State of Maine v. Kevin W. Carton State of Maine v. Micah Carton , 145 A.3d 555 ( 2016 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2016 ME 119 Docket: Aro-15-269
Argued: May 5, 2016
Decided: July 28, 2016
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
KEVIN W. CARTON
*****
STATE OF MAINE
v.
MICAH CARTON
JABAR, J.
[¶1] Kevin W. Carton and Micah Carton appeal from judgments of
conviction for unlawful trafficking in schedules drugs (Class B), 17-A M.R.S.
§ 1103(1-A)(A) (2015), entered in the trial court (Aroostook County,
Stokes, J.). The Cartons challenge an order denying their motion to suppress
evidence obtained in the course of police questioning and a warrantless
search. Because the Cartons did not object to the search, and because a public
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safety exception to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), existed at the
time of the officer’s questioning, we affirm the court’s judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The following facts were found by the suppression court, are
reviewed for clear error, and are supported by the record. See State v. Cote,
2015 ME 78, ¶ 9, 118 A.3d 805.
[¶3] On November 26, 2013, a Maine State Police trooper, who was also
a certified member of the Maine Drug Enforcement Agency’s Clandestine Drug
Lab Enforcement Team (MDEA-CDLET), received a call instructing him to
contact a State Police dispatcher with whom the officer was familiar. The
dispatcher informed the trooper that she suspected that a family member may
have been involved in the production of methamphetamine. The trooper
proceeded to Amity to meet with the dispatcher and her brother-in-law, who
owned a hunting camp where he permitted members of his family to stay
during the hunting season. The owner allowed the Cartons to stay at the camp
with his permission for varying lengths of time. The owner’s son had
previously informed him that he had seen his cousins, the Cartons, mixing
chemicals inside a bottle while staying at the camp.
3
[¶4] After the meeting in Amity, the trooper drove to the camp with the
camp owner in his pickup truck. During the drive, the camp owner informed
the trooper that he owned the one-room hunting camp and gave the trooper
permission to search it.
[¶5] When the uniformed trooper entered the camp with the owner,
one of the Cartons asked the officer, “What’s up?” The trooper responded by
informing the Cartons that he was there to “look around.” Neither Kevin nor
Micah Carton objected to the search of the camp.
[¶6] On the floor of the bunkroom, the trooper observed a plastic bottle
containing off-white liquid, which he believed to be liquid methamphetamine.
He also observed a backpack containing drain cleaner and a container of
muriatic acid. The trooper concluded that he had discovered the components
of a “one pot” methamphetamine production system, and that the bottle
containing the off-white liquid was the reaction vessel of the system.1 During
his search, the trooper did not observe any tubing or tin foil as is often
associated with the “one pot” system, nor did he smell any pungent odors as is
1 The court heard testimony from the officer that in the “one pot” system of methamphetamine
manufacture, two bottles are used to produce methamphetamine. The first, known as the reaction
vessel, is used to create liquid methamphetamine, or “sludge.” The second bottle, known as the
gassing generator, is used for a second chemical reaction to produce hydrogen chloride gas—a
substance highly toxic to humans. Muriatic acid is commonly used as a component in the
production of hydrogen chloride gas. The “sludge” and the hydrogen chloride gas are then
combined to create solid methamphetamine.
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characteristic of the release of dangerous hydrogen chloride gas during
production of methamphetamine using the “one pot” system.
[¶7] After finding the items in the bunkroom, the trooper placed the
Cartons under arrest and restrained them with handcuffs. While the Cartons
were handcuffed, and before the officer read them their Miranda rights, the
trooper asked Kevin Carton where the gassing generator was located because
he believed that the device could result in such hazards as fire or the release
of toxic gas. Kevin responded to the trooper’s question, indicating that the
gassing generator was broken and outside of the camp.
[¶8] On November 27, 2013, a special agent of the MDEA-CDLET
applied for a warrant to search the camp for evidence of illegal drug
manufacture and trafficking. The District Court (O’Mara, J.) issued a search
warrant that day.
