State v. June Gorthy(075009) , 226 N.J. 516 ( 2016 )

SYLLABUS
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)
State v. June Gorthy (a/k/a June Governale) (075009) (A-51-14)
Argued March 14, 2016 – Decided September 28, 2016
PATTERSON, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
In this appeal, the Court determines whether a trial court that has found a defendant competent to stand
trial on criminal charges may compel her to assert an insanity defense, based on the evidence presented, where she
has refused to do so.
Through persistent efforts over more than a decade, defendant June Gorthy attempted to commence a
relationship with C.L., a mental health therapist residing in New Jersey whom she met only briefly in 1998 at a
conference in California. After the conference, defendant repeatedly sent C.L. gifts, letters and phone messages,
stating that she was in love with C.L. C.L. categorically rejected these overtures. Defendant then abandoned her
home in Colorado and drove to New Jersey, where she repeatedly contacted C.L. Defendant was arrested when she
was found sitting on the floor in front of C.L.’s office. Defendant was carrying a knife, and, after a consent search
of her truck, the police found several guns, ammunition, including hollow point bullets, another knife and an axe.
Upon her release from jail, she initially complied with instructions not to contact C.L., but then resumed doing so.
Defendant was arrested again, and charged with stalking and weapons offenses. Defendant was released on
bail, and admitted to pre-trial intervention subject to conditions, including that she have no contact with C.L.
Defendant complied until the spring of 2006, when she made seventy-four calls to C.L. over a three-week period.
On November 15, 2006, defendant was charged under a superseding indictment with stalking and weapons offenses.
Defendant filed a pretrial motion challenging her competency to stand trial. After reviewing defendant’s
medical records and mental health evaluation, and questioning defendant, the trial court concluded that she was
competent. Prior to trial, defendant’s counsel served notice that defendant may assert an insanity defense, and
submitted the report of a psychiatrist who opined that defendant was psychotic and delusional at the time of the
alleged offenses. The psychiatrist further opined that, if defendant were to decide not to assert an insanity defense,
she would be doing so knowingly, but not intelligently or voluntarily.
Defendant declined to raise the insanity defense, over the objection of her attorney. The trial court held a
hearing at which the judge explained to defendant the consequences of declining to assert the defense, and of
asserting it and being acquitted by reason of insanity. Defendant continued to refuse to assert an insanity defense.
The trial court concluded that defendant’s delusional condition had limited her ability to knowingly, intelligently
and voluntarily determine whether to raise the defense, and then asserted the defense on her behalf on the stalking
charge. Defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity on that charge, and convicted on the weapons charges.
The court entered an order of civil commitment on the stalking charge, and probation on the weapons convictions.
Defendant appealed her conviction, challenging the trial court’s decision to assert the insanity defense on
her behalf, and also raising several trial errors. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s judgment on the
insanity defense, and remanded for a bifurcated hearing on the insanity defense and the substantive defenses. This
Court summarily remanded for reconsideration as to the insanity defense in light of the Court’s disapproval of
bifurcated proceedings where an insanity defense is raised. On the remand, another panel of the Appellate Division,
in a published opinion, affirmed the trial court’s judgment of acquittal by reason of insanity on the stalking charge.
The panel rejected defendant’s contention that because she was found competent to stand trial, the court should have
permitted her to decline to raise the insanity defense, holding that a defendant’s determination not to raise a defense
is subject to a higher standard than that set by the competency statute. 437 N.J. Super. 339 (App. Div. 2014).
This Court granted defendant’s petition for certification. 221 N.J. 220 (2015).
1
HELD: When a criminal defendant is found competent to stand trial under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4, he or she has the
autonomy to make strategic decisions at trial, with the advice of counsel, including whether to assert the insanity
defense. Based on the trial court’s finding that defendant was competent to stand trial, and the detailed explanation
that it gave defendant of the potential benefits and risks of the insanity defense, the court should have permitted her
to decide whether to assert the defense, rather than invoking it on her behalf. We reverse the trial court’s judgment
of acquittal by reason of insanity on the stalking charge, and remand for a new competency determination and, if
appropriate, a new trial on this charge. We affirm defendant’s conviction on the weapons charges.
