Norfolk & New Brunswick Hosiery Co. v. Arnold , 143 N.Y. 265 ( 1894 )

[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] The claim of the defendant is that, upon the facts made to appear in this case, the court had no jurisdiction to stay proceedings in the Common Pleas action, and the commencement of further actions to recover royalties under the contract between the parties.

The jurisdiction of a court of equity by action to restrain proceedings in actions pending in courts of law should be sparingly exercised, and only when other remedies are inadequate and the equities invoking its jurisdiction are apparent and strong. There is no hard and fast rule about it, and every case must depend largely upon its own circumstances. (Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. § 1371; Hart v. Mayor of Albany, 3 Paige Ch. 381; ErieRailway Co. v. Ramsey, 45 N.Y. 637; Third Ave. R.R. Co. v.The Mayor of N.Y., 54 id. 159; Schuehle v. Reiman, 86 id. 270.)

The purpose of this action is to compel the settlement of the controversy between these parties in the one action, and thus to prevent multiplicity of actions, and that is a purpose usually favored by courts of equity.

A case appealing more strongly than this to an equity court for relief could rarely be found. There appears to be an honest controversy between the parties, the plaintiff and its counsel believing that it has a good defense to the royalties claimed. The amount involved in the controversy is large. One action involving the expenditure of much time and money has been tried, and the defendant has a judgment establishing her right. The plaintiff desires to bring that judgment under review, if necessary, in the court of last resort, and the defendant intended and threatened to proceed in the Common Pleas action, and to commence other actions for successive installments of royalties, and the plaintiff was absolutely barred of any defense to such action by the estoppel of the judgment she had already recovered; and thus inevitably it would be subjected to large expenses and costs. She could enforce payment of her judgments, and being substantially irresponsible it might lose all the money it was obliged to pay and thus subjected to irreparable loss.

The plaintiff was without other adequate relief, and even if it might from the Common Pleas probably obtain a stay of the action there pending, no court of law could stay the commencement of successive actions and thus the piling up of unnecessary costs. Under such circumstances we think it was a wise exercise of its jurisdiction for the court in this action to grant the injunction upon terms adequate for the defendant's protection. She had ample security for the payment of her royalties to an amount exceeding $100,000, and a stipulation which will end all litigation in case of the affirmance of her judgment, or the dismissal of the appeal. Thus, all her rights and interests are fully protected, and she should not be permitted to harass and oppress her adversary with unnecessary litigation.

The defendant claims that this injunction, so far as it prevents the commencement of further actions to enforce the payment of her royalties, is illegal, violating her constitutional rights. But she is not deprived of her remedy upon her contract. Her actions are simply stayed with adequate security for her protection, not arbitrarily, but simply until her right to recover royalties is finally determined in an action involving all the questions upon which the rights of the parties depend. This stay is granted, not by the arbitrary fiat of the legislature, but in a judicial proceeding in which she has had an opportunity to be heard. Such stays granted in regular judicial proceedings to promote the ends of justice violate no constitutional right and are not uncommon in judicial annals.

The case of Eldredge v. Hill (2 Johns. Ch. 281) must not be given too wide a scope as authority. There the purpose of the equitable action was to restrain the commencement of successive actions to recover damages for a nuisance. There the plaintiff could have prevented the successive suits by abating the nuisance, and that he could have done without any considerable loss or damage to himself, and hence the resort to the equitable action was unnecessary. Here the plaintiff could do nothing to prevent the multiplication of suits, and, bound hand and foot by the estoppel of the first judgment, it was at the mercy of the defendant, except for such relief as it could get in a court of equity by such an action as this.

Therefore, as the court had jurisdiction to grant the injunction, its discretion is not reviewable here, and the appeal must be dismissed, with costs.

All concur, except ANDREWS, Ch. J., not sitting, and BARTLETT, J., not voting.

Appeal dismissed.