Katz v. Walkinshaw ( 1903 )


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  • This appeal is taken from a judgment of nonsuit, entered against plaintiffs on motion of defendant.

    The action was brought to enjoin defendant from drawing off and diverting water from an artesian belt, which is in part on or under the premises of plaintiffs, and to the water of which they have sunk wells, thereby causing the water to rise and flow upon the premises of plaintiffs, and which they aver had constantly so flowed for twenty years before the wrong complained of was committed by defendant. The water is necessary for domestic purposes and for irrigating the lands of plaintiffs, upon which there are growing trees, vines, shrubbery, and other plants, which are of great value to plaintiffs. All of said plants will perish, and plaintiffs will be greatly and irreparably injured if the defendant is allowed to divert the water.

    These facts are admitted, and further, that defendant is diverting the water for sale, to be used on lands of others distant from the saturated belt from which the artesian water is derived.

    The plaintiffs contend that this subsurface water constitutes an underground stream, and that plaintiffs are riparian thereto, and as such riparian owners they are seeking relief in this case.

    The defendant denies that she is taking or diverting water from an underground stream or watercourse, and alleges that all the water which rises in the artesian wells on her premises, and which she is selling, is percolating water, and is parcel of her premises, and her property.

    In effect, therefore, while denying that she is doing any act of which plaintiffs can complain, she really only denies that she is diverting water from an underground watercourse, and asserts her right to dispose of the water in the manner *Page 139 alleged, because it is percolating water, not confined to a definite watercourse.

    The court sustained that proposition, and for that reason granted defendant's motion for nonsuit.

    The so-called artesian belt includes several square miles of territory. It is a large accumulation of earth upon the base of very high mountains, and is composed of detritus of varying quantity and material with no regular stratification. Wells have been sunk at least to the depth of seven hundred and fifty feet, but no bed-rock has been found. It has quite an incline from the mountain, and is from seven hundred to fifteen hundred feet above sea-level. Mr. F.C. Finkle, a civil engineer, was the chief witness for the plaintiffs, and testified both as to facts palpable to the senses and as an expert. He says the saturated land is fed, first, by the underflow from the numerous ravines, cañons, and streams which enter the valley from the mountains; and secondly, by the rain and flood-water upon, and absorbed upon the slope and between the artesian belt and the mountains. This water percolating down into the soil, and constantly pressed forward by water accumulating, finally gets under partially impervious earth, where it is held under sufficient pressure to create the artesian belt. The banks of this supposed subsurface stream, the witness thought, were on the west, "a cemented dyke which runs through the valley, and the eastern boundary of it is the clay bank or dyke at the south side of the Santa Ana River." Within these limits many ravines enter from the mountains, some of them carrying at times great quantities of water, much of which had been appropriated and carried off in pipes or cemented aqueducts.

    It is evident that if there is any flow to this underground body of water thus held under pressure, it is by percolation. The witness stated that the process was the same the world over. The lower lands are saturated from above. "It is done by saturation from the rainfalls and the floods, and percolation through voids in the soil."

    It is quite manifest that this body (if it can be so styled) of percolating water cannot be called an underground watercourse to which riparian rights can attach, unless we are prepared to abolish all distinction between percolating water and *Page 140 the water flowing in streams with known or ascertainable banks which confine the water to definite channels. All rainwater which falls upon the hills and mountain-sides which does not flow off at once as surface water is absorbed and percolates down in the same way to the valley below. No doubt limits can be found to every such flow, as in this case. The distinction is well established, and, in some respects, different rules of law applied to the two cases. The plaintiffs, therefore, cannot establish their claims upon the theory of an underground watercourse to which they are riparian.

    But appellants contend that though they are not riparian to an underground watercourse, and although the saturated belt carries only percolating water, still they are entitled to the injunction prayed for.

    The defense, conceding that the water held in the earth is percolating water, relies upon certain decisions, which assert and apply literally the maxim, Cujus est solum ejus est usque adinferos. And that water percolating in the ground, or held there in saturation, belongs to the landowners as completely as do the rocks, ground, and other material of which the land is composed, and therefore he may remove it and sell it, or do what he pleases with it. He cites as authority for the proposition, Hanson v.McCue, 42 Cal. 303;1 Southern Pacific R.R. Co., v. Dufour,95 Cal. 616; Gould v. Eaton, 111 Cal. 641;2 and City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597.