1. An important factor in determining whether defendant is competent to stand trial under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4(b) is
whether defendant has the capacity to assist in his or her own defense, which turns on whether defendant’s mental
condition precludes meaningful interaction with his or her attorney regarding the pending charges and the trial.
Where, as here, a court declares a defendant competent to stand trial, the defendant is deemed capable of
understanding the basic elements of the proceeding, interacting with counsel to provide information, and making
decisions about his or her defense. (pp. 17-20)
2. The insanity defense allows the court to determine whether one with mental illness should be held criminally
responsible for his or her conduct under the standard stated in N.J.S.A. 2C:4-1. It is an affirmative defense that
defendant must specifically invoke. If the court finds that defendant lacks the ability to distinguish between right
and wrong, he or she is thereby excused from criminal culpability. If a defendant is acquitted by reason of insanity,
the available options for defendant’s disposition are set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(3). (pp. 20-21)
3. A defendant found competent to stand trial has the right to decline the insanity defense. Prior cases have set forth
the procedure that a trial court should follow in that event. In State v. Handy, 215 N.J. 334 (2013), we rejected the
bifurcated proceeding that the court prescribed in State v. Khan, 175 N.J. Super. 72, 81-82 (App. Div. 1980), when a
defendant seeks to assert both a substantive defense and the insanity defense, and held that a unitary hearing should
occur on all defenses. Accordingly, where the court is advised that the defendant does not plan to assert the insanity
defense notwithstanding evidence that could support the defense, the court should undertake a detailed colloquy at
the conclusion of the State’s case to ensure that defendant understands the ramifications of his or her decision. The
court should: explain the nature and purpose of the defense; describe generally the evidence relevant to that defense,
including expert opinion that could be used to support or counter the defense; inform the defendant of his or her
sentencing exposure in the event of a conviction; describe civil commitment and the other potential dispositions
prescribed by N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b); and confirm the defendant’s understanding of these matters. (pp. 21-25)
4. In this case, after finding defendant competent to stand trial and based on the defense psychiatrist’s report, the
trial court properly conducted a colloquy with defendant regarding her refusal to assert the insanity defense. The
court thereby ensured that defendant had the information that she needed to make an informed decision. The trial
court erred when it declined to respect defendant’s autonomous decision not to assert the insanity defense, and
interposed its own judgment to invoke the defense. To the extent that prior case law suggests otherwise, the Court
declines to follow it. This error warrants a new trial on the stalking charge. The Court rejects defendant’s other
claims of trial error, and affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division upholding the weapons possession
convictions. (pp. 25-32)
5. On remand, the trial court should assess defendant’s competency to stand trial under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4, based on
current information and mental health evaluations. The court should consider, among other issues, whether
defendant’s delusionary condition, if it persists, renders her unable to participate in an adequate presentation of her
defense. If defendant is found competent to stand trial, and declines to invoke the insanity defense, the court should
advise her, at the close of the State’s case, of the defense and the consequences of her choice, and then respect the
decision that defendant makes. (pp. 27-32)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART, and the
matter is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and
SOLOMON; and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned), join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion.
2
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-51 September Term 2014
075009
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JUNE GORTHY (a/k/a JUNE
GOVERNALE),
Defendant-Appellant.
Argued March 14, 2016 – Decided September 28, 2016
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is
reported at 437 N.J. Super. 339 (App. Div.
2014).
Michele A. Adubato, Designated Counsel,
argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E.
Krakora, Public Defender, attorney).
Mary R. Juliano, Special Deputy Attorney
General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued
the cause for respondent (Christopher J.
Gramiccioni, Acting Monmouth County
Prosecutor, attorney).
Emily R. Anderson, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney
General of New Jersey (Robert Lougy, Acting
Attorney General, attorney).
JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
When a criminal defendant is found competent to stand trial
under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4, he or she has the autonomy to make
strategic decisions at trial, with the advice of counsel. Among
1
those decisions is the choice whether or not to assert the
insanity defense, which absolves a defendant of criminal
responsibility for his or her conduct, if at the time of such
conduct the defendant “was laboring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he
did not know what he was doing was wrong.” N.J.S.A. 2C:4-1.