[¶9] On March 6, 2014, the Cartons were each charged by indictment
with one count of unlawful trafficking in scheduled drugs (Class B),
17-A M.R.S. § 1103(1-A)(A). On July 23, 2014, the Cartons filed a joint motion
to suppress (1) evidence obtained from the officer’s initial search of the camp
on November 26th, (2) any and all statements made as a result of the officer’s
pre-Miranda questioning at the camp on November 26th, and (3) any and all
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evidence obtained as a result of searches conducted pursuant to the
November 27th search warrant because of an alleged misstatement in the
affidavit supporting the issuance of the warrant.2
[¶10] Following a hearing on January 27, 2015, the trial court
(Stokes, J.) denied the joint motion to suppress. In its order, the court
concluded that the trooper’s initial, warrantless search of the camp was valid
because he had permission from the camp’s owner. The court further
concluded that because he had the owner’s permission, the trooper was under
no obligation to consult with the Cartons as to whether they objected to the
search. The court concluded that Kevin Carton’s statement regarding the
location of the gassing generator was admissible under the public safety
exception to the Miranda rule as recognized in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649, 653 (1984). It further concluded that the trooper’s concern for the
location of the gassing generator was appropriate and sufficient to qualify for
the public safety exception to Miranda. It reasoned that Quarles did not
require the public safety issue to be “acute” in order for the exception to
apply, that the trooper had probable cause to believe that a “one pot” system
2 The alleged misstatement in the affidavit was that the officer observed Micah Carton “cooking
methamphetamine in the kitchen” of the hunting camp when he arrived, whereas the officer’s
incident report stated that the officer had observed Micah Carton “cooking supper in the kitchen.”
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utilizing a gassing generator was at the camp, and that the conspicuous
absence of the gassing generator among the other components was enough to
justify the pre-Miranda question.
[¶11] The court also denied the Cartons’ joint motion to suppress the
results of searches conducted pursuant to the November 27, 2013, search
warrant. Although the affidavit included a statement that the State conceded
was erroneous with regard to the trooper’s observation of Micah Carton’s
activity in the kitchen, the court concluded that there was other sufficient
information to support the issuance of the search warrant. The court ruled
that under the totality of the circumstances contained in the affidavit, and
allowing for all reasonable inferences that could have been drawn from it,
there was a “fair probability” sufficient to sustain the magistrate’s issuance of
the search warrant.
[¶12] On May 6, 2015, the Cartons each entered a conditional guilty
plea to the sole charge of unlawful trafficking of scheduled drugs (Class B),
17-A M.R.S. § 1103(1-A)(A), pursuant to M.R. Crim. P. 11.3 On May 20, 2015,
the court entered judgments of conviction, sentencing each brother to
fifty-four months of commitment to the Department of Corrections with all
3 The Maine Rules of Unified Criminal Procedure (effective July 1, 2015) were not in effect in
Aroostook County when the pleas were entered.
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but six months suspended, three years of probation, and a fine of two
thousand dollars. The Cartons timely appealed. See M.R. App. P. 2(b)(2)(A).
II. DISCUSSION
[¶13] In reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress, we review
questions of law de novo. Cote, 2015 ME 78, ¶ 9, 118 A.3d 805. We “will
uphold the court’s denial of a motion to suppress if any reasonable view of the
evidence supports the trial court’s decision.” State v. Diana, 2014 ME 45, ¶ 11,
89 A.3d 132.
A. Warrantless Search
[¶14] The Cartons argue that although the owner of the camp
consented to the officer’s search, they nevertheless had a reasonable
expectation of privacy at the camp. They further contend that because they
were guests of the camp owner, they had the right to object to the warrantless
search and should have been granted the opportunity to do so before the
officer began his search.
[¶15] Both the United States and Maine Constitutions guarantee
citizens protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const.
amend IV; Me. Const. art. I, § 5; State v. Glover, 2014 ME 49, ¶ 10, 89 A.3d
1077. This authority applies to defendants who have a legitimate expectation
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of privacy in the location of the search. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143
(1978).
[¶16] The owner of a home has the right to consent to a warrantless
search by law enforcement. Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1132
(2014). However, the United States Supreme Court has generally recognized
that an overnight guest in a home has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
that home. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97 (1990); see also Stoner v.
California, 376 U.S. 483, 488-90 & n.7 (1964) (holding that hotel night clerk’s
consent to search an occupied guest room was not valid consent and the
evidence obtained from the search was inadmissible).
[¶17] An officer may conduct a warrantless search of premises without
the consent of a defendant, provided that the officer has obtained the consent
of “a third party who possesse[s] common authority over or other sufficient
relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.” United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). However, if the defendant is lawfully
present and objects, the search may not be conducted without a warrant.
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120 (2006).
[¶18] In Randolph, police responded to a domestic dispute between an
estranged couple. Id. at 107. The wife informed police that her husband was
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an active cocaine user and that they would be able to find evidence of cocaine
use in his home. Id. Police asked the husband for consent to search his house
and the husband refused. Id. Police then turned to the wife and asked for her
consent, which she gave. Id. The police found evidence of cocaine during their
search. Id.
