Steve Lucsik v. Board of Education of the Brunswick City School District ( 1980 )

PER CURIAM.

This appeal arises from the jailing of Lucsik and his colleagues by a state court for contempt. Alleging that certain actions of counsel for the Brunswick, Ohio, City School District during the contempt proceedings deprived them of constitutional rights, the contemnors sued the Brunswick Board of Education, the Superintendent and the members of the Board for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District Court dismissed their complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Lucsik and his colleagues were teachers who struck the Brunswick School District in April, 1978. During the strike the Brunswick Board of Education succeeded in winning a temporary restraining order against the work stoppage from the local state court. When the teachers defied the order, the Board brought contempt proceedings. The state court ruled that the teachers had to sign an affidavit pledging not to violate the TRO. The teachers refused to sign, and the court sent them to the county jail. The teachers unsuccessfully sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court of appeals, but were released soon afterward.

In the present suit under § 1983, Lucsik and his colleagues claim that attorneys for the Board unconstitutionally caused and prolonged their confinement. The teachers contend that manipulation of the contempt proceedings by the attorneys resulted in their incarceration. According to the teachers, the attorneys also misrepresented facts to the state appeals court during the habeas hearing. Specifically, the teachers argue that counsel for the Board erroneously told the appeals panel that the teachers had been found guilty of contempt. It is the contention of the teachers that they had not been found guilty of contempt and that, by conveying a contrary impression to the appeals court, the Board attorneys unconstitutionally lengthened their imprisonment.

We affirm the dismissal of the suit by the District Court. In reviewing claims arising out of injunctive proceedings, federal courts are guided by the principle that “no action lies against a party for resort to civil courts.” United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, 456 F.2d 483, 492 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 923, 92 S.Ct. 2492, 33 L.Ed.2d 334 (1972). As this Court recognized in a related context, the assertion of a legal argument “whether valid or not, is unquestionably ‘an integral part of the judicial process’ and may not be the basis of a civil rights action . . . ." Ellison v. Stephens, 581 F.2d 584, 585 (6th Cir. 1978).

The courts, of course, will entertain damages claims for allegedly-wrongful litigative conduct that would support a cause of action for malicious prosecution. See Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc., 561 F.2d 807, 813 (10th Cir. 1977); Buddy-Systems, Inc. v. Exer-Genie, Inc., 545 F.2d 1164, 1167-69 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 903, 97 S.Ct. 1694, 52 L.Ed.2d 387 (1977); United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, 456 F.2d 483, 492 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 923, 92 S.Ct. 2492, 33 L.Ed.2d 334 (1972); 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2973 (1973 & Cum.Supp.1980); Note, Interlocutory Injunctions and the Injunction Bond, 73 Harv. L.Rev. 333, 343-46 (1959). Absent a claim of malice, however, the instances in which federal courts have heard or granted non-bond-related damages claims for the wrongful issuance of an injunction are extremely rare. See, e. g., Monroe Division, Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. DeBari, 562 F.2d 30, 32-33 (10th Cir. 1977). At the basis of this broad-based judicial policy is a desire to encourage vigorous advocacy. United Motors Service v. Tropic-Aire, Inc., 57 F.2d 479, 482-83 (8th Cir. 1932).

There is no reason to hold the courtroom conduct of school boards to a higher or lower standard than the conduct of other litigants. Normally, school board members are liable for deprivations of constitutional rights that are motivated by bad faith. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322, 95 S.Ct. 992, 1001, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975). Yet in qualifying the immunity of school board members, the Supreme Court dealt only with the exercise of an unique school board function. See 420 U.S. at 322, 95 S.Ct. at 1001 (“in the specific context of school discipline,” school board members are entitled only to good faith immunity from § 1983 liability). The present case, by contrast, involves the actions of a school board as litigant. The ordinary standard of constitutional liability of school board members thus is inapplicable to this case.

The complaint contains no allegation of malice, and no set of facts that would constitute malice if proven. We thus are unwilling to reinstate the suit.

Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.