People v. Conley , 63 Cal. 4th 646 ( 2016 )


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  • Filed 6/30/16
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
    THE PEOPLE,                          )
    )
    Plaintiff and Respondent, )
    )                             S211275
    v.                        )
    )                       Ct.App. 3 C070272
    PATRICK LEE CONLEY,                  )
    )                          Yolo County
    Defendant and Appellant.  )                   Super. Ct. No. CRF113234
    ____________________________________)
    Under the ―Three Strikes‖ law as originally enacted in 1994, an individual
    convicted of any felony offense following two prior convictions for serious or
    violent felonies was subject to an indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a
    minimum term of no less than 25 years. (Pen. Code, former §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i),
    1170.12, subd. (c)(2).) In 2012, the electorate passed the Three Strikes Reform
    Act of 2012 (Reform Act or Act) (Prop. 36, as approved by voters, Gen.
    Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012)), which amended the law to reduce the punishment prescribed
    for certain third strike defendants. The electorate also authorized persons
    ―presently serving‖ an indeterminate term of life imprisonment imposed under the
    prior version of the law to seek resentencing under the amended penalty scheme
    by filing a petition for recall of sentence. (Pen. Code, § 1170.126, subd. (a).)
    Under the Act, a court must grant a recall petition unless it determines that
    resentencing the petitioner ―would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
    safety.‖ (§ 1170.126, subd. (f).)
    SEE CONCURRING OPINION
    1
    The Reform Act took effect on November 7, 2012. The question in this
    case is whether third strike defendants who were sentenced under the Three
    Strikes law before November 7, 2012, but whose judgments were not yet final as
    of that date, are entitled to automatic resentencing under the revised penalty
    provisions of the Reform Act. We conclude that these defendants are not entitled
    to automatic resentencing, but instead may seek resentencing by petitioning for
    recall of sentence under section 1170.126.
    I.
    A.
    Enacted ―to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for
    those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or
    violent felony offenses‖ (Pen. Code, former § 667, subd. (b), as amended by Stats.
    1994, ch. 12, § 1, pp. 71, 72), the Three Strikes law ―consists of two, nearly
    identical statutory schemes.‖ (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 
    13 Cal.4th 497
    , 504 (Romero).) The first of these schemes was enacted by the
    Legislature in March 1994. (Pen. Code, former § 667, subds. (b)-(i).) The second
    was enacted by ballot initiative in November of the same year. (Pen. Code, former
    § 1170.12, added by Prop. 184, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994)
    (Proposition 184).) The two statutes differ only in minor respects not relevant
    here. (Accord, Romero, at p. 505.)1
    Under the Three Strikes law as originally enacted, a felony defendant who
    had been convicted of a single prior serious or violent felony (a second strike
    defendant) was to be sentenced to a term equal to ―twice the term otherwise
    1     For convenience, we therefore refer in this opinion to the version enacted
    by Proposition 184. Our decision, however, applies equally to both.
    2
    provided as punishment for the current felony conviction.‖ (Pen. Code, former
    § 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).) By contrast, a defendant who had been convicted of two
    or more prior serious or violent felonies (a third strike defendant) was to be
    sentenced to ―an indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a minimum term
    of‖ at least 25 years. (Pen. Code, former § 1170.12, subd. (c)(2).)
    The Reform Act changed the sentence prescribed for a third strike
    defendant whose current offense is not a serious or violent felony. (See Teal v.
    Superior Court (2014) 
    60 Cal.4th 595
    , 596-597.) Under the Reform Act‘s revised
    penalty provisions, many third strike defendants are excepted from the provision
    imposing an indeterminate life sentence (see Pen. Code, § 1170.12, subd.
    (c)(2)(A)) and are instead sentenced in the same way as second strike defendants
    (see id., subd. (c)(2)(C)): that is, they receive a term equal to ―twice the term
    otherwise provided as punishment for the current felony conviction‖ (id., subd.
    (c)(1)). A defendant does not qualify for this ameliorative change, however, if his
    current offense is a controlled substance charge involving large quantities (id.,
    subd. (c)(2)(C)(i)), one of various enumerated sex offenses (id., subd.
