Alice Finn v. Ballentine Partners, LLC & a. , 169 N.H. 128 ( 2016 )


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    THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
    ___________________________
    Merrimack
    No. 2015-0332
    ALICE FINN
    v.
    BALLENTINE PARTNERS, LLC & a.
    Argued: January 27, 2016
    Opinion Issued: June 14, 2016
    Hage Hodes, P.A., of Manchester (Jamie N. Hage on the brief), and Cohan
    Rasnick Myerson Plaut LLP, of Boston, Massachusetts (Robert D. Cohan on the
    brief and orally), for the plaintiff.
    McLane Middleton, Professional Association, of Manchester (Wilbur A.
    Glahn, III, Michael A. Delaney, and Nicholas F. Casolaro on the brief, and Mr.
    Glahn orally), for the defendants.
    LYNN, J. The plaintiff, Alice Finn, appeals an order of the Superior Court
    (McNamara, J.) denying her motion to affirm and granting the motion of the
    defendants, Ballentine Partners, LLC (BPLLC), Ballentine & Company, Inc., Roy
    C. Ballentine, Kyle Schaffer, Claudia Shilo, Andrew McMorrow, and Gregory
    Peterson, to vacate a final arbitration award in part pursuant to RSA 542:8
    (2007). Because we conclude that the trial court did not err in ruling that RSA
    542:8 is not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), see 9 U.S.C. §§ 2,
    9-11 (2012), and in ruling, pursuant to RSA 542:8, that the arbitration panel
    committed a plain mistake of law by concluding that res judicata did not bar
    Finn’s claim, we affirm.
    I
    The record supports the following facts. Ballentine and Finn founded
    Ballentine Finn & Company, Inc. (BFI), a New Hampshire subchapter S
    corporation, in 1997. Each owned one half of the company’s stock, and Finn
    served as the Chief Executive Officer. Later, four other individuals became
    shareholders of BFI. In 2008, Ballentine and the other shareholders forced
    Finn out of the corporation and terminated her employment. BFI asserted that
    the termination was for cause, and exercised its right to purchase Finn’s
    shares at the price assigned to “for cause” terminations pursuant to the
    Shareholder Agreement (Agreement). At the time of her termination, Finn held
    37.5% of the shares of BFI. BFI gave Finn a promissory note in the amount of
    $4,635,684, which represented 1.4 times earnings for her shares for the 12
    months before her termination. This amount was below the fair market value
    of Finn’s shares.
    Pursuant to the Agreement, Finn challenged her termination before an
    arbitration panel in 2009.1 This first arbitration panel found that Finn’s
    termination was unlawful and awarded her $5,721,756 for the stock that BFI
    forced her to sell and $720,000 in lost wages. The panel recognized that BFI
    likely did not have sufficient liquidity to pay the award immediately, so it
    authorized BFI to make periodic payments through December 31, 2012.
    After the first panel award, BFI formed BPLLC, contributed all of its
    assets and some of its liabilities to BPLLC, and became its sole member. BFI
    then changed its name to Ballentine & Company (Ballentine & Co.). After the
    reorganization, Ballentine & Co. sold 4,000 preferred units, a 40% membership
    interest in BPLLC, to Perspecta Investments, LLC (Perspecta). Perspecta paid
    $7,000,000 to Ballentine & Co. and made a $280,000 capital contribution to
    BPLLC. The defendants asserted that the membership interest had to be sold
    in order to raise funds to pay the arbitration award to Finn.
    In 2013, Finn filed a complaint and a motion to compel arbitration in
    superior court, alleging that she was entitled to relief under the “Claw Back”
    provision of the Agreement. That provision provides, in essence, that if a
    founding shareholder of BFI sells shares back to the corporation and those
    shares are resold at a higher price within eight years, the founder is entitled to
    recover a portion of the additional price paid for the shares. The defendants
    moved to dismiss Finn’s complaint, arguing that it was barred by res judicata.
    1The dispute resolution section of the Agreement requires the parties to proceed through
    negotiation, mediation, and/or arbitration before instituting a proceeding in court.
    2
    The trial court did not rule on the motion to dismiss; instead, it stayed the
    court proceedings and granted Finn’s motion to compel arbitration, concluding
    that the issue of res judicata must be decided by arbitration in the first
    instance.
    A second arbitration panel held a five-day hearing to decide Finn’s new
    claims, which included breach of contract and unjust enrichment. It ruled that
    “[t]he findings of the first panel essentially resolve[d] Finn’s contract claim for
    ‘Claw Back’ benefits because the predicate facts needed to support a
    contractual ‘Claw Back’ claim were found against Finn by that panel.”2 The
    second panel concluded, however, that Finn was entitled to an award based
    upon her unjust enrichment claim. Although it agreed with the defendants’
    argument that a party cannot be awarded relief under a theory of unjust
    enrichment when “there is an available contract remedy identified,” the panel
    stated that this “legal principle cannot equitably pertain where the breaching
    party has, because of its wrongdoing, effectively eliminated the opposing party’s
    contractual remedy, as happened here.”3 Therefore, the panel concluded that
    the defendants had been unjustly enriched by the sale of shares to Perspecta.
    Using the “Claw Back” provision in the Agreement as a guide only, the second
    panel awarded Finn $600,000 in equitable relief.
