Lisa Lombardi v. Anthony A. Lombardi , 447 N.J. Super. 26 ( 2016 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3624-13T1
LISA LOMBARDI,
Plaintiff-Appellant/
Cross-Respondent, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
September 12, 2016
v.
APPELLATE DIVISION
ANTHONY A. LOMBARDI,
Defendant-Respondent/
Cross-Appellant.
__________________________________________
Argued March 1, 2016 – Decided September 12, 2016
Before Judges Espinosa, Rothstadt, and
Currier.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Mercer
County, Docket No. FM-11-113-11.
Mark H. Sobel argued the cause for
appellant/cross-respondent (Greenbaum, Rowe,
Smith, & Davis LLP, attorneys; Mr. Sobel, of
counsel and on the brief; Lisa B. DiPasqua,
on the briefs).
Brian G. Paul argued the cause for
respondent/cross-appellant (Szaferman,
Lakind, Blumstein & Blader, P.C., and Stark
& Stark, attorneys; Mr. Paul, of counsel and
on the briefs).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ROTHSTADT, J.A.D.
This appeal requires us to address the calculation of
alimony where the parties relied on only a fraction of their
household income to pay their monthly expenses and regularly
saved the balance during the course of their marriage. It is
well-established that the accumulation of reasonable savings
should be included in alimony to protect the supported spouse
against the loss of alimony. See Jacobitti v. Jacobitti, 135
N.J. 571, 582 (1994); Martindell v. Martindell, 21 N.J. 341, 354
(1956); Davis v. Davis, 184 N.J. Super. 430, 437 (App. Div.
1982). In this case, we consider whether the parties' history
of regular savings as part of their marital lifestyle requires
the inclusion of savings as a component of alimony even when the
need to protect the supported spouse does not exist.
The Family Part found that the monthly savings were part of
the marital lifestyle, but excluded the amount from its
calculation of alimony because savings were not necessary to
ensure future payment of alimony. We disagree with the court's
decision and hold that regular savings must be considered in a
determination of alimony, even when there is no need to create
savings to protect the future payment of alimony.
Both plaintiff Lisa Lombardi and defendant Anthony A.
Lombardi appeal from portions of their final judgment of divorce
(FJOD), entered after a twenty-eight day trial. Plaintiff
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challenges the court's alimony award based upon its rejection of
the savings element despite it being undisputed that during the
course of the marriage the parties "established [a] practice of
savings" that was "the largest component of [their] marital
lifestyle." As to child support, she claims the court's
"allocation . . . of the children's expenses [does] not allow
[them] to share in their father's economic good fortune."
Plaintiff also challenges the court's equitable distribution of
two accounts, and its denial of her request for counsel fees and
costs. Defendant avers that the FJOD should be affirmed in all
respects, but argues that, "in the event any portion of [it] is
reversed and remanded," the court's failure to provide him with
a credit for "the active appreciation" of the funds in one of
the two accounts disputed by plaintiff warrants reversal.
We have considered the parties' arguments in light of the
record and our review of the applicable legal principles. We
vacate and remand for reconsideration of the determinations as
to alimony, child support, the equitable distribution of the two
subject accounts, and counsel fees and costs.
I.
The parties began dating in college, and married in May
1990, three years after their graduation. Three children were
born of the marriage, now ages twenty, eighteen, and fifteen.
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Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce on August 2, 2010, and
the court entered the FJOD on March 7, 2014.
At the time of the FJOD's entry, the parties were forty-
eight-years-old and healthy, and defendant was employed full-
time. Plaintiff, who holds a bachelor's degree in marketing,
previously worked as the vice president of desktop publishing at
Bear Stearns, reaching a salary of $80,000 per year, when the
parties agreed that she would leave the workforce to become a
full-time homemaker after the birth of their first child. As
the children grew older, plaintiff obtained a certification as a
fitness instructor and now teaches classes part-time at local
fitness clubs for a gross income of approximately $10,000 per
year. She is the children's parent of primary residence and
continues to reside in the marital home.