    (c)(2)(C)(ii)), or one in which he used a firearm, was armed with a firearm or
    deadly weapon, or intended to cause great bodily injury (id., subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii)).
    The ameliorative provisions of the Reform Act also do not apply in cases in which
    the defendant was previously convicted of certain enumerated offenses, including
    those involving sexual violence, child sexual abuse, homicide or attempted
    homicide, solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a peace
    officer or firefighter, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, or any serious or
    violent felony punishable by life imprisonment or death. (§ 1170.12, subd.
    (c)(2)(C)(iv)(I)-(VIII).) The Act provides that these disqualifying factors must be
    pleaded and proved by the prosecution. (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C).)
    3
    In the Reform Act, the voters also established a procedure for ―persons
    presently serving an indeterminate term of imprisonment‖ under the prior version
    of the Three Strikes law to seek resentencing under the Reform Act‘s revised
    penalty structure. (Pen. Code, § 1170.126, subd. (a).) Under section 1170.126,
    ―within two years after the effective date of the act . . . or at a later date upon a
    showing of good cause,‖ such persons can file a petition for a recall of sentence
    before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction. (Id., subd. (b).) If
    the petitioner would have qualified for a shorter sentence under the Reform Act
    version of the law, taking into consideration the disqualifying factors (§ 1170.126,
    subds. (e), (f)), section 1170.126 provides that he ―shall be resentenced pursuant to
    [the Reform Act] unless the court, in its discretion, determines that resentencing
    the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety‖ (id.,
    subd. (f)). In exercising this discretion, the court may consider the defendant‘s
    criminal conviction history, the defendant‘s disciplinary record and record of
    rehabilitation while incarcerated, and ―[a]ny other evidence the court . . .
    determines to be relevant.‖ (Id., subd. (g).)
    B.
    In October 2010, a California Highway Patrol officer observed defendant
    Patrick Lee Conley retrieving tools from the middle of a county road.2
    Defendant‘s pickup truck was parked nearby, partially blocking a lane of the road.
    Defendant appeared to be intoxicated and smelled of alcohol. At first, defendant
    claimed that his son had been driving the truck and had gone to get gas, but later
    defendant admitted that he had been the driver. Defendant also admitted that he
    had consumed a few cans of malt liquor at his son‘s house. After defendant failed
    2      We take the facts from the opinion of the Court of Appeal.
    4
    a series of field sobriety tests, the highway patrol officer arrested him.
    Defendant‘s blood was drawn at a hospital approximately an hour after he was
    first stopped. Testing showed defendant‘s blood alcohol content (BAC) was 0.19
    percent.
    Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of driving under the
    influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)) and driving with a BAC level
    of 0.08 percent or more (id., § 23152, subd. (b)), with enhancements for refusing
    to take a chemical test (id., § 23578).3 The jury also found true allegations that
    defendant had four prior convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol
    (see Veh. Code, § 23550), that he had served three prior prison terms (Pen. Code,
    § 667.5), and that he had two prior convictions that qualified as strikes under the
    Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, § 1170.12). The first prior strike conviction was for
    a residential burglary in which defendant — then on parole for a different first
    degree burglary that he committed as a juvenile — entered a home, while armed
    and wearing a stocking over his face, and assaulted and bound the occupant. The
    second prior strike conviction was for a physical altercation in which defendant
    stabbed his opponent multiple times. On January 23, 2012, the trial court denied
    defendant‘s motion to dismiss one or both strike allegations (see Romero, 
    supra,
    13 Cal.4th at p. 504), citing the details of defendant‘s prior offenses, his poor
    parole record, and his attempt to evade responsibility for his current offense by
    shifting the blame to his son. The court sentenced defendant under the Three
    Strikes law to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life (Pen. Code, former
    3       Defendant also pleaded no contest to driving with driving privilege
    suspended due to a driving-under-the-influence conviction (with three prior
    violations within the preceding five years) (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a)),
    failure to provide proof of insurance (id., § 16028), and driving an unregistered
    vehicle (id., § 4000, subd. (a)(1)).
    5
    § 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)), plus three consecutive one-year terms for his three prior
    prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5).
    Defendant appealed, raising no issues but asking the Court of Appeal to
    independently review the record under People v. Wende (1979) 
    25 Cal.3d 436
    .