    Returning to court, Finn moved to affirm, and the defendants moved to
    vacate in part, the second arbitration award. Applying the plain mistake
    standard of review found in RSA 542:8, the trial court ruled that the second
    panel’s award of additional damages to Finn on her unjust enrichment claim
    2 The second panel reasoned that Finn would only be entitled to “Claw Back” benefits if the sale to
    Perspecta met three conditions: (1) BFI or its shareholders must have purchased her shares
    pursuant to the Agreement; (2) the purchase price for the shares must have been calculated
    under Section 7 of the Agreement; and (3) an “Acquirer” must have purchased the shares of the
    corporation within eight years of the original sale. The second panel recognized that the first
    panel found “that Finn was involuntarily terminated without cause and that BFI and its
    Shareholders could not, therefore, have purchased her shares pursuant to [the] Agreement
    because involuntary termination without cause was not one of the enumerated Events of
    Termination triggering the option.” (Quotations omitted.) Because the second panel was bound
    by the first panel’s finding, it concluded that BFI did not purchase Finn’s shares pursuant to the
    Agreement. Therefore, the second panel concluded that Finn did not have a valid contract claim.
    3 The second panel reasoned:
    The first panel found that Respondents’ conduct made it impossible for
    them to acquire Finn’s stock “pursuant to” the . . . Agreement and at a price
    calculated under Section 7 (and that it was equally impossible to return Finn’s
    stock to her and put her back in her former position at BFI). As a direct result,
    because “Claw Back” rights are only contractually viable if the referenced
    conditions are met, Finn was unilaterally deprived of her contractual “Claw
    Back” rights by the Respondents’ wrongdoing. That circumstance did not arise
    because of some choice Finn could have made in 2008 but didn’t. It arose
    because of Respondents’ conduct terminating her without cause in violation of
    the parties’ Shareholder Agreement. It would be unconscionable to permit the
    Respondents to profit from their wrongdoing.
    3
    was barred, under settled principles of res judicata, by the award of damages
    she received from the first panel.
    Finn moved for reconsideration, arguing that the FAA applied to this case
    because the Agreement affected interstate commerce. Therefore, she argued,
    the trial court should have applied the more deferential FAA standard in
    reviewing the arbitration award because the FAA preempts state law. The trial
    court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.
    II
    On appeal, Finn asserts that the trial court erred in applying RSA 542:8
    to review the second arbitration panel’s award because state law is preempted
    by the FAA. Alternatively, she argues that, even if RSA 542:8 applies, the trial
    court erred because it did not afford sufficient deference to the panel’s findings
    of fact and rulings of law. Finally, she argues that the trial court misapplied
    the doctrine of res judicata to her unjust enrichment claim. We examine her
    arguments in turn.4
    A
    Finn argues that the trial court erred in reviewing the second panel’s
    award under RSA 542:8 instead of §§ 9 and 10 of the FAA. Relying primarily
    upon the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Hall Street
    Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 
    552 U.S. 576
    (2008), she asserts that RSA
    542:8 is impliedly preempted by the FAA because the Agreement is a contract
    affecting interstate commerce,5 to which the FAA applies, and that failing to
    employ the more deferential federal standard of judicial review of arbitration
    awards “foils the objective Congress seeks to advance with the FAA.” “Because
    the trial court’s determination of federal preemption is a matter of law, our
    review is de novo.” N.H. Attorney Gen. v. Bass Victory Comm., 
    166 N.H. 796
    ,
    801 (2014).
    The federal preemption doctrine effectuates the Supremacy Clause of the
    United States Constitution. State v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 
    168 N.H. 211
    , 229
    4 Relying upon the language of section 23.2.4 of the Agreement, which states in relevant part that
    “judgment upon any [arbitration] award may be entered in any court having jurisdiction,” Finn
    also claims that the second panel’s award was not subject to review by the trial court at all
    because “the parties agreed to enter the award in court, they did not agree that the award could
    be challenged in court.” We decline to address this argument because we agree with the
    defendants that it is not preserved for our review inasmuch as Finn never presented it to the trial
    court. See Thorndike v. Thorndike, 
    154 N.H. 443
    , 447 (2006) (“It is a long-standing rule that
    parties may not have judicial review of matters not raised in the forum of trial.” (quotation
    omitted)).
    5 The defendants do not dispute Finn’s contention that the Agreement is a contract that affects
    interstate commerce within the meaning of the FAA.
    4
    (2015). It ensures that federal law “shall be the supreme law of the land; and
    the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution
    or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding,” U.S. CONST. art. VI, by
    invalidating state laws that conflict with federal legislation. Exxon Mobil 
    Corp., 168 N.H. at 229
    . Congress may expressly preempt a state law, or it may
    implicitly preempt a state law through “field” preemption or “conflict”
    preemption. See 
    id. The Supreme
    Court has held that “[t]he FAA contains no express pre-
    emptive provision, nor does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire
    field of arbitration.” Volt Info. Sciences v. Leland Stanford Jr. U., 
    489 U.S. 468
    ,
    477 (1989). Therefore, Finn presses conflict preemption, which “arises when
    compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,
    or when state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
    of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Exxon Mobil 
    Corp., 168 N.H. at 229
    (quotation omitted).
    The trial court reviewed the second panel’s award pursuant to RSA
    542:8, which creates a procedure for parties to seek confirmation, modification,
    or vacatur of an arbitral award:
    At any time within one year after the award is made any party to
    the arbitration may apply to the superior court for an order
    confirming the award, correcting or modifying the award for plain
    mistake, or vacating the award for fraud, corruption, or
    misconduct by the parties or by the arbitrators, or on the ground
    that the arbitrators have exceeded their powers. Where an award
    is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the
    award to be made has not expired, the court may in its discretion,
    direct a rehearing by the arbitrators or by new arbitrators
    appointed by the court.
