Robinson v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana , 1938 La. App. LEXIS 582 ( 1938 )

DORE, Judge.

Plaintiff instituted this suit to recover of the defendant the sum of $396; and as a cause of action she alleges that she was married to one Hardin Robinson on August 14, 1931; that said Hardin Robinson died on November 6, 1934; that said Hardin Robinson was an employee of the defendant and that as a part of said employment the said decedent was a member of the benefit plan for employees of defendant and at the time of his death was a member in good standing; that while in the employment of defendant, the deceased became disabled by sickness and was paid the sum of $33 per month, until his death; “and that under the benefit plan of said company, annuitants are covered by gratuitous death benefits amounting to twelve times the monthly allowance being paid at the time of his death to his widow living with or dependent upon him”; that she was not divorced or separated from her husband, Plardin Robinson, and that she was dependent to an extent in excess of 20 per cent, of the salary of her husband and is therefore entitled to said benefit of $396; that after the death of her husband she attempted to qualify as his widow in dependency under the benefit plan of defendant, but that defendant refused to permit her to qualify or to recognize her claim. She averred unavailing amicable demand. To which, defendant interposed an exception of no cause or right of action, and which was overruled; thereafter defendant filed an exception of vagueness and also a motion for oyer of the benefit plan. The exception of vagueness and the motion was denied. This exception and motion have now passed out of th.e case in that defendant does not complain of the ruling of the lower court thereon. After which defendant filed its answer, admitting that decedent, Hardin Robinson, was an employee and that he had been granted a retirement allowance of $33 per month which had been paid him up to the time of his death, admitting amicable demand was made by plaintiff, hut denying all the other allegations made.

Upon trial, there was judgment in favor of plaintiff as prayed for; defendant has appealed.

Exception of no cause of action.

In this court, defendant complains of the lower court overruling its exception of no cause of action. It bases. its contention for the maintaining of the exception on two grounds which will be considered in order. The first ground is that the benefit plan, operated by the company at its own expense for the benefit of its employees, as stated by the petition, is a mere gratuity or charity conferring on the employees and their dependents no legal rights which can be enforced by the courts. There is no merit in this contention as it is now well settled that a benefit plan offered by an employer at its own expense to its employees, when impliedly accepted by the employee through remaining in the employment, constitutes a contract between the employer and the employee, the service rendered by the employee being a sufficient consideration to support the prom'ise of the employer to pay benefits. 39 C. J. page 248, paragraph 363(b).

The second ground on which the exception is based is that the petition does not allege that the committee in whose power the administration and interpretation of the plan is placed acted in bad faith or was guilty of fraud in refusing to recognize plaintiff’s claim. The petition does allege that a demand was made on the defendant for the payment of the claim without avail, and which is admitted by defendant without qualification. No plea -of prematurity was filed setting up a failure on the part of plaintiff to first exhaust her remedy before this committee, if there was such a committee.

The exceptor further contends that the rules adopted by the company for carrying out this plan provide for the appointment of a committee to operate the plan, which committee shall determine conclusively for all parties all questions arising in the administration, interpretation, and application of the plan. But the defendant company has not set up in its exception any facts to show, nor did it file with' its exception a copy of the said rules, that such a committee has been appointed and who compose this committee. Therefore there is nothing on the face of the pleadings to show that the plaintiff is precluded from suing on the claim. The defendant has waived its rights to have the facts decided by a committee under the benefit plan by filing an exception of no cause of action which admits all facts well pleaded. The exception of no cause of action was therefore properly overruled.