    While defendant‘s appeal was pending, the voters enacted the Reform Act on
    November 6, 2012. Two days later, the Court of Appeal issued an opinion
    affirming defendant‘s conviction.
    Defendant petitioned for rehearing, asking the Court of Appeal to vacate his
    sentence and remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing under the new
    sentencing provisions of the Three Strikes law. Although the Court of Appeal
    initially denied the petition, it later granted rehearing on its own motion to more
    fully explain its reasoning. The court noted that, under In re Estrada (1965) 
    63 Cal.2d 740
     (Estrada), courts ordinarily presume that newly enacted legislation
    lessening a criminal punishment is intended to apply ―to all cases not yet reduced
    to final judgment on the statute‘s effective date.‖ The court concluded, however,
    that the Estrada presumption is inapplicable here because the Reform Act includes
    a procedure whereby ―persons presently serving an indeterminate term of
    imprisonment [under the Three Strikes law]‖ (Pen. Code, § 1170.126, subd. (a))
    may file a petition for recall of sentence. Observing that this provision does not
    distinguish between persons serving final sentences and those serving nonfinal
    sentences, the court concluded that ―[t]hose already sentenced and serving an
    indeterminate term of imprisonment must petition the trial court for a recall of
    sentence regardless of whether or not their judgment is final.‖
    We granted defendant‘s petition for review to resolve a conflict in the
    Courts of Appeal about the application of the Reform Act to defendants who had
    been sentenced to indeterminate life terms under the previous version of the Three
    Strikes law but whose sentences were not yet final when the Act took effect.
    6
    II.
    In answering the question presented, we begin by identifying common
    ground. Defendant is a ―person[] presently serving an indeterminate term of
    imprisonment‖ under the prior version of the Three Strikes law. (Pen. Code,
    § 1170.126, subd. (a); see, e.g., People v. Buckhalter (2001) 
    26 Cal.4th 20
    , 30-31
    [a defendant‘s sentence of imprisonment begins to run upon the delivery of the
    defendant to the custody of the Director of Corrections], citing Pen. Code, § 2900,
    subds. (a), (c).) Therefore, under the plain language of the Reform Act, defendant
    is entitled to seek the benefit of the Act‘s reduced penalties by filing a petition to
    recall his sentence and requesting resentencing under the new law. (Pen. Code,
    § 1170.126, subd. (b).)
    Defendant argues, however, that he and others whose judgments were not
    yet final as of the effective date of the Reform Act are entitled to automatic
    resentencing under the revised penalty provisions of the Act, without the need to
    file a recall petition under Penal Code section 1170.126, and thus without regard
    to whether the trial court determines that resentencing the defendant would pose
    ―an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.‖ (Id., subd. (f).) He relies for his
    argument on this court‘s decision in Estrada, supra, 
    63 Cal.2d 740
    , which held
    that new laws that reduce the punishment for a crime are presumptively to be
    applied to defendants whose judgments are not yet final.
    In Estrada, we considered the retroactive application of a statutory
    amendment that reduced the punishment prescribed for the offense of escape
    without force or violence. ―The problem,‖ we explained, ―is one of trying to
    ascertain the legislative intent — did the Legislature intend the old or new statute
    to apply? Had the Legislature expressly stated which statute should apply, its
    determination, either way, would have been legal and constitutional.‖ (Estrada,
    supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 744.) But in the absence of any textual indication of the
    7
    Legislature‘s intent, we inferred that the Legislature must have intended for the
    new penalties, rather than the old, to apply. (Id. at pp. 744-745.) We reasoned
    that when the Legislature determines that a lesser punishment suffices for a
    criminal act, there is ordinarily no reason to continue imposing the more severe
    penalty, beyond simply ― ‗satisfy[ing] a desire for vengeance.‘ ‖ (Id. at p. 745,
    quoting People v. Oliver (1956) 
    1 N.Y.2d 152
    , 160.) Thus, we concluded, ―[i]t is
    an inevitable inference that the Legislature must have intended that the new statute
    imposing the new lighter penalty now deemed to be sufficient should apply to
    every case to which it constitutionally could apply,‖ including ―to acts committed
    before its passage[,] provided the judgment convicting the defendant of the act is
    not final.‖ (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745.)