    We have construed this statute to grant a court the authority to vacate an
    award for plain mistake if it “determine[s] that an arbitrator misapplied the law
    to the facts.” Sherman v. Graciano, 
    152 N.H. 119
    , 120 (2005). Similarly, the
    FAA creates “mechanisms for enforcing arbitration awards: a judicial decree
    confirming an award, an order vacating it, or an order modifying or correcting
    it.” Hall 
    Street, 552 U.S. at 582
    .
    Section 2 of the FAA provides:
    A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction
    involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
    arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
    perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing
    to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such
    5
    a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
    enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
    for the revocation of any contract.
    9 U.S.C. § 2. Thus, the FAA applies to state courts insofar as § 2 prohibits
    state courts from refusing to enforce agreements to arbitrate. Southland Corp.
    v. Keating, 
    465 U.S. 1
    , 14-16 (1984).
    Finn’s argument relies upon §§ 9,6 107 and 118 of the FAA. In Hall
    6 Section 9 of the FAA provides:
    If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court
    shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall
    specify the court, then at any time within one year after the award is made any
    party to the arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an order
    confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an order unless
    the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11
    of this title. If no court is specified in the agreement of the parties, then such
    application may be made to the United States court in and for the district within
    which such award was made. Notice of the application shall be served upon the
    adverse party, and thereupon the court shall have jurisdiction of such party as
    though he had appeared generally in the proceeding. If the adverse party is a
    resident of the district within which the award was made, such service shall be
    made upon the adverse party or his attorney as prescribed by law for service of
    notice of motion in an action in the same court. If the adverse party shall be a
    nonresident, then the notice of the application shall be served by the marshal of
    any district within which the adverse party may be found in like manner as
    other process of the court.
    9 U.S.C. § 9.
    7 Section 10 of the FAA establishes the grounds for vacating an arbitral award. It provides:
    (a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the
    district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award
    upon the application of any party to the arbitration—
    (1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
    (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
    either of them;
    (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
    postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
    evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior
    by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
    (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
    executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
    submitted was not made.
    (b) If an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required
    the award to be made has not expired, the court may, in its discretion, direct a
    rehearing by the arbitrators.
    (c) The United States district court for the district wherein an award was
    made that was issued pursuant to section 580 of title 5 may make an order
    vacating the award upon the application of a person, other than a party to the
    arbitration, who is adversely affected or aggrieved by the award, if the use of
    arbitration or the award is clearly inconsistent with the factors set forth in
    section 572 of title 5.
    9 U.S.C. § 10.
    6
    Street, the Supreme Court held that the listed grounds for vacation, correction
    or modification of an arbitral award by a federal court, as set forth in §§ 10 and
    11 of the FAA, may not be supplemented by the terms of the arbitration
    agreement entered into by the parties. Hall 
    Street, 552 U.S. at 590
    . These
    provisions provide much more limited grounds for review of an arbitration
    award than does “plain mistake” review under RSA 542:8.
    We do not agree with Finn’s first argument that the FAA is the exclusive
    method by which to review the second panel’s award because we conclude that
    §§ 9-11 of the FAA apply only to arbitration review proceedings commenced in
    federal courts. As we have already noted, the FAA creates some substantive
    rules that apply to arbitration agreements in both federal and state courts
    when the contract to arbitrate affects commerce. Southland 
    Corp., 465 U.S. at 14-16
    . Section 2 of the act applies in state courts to prevent anti-arbitration
    laws from invalidating otherwise lawful arbitration agreements. Allied-Bruce
    Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 
    513 U.S. 265
    , 281 (1995). However, it does not follow
    that the FAA applies to state courts in its entirety. In fact, the Supreme Court
    has suggested that some of the statute’s provisions apply only in federal courts.
    See 
    Volt, 489 U.S. at 477
    n.6. In considering whether other sections of the
    FAA apply in state courts, the Court noted that it has “never held that §§ 3 and
    4, which by their terms appear to apply only to proceedings in federal court,
    . . . are nonetheless applicable in state court.” 
    Id. This comment
    clearly
    contemplates that the Court considers the application to the states of each
    section individually, rather than the application of the Act as a whole.
    Therefore, we consider whether §§ 9-11 of the FAA also use language that
    limits their application to federal courts.
    The sections at issue in Volt made reference to either “the courts of the
    United States” or “any United States district court.” Id.; see Southland 
    Corp., 465 U.S. at 29
    n.18 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (explaining that “courts of the
    United States” is a term of art designating federal, not state courts). Likewise,
    8Section 11 of the FAA establishes the grounds for modifying or correcting an arbitral award. It
    provides:
    In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
    wherein the award was made may make an order modifying or correcting the
    award upon the application of any party to the arbitration—
    (a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident
    material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in
    the award.
    (b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them,
    unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter
    submitted.
    (c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of
    the controversy.
    The order may modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent thereof
    and promote justice between the parties.
    9 U.S.C. § 11.
    7
    §§ 10 and 11, the sections that establish the limited grounds upon which
    arbitration awards may be upset, reference only the federal courts. 9 U.S.C.