[¶19] The Supreme Court ruled that the search of the home was
unreasonable, as the husband was physically present and gave an express
denial of consent, even though his wife later consented to the search. Id. at
120. The Court held that “[d]isputed permission is no match for [the] central
value of the Fourth Amendment,” i.e., that “the home is entitled to special
protection as the center of the private lives of our people.” Id. at 115 (quotation marks omitted). In the Court’s estimation, the right that a
nonconsenting co-occupant has to privacy outweighs any interest the
consenting co-occupant has in allowing the premises to be searched. Id. As
Justice Souter, writing for the Court, stated,
We therefore hold that a warrantless search of a shared dwelling
for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically
present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the
basis of consent given to the police by another resident.
Id. at 120. 10
[¶20] Randolph, however, does not require law enforcement to
affirmatively seek the consent of physically present co-tenants who may
object. Id. at 121-22 (holding that there is no need to affirmatively seek the
consent of a potentially objecting co-tenant when consent has been given by
another co-tenant, unless law enforcement has removed the potentially
objecting co-tenant). Here, a uniformed officer entered the camp. The
Cartons asked what the officer was doing there, and he informed them that he
was there to “look around.” The officer had previously received the consent of
the owner to search the camp. Neither of the Cartons affirmatively denied the
officer consent to conduct the search. Given the lack of any objection by the
Cartons, and because the officer had previously received the consent of the
owner to search the camp, the court did not err in concluding that the
warrantless search was valid.
B. Pre-Miranda Statement
[¶21] The Cartons argue that Kevin Carton was in custody when he
indicated to the officer where the gassing generator was located, and that his
statement is therefore inadmissible against them because it was made while
Kevin was under arrest but before he was informed of his Miranda rights.
They further argue that the public safety exception to Miranda as announced
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by the United States Supreme Court in Quarles does not apply in the instant
case because the threat of exposure to the contents of the gassing generator
was not an imminent threat to public safety.
[¶22] Generally, a defendant who is in custody must be advised of his
or her Miranda rights prior to an interrogation by law enforcement in order
for statements made during the interrogation to be admissible against him or
her in the defendant’s subsequent trial. State v. Dion, 2007 ME 87, ¶ 21,
928 A.2d 746. Statements made by a defendant in custody before being given
a Miranda warning may still be admissible if they fall within one of several
exceptions. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655, 687 n.10. In Quarles, the United States
Supreme Court articulated one of these exceptions as occurring when the
interrogation is prompted by a concern for public safety. Id. at 655-56. In
recognizing the public safety exception, the Court held that “concern for public
safety must be paramount to adherence to the literal language of the
prophylactic rules enunciated in Miranda.” Id. at 653. [¶23] Federal courts have held that the public safety exception applies
to law enforcement questioning related to the location of a gassing generator
or other methamphetamine manufacturing equipment. See, e.g., United States
v. Noonan, 745 F.3d 934, 938 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that the public safety
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exception applied when a deputy had probable cause to believe that a stopped
driver was a methamphetamine manufacturer and the officer asked if a “one
pot” was in the car to avoid being sprayed with toxic chemicals); United States
v. King, 182 F. App’x 88, 91 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that officers’ pre-Miranda
questions concerning active methamphetamine production were within the
public safety exception); see also State v. Bilynsky, 2007 ME 107, ¶¶ 29-30,
932 A.2d 1169 (holding that questions about the location of a gassing
generator and other equipment related to the production of
methamphetamine fall within the “protective sweep” exception to Miranda).
[¶24] Here, the officer had probable cause to believe that there existed
a risk to public safety because the whereabouts of the source of a potential
danger to the public was unknown. Although the officer did not notice tin foil,
tubing, or the pungent scent associated with an operative gassing generator,
he did observe other components of a “one pot” system, as well as muriatic
acid, which is used in the gassing generator to produce toxic hydrogen
chloride gas. The officer did not know that the generator was located outside
of the camp. Because the officer’s questions were prompted by his concern
for public safety, the court did not err in concluding that Kevin Carton’s
statements were admissible under the public safety exception to Miranda.
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The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
On the briefs:
Matthew C. Garascia, Esq., Auburn, for appellants Kevin
Carton and Micah Carton
Todd R. Collins, District Attorney, and Kurt A. Kafferlin, Asst.
Dist. Atty., 8th Prosecutorial District, Houlton, for appellee
State of Maine
At oral argument:
Matthew C. Garascia, Esq., for appellants Kevin Carton and
Micah Carton
Kurt A. Kafferlin, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee State of Maine
Aroostook County (Houlton) Superior Court docket numbers CR-2013-183, 184
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY