Merriman v. Merriman , 2016 Ohio 3385 ( 2016 )

[Cite as Merriman v. Merriman, 2016-Ohio-3385.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
PAULDING COUNTY
JACOB J. MERRIMAN,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 11-15-10
v.
KATELYN A. MERRIMAN n.k.a. MAAG, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Paulding County Common Pleas Court
Domestic Relations Division
Trial Court No. DIS12-223
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: June 13, 2016
APPEARANCES:
Jennifer N. Brown for Appellant
Matthew A. Cunningham for Appellee
Case No. 11-15-10
PRESTON, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Katelyn A. Merriman, n.k.a. Katelyn A. Maag,
(“Katelyn”), appeals the December 15, 2015 decision of the Paulding County
Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, reallocating Katelyn’s and
defendant-appellee’s, Jacob J. Merriman (“Jacob”), parental rights and
responsibilities. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} Jacob and Katelyn were married on August 17, 2010. (Doc. No. 1).
Jacob and Katelyn filed a petition for dissolution of their marriage on October 26,
2012. (Id.). One child, (“K.M.”), was born as issue of this marriage. (Id.). The
trial court issued its final dissolution decree on February 26, 2013. (Doc. No. 9).
In that, the trial court adopted the parties’ separation agreement, which provided,
with respect to K.M.:
[Jacob] and [Katelyn] mutually agree no * * * child support shall be
paid to or by either party. [Jacob] shall be designated residential
parent of [K.M.]. [Katelyn] shall have parenting time as follows:
First Friday of each month at 6 p.m. until the following
Monday at 6 p.m. and on the following Wednesday at 6 p.m. until
the following Friday at 6 p.m. and continuing on alternating 48 hour
periods. [Jacob] shall have parenting time on the opposite
alternasting [sic] 48 hour periods in conformity with the above.
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[K.M.] shall remain in the Wayne Trace School District. [Katelyn]
shall carry medical insurance on [K.M.] and the parties shall pay
equally any amounts uncovered by insurance. The parties shall pay
equally all amounts for school activities, fees, etc. [Jacob] shall pay
all day care expenses for [K.M.].
(Id.).
{¶3} On August 15, 2014, Katelyn filed a motion for reallocation of
parental rights and responsibilities. (Doc. No. 10). In her motion, Katelyn
requested that the trial court conclude that it is in K.M.’s best interests that
Katelyn “be designated as the residential parent and legal custodian of [K.M.]”
and that her residence determine which school district K.M. is to attend. (Id.).
{¶4} On August 20, 2014, Jacob filed a motion requesting that the trial
court appoint a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) to represent K.M.’s best interest. (Doc.
No. 17). The trial court granted Jacob’s motion and appointed a GAL on
September 2, 2014. (Doc. No. 18).
{¶5} On September 29, 2014, the trial court ordered the parties to continue
the “parenting plan” as ordered in the final dissolution decree. (Doc. No. 21).
{¶6} On July 30, 2015, the GAL filed her confidential report. (Confidential
GAL Report). (See also Doc. No. 39).
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{¶7} The trial court held a bench trial on August 11, 2015. (Aug. 11 and
14, 2015 Tr. at 1, 4). The trial court issued an oral decision on August 14, 2015.
(Aug. 11 and 14, 2015 Tr. at 1, 216).
{¶8} On August 20, 2015, Katelyn filed a motion requesting findings of
fact and conclusions of law, which the trial court issued on September 24, 2015.
(Doc. Nos. 42, 46). The trial court filed its judgment entry on December 15, 2015.
(Doc. No. 49).
{¶9} Katelyn filed her notice of appeal on December 28, 2015. (Doc. No.
50). She raises one assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The Paulding County Court of Common Pleas Abused its
Discretion in Designating Appellee the Residential Parent for
School Purposes and Primarily Awarding Appellee Parenting
Time During the School Year Without Consideration or
Addressing in its Ruling That the Guardian Ad Litem’s
Recommendations Were in Direct Conflict to the Court’s
Decision.
{¶10} In her assignment of error, Katelyn argues that the trial court abused
its discretion in reallocating parental rights and responsibilities. In particular,
Katelyn argues that the trial court abused its discretion because it failed “to
consider anywhere in its decision and anywhere in its discussion of the [R.C.
3109.04(F)(1) factors] any of the Guardian Ad Litem recommendations, especially
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considering the Guardian Ad Litem recommendations were polar opposite of the
trial court’s ruling.” (Appellant’s Brief at 9-10).