    Because the Estrada rule reflects a presumption about legislative intent,
    rather than a constitutional command, the Legislature (or here, the electorate) may
    choose to modify, limit, or entirely forbid the retroactive application of
    ameliorative criminal-law amendments if it so chooses. Thus, as we explained in
    Estrada, the presumption does not govern when the statute at issue includes a
    ―saving clause‖ providing that the amendment should be applied only
    prospectively. (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 747; see People v. Floyd (2003) 
    31 Cal.4th 179
    , 184-188.) And we have since made clear that, while such express
    statements unquestionably suffice to override the Estrada presumption, the
    ―absence of an express saving clause . . . does not end ‗our quest for legislative
    intent.‘ ‖ (People v. Nasalga (1996) 
    12 Cal.4th 784
    , 793, quoting In re Pedro T.
    (1994) 
    8 Cal.4th 1041
    , 1049 (Pedro T.).) Our cases do not ―dictate to legislative
    drafters the forms in which laws must be written‖ to express an intent to modify or
    limit the retroactive effect of an ameliorative change; rather, they require ―that the
    Legislature demonstrate its intention with sufficient clarity that a reviewing court
    8
    can discern and effectuate it.‖ (Pedro T., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 1048-1049;
    accord, Nasalga, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 793.)
    In Pedro T., for example, we concluded that the Estrada presumption did
    not govern the interpretation of a ― ‗sunset‘ ‖ provision attached to legislation
    increasing the maximum punishment for vehicle theft. (Pedro T., 
    supra,
     8 Cal.4th
    at p. 1045.) Although the legislation contained no express saving clause, we
    concluded that the presumption did not control where the overarching purpose of
    the legislation was to temporarily increase, rather than to decrease, the penalties
    for the offense. We reaffirmed that, ―[o]rdinarily when an amendment lessens the
    punishment for a crime, one may reasonably infer the Legislature has determined
    imposition of a lesser punishment on offenders thereafter will sufficiently serve
    the public interest.‖ (Ibid.) But we concluded that ―[i]n the case of a ‗sunset‘
    provision attached to a temporary enhancement of penalty, the same inference
    cannot so readily be drawn.‖ (Ibid.; see 
    id.
     at pp. 1045–1046.) We further
    reasoned that giving controlling weight to the Estrada presumption would have
    ―practical effect[s]‖ the Legislature could not have intended: It would both
    undermine ―[t]he utility of a three-year legislative experiment in enhanced
    penalties‖ and ―provide a motive for delay and manipulation in criminal
    proceedings.‖ (Pedro T., at pp. 1046–1047.)
    Here, a similar set of interpretive considerations persuades us that the
    voters who passed the Reform Act did not intend to authorize automatic
    resentencing for third strike defendants serving nonfinal sentences imposed under
    the former version of the Three Strikes law. First, unlike the statute at issue in
    Estrada, supra, 
    63 Cal.2d 740
    , the Reform Act is not silent on the question of
    retroactivity. Rather, the Act expressly addresses the question in section
    1170.126, the sole purpose of which is to extend the benefits of the Act
    retroactively. Section 1170.126 creates a special mechanism that entitles all
    9
    persons ―presently serving‖ indeterminate life terms imposed under the prior law
    to seek resentencing under the new law. By its terms, the provision draws no
    distinction between persons serving final sentences and those serving nonfinal
    sentences, entitling both categories of prisoners to petition courts for recall of
    sentence under the Act.
    The Estrada rule rests on an inference that, in the absence of contrary
    indications, a legislative body ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the
    criminal law to extend as broadly as possible, distinguishing only as necessary
    between sentences that are final and sentences that are not. (See Estrada, supra,
    63 Cal.2d at p. 745.) In enacting the recall provision, the voters adopted a
    different approach. They took the extraordinary step of extending the retroactive
    benefits of the Act beyond the bounds contemplated by Estrada — including even
    prisoners serving final sentences within the Act‘s ameliorative reach — but
    subject to a special procedural mechanism for the recall of sentences already
    imposed. In prescribing the scope and manner of the Act‘s retroactive application,
    the voters did not distinguish between final and nonfinal sentences, as Estrada
    would presume, but instead drew the relevant line between prisoners ―presently
    serving‖ indeterminate life terms — whether final or not — and defendants yet to
    be sentenced.