    §§ 10, 11. Although § 9 of the FAA could be read to encompass state courts as
    well as federal courts, and to contemplate that state courts reviewing covered
    arbitration awards (i.e., those involving contracts affecting interstate
    commerce) must utilize exclusively the standards set forth in §§ 10 and 11, the
    Court has not interpreted the FAA in this fashion. In Hall Street, the Court not
    only acknowledged the potential for review of arbitration awards under state
    law, see Hall 
    Street, 552 U.S. at 590
    , but even noted the possibility of a federal
    court reviewing an arbitration award under its “case management authority
    independent of the FAA,” 
    id. at 592.9
    If the FAA were, in all circumstances, the
    exclusive grounds for review of arbitration awards subject to the FAA, these
    possible alternative paradigms of judicial review that the Court described
    would have been completely foreclosed. Indeed, the Texas Supreme Court has
    specifically recognized the limited applicability of the FAA to state courts: “The
    mere fact that a contract affects interstate commerce, thus triggering the FAA,
    does not preclude enforcement under [state law] as well.” Nafta Traders, Inc. v.
    Quinn, 
    339 S.W.3d 84
    , 98 (Tex. 2011).
    Here, the FAA applied to the extent that it required the parties to
    arbitrate their dispute, as the trial court noted when it referred Finn’s claim to
    the second arbitration panel. That does not mean that all aspects of the FAA
    are applicable to this proceeding. Based upon our review of the pertinent case
    law, we conclude that neither Hall Street, nor any other precedents by which
    we are bound, requires that we accept plaintiff’s position that §§ 10 and 11
    provide the exclusive grounds for state court review of arbitration awards
    subject to the FAA.
    We next consider Finn’s argument that so-called “obstacle preemption”
    supports her assertion that RSA 542:8 is invalidated by the FAA. The
    “obstacle” branch of conflict preemption requires more than a showing that
    some tension between the state and federal laws exists. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
    9 It must be noted that the arbitration agreement at issue in Hall Street was not, as here, one
    contained in the agreement that was the genesis of the underlying dispute between the parties.
    Rather, it was a separate agreement to arbitrate a particular issue (indemnification) that was
    entered into by the parties after a lawsuit had already been filed in federal district court and after
    the case had been partially resolved (as to other issues) by that court. See Hall 
    Street, 552 U.S. at 579
    . The fact that the parties were already in federal court when they agreed to arbitrate appears
    to be what caused the Court to opine that when the case arrived at its doorstep, “no reason then
    appeared for treating [it] as anything but an FAA case,” and to note, “[n]or is there any doubt now
    that the parties at least had the FAA in mind at the outset.” 
    Id. at 590.
    Because the dispute was
    already before a federal court when the parties agreed to arbitrate, it was quite natural for the
    courts, including the Supreme Court, to treat the agreement as contemplating that any judicial
    review of that agreement would take place in federal court, and thus be subject to §§ 10 and 11 of
    the FAA. In this case, by contrast, the arbitration occurred pursuant to the terms of the
    Agreement, which was entered into long before there was any extant dispute between the parties,
    let alone one that had invoked the jurisdiction of a particular court.
    
    8 168 N.H. at 229-30
    . A party must show that “the repugnance or conflict is so
    direct and positive that the two acts cannot be reconciled or consistently stand
    together.” 
    Id. (quotation omitted).
    “What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of
    judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and
    identifying its purpose and intended effects.” Crosby v. National Foreign Trade
    Council, 
    530 U.S. 363
    , 373 (2000).
    The Supreme Court has provided guidance regarding the purpose of the
    FAA. It has described the primary purpose of the FAA as “foreclos[ing] state
    legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.”
    Southland 
    Corp., 465 U.S. at 16
    . This purpose is rooted in § 2 of the FAA. 
    Id. at 10.
    By establishing that agreements to arbitrate “shall be valid, irrevocable,
    and enforceable,” 9 U.S.C. § 2, Congress “withdrew the power of the states to
    require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting
    parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.” Southland 
    Corp., 465 U.S. at 10
    . For
    example, the Court held preempted a state law that required notice of an
    arbitration clause upon the first page of the contract, Doctor’s Associates, Inc.
    v. Casarotto, 
    517 U.S. 681
    , 683 (1996), and a law that required administrative
    procedures before a case could proceed to arbitration, Preston v. Ferrer, 
    552 U.S. 346
    , 349-50 (2008). Thus, at the heart of the Court’s FAA preemption
    doctrine is its effort to enforce Congressional intent by thwarting the recurring
    refusal of state courts to enforce an otherwise valid contract because it
    embodied the parties’ agreement to arbitrate. See Southland 
    Corp., 465 U.S. at 16
    . In short, preemption under the FAA is at its apex when parties cannot get
    to arbitration because state law attempts to force them to resolve their dispute
    in court. See 
    id. In AT&T
    Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 
    563 U.S. 333
    , 338 (2011), the Court
    considered California’s application of the doctrine of unconscionability to an
    arbitration agreement. AT&T 
    Mobility, 563 U.S. at 338
    . The California law
    held unconscionable arbitration agreement provisions that waived class
    proceedings — both in litigation and arbitration — if the state court found that
    bilateral proceedings would not adequately substitute for the deterrent effect of
    a class action. 
    Id. The Court
    had to decide whether the FAA preempted the
    California law, which was generally applicable but was “alleged to have been
    applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitration.” 
    Id. at 341.
    In reaching its
    conclusion, the Court emphasized that “[t]he overarching purpose of the
    FAA . . . is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to
    their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.” 
    Id. at 344.
    Reiterating
    that “our cases place it beyond dispute that the FAA was designed to promote
    arbitration,” the Court examined whether the California rule “interferes with
    arbitration.” 
    Id. at 345-46.
    It concluded that, by requiring that class actions
    be available in a particular subset of arbitration agreements, California courts
    had “sacrifice[d] the principal advantage of arbitration—its informality.” 
    Id. at 348.
