Johnny J. E. Meadows v. Lon Evans, Sheriff, Tarrant County, Texas ( 1976 )


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  • *386RONEY, Circuit Judge:

    The instant cause concerns the propriety of the district judge in dismissing an action clearly labeled as a civil rights complaint for damages under 42 U.S. C.A. § 1983 on the ground that the complaint set forth an action in habeas corpus requiring exhaustion of state remedies. On the basis of our recent analysis of this legal issue in Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1976) [Slip Opin. No. 74-2723, March 25, 1976], we reverse and remand first, for consideration of any damage claims made for asserted deprivations during confinement, which can be made without exhaustion, and second, for consideration of the statute of limitations effect of the dismissal of claims going to the involuntariness of the confession, which cannot proceed pri- or to exhaustion of state remedies.

    In Fulford, we decided that where a prisoner who has not exhausted state remedies brings a civil rights action for damages under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, and in that action asks for relief or raises issues which go directly to the constitutionality of his conviction or confinement, that action is not properly before the court until state remedies have been exhausted. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254. We noted, however, that civil rights actions which challenge prison conditions are supplementary to habeas corpus actions and may be brought without exhaustion.

    The Fulford opinion reexamined our case upon which the district court here relied, Alexander v. Emerson, 489 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1973), in light of two subsequent Supreme Court decisions, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) and Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). It squarely concludes that a federal court cannot consider, prior to exhaustion of state remedies, a civil rights claim involving an issue which goes directly to the constitutionality of a plaintiff’s state court conviction and consequent confinement. To apply Fulford to the case at hand does not require restatement of the reasoning.

    Meadows pled guilty to murder and was convicted on his plea. Broadly he asserts that his plea resulted from improper prison conditions, coercion, and bribery of an unnamed witness. To the extent that any of the allegations go to the voluntariness of his plea or the validity of the conviction posited thereon, exhaustion is required. The mere assertion that Meadows seeks damages rather than release is insufficient to distinguish the case from a habeas corpus action so as to remove the comity-inspired prerequisites of exhaustion of state remedies. As in Fulford, consideration of the merits of any civil rights claim, even after exhaustion, must be reserved and not decided now.

    To the extent that Meadows asserts damage claims for deprivation of civil rights due to prison conditions, however, which claims are unrelated to his plea of guilt, his action may proceed. Read in light of the Supreme Court’s directive in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), Meadows’ pro se complaint must be reconsidered by the district court insofar as it asserts claims cognizable without exhaustion, as mandated by Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, and Preiser v. Rodriguez, supra. Cf. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 92 S.Ct. 407, 30 L.Ed.2d 418 (1971).

    Although the Texas provision tolling the statute of limitations as to persons imprisoned (Article 5535, Revised Civil Statutes of Texas) may remove the concerns expressed in Fulford if the premature claims are dismissed, rather than held in abeyance, the district court should directly consider the problem first in light of the comments in Fulford.

    Reversed and remanded.

Document Info

Docket Number: 74--3362

Judges: Tuttle, Brown, Tut-Tle, Roney, Wisdom, Gewin, Thornberry, Coleman, Goldberg, Ainsworth, Dyer, Morgan, Clark, Gee, Tjoflat

Filed Date: 5/20/1976

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/4/2024