Lord Noble Kato Bakari El v. United States ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •           Jrn tbt Wnittb
    ORIGINAL  ~tatts
    Q.Court of tbtral Q.Claims      jf
    No. 16-1 lOC                                          FILED
    (Filed: August 19, 2016)
    AUG I 9 2016
    *************************************
    U.S. COURT OF
    LORD NOBLE KATO BAKARI EL,                   *          .        . . A . . FEOPERAL CLAIMS
    *      Motion to Dismiss; pp 1icat10n to roceea
    Plaintiff,             *      In Forma Pauperis; Pro Se Plaintiff;
    *      Collateral Attack of State Court Judgment;
    v.                                           *      Fraud; Mistake; Conspiracy; Trespass;
    *      Fifth Amendment Taking; Lack of
    THE UNITED STATES,                           *      Jurisdiction
    *
    Defendant.             *
    *************************************
    Lord Noble Kato Bakari El, Mesa, AZ, pro se.
    Jessica L. Cole, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant.
    OPINION AND ORDER
    SWEENEY, Judge
    Before the court is defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs prose complaint for lack of
    subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
    pursuant to Rules 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6), respectively, of the Rules of the United States Court of
    Federal Claims ("RCFC"). In addition, plaintiff has filed an application to proceed in forma
    pauperis. Plaintiff alleges that the Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa County ("Superior
    Court of Arizona") unlawfully entered a judgment of forcible detainer against him for illegally
    occupying private property and ordered him to vacate that property. Although plaintiffs
    application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted, the court possesses no jurisdiction to hear
    plaintiffs claims. Accordingly, the court must dismiss his complaint.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Plaintiff Lord Noble Kato Bakari El alleges that he is the legal heir of the estate of his
    wife, Wilma Jean Ford, in Maricopa County, Arizona. The property at issue is located at 1502
    South Lee Circle, Mesa, Arizona 85204. Previously, Carrington Property Services, LLC brought
    an action for forcible detainer in the Superior Court of Arizona against plaintiff and his wife,
    seeking their removal from that property. On December 3, 2015, Commissioner James Morrow
    of the Superior Court of Arizona entered a judgment against the defendants in that case for
    forcible detainer, ordering them to vacate the property by January 2, 2016; if they did not, the
    court stated, a Writ of Resolution would be issued. In addition, the defendants were ordered to
    pay the plaintiff$539 in costs and $125 in attorney's fees.
    USPS TRACKING#:   9114 9999 4431 3548 1336 64
    &CUSTOMER          For Tracking or inqUiries go to USPS.com
    RECEIPT            or call 1·800-222· 1811.
    On January 21, 2016, plaintiff filed suit in this court, alleging that the Superior Court of
    Arizona failed to recognize that he owns the subject property pursuant to a deed and a land
    patent. According to plaintiff, the property "passed to [him] by way of grant deed recorded ...
    in the Maricopa County Recorder's Office." Comp!. 7. Plaintiff asserts that he is in possession
    of the original land patent of the property at issue. Consequently, plaintiff contends, the Superior
    Court of Arizona "failed to recognize ... the Defendants['] Grant deed that was executed on
    April/28/15 before the allege[d] trustee sale on July/02/15." 
    Id. at 10.
    Plaintiff argues that the
    court's judgment was unlawful-asserting claims of fraud, mistake, trespass, conspiracy,
    unauthorized administration of property without right, and "diversity"-and seeks $1.75 million
    in damages. 
    Id. at 8.
    In addition, plaintiff requests that this court render the Superior Court of
    Arizona's decision "void" for "fraud[,] mistake[,] and surprise." 
    Id. Defendant filed
    a motion to dismiss plaintiffs amended complaint pursuant to RCFC
    12(b)(l) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and RCFC 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim
    upon which relief can be granted.' The motion is fully briefed, and the court deems oral
    argument unnecessary.
    II. LEGAL ST AND ARDS
    A. Tucker Act
    The ability of the United States Court of Federal Claims ("Court of Federal Claims") to
    entertain suits against the United States is limited. "The United States, as sovereign, is immune
    from suit save as it consents to be sued." United States v. Sherwood, 
    312 U.S. 584
    , 586 (1941).
    A waiver of immunity "cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed." United States
    v. King. 