Defendant has a bachelor's degree in finance, a master's
degree in business administration, and is a chartered financial
analyst. During the course of the marriage, he worked for a
number of investment firms as an analyst or portfolio manager.
He accepted a position with his current employer in 2004, at a
base salary of $250,000 with a $1,125,000 guaranteed bonus for
two years, and is now a vice president, senior portfolio
manager. He was paid total compensation ranging from $1,087,000
to $2,275,000 during the five years immediately preceding the
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filing of the divorce complaint.
Despite defendant's substantial earnings, the parties
routinely saved the better part of his salary. The portion of
his earnings used for the family's expenses allowed them to
enjoy a comfortable, but not extravagant, standard of living.
The decision to not "live a very lavish lifestyle" was the
result of the parties' shared desire to budget most of their
income during the marriage. According to plaintiff, after
watching her parents struggle financially as a result of
unreimbursed health care expenses, she wanted to ensure that she
had enough saved for her and defendant's care as they grew older
so that they could still pay for their children's college
education and "live comfortably" after retirement without the
need to "worry" about finances or "change [the family's]
lifestyle." According to defendant, although he was still
working, they saved so that he could retire at forty-five, when
the family would have accumulated $5 million in assets, a sum
sufficient to generate enough annual income to meet the family's
needs at their current lifestyle.
The parties spent $22,900 per month in order to maintain
their lifestyle, exclusive of savings and gifts to the children.
Plaintiff estimated that the parties saved approximately $67,000
per month. Consistent with their lifestyle choice, they did not
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often buy extravagant clothing or dine at expensive restaurants.
Defendant drove a BMW and then a Camaro, while plaintiff drove a
Buick Enclave. The family usually spent vacations locally, in
New York's Catskill Mountains or in Cape May, and sometimes took
ski vacations during the children's winter break. They never
hired domestic help or sent the children to daycare.
In addition to their savings, which totaled approximately
$4.18 million at the time of the FJOD,1 the parties owned the
marital home. They established and funded college savings
accounts for all three children, and avoided debt for the most
part – at the time of the divorce complaint, they had a mortgage
on the marital home, a lease on one car, and a loan on another.
The parties eventually settled issues of custody and
parenting time, agreed that plaintiff would be entitled to an
award of permanent alimony, although they disputed the amount,
and to an equal division of the marital estate by equitable
distribution, except as to one joint account and another account
opened by defendant in his own name. They also did not resolve
their claims for counsel fees and costs. These remaining issues
were addressed during the parties' twenty-eight day trial that
began in December 2011 and concluded in 2014 when the court
1
The parties also held another joint account and retirement
accounts that they agreed should be divided equally.
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placed its oral decision on the record over the course of four
days.
The court entered the FJOD and the parties filed their
respective appeals from certain provisions thereof.
II.
Our review of the Family Part's determination in
dissolution matters is limited. We accord deference to
decisions of the Family Part based on its expertise in
matrimonial matters. See Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412
(1998). We will not disturb its decisions if they are supported
by substantial credible evidence and are consistent with
applicable law. Ibid.; see also Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414,
428 (2015). This standard applies equally to its decisions
regarding alimony, see J.E.V. v. K.V., 426 N.J. Super. 475, 485
(App. Div. 2012), child support, see J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305,
325-26 (2013), equitable distribution, see La Sala v. La Sala,
335 N.J. Super. 1, 6 (App. Div. 2000), certif. denied, 167 N.J.
630 (2001), and counsel fees. See Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J.
229, 233 (1971); Barr v. Barr, 418 N.J. Super. 18, 46 (App. Div.
2011). However, we owe no special deference to the court's
legal conclusions. See D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J. 232, 245-46
(2012).
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III.
A.