This appeal requires the Court to determine whether a trial
court that has found a defendant competent may compel that
defendant to assert the insanity defense, notwithstanding the
defendant’s decision not to raise that defense. Defendant June
Gorthy was charged with stalking and weapons offenses. The
charges arose from defendant’s persistent attempts, over more
than a decade, to contact a New Jersey woman whom she had met
only briefly and who categorically rejected defendant’s
advances. Abandoning her Colorado home, defendant drove to New
Jersey and repeatedly contacted the woman despite police
warnings to cease doing so. When defendant was arrested,
several weapons and hollow point bullets were found in her
possession.
At the request of defense counsel, the trial court
considered defendant’s competence to stand trial. Although
mental health experts agreed that defendant’s conduct stemmed
from a delusional disorder that caused her to believe that she
2
and the victim of her alleged stalking had a consensual romantic
relationship, defendant indicated that she understood basic
components of the judicial process, and the trial court found
her competent to stand trial. At trial, defendant decided to
forego the insanity defense, over the objection of her attorney.
However, the trial court concluded that by virtue of her
delusion, defendant could not knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waive the insanity defense, and asserted that
defense on her behalf. Defendant was acquitted of the stalking
charge by reason of insanity, convicted of the two remaining
charges, sentenced to probation, and civilly committed.
The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s judgment
with respect to the insanity defense, rejected defendant’s
contention that the trial court had committed evidentiary
errors, and remanded for a new trial. This Court summarily
remanded the case for reconsideration as to the insanity
defense, and, on remand, the Appellate Division affirmed the
trial court’s judgment of acquittal by reason of insanity on the
stalking charge. State v. Gorthy, 437 N.J. Super. 339, 347-48
(App. Div. 2014). We granted defendant’s petition for
certification.
We hold that in light of the trial court’s finding that
defendant was competent to stand trial, and the court’s detailed
explanation of the potential benefits and risks of the insanity
3
defense in a colloquy with defendant, the trial court should
have permitted defendant to decide whether or not to assert the
defense. However unwise defendant’s strategy may have been, it
constituted a competent defendant’s decision about the conduct
of her defense. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s
judgment of acquittal by reason of insanity on the stalking
charge. We remand for a new competency determination and, if
appropriate, a new trial on that charge. Because defendant’s
delusion was unrelated to her conviction for the two weapons
offenses, and the trial errors that she alleges did not deprive
her of a fair trial, we affirm her conviction for those
offenses.
I.
We summarize the facts based on the record of the pretrial
proceedings, including the mental health evaluations submitted
to the trial court and the trial record.
In 1998, defendant, then a resident of Colorado, met a New
Jersey-based therapist, C.L., at an event described as an
“intensive therapy” or “personal growth” workshop in California.
The workshop was conducted by C.L. and another mental health
professional. Following the workshop, defendant sent C.L.
gifts, which C.L. rejected. After defendant attended another
workshop conducted by C.L. in 1999, she began sending letters
and leaving phone messages for C.L., stating that she was in
4
love with C.L. and wanted to be with her. Despite C.L.’s prompt
and definitive rejection of defendant’s advances, and her
unequivocal advice that defendant needed professional help,
defendant repeatedly attempted to contact C.L. over the course
of several years.
In 2002, defendant packed her belongings in a trailer and
drove from Colorado to New Jersey. On July 8, 2002, defendant
left a voicemail for C.L. The next day, C.L. found a note from
defendant, written on a napkin, on her office door. The note
stated that defendant was in the municipality in which C.L.
maintained her office, and that defendant wanted to see C.L.
C.L. contacted the police. An officer found defendant
sitting on the floor in front of C.L.’s office. After defendant
produced a knife that she was carrying and consented to the
search of her truck, the officer found several guns, ammunition
including hollow point bullets, another knife, and an axe.
Defendant told the officer that the guns were registered in
Colorado. Defendant was arrested. When she was released a week
later, she was advised not to communicate with C.L. Five months
later, defendant resumed her attempts to contact C.L.
Defendant was arrested again. She was charged with fourth-
degree stalking, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(b), third-degree unlawful
possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b), fourth-degree
possession of a prohibited weapon (hollow point bullets),
5
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f), and fourth-degree contempt, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-
9(a). She was released on bail, and ordered not to contact C.L.
Defendant was admitted into the pretrial intervention program
(PTI), pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12 and Rule 3:28, with two
conditions: that she refrain from any contact with C.L., and
that she participate in mental health treatment and counseling.