    Class arbitrations take more time to reach a final award on the merits
    than bilateral arbitration and require procedural formality to make the award
    9
    binding upon absent parties. 
    Id. at 348-49.
    These complications, the Court
    determined, departed significantly from arbitration as envisioned by the FAA
    and, therefore, were a thinly veiled refusal to enforce arbitration agreements.
    
    Id. at 351.
    The California rule was therefore preempted because it required
    drastic procedural changes before the court would enforce the agreement to
    arbitrate. 
    Id. at 351-52.
    In contrast, state rules that slow or change procedures without the
    potential consequence of invalidating an arbitration agreement are not
    preempted. In Volt, the Court considered whether the FAA preempted a state
    court from interpreting a choice-of-law provision as applying state procedural
    rules. 
    Volt, 489 U.S. at 470
    , 477-78. The state procedure that the trial court
    applied stayed the arbitration when the FAA would not, thus delaying the
    arbitration. 
    Id. at 471-72.
    The Court recognized that “Congress was no doubt
    aware that the Act would encourage the expeditious resolution of disputes,”
    but declined to accept expeditious review as a primary goal of the FAA. 
    Id. at 478-79.
    Rather, it reasoned that “[t]he FAA was designed to overrule the
    judiciary’s long-standing refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate.” 
    Id. at 478
    (quotation omitted). The Court explained that Congress “was motivated, first
    and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into which
    parties had entered.” 
    Id. (quotation omitted).
    Although the Court had held
    preempted state laws that required judicial resolution of claims despite parties
    contracting to resolve them by arbitration, it distinguished the FAA’s
    procedural rules: “There is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain
    set of procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability,
    according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate.” 
    Id. at 476.
    The fact that a state law affecting arbitration is less deferential to an
    arbitrator’s decision than the FAA does not create an obstacle so
    insurmountable as to preempt state law. Volt demonstrates that not all
    obstacles to arbitration are repugnant to the FAA. The procedural rule in Volt
    delayed arbitration, and simplified it, by staying the proceedings until non-
    arbitral issues had been resolved. 
    Id. at 471.
    On the other hand, the state
    rule at issue in AT&T Mobility contemplated an extreme alteration of
    arbitration procedure, risks, and efficiency, and failure to comply with its
    requirement would make the agreement to arbitrate unenforceable. AT&T
    Mobility, 
    563 U.S. 348-49
    . It thus had such a profound effect upon arbitration
    as to effectively deter parties from choosing arbitration.
    RSA 542:8 is more like the rule at issue in Volt than that at issue in
    AT&T Mobility. “[T]he FAA does not preempt all state-law impediments to
    arbitration; it preempts state-law impediments to arbitration agreements.”
    Nafta 
    Traders, 339 S.W.3d at 100
    . Thus, “[f]or the FAA to preempt [state law],
    state law must refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement that the FAA would
    enforce.” 
    Id. at 98
    (quotation omitted). RSA 542:8’s more rigorous standard of
    judicial review of arbitral decisions is not an impediment to enforcement of the
    10
    parties’ agreement to arbitrate as per the terms of the Agreement. In fact, it
    does not even slow the enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate, but instead
    applies after an agreement to arbitrate has already been enforced, arbitration
    conducted, and a final award issued. It allows the trial court to ensure that no
    plain mistakes made by the arbitrators will go uncorrected.
    In this case, the trial court did not refuse to enforce the parties’
    agreement to arbitrate. Instead it applied RSA 542:8 to review the second
    panel’s award, which was produced because the trial court had complied with
    the FAA and enforced their agreement to arbitrate. RSA 542:8 does not
    interfere with the FAA’s principal purpose of protecting arbitration agreements
    from perceived judicial hostility. Because our state standard of review does not
    impede the enforcement of an arbitration agreement nor mandate drastic
    changes to the procedures by which arbitration is to be conducted, it is not
    preempted by the FAA.
    Finn nonetheless insists that the Court’s discussion in Hall Street about
    the dangers of “full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals that can render informal
    arbitration merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming
    judicial review process,” thus “bring[ing] arbitration theory to grief in
    postarbitration process,” Hall 
    Street, 552 U.S. at 588
    (quotation and brackets
    omitted), demands that we hold RSA 542:8 preempted by the FAA. She argues
    that, although the Court acknowledged that parties may seek review of arbitral
    decisions through other avenues of enforcement, these “are only permissible
    where they are more restrictive than federal standards of review.” See Hall
    
    Street, 552 U.S. at 584
    , 590-92. We do not believe that Hall Street stands for
    this proposition.
    In Hall Street, the Court considered whether §§ 10-11 of the FAA
    prevented a federal court from “enforcing a contract to expand judicial review.”
    
    Id. at 586.
    After commencing complex litigation in federal court, the parties
    agreed to submit one of the claims to arbitration. 
    Id. at 579.
    Their arbitration
    agreement granted the trial court the authority to review the arbitrator’s
    findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
    Id. Following the
    arbitration, one of
    the parties moved to vacate the award for legal error, and the trial court
    granted such relief. 
    Id. at 580.
    On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded “that
    §§ 10 and 11 respectively provide[d] the FAA’s exclusive grounds for expedited
    vacatur and modification.” 
    Id. at 584.
    The Court rejected the argument that
    allowing for expanded judicial review was consistent with the FAA’s primary
    purpose of enforcing the parties’ agreements. 
    Id. at 586.
    It explained that “to
    rest this case on the general policy of treating arbitration agreements as
    enforceable as such” was at odds with what it found to be the exclusiveness
    language used in §§ 10 and 11. 