We begin our review by addressing the trial court's alimony
award. According to plaintiff, she required $16,291 per month
to support herself and the three children at a standard of
living comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage, exclusive
of savings. She sought an additional $30,000 per month for
savings.2 Plaintiff requested an award of child support in the
amount of $5000 per month and a requirement that defendant be
solely responsible for paying certain expenses for the children,
such as extracurricular activities, tutoring, summer camps,
cars, and auto insurance.
After considering the evidence, the court established a
permanent award of monthly alimony in the amount of $7600,
without including an amount for savings, even though it found it
was a component of the marital lifestyle. It determined that
plaintiff required alimony to meet her needs at the marital
2
Plaintiff's forensic accounting expert testified that the
parties had habitually saved an average of $67,000 per month
during the final years of the marriage. He estimated that, even
at the $30,000 per month plaintiff was requesting as a savings
component of alimony, she would be able to save $228,000 per
year after taxes, while defendant would be able to save
$705,000. At that rate, in fifteen years, when the parties
would both be sixty-one-years-old, plaintiff and defendant would
have accumulated approximately $3,960,000 and $12,043,000,
respectively, assuming a three percent rate of return on
investment compounded monthly.
8 A-3624-13T1
standard of living, which the court characterized as a "modest
middle-class lifestyle," and found that the parties did not
dispute the monthly amount needed to meet plaintiff and the
children's expenses. The court concluded that plaintiff's
proposed budget, without savings, for herself and the children
was largely reasonable and consistent with the evidence, and
approved a monthly budget of $14,516, excluding savings. After
deducting the $5000 it was awarding in child support, the $3610
monthly after-tax income it estimated could be generated by
investment of plaintiff's equitable distribution share, and the
$583 after-tax monthly earnings from her part-time work, the
court found plaintiff would require another $5323 to meet her
budget. Accounting for taxes, the court concluded that the
gross award of $7600 per month would cover the shortfall. The
court then determined that defendant earned a sufficient amount
to cover plaintiff's budget, including the requested savings
component, and his own expenses.
In reaching its decision, the court observed that each
party would have the benefit of half of the roughly $5.5 million
marital estate after equitable distribution, providing a
significant opportunity for investment and saving for
unanticipated expenses, although defendant's considerable income
and earning potential conferred on him a greater opportunity
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than plaintiff. Moreover, the children's college expenses were
already provided for in amply-funded custodial accounts, and
defendant was responsible for maintaining the children's
medical, dental, and vision coverage and paying all uncovered
costs over $250 per child per year. Finally, the parties had no
debt, and plaintiff, the parent of primary residence, would
retain the marital residence unencumbered by a mortgage.3
As for the savings issue, the court observed that the
parties' "earning[s] exceeded consumption by approximately
$87,000 per month on average." It noted that those savings
could be understood as a "component of lifestyle" in the sense
that the parties had habitually saved the better part of their
income during the marriage, whether, as defendant claimed, to
provide for an early retirement or, as plaintiff testified, to
enhance the couple's economic security more broadly, and lived a
generally frugal lifestyle as a result. Nonetheless, the court
concluded that including savings as a component of an alimony
award was only warranted to the extent it was necessary to
ensure a dependent spouse's economic security in the face of a
later modification or cessation of support, which were not
issues here. However, it identified factors it found allowed
3
Defendant paid off the mortgage in full from a joint account
during the litigation. According to plaintiff, he did so
without her knowledge or consent.
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plaintiff to accumulate savings through means other than
increased alimony, though not to the extent the parties saved
during the marriage. It cited to, among other factors, some
"overlap" in the alimony and child support budgets, plaintiff's
right to claim the children as exemptions for tax purposes, and
"her ability to work and retain earnings to use for savings
. . . because of the maturation of the children . . . such that
she would have more time to spend working if she chose to do
so." The court stated:
Furthermore, from a budget standpoint
the plaintiff will have no obligation for
any college expense, no obligation for any
unreimbursed medical or health expense, all
extracurricular activities are covered by
the above-guideline . . . award, and if she
chose to work more that she would be
protected against any claim that her alimony
should be reduced or that she has lesser
need.
