Board of Education v. . Burgin ( 1934 )

Beogden, J.

Does the school committee of Glenwood-Dysartville High School District, as successor of the Glenwood High School District, have the right to expend the fund produced by taxes heretofore duly levied in said district and now in hand to its credit, for the purpose of supplementing the six months school term in said district ?

Glenwood High School District by a vote of the taxpayers therein, levied a tax upon all property within the district for the purpose of supplementing the six months school term. By economy and wise management an unexpended balance of $3,060.20 had been accumulated. By virtue of chapter 562, Public Laws of 1933, the district was abolished and a new district known as Glenwood-Dysartville High School District set up in its stead, covering, however, the identical territory theretofore comprising the Glenwood District.

The initial inquiries, therefore, are: to whom does this money belong and who has the power to spend it, and for what purpose?

The fund was raised by taxation in a particular governmental subdivision, to wit, Glenwood High School District. The tax producing the fund was levied by virtue of a vote of the people in the said particular district and for the express purpose of supplementing the six months school term therein. Consequently, nothing else appearing the conclusion would be inevitable, that when the district was abolished, the money should return to the taxpayers or be used for the school needs of the district through the instrumentality of its successor, the Glenwood-Dysartville High School District.

The defendant, however, asserts that chapter 562, section 4, of the Public Laws of 1933, directs the application of the money. The language relied upon is substantially as follows: “All uncollected taxes which have been levied in the respective school districts of the State .. . . upon collection shall be made a part of the debt service fund of the special bond tax unit along with such other funds as may accrue to the credit of said unit; and in the event there is no debt service requirement upon such district, the amount so collected shall be covered into the county treasury to be used as a part of the county debt service for schools,” etc.

It does not appear that Glenwood School District had any outstanding bonds. Manifestly, the expressions “uncollected taxes” and “such other funds as may accrue” refer to funds becoming available in the future, and hence do not operate upon the money specified in the complaint. Therefore, even if it be granted that the Legislature had the power to take this money and spend it for the benefit of other governmental subdivisions, it has not sought to do so, and hence so far as the law is concerned, the money is still in the treasury to the credit of the school district, and available for the very purposes for which the taxpayers provided it.

It is further asserted that the fund has not been properly budgeted and appropriated. It would seem that this contention is water that has passed over the dam, because it is alleged and admitted by demurrer that this money has been budgeted each year and that appropriations have been duly made during the existence of the Glenwood High School District. Moreover, the budget is designed as a tentative basis for de termining tbe tax levy necessary to operate tbe scbool. Tbe disposition of tbe particular sum of money would in tbis case invoke no taxing power.

While tbe county auditor perhaps acted wisely in proceeding cautiously because of changes in tbe law, no sound reason occurs to tbe court why she should not sign tbe voucher or vouchers specified in tbe complaint, to tbe end that tbe money shall be used for tbe purpose for which it was accumulated. Indeed, it was alleged in tbe complaint and admitted by demurrer that tbe defendant “refused to sign said vouchers without good cause therefor and as required by law.” Tbe signing of tbe vouchers 'upon tbe facts disclosed in tbe pleadings, does not involve tbe exercise of discretion, but would seem to fall within tbe category of purely ministerial acts.

Reversed.