    395 U.S. 1
    , 4 (1969). The Tucker Act, the principal statute governing the jurisdiction of
    this court, waives sovereign immunity for claims against the United States not sounding in tort
    that are founded upon the United States Constitution, a federal statute or regulation, or an
    express or implied contract with the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 149l(a)(l) (2012). However, the
    Tucker Act is merely a jurisdictional statute and "does not create any substantive right
    enforceable against the United States for money damages." United States v. Testan, 
    424 U.S. 392
    , 398 (1976). Instead, the substantive right must appear in another source of law, such as a
    "money-mandating constitutional provision, statute or regulation that has been violated, or an
    express or implied contract with the United States." Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 
    27 F.3d 1545
    , 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en bane).
    B. RCFC 12(b)(l) Motion to Dismiss
    Whether the court has jurisdiction to decide the merits of a case is a threshold matter.
    See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 
    523 U.S. 83
    , 94-95 (1998). "Without jurisdiction the
    court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it
    ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and
    dismissing the cause." Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868). The parties, or
    1
    Because the court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims, it does not
    address defendant's RCFC 12(b)(6) motion.
    -2-
    the court, sua sponte, may challenge the existence of subject matter jurisdiction at any time.
    Arbaugh v. Y &H Corp., 
    546 U.S. 500
    , 506 (2006).
    When considering whether to dismiss a complaint for lack of jurisdiction, a court
    assumes that the allegations in the complaint are true and construes those allegations in the
    plaintiffs favor. Henke v. United States, 
    60 F.3d 795
    , 797 (Fed. Cir. 1995). A prose plaintiffs
    complaint, "'however inartfully pleaded,' must be held to 'less stringent standards than formal
    pleadings drafted by lawyers' .... " Hughes v. Rowe, 
    449 U.S. 5
    , 10 n.7 (1980) (quoting Haines
    v. Kerner, 
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520-21 (1972)). However, a prose plaintiff is not excused from
    meeting basic jurisdictional requirements. See 
    Henke, 60 F.3d at 799
    ("The fact that [the
    plaintiff] acted pro se in the drafting of his complaint may explain its ambiguities, but it does not
    excuse its failures, if such there be."). In other words, a pro se plaintiff is not excused from his
    burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the court possesses jurisdiction. See
    McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 
    298 U.S. 178
    , 189 (1936); Reynolds v. Army & Air
    Force Exch. Serv., 
    846 F.2d 746
    , 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The plaintiff cannot rely solely on
    allegations in the complaint, but must bring forth relevant, adequate proof to establish
    jurisdiction. See 
    McNutt, 298 U.S. at 189
    . Ultimately, ifthe court finds that it lacks subject
    matter jurisdiction, then it must dismiss the claim. Matthews v. United States, 
    72 Fed. Cl. 274
    ,
    278 (2006); see also RCFC 12(h)(3) ("If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-
    matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.").
    III. DISCUSSION
    In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that the Superior Court of Arizona's judgment was
    unlawful-asserting claims of fraud, mistake, surprise, trespass, conspiracy, unauthorized
    administration of property without right, and "diversity"-and requests that this court render that
    judgment void. Comp!. 8. The court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims. Consequently,
    plaintiffs complaint must be dismissed.
    A. The United States Is the Only Proper Defendant in the Court of Federal Claims
    Although the court has read the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff, it
    cannot locate any allegations that implicate the United States.' Plaintiff instead challenges the
    decision of a state court, but this court does not possess jurisdiction to entertain claims against
    state courts or state officials. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491; 
    Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588
    (concluding that
    jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims "is confined to the rendition of money judgments in
    suits brought for that relief against the United States, and if the relief sought is against others
    than the United States the suit as to them must be ignored as beyond the jurisdiction of the court"
    (citations omitted)); accord Trevino v. United States, 
    557 F. App'x 995
    , 998 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
    (unpublished decision) (affirming the trial court's decision that it did not possess jurisdiction
    over claims against "states, localities, state and local government officials, state courts, state
    prisons, or state employees"); see also Jefferson v. United States, 104 Fed. CL 81, 89 (2012)
    2
    Plaintiff alleges that his land patent is registered with the Bureau of Land Management
    of the United States Department of the Interior, but he does not allege any claims against this or
    any other federal agency.
    -3-
    (stating that the court lacks jurisdiction over claims against state agencies and private
    individuals).
    B. The Court of Federal Claims Cannot Entertain a Collateral Attack Against the
    Judgment of Another Court
    Further, this court lacks jurisdiction to review the decisions of state courts. As explained
    by the United States Supreme Court:
    Congress has prescribed a primary route, by appeal as of right and certiorari,
    through which parties may seek relief from the legal consequences of judicial
    judgments. To allow a party who steps off the statutory path to employ ... [a]
    collateral attack on the judgment would-quite apart from any considerations of
    fairness to the parties-disturb the orderly operation of the federal judicial system.