{¶11} “Revised Code 3109.04 governs the trial court’s award of parental
rights and responsibilities.” August v. August, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-13-26,
2014-Ohio-3986, ¶ 22, citing King v. King, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-11-23, 2012-
Ohio-1586, ¶ 8. R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a) governs modification of a prior decree
allocating parental rights and responsibilities and provides:
The court shall not modify a prior decree allocating parental rights
and responsibilities for the care of children unless it finds, based on
facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to
the court at the time of the prior decree, that a change has occurred
in the circumstances of the child, the child’s residential parent, or
either of the parents subject to a shared parenting decree, and that the
modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the child. In
applying these standards, the court shall retain the residential parent
designated by the prior decree or the prior shared parenting decree,
unless a modification is in the best interest of the child and one of
the following applies:
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(i) The residential parent agrees to a change in the residential
parent or both parents under a shared parenting decree agree to a
change in the designation of residential parent.
(ii) The child, with the consent of the residential parent or of both
parents under a shared parenting decree, has been integrated into the
family of the person seeking to become the residential parent.
(iii) The harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is
outweighed by the advantages of the change of environment to the
child.
The statute creates a strong presumption in favor of retaining the
residential parent designation and precludes a trial court from
modifying a prior parental rights and responsibilities decree unless
the court finds all of the following: (1) a change occurred in the
circumstances of the child, the child’s residential parent, or a parent
subject to a shared-parenting decree; (2) the change in circumstances
is based upon facts that arose since the court entered the prior decree
or that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree; (3)
the child’s best interest necessitates modifying the prior custody
decree; and (4) one of the circumstances specified in R.C.
3109.04(E)(1)(a)(i)-(iii) applies.
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Rohrbach v. Rohrbach, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-15-14, 2015-Ohio-4728, ¶ 15,
citing In re Brayden James, 113 Ohio St. 3d 420, 2007-Ohio-2335, ¶ 14. “Thus,
the threshold question in a parental rights and responsibilities modification case is
whether a change in circumstances has occurred.” Id.
{¶12} “‘In determining whether a change in circumstances has occurred so
as to warrant a change in custody, a trial judge, as the trier of fact, must be given
wide latitude to consider all issues which support such a change.’” Id. at ¶ 16,
quoting Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St. 3d 415 (1997), paragraph two of the
syllabus. “The determination that a change in circumstances has occurred for the
purposes of R.C. 3109.04 ‘should not be disturbed, absent an abuse of
discretion.’” Id., quoting Davis at paragraph one of the syllabus. “‘An abuse of
discretion suggests the trial court’s decision is unreasonable or unconscionable.’”
Krill v. Krill, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-13-15, 2014-Ohio-2577, ¶ 26, quoting
Brammer v. Meachem, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-10-43, 2011-Ohio-519, ¶ 14, citing
Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St. 3d 217, 219 (1983). “However, the trial
court’s discretion is not absolute, and it must abide by R.C. 3109.04 in making
decisions concerning custody.” Rohrbach at ¶ 16, citing Erwin v. Erwin, 3d Dist.
Union No. 14-04-37, 2005-Ohio-1603, ¶ 7, citing Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St. 3d
71, 74 (1988).
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{¶13} “The statute requires that in allocating the parental rights and
responsibilities, the court ‘shall take into account that which would be in the best
interest of the child[].’” August, 2014-Ohio-3986, at ¶ 22, citing Self v. Turner, 3d
Dist. Mercer No. 10-06-07, 2006-Ohio-6197, ¶ 6, quoting R.C. 3109.04(B)(1).
