Abel v. . President, Etc., D. H.C. Co. , 103 N.Y. 581 ( 1886 )

[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.]

[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] The plaintiff's testator was a car repairer in the employ of the defendant, and while under one of its cars standing upon a side track engaged in making repairs, its employes, using an engine, carelessly backed a car against it, and thus he came to his death.

The principal claim on the part of the plaintiff is that the evidence tended to show that the defendant had not made and promulgated proper rules for the government of its employes, and hence that its negligence in that respect should have been submitted to the jury.

The law imposes upon a railroad company the duty to its employes of diligence and care, not only to furnish proper and reasonably safe appliances and machinery and skilled and careful co-employes, but also to make and promulgate rules which, if faithfully observed, will give reasonable protection to the employes. (Slater v. Jewett, 85 N.Y. 61; Besel v. N.Y.C. H.R.R.R. Co., 70 id. 171; Sheehan v. Same, 91 id. 339;Dana v. Same, 92 id. 639.)

It appears that the managers of some railroads in this country have adopted a rule substantially like this: "A blue flag by day and blue light by night, placed in the draw-head or on the platform or step of a car at the end of a train, or car standing on a main track or siding, denotes that car repairmen are at work underneath. The car or train thus protected must not be coupled or moved until the blue signal is removed by the repairmen." This is certainly a very efficient rule, and if faithfully and carefully observed would give reasonable protection to repairmen.

The plaintiff contends that it was, under the circumstances of this case, a question for the jury to determine whether the defendant, for the protection of its repairmen engaged in a peculiarly hazardous work, should not have promulgated such a rule or one substantially as efficient. The only rule the defendant had made bearing upon this case was as follows: "A red flag by day and a red lantern by night, or any signal violently given, are signals of danger, on perceiving which the train must be brought to a full stop as soon as possible, and not proceed until it can be done with safety."

This rule seems from its phraseology to have been mainly if not exclusively intended for the government of moving trains, and was not very well adapted for the protection of men under stationary cars, upon side tracks, engaged in making repairs. There was no rule prohibiting the removal of the signal, and the signal was not intended exclusively for the protection of such men, nor did it give notice that human life was in danger.

It matters not that there was a custom or rule among the repairmen in the employ of the defendant at Mechanicville that they should place a red flag at each end of the cars which they were repairing. It does not appear that that rule was regularly promulgated by the defendant, or that obedience to it was required by the defendant; nor does it appear that it was printed or generally known to the engineers engaged in running trains.

It appears that it was a common and frequent occurrence for engines and cars to be switched upon the side tracks at Mechanicville without any check or hindrance from any one having control of the tracks at that place, and thus the repairmen engaged under and about cars seem to have been exposed to constant peril.

We do not perceive how it was possible to say, as matter of law, that the rules of the defendant were proper and sufficient for the protection of its repairmen, and that it should not have taken greater precautions by rules or otherwise for their safety.

We think the facts should have been submitted to the jury and that the nonsuit was improper.

The judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered, costs to abide event.

All concur, except EARL, J., not voting, and MILLER, J., taking no part.

Judgment reversed.