    Second, the nature of the recall mechanism and the substantive limitations
    it contains call into question the central premise underlying the Estrada
    presumption: that when an amendment lessens the punishment for a crime, it is
    reasonable to infer that the enacting legislative body has categorically determined
    that ―imposition of a lesser punishment‖ will in all cases ―sufficiently serve the
    public interest.‖ (Pedro T., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1045.)
    There can be no doubt that the Reform Act was motivated in large measure
    by a determination that sentences under the prior version of the Three Strikes law
    10
    were excessive. As the ballot materials argued, ―[p]eople convicted of shoplifting
    a pair of socks, stealing bread or baby formula don‘t deserve life sentences.‖
    (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012), rebuttal to argument against
    Prop. 36, p. 53.) But voters were motivated by other purposes as well, including
    the protection of public safety. The ballot materials explained that ―dangerous
    criminals are being released early from prison because jails are overcrowded with
    nonviolent offenders who pose no risk to the public.‖ (Ibid.) Voters were told
    that the Reform Act would protect public safety by ―prevent[ing] dangerous
    criminals from being released early‖ (ibid.) and would have no effect on ―truly
    dangerous criminals‖ (id., argument in favor of Prop. 36, p. 52).
    The recall procedures in Penal Code section 1170.126 were designed to
    strike a balance between these objectives of mitigating punishment and protecting
    public safety by creating a resentencing mechanism for persons serving
    indeterminate life terms under the former Three Strikes law, but making
    resentencing subject to the trial court‘s evaluation of whether, based on their
    criminal history, their record of incarceration, and other relevant considerations,
    their early release would pose an ―unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.‖
    (Id., subd. (f).)
    Where, as here, the enacting body creates a special mechanism for
    application of the new lesser punishment to persons who have previously been
    sentenced, and where the body expressly makes retroactive application of the
    lesser punishment contingent on a court‘s evaluation of the defendant‘s
    dangerousness, we can no longer say with confidence, as we did in Estrada, that
    the enacting body lacked any discernible reason to limit application of the law
    with respect to cases pending on direct review. On the contrary, to confer an
    automatic entitlement to resentencing under these circumstances would undermine
    the apparent intent of the electorate that approved section 1170.126: to create
    11
    broad access to resentencing for prisoners previously sentenced to indeterminate
    life terms, but subject to judicial evaluation of the impact of resentencing on
    public safety, based on the prisoner‘s criminal history, record of incarceration, and
    other factors. This public safety requirement must be applied realistically, with
    careful consideration of the Reform Act‘s purposes of mitigating excessive
    punishment and reducing prison overcrowding. But given that section 1170.126,
    by its terms, applies to all prisoners ―presently serving‖ indeterminate life terms,
    we can discern no basis to conclude that the electorate would have intended for
    courts to bypass the public safety inquiry altogether in the case of defendants
    serving sentences that are not yet final.
    Finally, unlike in Estrada, the revised sentencing provisions at issue in this
    case do more than merely reduce previously prescribed criminal penalties. They
    also establish a new set of disqualifying factors that preclude a third strike
    defendant from receiving a second strike sentence. (See Pen. Code, § 1170.12,
    subd. (c)(2)(C).) The sentencing provisions further require that these factors be
    ―plead[ed] and prove[d]‖ by the prosecution. (Ibid.)
    These provisions add an additional layer of complexity to defendant‘s
    request for automatic resentencing under the revised penalty scheme. In cases
    arising after the Reform Act‘s effective date, operation of the pleading-and-proof
    requirements is straightforward enough. But for defendants who have already
    been tried and sentenced, the matter would be considerably more complicated.
    Before the Reform Act, prosecutors may have had no reason to plead and prove
    the new disqualifying factors in a particular case. Take, for example, the
    application of the ―armed with a firearm‖ disqualifying factor (Pen. Code,
    § 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii)) in the case of a prisoner serving an indeterminate
    life term for possessing a firearm as a felon. (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a); cf.