    U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship. 
    513 U.S. 18
    , 27 (1994); accord Vereda, Ltda. v.
    United States, 
    217 F.3d 1367
    , 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[T]he Court of Federal Claims cannot
    entertain a taking claim that requires the court to 'scrutinize the actions of another tribunal."
    (quoting Allustiarte v. United States, 
    256 F.3d 1349
    , 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001))); Joshua v. United
    States, 
    17 F.3d 378
    , 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("[T]he Court of Federal Claims does not have
    jurisdiction to review the decisions of district courts ... relating to proceedings before those
    courts.").
    C. Even if Plaintiff Alleged Claims Against the United States, the Court Lacks Jurisdiction
    to Entertain Them
    Moreover, to the extent that plaintiff alleges claims against the United States rather than
    the Superior Court of Arizona, this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain them. First, plaintiffs
    claims that the government acted unlawfully due to fraud, mistake, conspiracy, trespass, or other
    wrongful conduct sound in tort. Jumah v. United States, 
    90 Fed. Cl. 603
    , 607-08 (2009) (stating
    that claims of trespass or conspiracy sound in tort); Cottrell v. United States, 
    42 Fed. Cl. 144
    ,
    149 (1998) (holding that claims "that defendant engaged in negligent, fraudulent, or other
    wrongful conduct when discharging its official duties" sound in tort). It is well settled that the
    Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over tort claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) ("The
    United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim
    against the United States ... in cases not sounding in tort."); Rick's Mushroom Serv., Inc. v.
    United States, 521F.3d1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Woodruffv. United States, 
    80 Fed. Cl. 806
    ,
    816 (2008); McCauley v. United States, 
    38 Fed. Cl. 250
    , 264 (1997) (''Jurisdiction to hear tort
    claims is exclusively granted to the United States District Courts under the Federal Tort Claims
    Act."), affd, 
    152 F.3d 948
    (Fed. Cir. 1998).
    Second, plaintiffs reliance on Article VI of the United States Constitution in support of his
    claims is misplaced. Article VI provides:
    -4-
    All debts contracted and engagements entered into, before the adoption of this
    Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as
    under the Confederation.
    This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
    pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority
    of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every
    state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the
    contrary notwithstanding.
    The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several
    state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States
    and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to support this
    Constitution; but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any
    office or public trust under the United States.
    U.S. Const. art. VI. There is nothing in Article VI that indicates that it is money-mandating, and
    therefore, this court does not possess jurisdiction over claims that it was violated by the
    government. El v. United States, 
    122 Fed. Cl. 707
    , 709 (2015); accord Marshall v. United States,
    No. 09-431C, 
    2010 WL 125978
    , at *3 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 14, 2010) (unpublished decision).
    Third, plaintiff argues that the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous
    People provides a basis for the exercise of this court's jurisdiction. Plaintiff is mistaken. Under
    the Tucker Act, the court possesses jurisdiction to entertain claims founded upon the United
    States Constitution, federal statutes and regulations, and contracts with the United States. 28
    U.S.C. § 149l(a)(l). The Tucker Act does not provide the court with jurisdiction to entertain
    claims based upon United Nations declarations. Id.; see also 
    id. § 1502
    ("Except as otherwise
    provided by Act of Congress, the United States Court of Federal Claims shall not have
    jurisdiction of any claim against the United States growing out of or dependent upon any treaty
    entered into with foreign nations."); Prophet v. United States, 
    106 Fed. Cl. 456
    , 464 (2012)
    (holding that various declarations and conventions do not confer jurisdiction on the Court of
    Federal Claims because they "are not acts of the United States Congress, signed by the President
    of the United States"). Moreover, plaintiff has not referenced any statute providing this court
    with the authority to entertain claims under the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
    Fourth, plaintiff cites Article III of the Articles of Confederation, which recites:
    The said States hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each
    other, for their common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and
    general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other, against all force offered to,
    or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty,
    trade, or any other pretense whatever.
    Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. III. However, because the Articles of Confederation were
    replaced by the United States Constitution in 1789, they are not a valid source of law.
    Nonetheless, even if they were, there is nothing in Article III indicating that it is money-
    mandating. The court therefore lacks jurisdiction over any claims that plaintiff alleges arises
    -5-
    -----------·
    under Article III. See Kolakowski v. Sec'y of HHS, No. 99-0625V, 
    2010 WL 5672753
    , at *141
    (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 23, 2010) (explaining that the Articles of Confederation were later
    replaced by the United States Constitution).