    It is obvious at once that the analogy between the right to remove sand and gravel from the land for sale and to remove and sell percolating water is not perfect. If we suppose a saturated plain, one may remove and sell the sand and gravel from his land without affecting or diminishing the sand and gravel on the lands of his neighbors. If the water on his lands is his property, then the water in the soil of his neighbors is their property. But when he drains out and sells the water on his land, he draws to his land, and also sells, water which is the property of his neighbor. And the effect is similar in other respects. By pumping out the water from his lands he can perhaps deprive his neighbors of water for domestic uses, and, in fact, render their land valueless. In *Page 141 short, the members of the community, in the case supposed, have a common interest in the water. It is necessary for all, and it is an anomaly in the law if one person can for his individual profit destroy the community and render the neighborhood uninhabitable.

    We have derived our law, in respect to subterranean waters, as in other respects, mostly from England, but in regard to this matter the first cases are quite modern. Even yet the text-books on water-rights have but little to say upon the subject of percolating water. Such law as has been made upon the subject comes from countries and climates where water is abundant, and its conservation and economical use of little consequence as compared with a climate like southern California. The learned counsel for appellants state in their brief that water at San Bernardino is worth one thousand dollars per inch of flow. Percolating water, or water held in the earth, is the main source of supply for domestic uses, and for irrigation, without which most lands are unproductive. It is also stated that speculators are seeking to appropriate the percolating water, by getting title to some part of a watershed or slope, and by running canals and tunnels, and by sinking, to obtain water for sale. It is asserted that the lands naturally made moist by percolating water are very productive, and were first settled upon, and have been most highly improved; and he asks whether these lands are to be converted into deserts because speculators may pump and carry away to some distant locality the subsurface waters which rendered the land fertile. Certainly no such case as this has come before a court, or could well exist in England, or in the eastern states.

    It is often asserted that Acton v. Blundell, 12 Mees. W. 324, decided in Exchequer Chamber, in 1843, was the first case in England in regard to percolating water. This shows how unimportant, relatively, the subject is in England. It was an action for damages occasioned by working a coal-mine on adjoining land, which interfered with water which was flowing underground to plaintiff's spring. The court instructed the jury, "that if the defendants had proceeded and acted in the usual and proper manner in the land for the purpose of working and mining a coal-mine therein, they might lawfully *Page 142 do so." This instruction was held to be correct, and that is the real force and effect of the decision. But the chief justice pointed out some respects in which the right to water flowing in an open visible stream differs from an underground flow by percolation. The main difference, so far as concerns the question under consideration, was, that percolation was occult, the regulation of which was a difficult matter. One who disturbed the course of percolating water by digging upon his own land could not tell whether he would drain his neighbor's well, nor could the person injured demonstrate that such was the cause of the injury. So, too, when one diverts water from a visible stream, the fact and the effect are at once known, while as to percolating water its course may be obstructed or changed without the intent to do so, and without knowing that such would be the effect of what was done. His lordship, the case being one of first impression, quotes a passage from a civil-law writer to the effect that when one digging upon his own land drains his neighbor's well, such neighbor has no cause of action: Si nonanimo vicini nocendi, sed suum agrum meliorem faciendi, id fecit. His lordship, however, although the case did not require it, disregarded the qualifications found in the civil law, and held that the case was not governed by law which applies to flowing streams, "but that it rather falls within that principle which gives to the owner of the soil all that lies beneath the surface; that the land immediately below is his property, whether it is solid rock, or pervious ground, or venous earth, or part soil and part water; that the person who owns the surface may dig therein, and apply all that is there found to his own purposes at his free will and pleasure; and that if, in the exercise of this right, he intercepts or drains off the water collected from underground springs in his neighbor's well, this inconvenience to his neighbor falls within the description of damnum absque injuria, which cannot become the ground of an action."

    This statement has been frequently quoted, both in England and in this country, and has been generally adopted as a correct statement of the law upon the subject. In Acton v. Blundell, 12 Mees. W. 324, as has been said, the working of a mine upon an adjoining estate drained certain springs *Page 143 on plaintiff's land. It would have been sufficient to defeat plaintiff's action to have said that the working of a coal-mine in a proper manner is a reasonable use of land, and that it was without malice or an intent to injure plaintiff. It is a general rule — in fact a universal principle of law — that one may make reasonable use of his own property, although such use results in injury to another. But the maxim, Cujus est solum, ejus est usquead inferos, furnishes a rule of easy application, and saves a world of judicial worry in many cases. And perhaps in England and in our eastern states a more thorough and minute consideration of the equities of parties may not often be required. The case is very different, however, in an arid country like southern California, where the relative importance of percolating water and water flowing in definite watercourses is greatly changed.

    And it seems to me a great mistake is made in supposing that if the plenary property of a landowner in percolating water is denied, the alternative is to apply to such water all the rules which apply to the use of water flowing in watercourses having defined channels. The entire argument for what may be called thecujus est solum doctrine consists in showing that some recognized regulation of riparian rights would be inapplicable. It is said, for instance, that the law of riparian rights requires each proprietor to permit the water to flow as it was accustomed to flow. Apply this rule to subsurface water, and no one could drain his land, for he thereby prevents the water from flowing as it was accustomed to flow by percolation to his neighbor. The common-law method in the supposed case would be to apply the principle to the new case, although some judge-made rule as to how it shall be applied might stand in the way. The principle is clearly applicable. A riparian owner may not divert the water because he would thereby injure his neighbors who have equal rights in the stream. Still he may take a reasonable amount from the stream for domestic purposes, and that may equal the entire flow, although he thereby injures his neighbors. It is a question of reasonable use, and that applies both to the land of the person disturbing the percolation and to adjoining land. He may cultivate his land, and for that purpose *Page 144 ordinarily may drain it, and plow it, or clear it from forests, although all these operations may affect the flow of water to the lower proprietor, both in the watercourse and by percolation. He was allowed to become the owner for those purposes, and with the understanding that all other proprietors have the same right to use their land. The maxim, Sic utere, etc., plainly applies as between such proprietors, very much as it does between different riparian proprietors upon the same stream.

    The title to all land is held subject to this maxim. Such ownership is "but an aggregation of qualified principles the limits of which are prescribed by the equality of rights, and the correlation of rights and obligations necessary for the highest use of land by the entire community of proprietors." (Thompson v.Androscoggin etc. Co., 54 N.H. 545.)

    Proprietary rights are limited by the common interests of others, — that is, to a reasonable use, — and such use one may make of his land, though it injures others. This proposition is generally recognized, but for some reason has not always been recognized by the courts when considering the subject of percolating water, although all rights in respect to water are peculiarly within its province.

    This rule of reasonable use answers most effectually the main argument against recognizing any modification of the cujus estsolum doctrine as applied to percolating water, although in a majority of the cases which are claimed as authority against the rule of reasonable use the court takes pains to note that the act which disturbs the percolating water was in using the land in the usual manner and without the intent of injuring a neighbor.

    Among the English cases, Chasemore v. Richards, was most carefully considered. The village of Croydon was situated upon an extensive plain near the head-waters of the river Waundale, and a goodly portion of the permanent flow of the river came by percolation from this plain.

    The village had caused a large well to be dug about a quarter of a mile from the river, and was pumping from it five or six hundred thousand gallons of water daily for the use of the town. Plaintiff was a riparian proprietor upon the river below, and had a mill which was operated by the waters *Page 145 of the river. The pumping naturally diminished the flow and prevented the use of the mill as efficiently as before. All the facts were admitted or found to exist.

    The case was first decided in Exchequer Chambers in favor of the defendant, Mr. Justice Coleridge dissenting. (2 Hurl. N. 168.) The dissenting opinion presents the doctrine of reasonable use.

    The case was taken to the House of Lords. (7 H.L. Cas. 349.) There the case was most elaborately and ably argued, and the view in regard to reasonable use was fully presented. A case was made and the opinion of the judges was solicited. The judges held unanimously for the defendant, sustaining fully the cujus estsolum doctrine without qualification, and this was affirmed by the house. The matter mainly discussed, however, was the plaintiff's claim that he had a prescriptive right to the water. The court held that riparian rights are not derived by prescription, but the right to the water is ex jure naturæ. This settled the main contention, and little more was said, except to refer to the cases in which the rights to percolating waters are discussed. Lord Wensleydale, however, who had doubts, pronounced an opinion which seems to me in accord with the views I am trying to express.

    The doctrine of reasonable use has been recognized in many cases in the United States, — impliedly in most, as I have stated, but expressly in some.

    Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. St. 528,1 is one of these, and is remarkable in that the court states as strongly as possible, and with approbation, the cujus est solum doctrine. It is even said that the opposite doctrine (applying to such water the rule as to riparian rights) would amount to total abrogation of the rights of property. It is said one could not clear or cultivate his land or build a house without interfering with percolating water; and even if rights were admitted to exist, the difficulty of enforcing them would be insurmountable. I think I have shown that the admitted right to a reasonable use of the land and of the water answers all these objections. To my mind this is so obvious that I can but wonder that such objections have ever troubled the judiciary. And yet, notwithstanding this insistence upon the rule *Page 146 which apparently ignores all equities of others than the owner of the soil in which the water is found, the court felt obliged to, and did, in unequivocal words, declare that the use of it must be reasonable. The proprietor may make a reasonable use of his own land, although in so doing he obstructs or changes the percolation of water to or from his neighbor's land.

