Mays v. Phillips County ( 1925 )

Appellant was the sheriff of Phillips County, and this appeal involves the question as to the amount of compensation to which he is entitled for feeding prisoners confined in jail.

The General Assembly of 1919 enacted a special statute fixing the fees and emoluments of all the county officers in Phillips County. This act contained an emergency, and was approved by the Governor on February 17, 1919. Special Acts 1919, p. 132. The provision of that statute with reference to the sheriff's office fixed the salary of the sheriff and ex-officio collector at the sum of $5,000 per annum and allowing him a certain additional amount for expenses of deputies and clerical assistance, and also contained a provision with reference to feeding prisoners, which reads as follows: "The county court shall provide and pay out of the county treasury the expenses of lighting and heating the county jail, and for bedding of the prisoners, and shall allow the sheriff the actual cost of feeding the prisoners confined in the jail, not to exceed, however, the sum of fifty cents per day for each prisoner; provided, the salary of the jailer shall be included in the cost of feeding the prisoners in this section provided." At the same session a statute was enacted, approved February 27, 1919, fixing the fees of sheriff for feeding and keeping prisoners at the sum of one dollar per day. Acts 1919, p. 127. That statute, omitting the caption, and the second section declaring an emergency and putting the statute into effect, reads as follows: "Section 1. Hereafter sheriff shall be allowed as fees for feeding and keeping a prisoner confined in the county jail, per day, the sum of one ($1) dollar; provided, the provisions of this act shall not apply to Crawford, Madison, Sebastian, Newton, Greene, Lafayette and St. Francis."

The point of this case is whether or not the last statute repealed the first one. Appellant claims that there was a repeal by implication of the first statute, and that he is entitled to the amount of fees prescribed in the last one. Appellee contends to the contrary. Counsel on both sides present with much care all of the authorities bearing on the subject, and particularly the decisions of this court, which are so numerous and harmonious that it is scarcely worth while to cite them. The principles of law with respect to the interpretation of statutes in determining whether or not there is an implied repeal are elemental. Reference may only be made to a comparatively recent case where the rules of law on this subject are aptly stated. Sanderson v. Williams,142 Ark. 91. In that case it was stated that "where there is a plain repugnancy between two acts upon the same subject, the later act repeals the former, or, if the two acts are not in express terms repugnant and the later act covers the whole subject of the first and embraces new provisions, showing that it was intended as a substitute for the first, the last act will stand as the law upon the subject, and the first will be set aside." It has often been announced that repeals by implication are not to be favored, and, in another recent case on this subject, we said: "Repeals by implication are not favored, and, when two statutes covering the whole or any part of the same subject-matter are not absolutely irreconcilable, effect should be given, if possible, to both. It is only where two statutes relating to the same subject are so repugnant to each other that both cannot be enforced that the last one enacted will supersede the former and repeal it by implication." Martels v. Wyss, 123 Ark. 184.

Now, applying these principles, we do not find that these two statutes cover the same identical subject nor that they are in irreconcilable conflict with each other. Nor can it be said that the last statute takes up the whole subject and covers the subject-matter of the first one. The first statute relates to salaries of all of the county officers of a particular county, and it covers all of the details with reference to the salaries, emoluments and expenses of the office of sheriff. The last statute does not take up the whole subject anew, but it relates to the single subject of compensation for feeding prisoners. The first statute not only fixes the compensation in money of the sheriff for feeding prisoners, but it also requires the county to pay the expense of lighting and heating the jail and for the bedding of the prisoners. If the latter statute can be given any effect at all in its application to the emoluments of the sheriff of Phillips County, it is only to the extent of raising the compensation to one dollar per day instead of the maximum of fifty cents per day, and still leaves the provision requiring the county to furnish the light, heat and bedding. All the fees seem to have been adjusted with care by the first statute, and there is no reason to presume that the Legislature intended to raise the compensation for feeding prisoners above that enjoyed by the same officers in other counties. On the other hand, if we place them on an equality, we would have to indulge the presumption that the Legislature intended to take away by repeal the other requirements placed upon the county with respect to furnishing heat, light and bedding. In this state of the matter we must presume that the Legislature, having taken up the whole subject of salaries in Phillips County, did not intend to impliedly repeal those provisions merely by fixing generally the fees for feeding prisoners. We attach no importance to the fact that the last statute expressly exempts certain other counties. This affords no grounds for interpreting the statute as an express inclusion of all counties not thus exempted in express terms. If we are indulging in theories and presumptions, it is fair to assume that the Legislature, in passing this statute without expressly repealing the Phillips County special statute, assumed that it was unnecessary to exempt Phillips County, which was within the operation of the special statute and would not be controlled by the last one. The case is, we think, governed by the principles announced in Bank of Blytheville v. State, 148 Ark. 504. The relation of the two statutes involved in the present case removes the case from control of the recent case of Massey v. State use Prairie County, ante, p. 174, where the later statute was held to have covered the whole subject embraced in the older statute.

Upon the whole, we are convinced that, under settled principles of interpretation, the last statute should not be held to have repealed the first one, and that the circuit court was correct in its judgment limiting the amount of the sheriff's compensation to the specifications of the special act governing that county.

Affirmed.

WOOD and HART, JJ., dissent on the ground that Massey v. State use Prairie County governs.