Defendant was compliant with her PTI conditions until the
spring of 2006, when she made seventy-four calls to C.L. in a
three-week period. Defendant was arrested after police received
a report that she was harassing pedestrians in the municipality
in which C.L. maintained an office. Officers reported that
defendant misidentified herself, using C.L.’s last name and
address.
Thereafter, defendant’s PTI status was terminated by court
order due to her violation of the imposed conditions. On
November 15, 2006, a grand jury returned a superseding
indictment for the same offenses as the original indictment
other than fourth-degree contempt, with the time period of the
stalking count expanded to include the most recent incidents.
Defendant filed a pretrial motion challenging her
competency to stand trial under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4. After
reviewing medical records and mental health evaluations, the
trial court questioned defendant about her mental health history
and alleged offenses. Defendant insisted that C.L. had
6
initiated contact with her by appearing at locations in New
Jersey where defendant was riding her bicycle, jogging, or
driving, and stated her belief that she had been “welcome and
warmly invited” to move to New Jersey.
Defendant’s counsel referred the court to reports by mental
health professionals diagnosing defendant with schizophrenia,
paranoid type, delusional disorder, and other conditions. With
defendant interposing an “objection” to her counsel’s
statements, the attorney represented to the trial court that
defendant was incapable of assisting in her defense, and was
therefore incompetent to stand trial under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-
4(b)(2)(g). Relying on defendant’s apparent comprehension of
the trial process and the consequences of strategic decisions in
her case, the State argued that, notwithstanding her delusion,
defendant was competent to be tried.
In accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:4-5, the trial court ordered
mental health evaluations of defendant to determine whether she
was competent, and appointed a psychiatrist, Amir Rizvi, M.D.,
and a psychologist, Nichole Waldron, Psy.D., to conduct those
evaluations. Although the mental health experts did not
precisely agree on defendant’s diagnosis, both concluded that
defendant suffered from a delusional disorder. Nonetheless,
both experts opined that defendant was competent to stand trial.
7
After reviewing defendant’s evaluations and questioning
defendant in detail during a second hearing, the trial court
concluded that defendant was competent to stand trial. The
trial court found that defendant had “the mental capacity to
appreciate [her] presence in relation to time, place and
things[,]” as required by N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4(b)(1). The trial
court determined that defendant grasped the fact that she was
charged with a criminal offense in a court of justice, that she
understood the functions of the judge, the prosecutor, and the
jury, that she was aware that she had a lawyer who would defend
her, that she appreciated her obligations if she testified and
her right not to testify, and that she recognized the
ramifications of a guilty plea. N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4(b)(2)(a) to
(f). Without elaborating, the court referred to evidence
demonstrating defendant’s ability to participate in an adequate
presentation of her defense. N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4(b)(2)(g). The
trial court ordered that defendant follow the mental health
professionals’ recommendations regarding medication and other
treatment.
Prior to trial, defendant’s counsel served notice on the
court and the State that defendant “may assert the defense of
insanity pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 2C:4-1],” and submitted to the
trial court the report of a defense psychiatrist, Kenneth J.
Weiss, M.D. Dr. Weiss opined that, at the time of the alleged
8
offenses that gave rise to the stalking charge and defendant’s
PTI violation, defendant was “psychotic and delusional” and “did
not have the residual ability to know that she would be placing
the victim in fear of bodily injury or to know that she was
doing wrong.” Dr. Weiss explained that defendant’s mental
condition met the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:4-1, the New
Jersey statute governing the insanity defense, but that by
virtue of her delusion, if defendant were to decide not to
assert the insanity defense, she would do so knowingly but not
intelligently or voluntarily.
The trial court held a hearing pursuant to the Appellate
Division’s decision in State v. Khan, 175 N.J. Super. 72, 81-82
(App. Div. 1980), overruled by State v. Handy, 215 N.J. 334, 349
(2013), to assess the potential role of the insanity defense in
defendant’s trial. The court explained to defendant that if she
declined to assert the insanity defense and were convicted at
trial, she could be sentenced to a maximum of three to five
years in prison, but that if she were found not guilty by reason
of insanity, she “would not face incarceration in New Jersey
State Prison.” Citing N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8, the court explained that
in the event of defendant’s acquittal by reason of insanity, she
could be released with or without supervision or conditions, or
civilly committed, but that she “wouldn’t go back to jail[.]”
9
Defendant objected to the assertion of the insanity
defense. She stated that her attorney had told her that “with
the insanity defense, there’s hospital time though, which is
still imprisonment.” Defendant insisted to the court that she
was not guilty of stalking, and that she had an ongoing
relationship with the alleged victim. She repeated her
contention that C.L. had invited her to New Jersey. She claimed
that C.L.’s former colleague, with whom C.L. had conducted the
workshop in 1998, had “sabotaged” her relationship with C.L.,
and suggested that the colleague, not C.L., had contacted police
about defendant.
The trial court found that the factual defense articulated
by defendant -- that she and C.L. had a consensual relationship
-- was premised on a delusion. It concluded that by virtue of
her delusional condition, which had limited her ability to form
judgments about her case, defendant was unable to knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily decide not to assert the insanity
defense. The court then stated its intention to assert the
insanity defense on defendant’s behalf at trial with respect to
the stalking charge.
Defendant was tried before a jury. C.L. testified about
defendant’s attempts to contact her, the steps that she took to
try to protect herself from defendant, the fear that she
experienced because of defendant’s conduct, and the disruptive
10
impact of that conduct on her career and personal life. Police
officers described defendant’s behavior during various
incidents.
Defendant testified in her own defense. She told the jury
that C.L. had invited her to New Jersey, that C.L. had
repeatedly called her, that a police officer had advised her to
attempt to contact C.L., and that C.L.’s former colleague had
sabotaged her relationship with C.L. Dr. Weiss testified about
defendant’s mental condition, in support of the insanity defense
to the stalking charge.
The jury found defendant not guilty by reason of insanity
of the stalking charge, and guilty of the two weapons charges,
possession of a prohibited weapon and unlawful possession of a
weapon.
In the wake of defendant’s acquittal by reason of insanity
on the stalking charge, the trial court held a hearing in
accordance with Rule 3:19-2, N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8, and State v. Krol,
68 N.J. 236, 257 (1975). It found that if defendant were
released without supervision or conditions, she would pose a
danger to the community and to herself. The court civilly
committed defendant to the custody of the Commissioner of the
Department of Human Services for a period not to exceed eighteen
months. Defendant was sentenced to non-custodial probation for
11
her conviction of the weapons charges, and ordered, as a
condition of probation, that she refrain from contact with C.L.
Defendant appealed her conviction. Although defendant did
not contest the trial court’s competency determination, she
disputed the trial court’s decision to assert the insanity
defense on her behalf. Defendant also raised several alleged
trial errors: that the trial court erroneously admitted
evidence regarding weapons that were found in a locked gun case
in her trailer but were not specifically charged in the
indictment, that the prosecutor had asked improper questions and
made inappropriate comments, and that the court did not respond
correctly to the jury’s questions during deliberations. An
Appellate Division panel affirmed defendant’s convictions on the
two weapons charges but remanded the stalking charge for a
bifurcated trial on defendant’s substantive defenses and
insanity defense in accordance with another panel’s decision in
Handy, supra, 215 N.J. at 597-600.
We granted the State’s petition for certification, and
remanded the case to the Appellate Division for reconsideration
in light of our decision in Handy, supra, 215 N.J. at 364.
State v. Gorthy, 216 N.J. 2 (2013). In Handy, supra, we held
that when a competent defendant asserts a substantive defense
and the insanity defense, both defenses should be determined in
a unitary proceeding. 215 N.J. at 349. We thereby disapproved
12
of a bifurcated proceeding that had been adopted by the
Appellate Division in Khan, supra, 175 N.J. Super. at 84.
On remand, another Appellate Division panel issued a
published opinion, finding that the trial court’s procedure had
conformed to Handy, and affirmed defendant’s acquittal by reason
of insanity. Gorthy, supra, 437 N.J. Super. at 347-48. Relying
on Handy, the panel rejected defendant’s contention that because
she was deemed competent to stand trial, the trial court should
have permitted her to decline to raise the insanity defense.
Id. at 342-44. The appellate panel held that the requirement
that a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
decide not to raise a defense sets a higher standard than does
the competency statute. Id. at 344. The panel found that
defendant’s statements to the trial court were unrelated “to any
legal issue or consequence.” Id. at 347.
We granted defendant’s petition for certification. 221
N.J. 220 (2015). We also granted the Attorney General’s motion
for leave to participate as amicus curiae.
II.
Defendant argues that the trial court improperly considered
the potential merits of her insanity defense in determining that
she could not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive
the defense. She contends that the only question is whether, at
the time of trial, the defendant is capable of rationally
13
waiving the insanity defense. Defendant asserts that she
expressed an intelligent reason for her decision to forego the
insanity defense: her fear that she would be civilly committed
if acquitted of stalking by reason of insanity, which she
characterized in her colloquy with the trial court as “hospital
time.” Defendant also contends that she was deprived of a fair
trial because of testimony about her possession of weapons other
than those involved in the charges against her, comments by the
prosecutor, and the trial court’s erroneous response to
questions posed by the jury during deliberations.
The State asserts that both findings by the trial court --
that defendant was competent to stand trial, and that she was
incapable of a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision not
to assert the insanity defense -- were supported by substantial
credible evidence. The State argues that a trial court’s
decision to interpose the insanity defense over a competent
defendant’s objection implicates competing concerns: society’s
interest in withholding punishment when a defendant’s mental
illness renders him or her morally blameless, and respect for a
defendant’s autonomy in the adversarial process. It contends
that had defendant been convicted of stalking after refusing to
assert the insanity defense, the result would have been unjust.
The State denies that the trial court committed errors in the
14
admission of evidence or in its response to the jury’s
questions.
The Attorney General as amicus curiae concurs with the
State that the standard by which a court assesses a defendant’s
capacity to decide not to raise the insanity defense differs
from the standard of competency, and characterizes the trial
court’s decision as a “knowing and voluntary” determination
based on the defendant’s testimony and expert opinion. The
Attorney General urges the Court to permit trial judges to
interpose the insanity defense if a criminal defendant is not
able to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily decide not to
raise that defense.
III.
A.
The primary question raised by defendant in this appeal is
whether the trial court properly interposed the insanity defense
on her behalf, notwithstanding its prior rejection of
defendant’s position that she was incompetent to stand trial.
In that inquiry, we review the trial court’s factual findings in
accordance with a deferential standard, disturbing them “only if
they are so clearly mistaken ‘that the interests of justice
demand intervention and correction.’” State v. Elders, 192 N.J.
224, 244 (2007) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162
(1964)). Our construction of the relevant statutory provisions,
15
however, entails a de novo review of the trial court’s
determination. State v. Goodwin, 224 N.J. 102, 110 (2016)
(“Accordingly, the Appellate Division’s interpretative
conclusions are owed no deference, and we review the statute
with ‘fresh eyes.’”) (quoting Fair Share Hous. Ctr., Inc. v.
N.J. State League of Municipalities, 207 N.J. 489, 493 n.1
(2011)); see also State v. Tate, 220 N.J. 393, 405 (2015).
In a ruling that is not challenged in this appeal, the
trial court determined that defendant was competent to stand
trial, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4. That statute provides that
“[n]o person who lacks capacity to understand the proceedings
against him or to assist in his own defense shall be tried,
convicted or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long
as such incapacity endures.” N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4(a). The court
decides whether a competency hearing is required; there are “no
fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for
further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed.” Drope v.
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180, 95 S. Ct. 896, 908, 43 L. Ed. 2d
103, 118 (1975); see also State v. Lambert, 275 N.J. Super. 125,
129 (App. Div. 1994) (holding “[t]he evidence necessary to
establish the requisite bona fide doubt as to a defendant’s
competence is difficult to articulate”); State v. Cecil, 260
N.J. Super. 475, 480 (App. Div. 1992) (same), certif. denied,
133 N.J. 431 (1993).
16
In a competency proceeding, the State has the burden to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s
mental condition at the time of trial does not render him or her
incompetent to stand trial. State v. McNeil, 405 N.J. Super.
39, 49 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 199 N.J. 130 (2009); State
v. Purnell, 394 N.J. Super. 28, 47 (App. Div. 2007) (citing
Lambert, supra, 275 N.J. Super. at 129). The court is assisted
by evaluations by one or more mental health professionals, who
report to the court regarding the defendant’s condition and his
or her ability to understand and participate in the legal
process. N.J.S.A. 2C:4-5(a), (b).
The statute sets forth findings that the court must make in
order to find the defendant mentally competent. N.J.S.A. 2C:4-
4(b). The court determines the defendant’s “capacity to
appreciate his presence in relation to time, place and
things[,]” and his or her understanding of several aspects of
the court process. N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4(b)(1).
An important component of the inquiry is the question
whether the defendant has the capacity to assist in his or her
own defense. See N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4(a) (barring prosecution of
person lacking capacity to “assist in his own defense”);
N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4(b)(2)(g) (identifying “the ability to
participate in an adequate presentation of his defense” as
factor in competency determination). The State need not prove
17
that the defendant is capable of formulating legal strategy; as
this Court has noted, “[t]o assist in his defense of course does
not refer to legal questions involved but to such phases of a
defense as a defendant usually assists in, such as accounts of
the facts, names of witnesses, etc.” Aponte v. State, 30 N.J.
441, 453 (1959) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961, 78 S. Ct. 997, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1067
(1958)); Khan, supra, 175 N.J. Super. at 79. Nor must the State
prove that the defendant can communicate with his counsel using
complex language. See State v. Coleman, 46 N.J. 16, 40 (1965)
(“It is well recognized that an accused may have a mental
disorder but may nevertheless understand his position and be
able to assist fully in his own defense.”), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 950, 86 S. Ct. 1210, 16 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1966); State v.
Pugh, 117 N.J. Super. 26, 32 (App. Div. 1971) (finding defendant
competent, as he could “understand when simpler words and
sentence structure were used[,]” and no evidence suggested
“defendant could not reasonably comprehend his position and
consult with his lawyer”), certif. denied, 60 N.J. 22 (1972).
The question of a defendant’s ability to assist in his or her
defense turns on whether his or her mental condition precludes
meaningful interaction with his or her attorney with respect to
the pending charges and the trial.
18
If the defendant is found unfit for trial, the proceedings
against him or her are suspended, subject to exceptions
identified in the statute, and the court decides whether the
defendant will be civilly committed or released, with or without
conditions. N.J.S.A. 2C:4-6(b).1
When, as here, a court declares a defendant competent to
stand trial, the defendant is deemed capable of understanding
the basic elements of the proceeding, interacting with counsel
to provide information and obtain advice, and making decisions
about his or her defense, at the time of trial. See N.J.S.A.
2C:4-4(b); State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 457 (2004) (noting
defendant’s “soliloquy to the court . . . demonstrates that [he]
knew his where-abouts, the nature of the proceedings and of the
charges, and the role of the different actors”), cert. denied,
545 U.S. 1145, 125 S. Ct. 2973, 162 L. Ed. 2d 898 (2005);
Coleman, supra, 46 N.J. at 41 (concluding defendant’s condition
did not render him incompetent because he “understood his
1 The trial court determines whether “the defendant is so
dangerous to himself or others” that civil commitment is
warranted, or, in the alternative, “proceed[s] to determine
whether placement in an out-patient setting or release is
appropriate[.]” N.J.S.A. 2C:4-6(b). Should the defendant fail
to regain competency within three months, the court holds a
hearing to decide “whether the charges against [the defendant]
shall be dismissed with prejudice or held in abeyance.”
N.J.S.A. 2C:4-6(c).
19
situation, was able to consult intelligently with counsel, and
was able to proceed with the trial”).
B.
The defense at the heart of this case “exists . . . not to
identify the mentally ill, but rather to determine who among the
mentally ill should be held criminally responsible for their
conduct.” State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 157, 173 (2012) (citing
State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 470 (1965)). “As the ‘standard
for determining criminal responsibility, the insanity defense
draws on principles of moral blameworthiness.’” State v.
Winder, 200 N.J. 231, 242 (2009) (quoting State v. Worlock, 117
N.J. 596, 602 (1990)). Codifying the rule of M’Naghten’s Case,
8 Eng. Rep. 719 (H.L. 1843), the Legislature prescribed the
standard for criminal insanity in N.J.S.A. 2C:4-1:
A person is not criminally responsible for
conduct if at the time of such conduct he was
laboring under such a defect of reason, from
disease of the mind as not to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing, or if he
did know it, that he did not know what he was
doing was wrong.
