Darrow v. . Calkins ( 1897 )

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[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.]

[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.]

[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.]

[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] We are relieved on this appeal from the inquiry which frequently arises between copartners and copartnership and individual creditors, whether real estate purchased and conveyed to the copartners during the existence of the firm, by a conveyance which in form created a tenancy in common, is to be regarded as belonging to them collectively as partnership property, or as the individual property of each according to the interests disclosed on the face of the deed. The finding of the trial court, which is not assailed by any exception, is express, that the lands purchased by Daniel O. Calkins and Edwin J. Darrow were purchased by them as copartners out of the funds of the firm of Calkins and Darrow, and the deed executed by Darrow to Calkins on the 25th of September, 1861, upon which both the plaintiffs and the defendants rely as determining the character of the ownership, expressly declares in the habendum that the lands were partnership property of Calkins and Darrow. We are to assume, therefore, that the lands were originally purchased out of partnership funds, with the intention on the part of each partner that they should be held as partnership property, subject to administration under the rules governing the rights and interests of copartners in lands purchased by them to be held as the property of the partnership. The partners as between themselves made the lands partnership property, and the rights of creditors of the firm or of the individual partners are not involved. The only question here, is between the plaintiffs as heirs of Darrow, and the children of Calkins, and it turns mainly on the question whether upon the death of Darrow in 1864, an undivided half part of the lands to which he acquired the legal title by the deeds running jointly to himself and Calkins, executed between 1850 and 1854, descended to and vested in the plaintiffs as his heirs at law. The plaintiffs at the death of Darrow were infants, and although this action was not commenced until thirty years after his death, nor until fifteen years after the younger of the plaintiffs became of age, it seems, under the case of Howell v. Leavitt (95 N.Y. 617) the plaintiffs, although they have slumbered upon their rights during an adverse possession of twenty-seven years, were not barred by the Statute of Limitations. So, also, we think it must be held that they were not barred by the adjudication in the decree of October 31, 1867, in the action brought by the administratrix of Darrow against Calkins for the settlement of the partnership affairs, which declared that "they had no title or interest in the said lands and real estate as heirs of the said Edwin J. Darrow, deceased, or otherwise." The service of the summons on the infants by publication was not completed when the judgment was entered, and until the period of publication had expired the court could acquire no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian ad litem or to render a judgment binding upon them as parties to the action. (Brooklyn Trust Company v. Bulmer, 49 N.Y. 84; Crouter v.Crouter, 133 id. 55.)

The legal nature and incidents of land purchased by a copartnership with copartnership funds, is a subject upon which great diversity of opinion exists in different jurisdictions. The English rule, after many fluctuations, has, as we understand the cases, come to be, that lands so purchased, whether purchased for or used for partnership purposes or not, provided only that they were intended by the partners to constitute a part of the partnership property, become ipso facto, in the view of a court of equity, converted into personalty for all purposes, as well for the purpose of the adjustment of the partnership debts and the claims of the partners inter se, as for the purpose of determining the succession as between the personal representatives of a deceased partner and the heir at law. (Darby v. Darby, 3 Drewry, 495; Essex v. Essex, 20 Beav. 442; Lindley on Part. [3d ed.] 681 et seq.) This doctrine had its origin in England, and is said to have grown out of the peculiar law of inheritance there, and to remedy the hardship of the rule which excludes all but the eldest child from the inheritance, and of the other rule which exempts real estate in the hands of the heir from all but the specialty debts of the ancestor. (Fairchild v. Fairchild, 64 N.Y. 471; Shearer v.Shearer, 98 Mass. 114.) Lindley, in his work on Partnership, bases the rule on the nature of the interest of each partner in the partnership property. He says (p. 687): "From the principle that a share of a partner is nothing more than his proportion of the partnership assets after they have been turned into money and applied in liquidation of the partnership debts, it necessarily follows that in equity a share in a partnership, whether its property consists of land or not, must, as between the real and personal representatives of a deceased partner, be deemed to be personal and not real estate, unless, indeed, such conversion is inconsistent with the agreement between the parties." The concluding words of the paragraph quoted concede that the intention of the parties will prevent a conversion where that intention is manifested. The general doctrine of "out and out" conversion adopted by the English courts has not been followed to its full extent in this and many other American states. There is no policy growing out of our laws of inheritance or the exemption of lands from liability for simple contract debts, which requires the application of such a doctrine here. The lands of the ancestor are assets for the payment of all debts, and the persons who take by descent and under the Statute of Distribution are substantially the same. The necessity for an absolute conversion, supposed to be found in the nature of a partnership interest, seems hardly sufficient to justify a fiction which should deprive real estate of a partnership of its descendible quality when it is admitted on all hands that partnership real estate if the necessity arises is first subject to be appropriated in equity to the discharge of partnership obligations and the adjustment of the equities between the parties.

The clear current of the American decisions supports the rule that in the absence of any agreement, express or implied, between the partners to the contrary, partnership real estate retains its character as realty with all the incidents of that species of property between the partners themselves and also between a surviving partner and the real and personal representatives of a deceased partner, except that each share is impressed with a trust implied by law in favor of the other partner, that so far as is necessary it shall be first applied to the adjustment of partnership obligations and the payment of any balance found to be due from the one partner to the other on winding up the partnership affairs. To the extent necessary for these purposes the character of the property is in equity deemed to be changed into personalty. On the death of either partner, where the title is vested in both, the share of the land standing in the name of the deceased partner descends as real estate to his heirs, subject to the equity of the surviving partner to have it appropriated to accomplish the trust to which it was primarily subjected. The working out of the mutual rights which grew out of the partnership relation does not seem to require that the character of the property should be changed until the occasion arises for a conversion and then only to the extent required. The American rule commends itself for its simplicity. It makes the legal title subservient in equity to the original trust. It disturbs it no further than is necessary for this purpose. The portion of the land not required for partnership equities retains its character as realty, and it leaves the laws of inheritance and descent to their ordinary operation. It would be useless to review in detail the authorities which seem to us to maintain what has been called the American rule. We refer to a very few of them. (Buchan v.Sumner, 2 Barb. Ch. 167; Collumb v. Read, 24 N.Y. 505;Fairchild v. Fairchild, supra; Shearer v. Shearer, supra;Shanks v. Klein, 104 U.S. 18.)