    People v. White (2014) 
    223 Cal.App.4th 512
    .) Case law holds that possession of a
    12
    firearm does not necessarily imply being armed; ―a convicted felon may be found
    to be a felon in possession of a firearm if he or she knowingly kept a firearm in a
    locked offsite storage unit even though he or she had no ready access to the
    firearm and, thus, was not armed with it.‖ (White, at p. 524.) Before the Reform
    Act, the prosecution ordinarily would have had no reason to plead and prove that
    the defendant was actually armed with, not merely in possession of, the firearm;
    arming is not an element of the offense, and case law suggests that the armed-
    with-a-firearm enhancement (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (a)) does not apply to the
    offense of felon in possession of a firearm (see People v. Hicks (2014) 
    231 Cal.App.4th 275
    , 283-284). Thus, if the Reform Act version of the Three Strikes
    law applied retroactively to a defendant who was appealing a felon-in-possession
    conviction, then the defendant might receive a second strike sentence without the
    prosecution ever having had occasion to plead and prove that the defendant was
    disqualified from receiving that sentence on account of being armed with, not just
    in possession of, the firearm.
    Similar difficulties would arise in applying the ―intent to cause great bodily
    injury‖ disqualifying factor. (Pen. Code, § 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii).) Before
    the Reform Act became law, the prosecution ordinarily would have had no reason
    to plead and prove a defendant‘s intent to cause great bodily injury. (Cf. Pen.
    Code, § 12022.7 [creating an enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury].)4
    Thus, much as in the case of the ―armed with a firearm‖ factor, if the Reform Act
    version of the Three Strikes law applied retroactively to a defendant who was
    4      Penal Code section 12022.7 at one time included a specific intent
    requirement (see People v. Colantuono (1994) 
    7 Cal.4th 206
    , 222), but that
    requirement was deleted from the statute in 1995 (Stats. 1995, ch. 341, § 1,
    p. 1851).
    13
    appealing a conviction involving the infliction of great bodily injury, the defendant
    might receive a second strike sentence without the prosecution ever having had
    occasion to plead and prove that the defendant was actually disqualified from
    receiving that sentence under section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2)(C).
    In short, application of the Reform Act‘s revised sentencing scheme would
    not be so simple as mechanically substituting a second strike sentence for a
    previously imposed indeterminate life term. Unless defendants were to be
    resentenced solely based on the existing trial court record — leaving the
    prosecution without the opportunity to plead and prove the presence of
    disqualifying factors or offenses that have become newly relevant under the Act
    — trial courts presumably would have to permit prosecutors to hold mini-trials for
    the sole purpose of determining whether, for example, the defendant‘s offense of
    conviction involved arming with a firearm or an intent to cause great bodily injury
    (see Pen. Code, § 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii)).
    As defendant points out, such single-issue trials would not be
    unprecedented. (See People v. Figueroa (1993) 
    20 Cal.App.4th 65
     [setting aside
    the jury‘s true finding on an enhancement after an amendment to the law narrowed
    the enhancement‘s scope, but remanding to permit the prosecution to prove the
    enhancement as more narrowly defined].) But the question before us is not
    whether such trials are possible. The question is whether this is the system the
    voters intended to create, though no provision of the Act contains any affirmative
    indication to that effect. We find it difficult to escape the conclusion that the Act
    does not address the complexities involved in applying the pleading-and-proof
    requirements to previously sentenced defendants precisely because the electorate
    did not contemplate that these provisions would apply. Rather, voters intended for
    previously sentenced defendants to seek relief under section 1170.126, which
    14
    contains no comparable pleading-and-proof requirements. (See Pen. Code,
    § 1170.126, subd. (e)(2), (3).)
    III.
    Defendant objects that this analysis is inconsistent with Estrada, supra, 
    63 Cal.2d 740
    , which he reads to mean that ―a defendant whose judgment is not final
    is entitled to the benefit of a lighter penalty in the absence of a clear indication to
    the contrary.‖ Defendant argues that in the absence of an express statement that
    section 1170.126 was meant to provide the exclusive means for defendants with
    nonfinal sentences to seek resentencing under the Act, section 1170.126 should be
    understood as supplementing, rather than supplanting, such defendants‘
    entitlement to automatic resentencing. He further argues that the recall provision
    expressly preserves this ―right‖ in subdivision (k), which states that ―[n]othing in
    this section is intended to diminish or abrogate any rights or remedies otherwise
    available to the defendant.‖ (Pen. Code, § 1170.126, subd. (k).) Neither argument
    is persuasive.
