United States v. Malveaux , 411 F.3d 558 ( 2005 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS April 11, 2005
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-41618
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL MALVEAUX,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
______________________
Before HIGGINBOTHAM and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.*
PER CURIAM:
Michael Malveaux contends that his Sixth Amendment rights were
violated under United States v. Booker1 because the district court
sentenced him under a mandatory Sentencing Guidelines regime, and
enhanced his sentence based on facts not admitted by him or found
by a jury. We find that Malveaux is not entitled to resentencing.
Malveaux pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a
*
This appeal is being decided by a quorum due to the
retirement of Judge Pickering. 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
1
125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). After assessing a
four-level enhancement based on a finding that Malveaux used or
possessed a firearm in connection with another felony offense , the
district court sentenced him to 80 months’ imprisonment. Malveaux
appealed his conviction and sentence on grounds that there was no
evidence that he possessed a firearm in connection with another
felony offense, and we affirmed.2 Malveaux then filed a petition
for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court in which he argued that
his sentence was unconstitutional in light of Blakely v.
Washington.3 Following the release of Booker, the Court vacated
our judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of
Booker.4
Because Malveaux did not raise a Sixth Amendment challenge to
his sentence at trial, we review his Booker claim for plain error
only. “We find plain error when: (1) there was an error; (2) the
error was clear and obvious; and (3) the error affected the
defendant's substantial rights.”5 Malveaux satisfies the first
prong of the plain error test as the district court enhanced his
sentence based on findings “that went beyond the facts admitted by
2
United States v. Malveaux, 104 Fed. Appx. 430, 2004 WL
1835992 (5th Cir.).
3
124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
4
Malveaux v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1067 (2005) (mem.).
5
United States v. Infante, 2005 WL 639619, at *13 (5th Cir.
March 21, 2005) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-
37 (1993)).
2
[him] or found by the jury.”6 In addition, he satisfies the second
prong as the law making the error plain was settled at the time of
appellate review.7
Malveaux cannot establish, however, that the district court’s
error affected his substantial rights. Specifically, Malveaux has
“not shown, with a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome, that if the judge had sentenced him under an
advisory sentencing regime rather than a mandatory one, he would
have received a lesser sentence.”8 Based on facts properly found
by the district judge,9 Malveaux’s total offense level of 21 and
criminal history category of V yielded a sentencing range of 70 to
87 months. Malveaux was sentenced to 80 months’ imprisonment.
When invited to depart upward, the district judge stated: “The
court has considered, and recognized, that it may depart upward but
declines to do so, with the belief and the understanding that the
guidelines, as set forth, are sufficient in themselves to address
6
See United States v. Mares, 2005 WL 503715, at *8 (5th Cir.
March 4, 2005).
7
Id.8
Infante, 2005 WL 639619, at *13.
9
Malveaux contends that properly understood, Booker prohibits
a judge from finding any facts used to enhance a sentence. This
contention is in the teeth of our holding in Mares that post-
Booker, judges may still find all facts relevant to sentencing.
Mares, 2005 WL 503715, at *7. We decline to reconsider our
decision in Mares. In addition, we reject Malveaux’s argument that
Booker error is structural and insusceptible to harmless error
analysis, and that Booker error should be presumed prejudicial, as
both claims are in conflict with Mares. Id. at **8-9.
3
this particular offense.” The district judge’s decision to
sentence Malveaux in the upper half of the guidelines range, as
well as his expression of satisfaction with the sentence given,
indicates that he would not have reached a significantly different
result under an advisory guidelines regime. In addition, the facts
cited by Malveaux as indicative of a probability that his sentence
would be different under an advisory regime were either before the
trial judge at sentencing, or could easily have been presented.
Having reconsidered, we AFFIRM.
4