If, as sometimes happens, the title to partnership real estate is in the name of one of the partners only, on the death of the other partner, his equitable title descends to his heirs or goes to his devisees, but subject to the primary claims growing out of the partnership relation. (Fairchild v. Fairchild, supra; Parsons on Part. § 272.) But the general principles to which we have adverted are those applied by courts of equity in determining the character and incidents of partnership real estate, in the absence of any agreement, express or implied, between the partners on the subject. It is, however, generally conceded that the question whether partnership real estate shall be deemed absolutely converted into personalty for all purposes, or only converted pro tanto for the purpose of partnership equities, may be controlled by the express or implied agreement of the partners themselves, and that where by such agreement it appears that it was the intention of the partners that the lands should be treated and administered as personalty for all purposes, effect will be given thereto. In respect to real estate purchased for partnership purposes with partnership funds and used in the prosecution of the partnership business, the English rule of "out and out" conversion may be regarded as properly applied on the ground of intention, even in jurisdictions which have not adopted that rule as applied to partnership real estate acquired under different circumstances and where no specific intention appeared. The investment of partnership funds in lands and chattels for the purpose of a partnership business, the fact that the two species of property are in most cases of this kind, so commingled that they cannot be separated without impairing the value of each, has been deemed to justify the inference that under such circumstances the lands as well as the chattels were intended by the partners to constitute a part of the partnership stock and that both together should take the character of personalty for all purposes, and Judge DENIO in Collumb v. Read (supra) expressed the opinion that to this extent the English rule of conversion prevailed here. That paramount consideration should be given to the intention of the partners when ascertained, is conceded by most of the cases. (See Hoxie v. Carr, 1 Sumner, 183; Fall River Whaling Co. v. Borden, 10 Cush. 462; Collumb v. Read, supra; Parsons on Partnership, § 267.)

The legal title to the real estate which the heirs of Edwin J. Darrow asked to have partitioned in this action was vested in Daniel O. Calkins at the time of the death of Darrow in November, 1864. The plaintiffs on the death of their father took no legal estate in the lands. The legal estate which prior to the 25th day of September, 1861, Darrow held in the undivided one-half of the premises was by the deed executed by him on that day conveyed to Calkins. That this was the effect of the deed we have no doubt. The deed is in terms full and ample to convey in fee the interest of Darrow to his grantee. It was coupled, however, with the declaration on the face of the deed, that it was to be held by Calkins as partnership property, and the deed contained a power of management and sale, and this was followed by the significant clause, "and to pay over to the said Darrow, his heirs and assigns, or other legal representatives, such portion thereof as shall at the closing of the partnership business of said Calkins and Darrow belong to or be due or coming to said Darrow, his heirs, executors, assigns or other legal representatives." The suggestion that the deed attempted to create an express trust in lands, not within the enumerated trusts permitted by section 55 of our statute of "Uses and Trusts" (1 R.S. 728), and was, therefore void as a conveyance, is not well founded. It recognized a pre-existing trust imposed upon the lands, implied by law and arising out of the partnership relation, and that the trust was to continue notwithstanding the conveyance of the legal title. This was not, we think, in contravention of the statute, which contemplated the creation of original trusts, and not the abrogation of existing trusts resulting from or implied by operation of law; nor did it render inoperative the subsequent recognition of such an existing trust in connection with a conveyance of the legal title. We think the legal title to the one-half part of the land passed by Darrow's deed, subject to the performance by Calkins of the trust therein declared. The important question is, whether it operated to convert the partnership lands into personalty, and to change the interest of Darrow, or his representatives, from an interest in the land as realty into an interest in the proceeds of the lands, after a sale thereof by Calkins under the power contained in the deed.

We are of opinion that it was the intention of the partners, disclosed on the face of the deed and by the surrounding circumstances, to substitute in place of Darrow's prior interest in the lands, as such, an interest in him and his representatives in any surplus which should remain after a sale by Calkins and the adjustment of the partnership affairs. It is not necessary to decide whether the surplus, when ascertained, would go to the real or personal representatives of Darrow. As between Darrow and his representatives, and Calkins and his representatives, the deed operated as a conversion of the lands into personalty. The personal representatives of Darrow were entitled to enforce, in an action for an accounting and an adjustment of the partnership affairs, the claims of Darrow's estate. This was the purpose of the action which resulted in the decree of October 31st, 1867, and we think that decree was binding upon the plaintiffs, not on the ground that they were parties, but for the reason that no controversy existing as to the original character of the property as partnership property, or as to the subsequent dealing between the partners in respect to it, the heirs of Darrow were not necessary parties to a final adjustment of the partnership affairs, including the interest of the Darrow estate growing out of his relation to the lands under the deed of September 25th, 1861. It was open to the plaintiffs on an accounting by the administratrix of the Darrow estate to claim that the $14,000, received by her under the decree in the action for an accounting, should be regarded as real and not personal assets, and that they were entitled to it in their character as heirs, and not as distributees.

We think the order of the court below reversing the judgment at Special Term was correct, and it should, therefore, be affirmed and judgment absolute entered for the defendants on the stipulation, with costs.

All concur.

Order affirmed, etc.