    As noted, our decision in Estrada, supra, 
    63 Cal.2d 740
    , recognizes that the
    retroactive application of ameliorative changes to the criminal laws is ultimately
    governed by the intent of the legislative body. And we have expressly rejected the
    notion that Estrada ―dictate[s] to legislative drafters the forms in which laws must
    be written to express the legislative intent.‖ (Pedro T., supra, 8 Cal.4th at
    pp. 1048-1049.) ―[W]hat is required is that the Legislature demonstrate its
    intention with sufficient clarity that a reviewing court can discern and effectuate
    it.‖ (Id. at p. 1049.) As explained above, the text, structure, and purposes of the
    Act all lead to the conclusion that the electorate meant what it said when it
    approved section 1170.126: Prisoners presently serving indeterminate life terms
    imposed under the prior version of the Three Strikes law, including those with
    nonfinal judgments, may seek resentencing under the Act, but subject to judicial
    15
    determination of whether resentencing would pose an unreasonable danger to the
    public.
    That being the case, section 1170.126, subdivision (k) cannot help
    defendant‘s argument. Subdivision (k) contains no indication that automatic
    resentencing — as opposed to, for example, habeas corpus relief — ranks among
    the ―rights‖ the electorate sought to preserve. A careful reading of the statute
    points to the opposite conclusion: The voters authorized defendant and others
    similarly situated to seek resentencing under the recall provisions of section
    1170.126, but they did not intend to confer a right to automatic resentencing under
    the amended penalty provisions of the Reform Act.5
    IV.
    We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
    KRUGER, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
    WERDEGAR, J.
    CHIN, J.
    CORRIGAN, J.
    LIU, J.
    CUÉLLAR, J.
    5      Defendants with nonfinal judgments who did not file petitions for recall of
    sentence within the mandated two-year period (see Pen. Code, § 1170.126, subd.
    (b)) because they were litigating the question of automatic resentencing will
    generally have good cause for filing late petitions (ibid.), and therefore they will
    not be deprived of the resentencing mechanism that the electorate created for
    them.
    16
    CONCURRING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J.
    I concur in the court‘s decision that defendant, who was serving a third-strike
    life term when the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Prop. 36, as approved by
    voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012) (Reform Act or act)) took effect, may seek relief
    under the act only through the statutory procedure for recalling the sentence (Pen.
    Code, § 1170.126)1 even though his judgment of conviction was not yet final.
    Because I concur, I also necessarily agree that In re Estrada (1965) 
    63 Cal.2d 740
    (Estrada) does not require a different result. As the author of the court‘s opinion
    in In re Pedro T. (1994) 
    8 Cal.4th 1041
     (Pedro T.), and the only current member
    of the court who participated in that case, I write separately to explain its
    significance.
    To conclude that Estrada, supra, 
    63 Cal.2d 740
    , does not govern our
    interpretation of the Reform Act is a relatively straightforward exercise. Estrada
    articulates a presumption of statutory construction: ―[A]n amendatory statute
    lessening punishment is presumed to apply in all cases not yet reduced to final
    judgment as of the amendatory statute‘s effective date‖ (People v. Floyd (2003) 
    31 Cal.4th 179
    , 184, citing Estrada, at p. 744), unless the enacting body ―clearly
    signals its intent to make the amendment prospective, by the inclusion of either an
    express savings clause or its equivalent‖ (People v. Nasalga (1996) 
    12 Cal.4th 1
          All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
    784, 793 (Nasalga), citing Estrada, at p. 747). A savings clause is a provision in
    which the lawmakers articulate how the amended law is to apply, if at all, to cases
    decided under the prior law. This is precisely the effect of the Reform Act‘s
    provision for recalling sentences. The recall provision offers, to all ―persons
    presently serving an indeterminate term of imprisonment‖ (§ 1170.126, subd. (a))
    under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12), an opportunity to
    seek sentence reductions, without regard to whether the judgments underlying
    those sentences are final or not. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 7, 9–10.) Thus, the
    recall provision both functions as a saving clause and clearly signals the drafters‘
    intent that the revised penalty provisions apply prospectively. (See maj. opn.,
    ante, at p. 10.)