    But by far the most satisfactory case upon the subject isBassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569.1 That was a most elaborately considered case, and this precise question is discussed with a fullness and ability which I am not so vain as to think I could improve upon. I would like to transcribe the entire argument, but as it is accessible to the profession, I need only say I adopt it in full. The decision was approved inSwett v. Cutts, 50 N.N. 439.2 Smith v. City of Brooklyn, 18 App. Div. 340, 46 N.Y. Supp. 141, was in some ways a counterpart of Chasemore v. Richards. The city of Brooklyn constructed in Queens County culverts, aqueducts, reservoirs, and conduits, and dug deep trenches to intercept percolating waters, and further sunk in the process earth-wells, and put in pumps to obtain the water with which the soil, which it owned, was saturated. It thus procured for the use of the city a large amount of water. Plaintiff owned a farm distant from these waterworks about twenty-four hundred feet. Upon the land was a small brook, in which he had placed a dam, which he used for purposes of boat-building and for cutting ice. The brook had carried water all the year round. The operations of the defendant rendered this brook entirely dry, and deprived the plaintiff of his income.

    Here is a case like that of the village of Croydon. Defendant intercepted percolating water upon its own land before it had reached a watercourse. It did not drain water from a defined stream, but the water was prevented from reaching the stream, which was thereby as effectually destroyed as it could have been by draining the water from it.

    Judge Hatch, who wrote the opinion in the appellate division of the supreme court, begins by quoting the prevailing doctrine in regard to percolating water, from Pixley v. *Page 147 Clark, 35 N.Y. 520:1 "An owner of the soil may divert percolating water, consume or cut it off with impunity. It is the same as land, and cannot be distinguished in law from land." He says this proposition must be admitted, but nevertheless a case cannot be found in this country "where the right has been upheld in the owner of land to destroy a stream, a spring, or a well upon his neighbor's land, by cutting off the source of its supply, exceptit was done in the exercise of a legal right to improve the land,or make some use of it in connection with the enjoyment of theland itself." I have italicized the last clause, as it contains the qualification found in the civil law, upon which the English rule is professedly based, and expresses the principle for which I contend. The learned judge admits that the English cases go further, but says that the American cases have not gone further.

    The learned court gives a concise statement of the reasons given by the English courts for not applying to percolating water the same principle which governs the right of riparian proprietors, and agrees with Justice Coleridge and Lord Wensleydale that they are insufficient. The court recognized the right of the landowner to percolating water, but says the right must be exercised with reference to the equal right of others in their land. He says one may as well claim the right to tunnel into his neighbor's land and take out valuable minerals, as to drain from it water which is also parcel of it, for sale. The peculiar nature of the property which enables one to take it by drainage does not justify the taking save in the usual and reasonable use of his own land, — in other words, for the proper use and betterment of his own property.

    Allusion is made in the opinion to the rule, inconsistent with the cujus est solum doctrine, that you cannot do anything on your land which will drain water from a visible stream or natural pond upon the land of another. In Canal Co. v. Shugaer, L.R. 6 Ch. App. Cas. 483, Lord Hatherley said: "You have a right to all the water which you can draw from the different sources which may percolate underground; but that has no bearing at all on what you may do with regard to water which is in a defined channel, and which you are not to touch. If you cannot get at the underground water *Page 148 without touching the water in a defined surface channel, I think you cannot get at it at all." It is well said that this decision cannot stand with Chasemore v. Richards, even though the court may say that it can.

    If a landowner owns the water percolating in his soil, as he does the rock, minerals, and earth, why may he not take it in such a case? And what difference is there in destroying a stream or natural pond by drawing water from it through percolation or by preventing it from flowing into the stream? The effect is the same, and knowledge of the inevitable effect of the act is the same. And this rule would prevent a landowner from draining a marsh, or even from clearing or cultivating his land, when these operations would tend to increase the percolation from a stream or natural pond upon a neighbor's land. This is one of the main arguments in support of the doctrine of Acton v. Blundell, 12 Mees. W. 324. It seems here strangely to lose its force, as does also another reason for that rule, that when doing such acts the landowner could not reasonably anticipate the injury as probable.

    The court expressly applies the doctrine sic utere tuo to the case and affirms the judgment against the city.

