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The issue which awaits our disposition occurs upon the respondent's motion to dismiss the appeal taken by the appellant from an order of the circuit court which set aside a default judgment and permitted the respondent to file an answer. In seeking to sustain the appeal the plaintiff argues that the order aforementioned is of the type embraced by § 7-501, Oregon Code 1930, which defines the appealable orders, judgments and decrees:Bowman v. Holman,
48 Or. 351 (86 P. 792 ), and Hall v. McCan,62 Or. 556 (126 P. 5 ), hold that an order setting aside a default *Page 75 judgment is not a "final order affecting a substantial right" as defined by the above section of our code. Since the decision inBowman v. Holman, supra, the 1907 Session Laws, chapter 162, § 6, amended the quoted language by adding thereto: "An order setting aside a judgment and granting a new trial." In Taylor v.Taylor,61 Or. 257 (121 P. 431 , 121 P. 964), this court construed the language last quoted and held that an order which sets aside a default and permits an answer to be filed is not one which sets aside a judgment and grants a new trial. See to the same effect Carmichael v. Carmichael,101 Or. 172 (199 P. 385 ). After again considering the language of § 7-501, Oregon Code 1930, we remain satisfied with the construction placed upon it by the above decisions. It follows that the motion is allowed.Dismissed.
BEAN, C.J., RAND and KELLY, JJ., concur. *Page 76
Document Info
Citation Numbers: 298 P. 644, 136 Or. 74, 1931 Ore. LEXIS 112
Judges: Kossmaln, Bean, Band, Kelly
Filed Date: 1/13/1931
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024