R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) describes ten factors that the trial court shall consider to
determine the best interest of the child and provides:
In determining the best interest of a child [under R.C. 3109.04],
whether on an original decree allocating parental rights and
responsibilities for the care of children or a modification of a decree
allocating those rights and responsibilities, the court shall consider
all relevant factors, including, but not limited to:
(a) The wishes of the child’s parents regarding the child’s care;
(b) If the court has interviewed the child in chambers pursuant to
division (B) of this section regarding the child’s wishes and concerns
as to the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities concerning
the child, the wishes and concerns of the child, as expressed to the
court;
(c) The child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s
parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect
the child’s best interest;
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(d) The child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and
community;
(e) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the
situation;
(f) The parent more likely to honor and facilitate court-approved
parenting time rights or visitation and companionship rights;
(g) Whether either parent has failed to make all child support
payments, including all arrearages, that are required of that parent
pursuant to a child support order under which that parent is an
obligor;
(h) Whether either parent or any member of the household of either
parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any
criminal offense involving any act that resulted in a child being an
abused child or a neglected child; whether either parent, in a case in
which a child has been adjudicated an abused child or a neglected
child, previously has been determined to be the perpetrator of the
abusive or neglectful act that is the basis of an adjudication; whether
either parent or any member of the household of either parent
previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of
section 2919.25 of the Revised Code or a sexually oriented offense
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involving a victim who at the time of the commission of the offense
was a member of the family or household that is the subject of the
current proceeding; whether either parent or any member of the
household of either parent previously has been convicted of or
pleaded guilty to any offense involving a victim who at the time of
the commission of the offense was a member of the family or
household that is the subject of the current proceeding and caused
physical harm to the victim in the commission of the offense; and
whether there is reason to believe that either parent has acted in a
manner resulting in a child being an abused child or a neglected
child;
(i) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents subject to a
shared parenting decree has continuously and willfully denied the
other parent’s right to parenting time in accordance with an order of
the court;
(j) Whether either parent has established a residence, or is
planning to establish a residence, outside this state.
R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(a)-(j). “Any additional relevant factors shall be considered as
well.” August at ¶ 23, citing R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) and (2).
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{¶14} Decisions concerning child-custody matters also rest within the
sound discretion of the trial court. Krill, 2014-Ohio-2577, at ¶ 26, quoting Walker
v. Walker, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-12-15, 2013-Ohio-1496, ¶ 46, citing Wallace v.
Willoughby, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-10-15, 2011-Ohio-3008, ¶ 22 and Miller, 37
Ohio St. 3d at 74. “‘“Where an award of custody is supported by a substantial
amount of credible and competent evidence, such an award will not be reversed as
being against the weight of the evidence by a reviewing court.”’” Id., quoting
Walker at ¶ 46, quoting Barto v. Barto, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-08-14, 2008-Ohio-
5538, ¶ 25 and Bechtol v. Bechtol, 49 Ohio St. 3d 21 (1990), syllabus.
“‘Accordingly, an abuse of discretion must be found in order to reverse the trial
court’s award of child custody.’” Id., quoting Walker at ¶ 46, citing Barto at ¶ 25
and Masters v. Masters, 69 Ohio St. 3d 83, 85 (1994).
{¶15} “The trial court ‘has discretion in determining which factors are
relevant,’ and ‘each factor may not necessarily carry the same weight or have the
same relevance, depending upon the facts before the trial court.’” Id. at ¶ 29,
quoting Brammer v. Brammer, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-12-57, 2013-Ohio-2843, ¶
41, citing Hammond v. Harm, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23993, 2008-Ohio-2310, ¶ 51.
“Although the trial court must consider all relevant factors, there is no requirement
that the trial court set out an analysis for each of the factors in its judgment entry,
so long as the judgment entry is supported by some competent, credible evidence.”
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Id., citing Meachem, 2011-Ohio-519, at ¶ 30, citing Portentoso v. Portentoso, 3d
Dist. Seneca No. 13-07-03, 2007-Ohio-5770, ¶ 22. “‘[A]bsent evidence to the
contrary, an appellate court will presume the trial court considered all of the
relevant “best interest” factors listed in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1).’” Meachem at ¶ 32,
citing Goodman v. Goodman, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-04-37, 2005-Ohio-1091, ¶ 18.
{¶16} “Additionally, we note that the trier of fact is in the best position to
observe the witnesses, weigh evidence, and evaluate testimony.” Walton v.
Walton, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-10-21, 2011-Ohio-2847, ¶ 20, citing Clark v.
Clark, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-06-56, 2007-Ohio-5771, ¶ 23, citing In re Brown, 98
Ohio App. 3d 337 (3d Dist.1994). “Therefore, ‘“[a] reviewing court should not
reverse a decision simply because it holds a different opinion concerning the
credibility of the witnesses and evidence submitted before the trial court. A
finding of an error in law is a legitimate ground for reversal, but a difference of
opinion on credibility of witnesses and evidence is not.”’” Id., quoting Clark at ¶
23, quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St. 3d 77, 81 (1984).
{¶17} The parties do not dispute that the trial court made the appropriate
change-of-circumstances findings; rather, the parties dispute only whether the trial
court abused its discretion in designating Jacob as K.M.’s residential parent for
school purposes without discussing why it was disagreeing with the GAL’s
recommendation. Accordingly, we will address only whether the trial court
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abused its discretion by not specifically addressing in its best-interest analysis why
it was not following the GAL’s recommendation.