    In the appellate court this judgment was affirmed. (Smith v.City of Brooklyn, 160 N.Y. 357.) It is there treated, however, as a draining of water from plaintiff's brook and pond. Judge Hatch, in the supreme court, expressly states that defendant simply prevented the water from reaching the brook on plaintiff's farm. Perhaps either view may be taken of the facts. There was an immense saturated plain composed of porous earth. Defendant's wells extended lower down than the bottom of the pond. The stream and pond, and all the springs, wells, and streams in the neighborhood, have been dry ever since the operations of the defendant. Since the water was first drained out, surely there has been no percolation from the stream. This circumstance makes the case more like that in hand. Here was a vast quantity of water held in the soil, which constituted the common supply of many people. The defendant, pumping from wells on its own land, and taking only percolating water, exhausted this common supply. The court held that it could not be. The *Page 149 reasons would have been much more forceful had the case risen in an arid climate like San Bernardino.

    But this question was completely put at rest, so far as the state of New York is concerned, by the case of Forbell v. City ofNew York, 164 N.Y. 522.1 It was a suit by another plaintiff to restrain the same operations considered in Smith v. City ofBrooklyn, 18 App. Div. 340, 46 N.Y. Supp. 141. Here there was no visible stream or pond on plaintiff's land. His injury was merely that the level of the water held in the soil was lowered to his injury. In stating the case the court said: "The city makes merchandise of the large quantities of water which it draws from the wells that it has sunk on its two acres of land. The plaintiff does not complain that any surface stream or pond or body of water upon his land is thereby affected, but does complain and the courts below have found that the defendant exhausts his land of its accustomed and natural supply of underground or subsurface water, and thus prevents him from growing upon it the crops to which the land was and is peculiarly adapted, or destroys such crops after they are grown or partly grown." This statement shows a striking similarity of the issues made in that case to those involved here.

    The court proceeds to state the usual doctrine in regard to percolating water and approves the doctrine for the cases in which it is properly applicable. No doubt the land proprietor owns the water which is parcel of his land, and may use it as he pleases, regard being had to the rights of others. It is not unreasonable that he should dig wells in order to have the fullest enjoyment and usefulness of his estate, or for pleasure, trade, or whatever else the land as land may serve. "But to fit it up with wells and pumps of such persuasive and potential reach that from their base the defendant can tap the water stored in the plaintiff's land, and in all the region thereabout, and lead it to his own land, and by merchandising it prevent its return, is, however reasonable it may appear to the defendant and its customers, unreasonable as to the plaintiff, and others whose lands are thus clandestinely sapped and their value impaired."

    Counsel for the plaintiff in that case contended that since *Page 150 plaintiff owned the percolating water in his own soil, the unlawful draining of it away by the defendant was a trespass committed on his land. This contention was sustained, both in the supreme court and in the court of appeals. The court further indorsed the opinion of Judge Hatch in Smith v. City of Brooklyn, from which I have made quotations.

    If the principle announced in these cases prevails here, the order granting a nonsuit and the judgment entered thereon must be reversed. It does not require a reversal of the rule laid down inActon v. Blundell, which has been so often cited and indorsed, but only a holding that in certain cases there should be added the element of reasonable use, having reference both to the land belonging to the party who has disturbed the movement of percolating water and to adjoining land, and to land sensibly affected by such acts. Whatever the English rule may be the American cases either recognize the application of the rule ofsic utere tuo to the subject, or they are cases in which it was wholly unnecessary to consider that subject. Such are the California cases. In the case of City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy,124 Cal. 597, the question might have been raised, and in the trial court, it may be, was, and in some of the instructions the rule laid down in Acton v. Blundell is asserted without qualification. Still this court was not called upon, and did not consider any such question. I think it clear that the American cases do not require us to hold that the maxim sic utere tuo does not limit the right of the landowner to the use of the subsurface water, but on the contrary all the cases in which the question has been discussed held, or admit, that such maxim should limit such right where justice requires it. Such, I think, is the proper rule.

    It follows that the court erred in granting the nonsuit, and the judgment is therefore reversed and a new trial ordered.

    Beatty, C.J., McFarland, J., Van Dyke, J., Harrison, J., and Henshaw, J., concurred.

    Rehearing denied.

    1 10 Am. Rep. 299.

    2 52 Am. St. Rep. 201.

    1 64 Am. Dec. 721, and note.

    1 1 82 Am. Dec. 179.

    2 9 Am. Rep. 276, and note.

    1 91 Am. Dec. 72.

    1 79 Am. St. Rep. 666. *Page 151

Document Info

Docket Number: L.A. No. 967.

Judges: Angellotti, Shaw, Temple

Filed Date: 11/28/1903

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/25/2023