[(Emphasis added).]
Also, the court noted that defendant had been ordered to
maintain a life insurance policy to secure his obligation to
plaintiff and the children in case of his death, and determined
defendant's substantial assets and income therefrom made it
unlikely he would obtain a modification of his support
obligation in the future.
The court concluded by summarizing its reasons for not
including a savings component in its alimony calculation:
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The [c]ourt finds that a permissible
savings component which it elected not to do
or not to include was because there are
potentials for [plaintiff] to accumulate,
earn, and otherwise be protected from a
reduction by virtue of, one, reasons having
to do with the current budget and the room
in the budget to still save, the ability to
work more without worry about a reduction in
alimony, the investment opportunity that
might enhance the return on the over $2
million that she will receive, the life
insurance to protect against the death of
the defendant, and the likelihood of a
continued appreciation and increase in
assets and earnings that . . . would protect
her against any arbitrary . . . reduction in
alimony based upon early retirement or
otherwise.
B.
Plaintiff argues the court erred in excluding a savings
component from the alimony award because, among other reasons,
the award permitted defendant to continue to enjoy the marital
standard of living but deprived plaintiff of the same
opportunity. She argues her position is supported by the fact
that, although the case information statement form required by
our courts did not initially include savings as a budget
category, that category has since been added, reflecting the
courts' view that savings is a fundamental element of the family
lifestyle that must be accounted for in a support award. We
agree.
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Alimony is authorized by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 and is governed
by the factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b).4 It exists to
"permit [one spouse] to share in the economic rewards occasioned
by [the other's] income level (as opposed merely to the assets
accumulated), reached as a result of their combined labors,
inside and outside the home." Gugliotta v. Gugliotta, 160 N.J.
Super. 160, 164 (Ch. Div.), aff'd, 164 N.J. Super. 139 (App.
Div. 1978); see also Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 195
(1999). "[A]limony is neither a punishment for the payor nor a
reward for the payee. . . . It is a right arising out of the
marriage relationship to continue to live according to the
economic standard established during the marriage . . . ."
Aronson v. Aronson, 245 N.J. Super. 354, 364 (App. Div. 1991).
"Alimony relates to support and standard of living; it involves
the quality of economic life to which one spouse is entitled,
which then becomes the obligation of the other." Gnall, supra,
222 N.J. at 429.
A proper alimony award "assist[s] the supported spouse in
achieving a lifestyle that is reasonably comparable to the one
enjoyed while living with the supporting spouse during the
4
Several significant aspects of the statute were amended
effective after the entry of the FJOD. L. 2014, c. 42, § 1
(effective Sept. 10, 2014). None of the amendments, however,
impacts the trial court's decision or ours in this case.
13 A-3624-13T1
marriage." Tannen v. Tannen, 416 N.J. Super. 248, 260 (App.
Div. 2010) (quoting Steneken v. Steneken, 183 N.J. 290, 299
(2005)), aff'd o.b., 208 N.J. 409 (2011). "[A] judge awarding
alimony must methodically consider all evidence to assure the
award is 'fit, reasonable and just' to both parties, N.J.S.A.
2A:34-23, and properly balances each party's needs, the finite
marital resources, and the parties' desires to commence their
separate futures, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(c)." Gnall v. Gnall, 432
N.J. Super. 129, 149 (App. Div. 2013), rev'd on other grounds,
222 N.J. 414 (2015).
The goal of alimony is to assist the supported spouse in
achieving a lifestyle "reasonably comparable" to the one enjoyed
during the marriage. Steneken, supra, 183 N.J. at 299; see also
Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11, 17 (2000); Cox v. Cox, 335 N.J.
Super. 465, 473 (App. Div. 2000). "The importance of
establishing the standard of living experienced during the
marriage cannot be overstated." Crews, supra, 164 N.J. at 16.