    In contrast to the Reform Act and the statute at issue in Estrada, supra, 
    63 Cal.2d 740
    , the law we construed in Pedro T., 
    supra,
     
    8 Cal.4th 1041
    , expressly
    declared the Legislature‘s intention not to mitigate, but rather to ― ‗enhance . . .
    penalties.‘ ‖ (Id. at p. 1046, quoting Stats. 1989, ch. 930, § 1, p. 3247, italics
    added.) Enacted to support ―an experimental study of the deterrent effect of
    enhanced penalties‖ (Pedro T., at p. 1046), the statute temporarily increased the
    punishment for vehicle thefts committed within a three-year period, and then
    automatically reinstated the prior, lower punishment for offenses committed
    thereafter through a ― ‗sunset‘ ‖ provision. (Id. at p. 1043.) Asked whether
    Estrada, supra, 
    63 Cal.2d 740
    , required retroactive application of the sunset
    provision, we concluded it did not. The sunset provision did not include a savings
    clause or its equivalent. But retroactive sentence reductions would have
    compromised the experiment‘s validity, and thus defeated the statute‘s purpose, by
    reducing the data set from a three-year sample of offenders to a smaller sample
    ―comprised only of those whose convictions happened to become final before the
    sunset date of the increased penalties.‖ (Pedro T., at p. 1046.) In other words,
    2
    applying the Estrada presumption would have violated the important rule that we
    do not interpret legislation in a manner that would render it ―an idle act‖ by the
    Legislature or ―a nullity.‖ (California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto
    Unified School Dist. (1997) 
    14 Cal.4th 627
    , 634.)
    This was the context for our observation in Pedro T., supra, 
    8 Cal.4th 1041
    ,
    that, ―[d]espite broad language in Estrada regarding the necessity of express
    saving clauses, . . . courts [cannot] dictate to legislative drafters the forms in which
    laws must be written to express the legislative intent. Rather, what is required is
    that the Legislature demonstrate its intention with sufficient clarity that a
    reviewing court can discern and effectuate it.‖ (Pedro T., at pp. 1048–1049, fn.
    omitted.) While we thus declined to apply the Estrada presumption to defeat the
    purpose of a statute expressly intended to increase penalties, we did not abandon
    the presumption or replace it with a holistic inquiry into legislative intent
    concerning prospective versus retroactive operation. Indeed, just two years after
    Pedro T., this court strongly reaffirmed Estrada and pointedly declined the
    Attorney General‘s invitation to abrogate it. (Nasalga, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 792
    & fn. 7.) Neither does today‘s decision abrogate Estrada.
    Estrada, supra, 
    63 Cal.2d 740
    , has now governed our application of
    statutes reducing punishment for half a century. Our consistent application of the
    presumption articulated in that case assists the state‘s lawmakers in predicting and
    controlling the manner in which statutes mitigating punishment are applied. As
    explained above, I view the court‘s decision as consistent with our prior decisions
    on the subject, and on that basis I concur.
    WERDEGAR, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    LIU, J.
    CUÉLLAR, J.
    3
    See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
    Name of Opinion People v. Conley
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished Opinion
    Original Appeal
    Original Proceeding
    Review Granted XXX 
    211 Cal.App.4th 953
    Rehearing Granted
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Opinion No. S211275
    Date Filed: June 30, 2016
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Court: Superior
    County: Yolo
    Judge: Stephen L. Mock
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    Counsel:
    Patrick Lee Conley, in pro. per.; and Carol Foster, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant
    and Appellant.
    Michael S. Romano for Three Strikes Project as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
    Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P.
    Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Ivan P. Marrs, Deputy Attorneys General,
    for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
    Carol Foster
    Central California Appellate Program
    2407 J Street, Suite 301
    Sacramento, CA 95816
    (916) 441-3792
    Ivan P. Marrs
    Deputy Attorney General
    1300 I Street, Suite 125
    Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
    (916) 324-0069