State v. Garner. , 129 N.C. 536 ( 1901 )


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  • *539Cooe, J\,

    after stating tbe ease. The first two exceptions-to the charge are without merit. As to the third, we do not see that any prejudice was done the defendant by his Honor’s-charge as to the junishment. In passing upon the issues in. a criminal action, the jury know that some punishment follows a verdict of guilty. They are entitled to be informed upon the law creating the offense charged, and, as the punishment prescribed is a part thereof, we see no reason why the Court should not accurately and correctly inform them as to the same, rather than leave them to rely upon their own information.

    The difficult question involved in this case is, whether the evidence and circumstances set out amount to evidence fit to go to the jury, and upon which they could reasonably find the defendant guilty of committing the assault with the intent charged.

    The facts are very similar to those stated in State v. Neely, 74 N. C., 425, 21 Am. Rep., 496, and similar to those in State v. Massey, 86 N. C., 658, 41 Am. Rep., 478, but contain evidence of intent and purpose not apparent in those cases. In applying the rule that “when the act of a person may reasonably be attributed to two or more motives, the one criminal and the other not, the humanity of our law will ascribe it to- that which is not criminal,” we are not able to find evidence upon which we can attribute his motive to any other than to ravish the prosecuting witness. Neither does the testimony, nor any-of the circumstances or suroundings suggest any other motive; theft (or robbery) is negatived by the absence of any visible or known property to steal; no grudge or grievance or offense appears upon which to base a suspicion of malice or anger inducive to murder or personal injury; no acquaintance or social relation appears to have existed which would -suggest the idea of romp, joke or play; nothing suggests that he was in distress and needed aid or information which could have been obtainable from the *540prosecuting witness. His conduct while walking in front of the girl indicates a flirtation not warranted by the social or racial relations of the parties. The signs made to' her by fold ing bis arms in front of bim and opening them — suggestive of hugging her — indicated amorousness, and shaping his hat at her might be considered as soliciting a kindly response. Failing in his strategy to enlist her favorable attention, which became evident to him when she turned and ran, as soon as he turned back, carrying by his hand her little brother, he pursued her, and only stopped when nearing the sight of the house to which she was fleeing. For what purpose could he have chased her. Was not such conduct by him evidence fit to go to the jury in determining the intent with which he pursued her ? We think it was, and sustain his Honor in so ruling.

    There is no evidence to establish any motive other than to do an unlawful act — none was expressed — he did not speak, nor did she. Every person is presumed to have intended the natural consequences of his acts, and it must follow that he is presumed to have made the attempt to commit it, if the act done would be such as would apparently result in the natural course of events in the commission of the crime itself, if not prevented. The intent was locked up in his own breast, and can only be interpreted by his acts and conduct under the circumstances and surroundings. As assault is an intentional attempt by violence to do injury to another; but how is the intention to be ascertained otherwise than by the conduct? Intent is likewise an essential element in larceny, burglary, etc., which can only be ascertained by the conduct and acts and circumstances accompanying the transaction.

    But it is argued that the commission of the offense charged is negatived by the location in that there was a school-house two hundred or three hundred yards away, and a dwelling-house in sight of the place where she first saw him, and that she was accompanied by her brother eight years old. But *541tbat is only evidence in bis bebalf to be considered by tbe jury in inquiring into bis intent and purpose — tbe contention being tbat it would be unreasonable for a man to undertake to commit a capital felony so near a scbool-bouse where a school was in session, and so near dwelling-houses where people lived, when be would probably be caught and tbe chances of escape so limited. But tbe rules of reason are not employed by tbe criminal; if they were, crime would rarely be committed. Every element of reason is wanting in tbe commission of tbe crime which be is charged with having attempted. Even tbe instinct of brutes, when allowed to roam together in their natural state, forbids such an act, leaving this, tbe most fiendish of all offenses against nature, within tbe possibilities of tbe human-kind. There is

    No Error.

Document Info

Citation Numbers: 40 S.E. 6, 129 N.C. 536, 1901 N.C. LEXIS 112

Judges: Douglas, Eueches

Filed Date: 11/26/1901

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024