It is the "touchstone for the initial alimony award." Ibid.
In determining the marital lifestyle, the trial court looks
at various elements including "the marital residence, vacation
home, cars owned or leased, typical travel and vacations each
year, schools, special lessons, and camps for [the] children,
entertainment (such as theater, concerts, dining out), household
14 A-3624-13T1
help, and other personal services." Weishaus v. Weishaus, 360
N.J. Super. 281, 290-91 (App. Div. 2003), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 180 N.J. 131 (2004). The ultimate determination must
be based not only on the amounts expended, but also what is
equitable. Glass v. Glass, 366 N.J. Super. 357, 372 (App.
Div.), certif. denied, 180 N.J. 354 (2004).
"[A]n appropriate rate of savings . . . can, and in the
appropriate case should, be considered as a living expense when
considering an award of . . . maintenance." Id. at 378 (second
alteration in original) (quoting In re Marriage of Weibel, 965
P.2d 126, 129-30 (Colo. App. 1998)). Thus, the court can take
into account the marital standard of living and allow the
supported spouse to save for the future. See id. at 379; see
also Capodanno v. Capodanno, 58 N.J. 113, 120 (1971). This is
particularly true when the supporting spouse can afford any
amount paid to the supported spouse. Glass, supra, 366 N.J.
Super. at 379.
A spouse's need for savings has long been recognized as a
component of alimony, see Martindell, supra, 21 N.J. at 354,
that allows for the accumulation of "reasonable savings to
protect [the supported spouse] against the day when alimony
payments may cease because of [the death of the supporting
spouse] or change in circumstances." Davis, supra, 184 N.J.
15 A-3624-13T1
Super. at 437 (quoting Khalaf v. Khalaf, 58 N.J. 63, 70 (1971)).
Savings have been used for such security in lieu of directing
the supporting spouse to keep a life insurance policy or
establish a trust. See Jacobitti, supra, 135 N.J. at 582
(upholding an order to create a trust in lieu of life insurance
to ensure "continuing alimony payments for the life of the
dependent spouse"); Davis, supra, 184 N.J. Super. at 436-40
(upholding an order directing the supporting spouse to obtain
and designate the dependent spouse as the beneficiary of a life
insurance policy). In short, savings has been a relevant and
appropriate factor to be considered in the establishment of a
reasonable and equitable alimony award because the amount of
support awarded is subject to review and modification upon a
showing of a change of circumstances, which could result in the
supported spouse being incapable of supporting himself or
herself. See Davis, supra, 184 N.J. Super. at 437.
However, the protection of income being derived through
alimony is not the only reason why a supported spouse requires
savings, especially where regular savings have been part of the
established marital lifestyle. "[A]n appropriate rate of
savings to meet needs in the event of a disaster, to make future
major acquisitions such as automobiles and appliances, and for
retirement can, and in the appropriate case should, be
16 A-3624-13T1
considered as a living expense when considering an award of
. . . [alimony]." Weibel, supra, 965 P.2d at 129-30; see also
Glass, supra, 366 N.J. Super. at 378.
The most "appropriate case" in which to include a savings
component is where the parties' lifestyle included regular
savings. Because it is the manner in which the parties use
their income that is determinative when establishing a marital
lifestyle, see Weishaus, supra, 180 N.J. at 145, there is no
demonstrable difference between one family's habitual use of its
income to fund savings and another family's use of its income to
regularly purchase luxury cars or enjoy extravagant vacations.
The use of family income for either purpose over the course of a
long-term marriage requires the court to consider how the money
is spent in determining the parties' lifestyle, regardless of
whether it was saved or spent on expensive purchases. The fact
that the payment of the support ultimately is protected by life
insurance or other financial tools, does not make the
consideration of the savings component any less appropriate.