    Id. Therefore, the
    parties could not contract to
    expand the scope of review applied to the award under the FAA because “it
    makes more sense to see the three provisions . . . as substantiating a national
    policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain
    11
    arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.” 
    Id. at 588.
    But the Court limited the reach of this national policy:
    In holding that §§ 10 and 11 provide exclusive regimes for
    the review provided by the statute, we do not purport to say that
    they exclude more searching review based on authority outside the
    statute as well. The FAA is not the only way into court for parties
    wanting review of arbitration awards: they may contemplate
    enforcement under state statutory or common law, for example,
    where judicial review of different scope is arguable. But here we
    speak only to the scope of the expeditious judicial review under
    §§ 9, 10, and 11, deciding nothing about other possible avenues for
    judicial enforcement of arbitration awards.
    
    Id. at 590.
    Accordingly, Hall Street does not support Finn’s contention that the
    Court has held preempted state standards of review that are more rigorous
    than the FAA. Instead, the caveat of Hall Street supports our conclusion that
    RSA 542:8 is not preempted. Hall Street was a question of statutory
    interpretation, not preemption. See 
    id. at 586-88.
    It considered only federal
    law as it applied to a federal court. Although it based its conclusions upon a
    “national policy,” 
    id. at 588,
    it did not do so in the context of a state law. Not
    only did the Court recognize that other statutes existed that would conflict with
    the Court’s interpretation of the FAA, it suggested that such avenues remained
    open to parties, even after its decision. Thus, it implied that although “more
    searching review,” 
    id. at 590,
    was in conflict with the “national policy favoring
    arbitration with just limited review,” the conflict may not effectively preempt
    such avenues of review. 
    Id. at 588.
    The California Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion when it
    considered whether its rule allowing parties to expand judicial review by
    contract was preempted in the aftermath of Hall Street:
    Nevertheless, we do not believe the Hall Street majority
    intended to declare a policy with preemptive effect in all cases
    involving interstate commerce. Hall Street was a federal case
    governed by federal law; the court considered no question of
    competing state law. It reviewed the application of FAA provisions
    for judicial review that speak only to the federal courts. The court
    unanimously left open other avenues for judicial review, including
    those provided by state statutory or common law. While the court,
    of course, decided nothing about the viability of these alternatives,
    their mention in the majority opinion indicates that Hall Street’s
    holding on the effect of the FAA is a limited one.
    12
    Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 
    190 P.3d 586
    , 599 (Cal. 2008)
    (citation omitted). We agree with the California court. To conclude from Hall
    Street that the Court intended to establish a new policy with preemptive effect
    is unreasonable given both the context and express limitation of the case’s
    holding, as well as the federalism concerns that would be implicated by such a
    broad reading of the case.
    Here, the Agreement included a choice-of-law clause, and Finn and the
    other shareholders selected New Hampshire law as the governing law: “This
    Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the internal
    laws of the State of New Hampshire, without regard to conflict of laws
    principles.” Their choice to govern their agreement by New Hampshire law
    includes the agreement to arbitrate; the arbitration clause does not reference
    the use of any other governing law. The parties opted for judicial review
    through a mechanism other than the FAA, an avenue left undisturbed by the
    Court in Hall Street. See Hall 
    Street, 552 U.S. at 590
    . By applying RSA 542:8
    to the arbitral award, the trial court was faithful to the parties’ intent. Not only
    does Hall Street contemplate the possibility of such an outcome, enforcing
    parties’ agreements according to their terms remains at the heart of the FAA.
    AT&T 
    Mobility, 563 U.S. at 339
    (“[C]ourts must place arbitration agreements on
    an equal footing with other contracts and enforce them according to their
    terms.” (citations omitted)). We therefore conclude that the FAA does not
    preempt RSA 542:8, and that the trial court did not err by applying it to the
    second arbitral award.
    B
    Finn next argues that the trial court erred because it did not give
    deference to the second panel’s findings of fact and rulings of law. She
    contends that the trial court erred by failing to accept the second panel’s
    finding that Finn could not have brought her unjust enrichment claim in the
    first arbitration. She also contends that the trial court was entitled to vacate
    the second panel’s award for mistake of law only if it found that the panel did
    not know what the law was. We are not persuaded by these arguments.
    We have construed RSA 542:8 to grant the trial court the power to vacate
    an arbitration award for a “plain mistake” of law or fact. Walsh v. Amica Mut.
    Ins. Co., 
    141 N.H. 374
    , 375 (1996). “It must be shown that the arbitrators
    manifestly fell into such error concerning the facts or law, and that the error
    prevented their free and fair exercise of judgment on the subject.” Merrill
    Lynch Futures v. Sands, 
    143 N.H. 507
    , 509 (1999). We therefore consider
    arbitral awards with deference to the arbitrators. 
    Id. In past
    cases we have
    defined a “plain mistake” as “an error that is apparent on the face of the record
    and which would have been corrected had it been called to the arbitrators’
    attention.” 
    Id. (quotation omitted).
    Although we have recited this language, we
    have reversed arbitration awards when the errors, although not subtle, were
    13
    not so obvious as to satisfy the literal meaning of this language. Indeed, we
    have found plain mistake in circumstances where the correct legal analysis was
    presented to the arbitrator(s) but was rejected. See 
    Sherman, 152 N.H. at 121
    -
    23 (reversing when parties disputed before arbitrator whether contract
    language was ambiguous, arbitrator found language ambiguous, and we
    disagreed); John A. Cookson Co. v. N.H. Ball Bearings, 
    147 N.H. 352
    , 361-62
    (2001) (reversing arbitrator who did not award interest when the parties’
    arbitration agreement did not contain a provision for the payment of interest on
    damages because we concluded that, given the “broad language” of the
    agreement, “the arbitrator could have awarded interest”); 
    Walsh, 141 N.H. at 375-76
    (reversing arbitration panel that found plaintiff’s injuries arose out of
    the use of a motor vehicle because although the operator used the vehicle in a
    sense, we held it was not a normal use and “any connection to the plaintiff’s
    injuries [was] too tenuous”).