{¶18} As an initial matter, Katelyn failed to cite any authority in support of
her argument other than loosely referring to Rule 48 of the Rules of
Superintendence. “[W]e have previously held that ‘[t]he Rules of
Superintendence “do not have the same force as a statute or case law, but are
rather purely internal housekeeping rules which do not create substantive rights in
individuals or procedural law.”’” Castanien v. Castanien, 3d Dist. Wyandot No.
16-12-08, 2013-Ohio-1393, ¶ 25, quoting Heilman v. Heilman, 3d Dist. Hardin
No. 6-12-08, 2012-Ohio-5133, ¶ 33, quoting Elson v. Plokhooy, 3d Dist. Shelby
No. 17-10-24, 2011-Ohio-3009, ¶ 40. Therefore, Katelyn’s “reliance on the Rules
of Superintendence under our own case law is misplaced as the rules do not create
rights.” Id. This court overruled assignments of error for relying solely on the
Rules of Superintendence. Id., citing Heilman ¶ 33-34 and Elson ¶ 40-41. As
such, Katelyn’s assignment of error fails to raise any reversible error of law. See
id.; Heilman ¶ 33; Elson ¶ 40.
{¶19} Even were we to consider Katelyn’s argument in the interest of
justice, we would conclude that her argument is meritless. “‘[A] trial court is not
bound to follow a guardian ad litem’s recommendation.’” Bomberger-Cronin v.
Cronin, 2d Dist. Greene, No. 2014-CA-4, 2014-Ohio-2302, ¶ 27, quoting Lumley
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v. Lumley, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-556, 2009-Ohio-6992, ¶ 46. See also
Castanien at ¶ 26. “‘The function of a guardian ad litem is to consider the best
interests of a child and to make a recommendation to the court, but the ultimate
decision in any proceeding is for the judge, and the trial court does not err in
making an order contrary to the recommendation of the guardian ad litem.’”
Koller v. Koller, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22328, 2008-Ohio-758, ¶ 24, quoting
In re D.W. and D.W., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21630, 2007-Ohio-431, ¶ 24 .
“As the fact finder, the trial court determines the guardian ad litem’s
credibility and the weight to be given to the guardian ad litem’s
recommendation. Because assessment of the credibility and weight
of the evidence is reserved for the trial court, we will not second
guess the court’s decision to disregard the guardian ad litem’s
recommendation.”
Cronin at ¶ 27, quoting Lumley at ¶ 46, citing Davis, 77 Ohio St. 3d at 419.
Katelyn concedes in her reply brief that the trial court is free to disagree with the
GAL’s recommendation. (Appellant’s Reply Brief at 4). Yet she argues that the
trial court abused its discretion by disagreeing with the GAL’s recommendation
“without at least some explanation and rationalization.” (Id.).
{¶20} Despite Katelyn’s argument, the trial court explicitly addressed its
best-interest findings. See Krill, 2014-Ohio-2577, at ¶ 29. Indeed, the trial court
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considered the GAL’s report, as well as the testimony and evidence presented at
the August 11, 2015 hearing, and weighed that evidence with the R.C. 3109.04
factors. (Aug. 11 and 14, 2015 Tr. at 217); (Doc. Nos. 46, 49). Therefore, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in designating Jacob as K.M.’s residential parent
for school purposes.
{¶21} To the extent that Katelyn argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by disagreeing with the GAL’s recommendation, her argument is also
meritless. The GAL recommended in her July 30, 2015 written report, and at the
August 11, 2015 hearing, that Katelyn be designated as K.M.’s residential parent
for school purposes. (Confidential GAL Report); (Aug. 11 and 14, 2015 Tr. at
26). The parties had the opportunity to cross-examine the GAL at the hearing.
See In re Z.B., 2d Dist. Champaign No. 09-CA-42, 2010-Ohio-3335, ¶ 36. The
trial court apparently found the GAL’s report and testimony less credible than the
evidence that Jacob should be designated as K.M.’s residential parent for school
purposes, which it was free to do. See Matter of Oard, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-
82-4, 1983 WL 4546, *4 (Dec. 28, 1983) (“the ultimate decision was for the trial
court [and] the trial court did not err in arriving at a decision other than that
recommended by the guardian ad litem”).
{¶22} Notwithstanding the GAL’s recommendation, the trial court
concluded that it is in K.M.’s best interest to designate Jacob as K.M.’s residential
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parent for school purposes. In particular, the trial court found the following R.C.
3109.04(F)(1) factors relevant to its decision: R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(a), Jacob and
Katelyn both expressed a desire to be K.M.’s residential parent for school
purposes; R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(c), K.M. has healthy relationships with Jacob and
Katelyn and a “significant relationship with her paternal grandparents”; R.C.
3109.04(F)(1)(d), K.M. has been exclusively raised in Payne, Ohio and attended
pre-school in the Wayne Trace School District; R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(h), Jacob and
his girlfriend have a history of domestic violence, but that incident did not involve
K.M., and K.M. was not present during the altercation; R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(j),
while neither parent presented evidence that they intended to move outside the
state, the trial court considered Katelyn’s move to Ottawa, Ohio as the reason for
her motion requesting the reallocation of parental rights and responsibilities
regarding the school district that K.M. is to attend. (Doc. No. 46). The trial court
concluded that R.C. 3109.04(b), (e), (f), (g), and (i) are inconsequential to its best-
interest analysis. (Id.). The trial court further found that Katelyn’s move to
Ottawa, Ohio “appears to be only a temporary move until she moves onto her next
relationship” and that “[k]eeping [K.M.] within the Wayne Trace School system is
the most stable alternative at this time [since K.M.] attended pre-school within the
Wayne Trace School system.” (Id.).
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{¶23} Nevertheless, Katelyn appears to further argue, without citation to
authorities, that the trial court abused its discretion by designating Jacob as K.M.’s
residential parent for school purposes by essentially permitting K.M.’s paternal
grandparents to assert “their rights via a back door” because evidence was
presented at the August 11, 2015 hearing that K.M.’s paternal grandparents “were
acting for their son as ‘parents’ during his parenting time.” (Appellant’s Brief at
19). Katelyn’s argument is misplaced.
{¶24} One of the best-interest factors that the trial court is to consider is
“[t]he child’s interaction and interrelationship with * * * any other person who
may significantly affect the child’s best interest.” R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(c). Indeed,
the trial court found that Jacob and Katelyn both played a role in the significant
relationship that K.M. has with her paternal grandparents. (Doc. No. 46). In
particular, the trial court found that Katelyn used K.M.’s paternal grandparents for
child care to provide Katelyn time without K.M. to pursue her own interests. (Id.).
Katelyn appears to further challenge the trial court’s decision by arguing that the
trial court placed too much weight on K.M.’s relationship with her paternal
grandparents. However, it is within the trial court’s discretion to determine which
factors are relevant and the weight each factor carries based on the facts before it.
Krill, 2014-Ohio-2577, at ¶ 29. Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion for
the trial court to consider K.M.’s relationship with her paternal grandparents in its
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best-interest analysis and decision to designate Jacob as K.M.’s residential parent
for school purposes. See Heilman, 2012-Ohio-5133, at ¶ 29 (considering the close
bond the child formed with his great-grandparents, who cared for him while his
mother was working, in the trial court’s best-interest analysis); August, 2014-
Ohio-3986, at ¶ 24 (considering the child’s “strong and continuing relationship
with his paternal grandparents” in the trial court’s best-interest analysis).
{¶25} Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in designating
Jacob as K.M.’s residential parent for school purposes.
{¶26} Katelyn’s assignment of error is overruled.
{¶27} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
SHAW, P.J., concurs.
ROGERS, J., Concurring Separately.
{¶28} I concur with the result reached by the majority on the specific issue
contained in Appellant’s sole assignment of error. I write separately to address an
apparent oversight by the trial court.
{¶29} The motion before the court was the reallocation of parental rights
and responsibilities. As noted by the majority, a change of residential parent
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requires a finding of a change of circumstances. Nowhere in the trial court’s
judgment entry or its findings of fact and conclusions of law is any mention made
of a change of circumstances. This omission is immaterial to the specific
assignment of error because the trial court retained the same residential parent for
school purposes as was designated in the original shared parenting order.
{¶30} However, the trial court did change the designation of primary
residential parent from father only to each parent being the residential parent when
the child is in their care. Such a change would require a finding of a change of
circumstances, as well as other findings pursuant to R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a).
Absent the required findings, the change of designation of primary residential
parent is error.
{¶31} However, the lack of the necessary findings was not raised by either
party, and the Appellee failed to file a cross-appeal, so that issue has become
moot.
/jlr
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