The Supreme Court has recognized the need to consider
regular savings in determining a marital lifestyle by including
a line item for monthly savings in Schedule C of the case
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information statement parties must file in family matters.5 See
R. 5:5-2; see also Family Part Case Information Statement,
Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix V(D) to
R. 5:5-2 (2016). While the original case information statement
form did not include a line item for savings, it was changed two
years after implementation to add or subtract certain budget
items so that the form would "more closely track [a family's]
actual expenses." Report of the Supreme Court Committee on
Family Division Practice, 118 N.J.L.J. 117, 130-31 (July 24,
1986). The Supreme Court's Committee on Family Division
Practice recommended a "savings and investments" item, reasoning
that "[a]lthough such a line might be viewed as subject to
abuse, [it] would still appear appropriate because in many
households savings and investments represent a fundamental
portion of an ongoing budget." Id. at 131. The Court adopted
that recommendation and, as stated in Rule 5:5-2(e), the revised
form is required in all actions involving alimony, and copies
must be preserved by the parties as evidence of the marital
5
While deciding an unrelated issue in an earlier case, we also
signaled our recognition of a trial court's need to properly
consider the savings component. See Tannen, supra, 416 N.J.
Super. at 277 (finding judge's consideration of lifestyle
inadequate because he did not consider savings component, among
other factors, as part of parties' lifestyle).
18 A-3624-13T1
standard of living at the time the award was made. R. 5:5-
2(e)(3).
We reject defendant's assertion that the court correctly
addressed the savings component through equitable distribution
of the parties' accounts. The argument runs afoul of the rule
that "equitable distribution determinations are intended to be
in addition to, and not as substitutes for, alimony awards,"
which are awarded to provide for the maintenance of the marital
lifestyle post-dissolution. Steneken, supra, 183 N.J. at 299.
Moreover, it is not equitable to require plaintiff to rely
solely on the assets she received through equitable distribution
to support the standard of living while defendant is not
confronted with the same burden. As expressed under the alimony
statute's current version, the court must recognize that
"neither party ha[s] a greater entitlement to that standard of
living than the other." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(4).
We therefore hold that the Family Part must in its
assessment of a marital lifestyle give due consideration to
evidence of regular savings adhered to by the parties during the
marriage, even if there is no concern about protecting an
alimony award from future modification or cessation upon the
19 A-3624-13T1
death of the supporting spouse.6 We recognize that the majority
of other jurisdictions have not extended their courts'
consideration of the savings component of an alimony award to
the extent we do today, see Glass, supra, 366 N.J. Super. at
377-78 (surveying cases awarding retirement savings as part of
alimony award), but we believe the result is equitable, see id.
at 372, and consistent with our statute.
Having said that, we caution that a court is equally
obligated to consider the marital lifestyle and the financial
situation of the parties post-divorce as set forth in the
statute, and "[n]o factor sh[ould] be elevated in importance
over any other factor unless the court finds otherwise, in which
case the court sh[ould] make specific written findings of fact
and conclusions of law in that regard." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b).
We recognize that the court attempted to identify areas
through which plaintiff might be able to save money at some
level, but the court's suggestions did not amount to a
consideration of savings as part of the parties' standard of
living, especially where there was no dispute that the parties
saved the lion's share of the family's income or that defendant
6
Our holding is limited to the establishment of alimony. We
do not decide in this opinion the extent to which the savings
component should be considered upon a change in circumstances,
such as the payor spouse's retirement.
20 A-3624-13T1
had the ability to continue to fund such savings. We are
therefore constrained to vacate the alimony award and remand for
further consideration by the Family Part consistent with our
holding today, with the understanding that we intimate no
suggestion as to the outcome of that reconsideration by the
court.
[At the direction of the court, the
discussion of the other issues in this
appeal at sections IV, V and VI has been
omitted from the published version of the
opinion.]
VII.
In sum, the trial court's awards of alimony, equitable
distribution, child support, counsel fees and costs are vacated
and remanded for further proceedings consistent with our
decision. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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