    Fifth, plaintiff references 43 U.S.C. § 59 and 43 U.S.C. § 83, which describe evidentiary
    rules governing copies of land records. However, these statutes do not require or even discuss
    payment for a violation. Consequently, the court possesses no jurisdiction over any claims
    brought pursuant to these statutes.
    Finally, to the extent that plaintiffs allegations may be construed as raising a Fifth
    Amendment takings claim, plaintiff fails to invoke this court's jurisdiction. The Fifth
    Amendment prohibits the federal government from taking private property for public use without
    paying just compensation. U.S. Const. amend. V. The Court of Federal Claims possesses
    jurisdiction to entertain Fifth Amendment takings claims against the United States. See Morris
    v. United States, 
    392 F.3d 1372
    , 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Absent an express statutory grant of
    jurisdiction to the contrary, the Tucker Act provides the Court of Federal Claims exclusive
    jurisdiction over takings claims for amounts greater than $10,000."). However, to bring suit in
    the Court of Federal Claims, a plaintiff"must concede the validity of the government action
    which is the basis of the taking claim .... " Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 
    10 F.3d 796
    , 802-
    03 (Fed. Cir. 1993); accord Reg'! Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 
    419 U.S. 102
    , 126-27 & n.16 (1974)
    ("[T]he Government action must be authorized. 'The taking of private property by an officer of
    the United States for public use, without being authorized, expressly or by necessary implication,
    to do so by some act of Congress, is not the act of the government,' and hence recovery is not
    available in the Court of Claims." (quoting Hooe v. United States, 
    218 U.S. 322
    , 336 (1910))).
    Plaintiff alleges that he was unlawfully forced to vacate the property at issue by the Superior
    Court of Arizona. In other words, plaintiff does not concede the lawfulness of the state court
    action. Accordingly, the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction over any Fifth Amendment takings
    claim asserted by plaintiff. 3
    D. The Court Grants Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
    Finally, as noted above, plaintiff filed, concurrent with his complaint, an application to
    proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, courts of the United States are
    3
    Even if the court could exercise jurisdiction over a Fifth Amendment takings claim
    asserted by plaintiff, plaintiff would not prevail on such a claim. To establish a Fifth
    Amendment taking, plaintiff would first be required to "identif{y] a cognizable Fifth Amendment
    property interest that is asserted to be the subject of the taking." Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v.
    United States, 
    708 F.3d 1340
    , 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013). "Property interests are created and defined
    by state law." Butner v. United States, 
    440 U.S. 48
    , 55 (1979). As a prerequisite to granting
    judgment in forcible detainer against plaintiff, the Superior Court of Arizona necessarily must
    have concluded that plaintiff did not have a valid property interest in the property at issue. Thus,
    the court's judgment could not constitute a Fifth Amendment taking. Cf. Vereda, 
    Ltda, 217 F.3d at 1375
    ("[T]he Court of Federal Claims cannot entertain a taking claim that requires the court to
    'scrutinize the actions of another tribunal." (quoting 
    Allustiarte, 256 F.3d at 1352
    )).
    -6-
    permitted to waive filing fees and security under certain circumstances.' See 28 U.S.C.
    § 1915(a)(l); see also Hayes v. United States, 
    71 Fed. Cl. 366
    , 366-67 (2006) (concluding that
    28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(l) applies to both prisoners and nonprisoners alike). Plaintiffs wishing to
    proceed in forma pauperis must submit an affidavit that lists all of their assets, declares that they
    are unable to pay the fees or give the security, and states the nature of the action and their belief
    that they are entitled to redress. 28 U.S.C. § l 915(a)(l). Here, plaintiff has satisfied all three
    requirements. The court therefore grants plaintiffs application and waives his filing fee.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    In sum, the court GRANTS plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis, and
    DISMISSES plaintiffs complaint for lack of jurisdiction. No costs. The clerk is directed to
    enter judgment accordingly.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    Judge
    4
    While the Court of Federal Claims is not generally considered to be a "court of the
    United States" within the meaning of title twenty-eight of the United States Code, the court has
    jurisdiction to grant or deny applications to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 2503(d)
    (deeming the Court of Federal Claims to be "a court of the United States" for the purposes of 28
    U.S.C. § 1915); see also 
    Matthews, 72 Fed. Cl. at 277-78
    (recognizing that Congress enacted the
    Court of Federal Claims Technical and Procedural Improvements Act of 1992, authorizing the
    court to, among other things, adjudicate applications to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28
    u.s.c. § 1915).
    -7-