    The trial court did not misapply the standard of review for an arbitration
    panel’s findings of fact because it did not upset the second panel’s findings as
    to any factual issues. The panel asked the parties to brief whether Finn
    “[c]ould and therefore should . . . have . . . advanced a claim for unjust
    enrichment in [the first] action and if she did not, is she foreclosed from
    advancing such a claim . . . in the current action.” This question is, in
    essence, merely a rephrasing of the doctrine of res judicata, which is an issue
    of law. Sleeper v. Hoban Family P’ship, 
    157 N.H. 530
    , 533 (2008). Therefore,
    we consider the question by applying the standard for plain mistakes of law.
    A trial court may vacate an award for plain mistake of law under two
    circumstances. First, the court may find a plain mistake of law when the law
    has changed after the issuance of an award, but before the award is reduced to
    final judgment, if the court concludes that the panel would not have reached
    the same conclusion had it known of the change in the law. N.H. Ins. Co. v.
    Bell, 
    121 N.H. 127
    , 129 (1981). Second, the court may find a plain mistake of
    law when the panel clearly misapplied the law to the facts. 
    Sherman, 152 N.H. at 120-23
    (reviewing the language of a contract de novo and concluding that
    the panel erred when it considered extrinsic evidence because the contract was
    not ambiguous); see also Turcotte v. Griffin, 
    120 N.H. 292
    , 294-95 (1980). RSA
    542:8 does not require, as Finn contends, a scouring of the record for proof as
    to the panel’s understanding of general legal principles that may be pertinent
    to the issues before it. Nor must it assume proper application of the law from
    the panel members’ resumes. Rather, although judicial review is deferential, it
    is the court’s task to determine whether the arbitrators were plainly mistaken
    in their application of law to the specific facts and circumstances of the dispute
    they were called upon to decide.
    Although Finn relies upon Walsh to support her claim that the panel
    committed no plain mistake of law, that case actually supports the trial court’s
    ruling in this case. See 
    Walsh, 141 N.H. at 375-76
    . In Walsh, an arbitration
    14
    panel found that Walsh’s uninsured motorist coverage required his insurer to
    cover the injuries he sustained as a result of being shot while he sat in his car.
    
    Id. at 374-75.
    We reversed the trial court’s confirmation of the award because
    the panel committed a plain mistake when it concluded that Walsh’s injuries
    arose from the use of an uninsured car. 
    Id. at 375-76.
    We identified the
    applicable law: “To warrant coverage, then, there must be more than a tenuous
    connection to the automobile; the [uninsured] operator must have been using
    his vehicle or behaving as a motorist at the time the plaintiff was injured.” 
    Id. at 375
    (quotation omitted). We then applied the law to the facts: “Though [the
    gunman] apparently ‘used’ the vehicle to steady his gun on the windshield, this
    is not a normal use for which a vehicle is intended; consequently, any
    connection to the plaintiff's injuries is too tenuous to warrant coverage.” 
    Id. at 375-76.
    It was the obvious misapplication of law to the facts that led us to
    comment that “[t]o the extent the arbitrators believed the law to be otherwise,
    they were plainly mistaken,” and it was this misapplication of the law that led
    to our vacating the arbitral award. 
    Id. at 376.
    The trial court in the instant case treated the second panel’s award with
    the same degree of deference that we employed in Walsh. It thoroughly
    described the law of res judicata and, as we discuss below, correctly applied
    that law to the record before it. Thus, we reject Finn’s contention that the trial
    court misapplied the plain mistake standard by conducting an overly searching
    review of the panel’s decision.
    C
    Finn asserts that the trial court erroneously applied res judicata because
    her second action arose from a separate transaction that occurred after the
    first arbitration and relied upon different material facts. Therefore, she
    reasons, she could not have brought her unjust enrichment claim in the first
    arbitration because “the damages sought in the second action could not have
    been requested in the first action.”
    The doctrine of res judicata “prevents parties from relitigating matters
    actually litigated and matters that could have been litigated in the first action.”
    Merriam Farm, Inc. v. Town of Surry, 
    168 N.H. 197
    , 199 (2015). “[I]t applies if
    three elements are met: (1) the parties are the same or in privity with one
    another; (2) the same cause of action was before the court in both instances;
    and (3) the first action ended with a final judgment on the merits.” 
    Id. (quotation omitted).
    Finn asserts only that her second arbitration did not involve the same
    cause of action as the first arbitration; she does not dispute that the first and
    third elements of res judicata are satisfied. Therefore, we consider only
    whether Finn’s unjust enrichment claim based upon the denial of “Claw Back”
    15
    benefits constitutes the same cause of action as her first claim based upon her
    wrongful termination.
    A “cause of action” is “the underlying right that is preserved by bringing
    a suit or action.” In re Estate of Bergquist, 
    166 N.H. 531
    , 535 (2014)
    (quotation omitted). It encompasses “all theories upon which relief could be
    claimed on the basis of the factual transaction in question.” 
    Id. (quotation and
    brackets omitted). Thus, if several theories of recovery arise out of the same
    transaction or occurrence, they amount to one cause of action.
