    structures, and the replacement of such structures.1 The Planning Board focused
    1
    The SZO defines a “non-conforming structure” as “a structure which does not meet any one or more
    of the following dimensional requirements; setback . . . but which is allowed solely because it was in
    7
    on the relocation provision. It is clear, however, that Johnson was not seeking to
    relocate the dilapidated deckhouse, but rather to demolish it and replace it with a
    new structure, plus an addition. When a nonconforming structure is replaced, as
    opposed to being relocated, then section 12(C)(3) of the SZO is applicable:
    Any non-conforming structure which is located less than the required
    setback from a water body . . . and which is removed . . . may be
    reconstructed or replaced provided that a permit is obtained within
    one year of the date of said . . . removal, and provided that such . . .
    replacement is in compliance with the water setback requirement to
    the greatest practical extent as determined by the Planning Board in
    accordance with the purposes of this Ordinance. . . . If the total
    amount of floor area and volume of the original structure can be
    relocated or reconstructed beyond the required setback area, no
    portion of the reconstructed or relocated (sic) shall be replaced or
    constructed at less than the setback requirement for a new structure.
    Owls Head, Me., Shoreland Zoning Ordinance § 12(C)(3) (March 4, 2013)
    (emphasis added).
    [¶13] Although the conclusion reached by the Superior Court—that the
    Planning Board erred in considering the footprint of the original structure and the
    new addition as a single whole—was reached after consideration of
    section 12(C)(2), the court’s reasoning is equally applicable to section 12(C)(3).2
    That said, while we agree with the court’s legal conclusion, the Planning Board’s
    lawful existence at the time this Ordinance or subsequent amendments took effect.” Owls Head, Me.,
    Shoreland Zoning Ordinance § 17 (March 4, 2013).
    2
    Section 12(C)(3) requires that new construction take place beyond the setback requirements of the
    SZO. See Owls Head, Me., Shoreland Zoning Ordinance § 12(C)(3) (March 4, 2013).
    8
    application of the wrong section of the SZO required the court as a procedural
    matter to remand the case to the Planning Board for reconsideration of Johnson’s
    application, which may require additional fact-finding. Instead, the court simply
    denied Johnson’s appeal from the BOA’s decision, which was also made after
    incorrectly considering section 12(C)(2). For that reason, we vacate the court’s
    judgment and remand the matter with instructions to remand Johnson’s permit
    application to the Owls Head Planning Board for de novo consideration and
    application of the applicable section of the Shoreland Zoning Ordinance.
    The entry is:
    Judgment vacated. Remanded with instructions
    that the Superior Court remand the Trust’s permit
    application to the Owls Head Planning Board for
    de novo consideration consistent with this opinion.
    On the briefs:
    Paul L. Gibbons, Esq., The Law Offices of Paul L. Gibbons,
    LLC, Camden, for appellant Osprey Family Trust
    David F. Jenny, Esq., Owls Head, for cross-appellant Jill
    Delaney
    The Town of Owls Head and Claire Perry did not file a brief
    Knox County Superior Court docket number AP-2014-08
    FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY