Schuyler v. . Curtis , 147 N.Y. 434 ( 1895 )

I must emphatically dissent from the decision of this court that there was no ground shown in this case for the equitable relief which was granted below. That a precisely analogous case may not have arisen heretofore, in which the peculiar power of a court of equity to grant relief by way of injunction has been exercised, furnishes no reason against the assumption of jurisdiction. This equitable jurisdiction of the court is determined by the particular circumstances of each particular case and depends upon the existence of a state of facts which demonstrates a wrongful act performed, or threatened to be performed, to the prejudice of some right of property and for which there is no adequate remedy at law.

Upon the findings in this case, I think we are bound to say that the purpose of the defendants was to commit an act which was an unauthorized invasion of the plaintiff's right to the preservation of the name and memory of Mrs. Schuyler intact from public comment and criticism. As the representative of all her immediate living relatives, it was competent for him to maintain an action to preserve them from becoming public property; as would be the case if a statue were erected by strangers, for public exhibition under such classification, with respect to the characteristic virtues of the deceased, as they judged befitting. I cannot see why the right of privacy is not a form of property, as much as is the right of complete immunity of one's person. If it is a property right with reference to the publication of a catalogue of private etchings and entitled to be protected against invasion, as Lord COTTENHAM held in Prince Albert v.Strange, (1 Macn. G. 25, 47), why is it not such with reference to name and reputation? We have some illustrations of the exercise by courts of equity of their peculiar powers in cases which have been cited, in principle not unlike this; where the publication of one's letters and the sales of photographic portraits have been enjoined, besides the case of the publication of the catalogue referred to. (See Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402; Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 De G. Sm. 652;Pollard v. Photog. Co., L.R., 40 Ch. D. 345, and Woolsey v.Judd, 4 Duer, 379.) These decisions are authority for the doctrine that equity will interfere to prevent what are deemed to be violations of personal legal rights and the only limitation upon the application is that the legal right which is to be protected shall be one cognizable as property. It seems to me clear that the jurisdiction of equity is not made to depend upon the existence of corporeal property and that it is exercised whenever the complainant establishes his claim to the possession of exclusive personal rights and their violation in definite ways; for which an action at law cannot afford plain and adequate redress. That is the case here. The defendants were a voluntary, unincorporated association; whose object was to erect a statue of Mrs. Schuyler as the "typical philanthropist," and subscriptions were solicited from the public to create a fund for that purpose. It was found by the trial court that the acts of the defendants "have exposed the name and the memory of Mrs. Schuyler to adverse comment and public criticism of a nature peculiarly disagreeable to her relatives, and have caused disagreeable notoriety, for which they are in no way responsible." It was found that "annoyance and pain have been caused thereby to the plaintiff and to the immediate relatives of Mrs. Schuyler," to their great distress and injury, by the notoriety incident thereto.

However opinions may differ with respect to the substantial nature of the injury to the feelings of Mrs. Schuyler's relatives, we have the finding that it was in fact caused, and we should not say that it was merely fanciful. The theory of the case, which calls for equitable relief, is not that of a mere protection to wounded feelings; but the protection of a right which those who represent the deceased have to her name and memory as a family heritage and which had not become the public property. Why is that not a legal and an exclusive interest and why are its possessors not entitled to be protected by the law from a notoriety which invites public criticism of the memory and reputation of the deceased relative? And if it be true that there is no known application at common law of the principle, does not that natural justice with which equity is synonymous require that equity supply the deficiency, or enlarge the operation of legal principles, and grant the shelter of the law to the name and memory of the deceased, at the instance of her relatives?

The evidence does not establish that Mrs. Schuyler was a public character, nor that she was in such public station, or so prominent in public works, as to make her name and memory public property. That she was engaged, throughout her life, in acts of benevolence and beneficence, may be perfectly true; but she was never a public character and in no just sense can it be said that, because of what she chose to do in the private walks of life, she dedicated her memory to the state or nation as public property. To hold that, by reason of her constant and avowed interest in philanthropical works, unconnected with public station, the right accrued to an association of individuals, strangers to her blood, to erect a statue of her, typifying a human virtue, through contributions solicited from the general public, is, in my judgment, to assert a proposition at war with the moral sense and I believe it to be in violation of the sacred right of privacy; whose mantle should cover not only the person of the individual, but every personal interest which he possesses and is entitled to regard as private, when through no act of his, nor by any peculiar circumstances, has the public acquired any right in them. Unless equity does interfere, the right of privacy will be lost and that will become the property of the public, which, our sentiments and reason and our sense of justice tell us, is the private property of the relatives of the deceased person. That the plaintiff is entitled, if any one is, to a remedy, has been heretofore mentioned and it is the finding of the trial court, and that that remedy may be preventive in its character seems to me to be within the reason and principle upon which equity proceeds.

It is not necessary that the proposed statue of Mrs. Schuyler should be libelous in character. The wrong consists not in that fact, but in the unauthorized acts of the defendants, which will invite adverse comment and public criticism upon the life and character of the deceased, bring her name and memory into more or less unenviable notoriety and inflict upon her immediate relatives and representatives more or less injury in their feelings and their desires for that privacy, which, in their private station of life, they have the right to enjoy.

The threatened offense is of a permanent and continuing nature and, in many senses, differs from cases of mere libelous publications. I think that a case was made out where equity was unfettered in its exercise by any legal principle and where the decree of the court below should be affirmed.

All concur with PECKHAM, J., for reversal, except GRAY, J., who reads for affirmance.

Judgment reversed.