    Finn argues that her wrongful termination and the sale of her stock to
    Perspecta are separate transactions entitling her to two separate actions for
    damages. However, Finn defines “transaction” too narrowly. “[T]ransaction,”
    for the purposes of res judicata, is used in a broad sense and “the overtones of
    voluntary interchange often associated with the term in normal speech do not
    obtain.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 cmt. b at 199 (1982).
    Instead, we use “transaction” to describe factual occurrences that can be
    grouped together naturally or that share operative facts. 
    Id. Several factors
    help us to determine whether two actions arise from the same factual
    occurrence: “their relatedness in time, space, origin, or motivation, and
    whether, taken together, they form a convenient unit for trial purposes.” 
    Id. In this
    case, the first arbitration and the second arbitration are tied
    together by their origin. The second panel’s own conclusions demonstrate the
    intertwining of Finn’s first and second actions:
    The Respondents terminated her for no cause and by doing so
    created the very circumstance in which her stock could not be
    purchased “pursuant to” the Shareholder Agreement or at a price
    calculated “under Section 7.” As a result of their wrongful
    conduct, Finn’s contractual “Claw Back” rights were lost.
    Finn’s second action was not based upon a new factual occurrence, but upon
    the continuing injury of her termination. Furthermore, substantial overlap
    exists between the material facts in the first arbitration and the material facts
    in the second arbitration, making the claims a convenient trial unit. Finn
    claims that the material facts are the “quick resale of [her] stock at a higher
    price,” but these facts do not exist without Finn’s wrongful termination and
    forced sale of her stock, which resulted in a substantial award against BFI and
    caused Ballentine & Co. to sell her shares, at least in part, to fulfill the
    judgment. In both arbitrations, Finn’s claim depended upon the same evidence
    of BFI’s wrongful conduct. In fact, the only additional evidence was the value
    of the newly discovered damage — BFI’s additional profit — which Finn sought
    in the second action. The second arbitration could not have succeeded without
    the material facts of the first arbitration. It was based upon additional
    damages arising out of the same wrongful conduct — her termination.
    16
    Finn also argues that she could not have requested unjust enrichment
    damages in the first action because she did not know that the claim existed
    until BFI resold her stock. However, res judicata precludes a second action
    based upon the same factual occurrence even if the plaintiff plans to seek
    remedies she did not assert in the first action. Restatement (Second) of
    Judgments § 25, at 209. Like the trial court, we find the Restatement
    instructive:
    Typically, even when the injury caused by an actionable wrong
    extends into the future and will be felt beyond the date of
    judgment, the damages awarded by the judgment are nevertheless
    supposed to embody the money equivalent of the entire injury.
    Accordingly, if a plaintiff who has recovered a judgment against a
    defendant in a certain amount becomes dissatisfied with [her]
    recovery and commences a second action to obtain increased
    damages, the court will hold [her] precluded; [her] claim has been
    merged in the judgment and may not be split. . . . It is immaterial
    that in trying the first action [s]he was not in possession of enough
    information about the damages, past or prospective, or that the
    damages turned out in fact to be unexpectedly large and in excess
    of the judgment.
    
    Id. § 25
    cmt. c at 211 (emphasis added).
    Both the first and second panels found that Finn was denied the benefits
    of the Agreement by BFI’s wrongful conduct. The first panel crafted a remedy
    for the fair value of her shares in BFI, taking into account all of the benefits
    she had been denied. The second panel found that one of the benefits which
    Finn was denied was the right to claim additional profits if, after selling her
    shares to BFI, they were resold within a certain time. Because “Finn’s original
    claims resolved by the first arbitration panel . . . did not include any claim
    involving or relating to the ‘Claw Back’ provision of the Shareholder
    Agreement,” the panel concluded that “Finn [was] not precluded by reason of
    [r]es judicata . . . from advancing her claims associated with the ‘Claw Back’
    provision in the [second] arbitration proceeding.” However, the loss of this
    benefit was an injury caused by the same wrongful conduct that the first panel
    remedied, and the first award should have embodied its value. It is irrelevant
    to the application of res judicata that Finn did not expect BFI to be able to
    liquidate her shares or make a profit from their sale. She knew that her
    termination was outside the confines of the Agreement and that she was
    effectively losing the benefits of certain provisions of the Agreement, including
    the “Claw Back” provision. Even though she did not know that BFI would
    resell her shares and, if they did, what the profit would be, she could have
    asked the panel to craft a contingent remedy.10 Though the value of the
    10   The first panel demonstrated that such contingent awards were possible when it ruled that the
    17
    damages was uncertain, the wrongful conduct that entitled Finn to claim
    unjust enrichment existed at the time of the first arbitration.
    The second panel should have applied res judicata to bar Finn’s second
    action. The panel acknowledged that the denial of benefits was based upon the
    same injury to Finn that was the subject of the first arbitration. Given its
    findings, it should have concluded that the action arose from the same factual
    occurrence and merely sought additional damages for the same injury. The
    record cannot support any other determination than that res judicata barred
    Finn’s unjust enrichment claim. The second panel therefore committed a plain
    mistake, and the trial court did not err when it vacated the second panel’s final
    award.
    III
    For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the superior court is
    hereby affirmed.
    Affirmed.
    DALIANIS, C.J., and HICKS, J., concurred.
    two final installment payments paid to Finn would be “either 1.4 million dollars, or 14% of
    Ballentine, Finn & Company, Inc.’s gross revenues, whichever is higher.” Similarly, the first panel
    could have added a contingent remedy for the possible sale of shares.
    18