The insanity defense is “an affirmative defense which must
be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” N.J.S.A. 2C:4-1.
In order to rely on the insanity defense at trial, a defendant
must provide the State with pretrial notice of his or her
intention to assert the defense, in accordance with N.J.S.A.
2C:4-3 and Rule 3:12-1. It is, accordingly, a defense that must
20
be affirmatively invoked by the defendant if it is to play a
role at trial.
As this Court has observed, “one who meets the test for
insanity, that is, one who lacks the ability to distinguish
between right and wrong, is thereby excused from criminal
culpability.” Handy, supra, 215 N.J. at 357 (citing Worlock,
supra, 117 N.J. at 601). Following acquittal by reason of
insanity, a court may: (1) release the defendant without
supervision, if it finds that such a release would be “without
danger to the community or himself,” N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(1); (2)
release the defendant under supervision or conditions, N.J.S.A.
2C:4-8(b)(2); or (3) civilly commit the defendant if it finds
“that the defendant cannot be released with or without
supervision or conditions without posing a danger to the
community or to himself,” N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(3).
Our courts have previously considered whether a trial court
should respect or overrule a competent defendant’s decision to
forego a viable insanity defense, when the defendant suffers
from a delusionary condition at the time of trial. In Khan,
supra, the defendant, charged with the murder of a tenant at his
aunt’s home, insisted that the victim had attacked him with a
hammer and that he had shot the victim in self-defense. 175
N.J. Super. at 76. Mental health experts opined that the
defendant’s version of the shooting –– and his self-defense
21
justification –– were the product of a paranoid delusion. Id.
at 76-77. Despite that expert evidence, the defendant refused
to permit his counsel to raise the insanity defense on his
behalf. Id. at 76. The three judges who considered the
defendant’s competency at different stages disagreed as to
whether he was competent to stand trial. Id. at 77-79.
An Appellate Division panel ordered a remand for a new
competency hearing in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4 and -6.
Id. at 77-80. The panel held that a trial court is authorized
to “raise an insanity defense sua sponte only if the defendant
is not capable of making, and has not made, an intelligent and
voluntary decision.” Id. at 81 (quoting Frendak v. United
States, 408 A.2d 364, 379 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979)). It also set
forth a procedure to be followed on remand in the event that the
defendant was held competent, yet persisted in his refusal to
assert the insanity defense, and the trial court interposed that
defense on his or her behalf. Ibid. The panel instructed trial
courts to conduct a bifurcated proceeding in that situation,
with the insanity defense imposed by the court tried first, and
the defendant’s substantive defense to be considered second, if
the jury did not acquit him or her by reason of insanity. Id.
at 84.
In Handy, supra, we rejected the bifurcated proceeding
prescribed by the Appellate Division in Khan. 215 N.J. at 349-
22
50. The appeal in Handy arose from the defendant’s acquittal by
reason of insanity of the murder of his uncle, in the first
phase of a bifurcated trial. Id. at 340, 344. A mental health
expert testified that, by virtue of a delusional disorder, the
defendant believed that the victim was one of a large group of
people who had beaten and sexually abused him in a hospital, and
that, as a result of his mental condition, the defendant did not
appreciate that his act was wrongful. Id. at 340-41, 344. We
held that when a defendant seeks to assert both a substantive
defense and the insanity defense, both defenses should be
adjudicated in a unitary trial, not a bifurcated proceeding as
envisioned by the Appellate Division panel in Khan. Id. at 349.
Although our primary focus in Handy was the appropriate
procedure for adjudicating an insanity defense and a substantive
defense, we briefly commented on the trial court’s decision to
“foist the insanity defense” on the defendant. Id. at 360. We
acknowledged the “merit in [the] general conclusion” that a
defendant has the right to decline the insanity defense. Ibid.
(citing Cecil, supra, 260 N.J. Super. at 489-90). Noting that
that the Code “does not distinguish between competence to stand
trial and competence to make other kinds of decisions relating
to one’s defense,” we prescribed “a thorough and searching
inquiry of an otherwise competent defendant concerning his or
her understanding of the nature of the right being waived and
23
the implications that flow from that choice[.]” Id. at 362
(citing State v. Crisafi, 128 N.J. 499, 509-10 (1992)).
Accordingly, in the event that the court is advised by
counsel that the defendant does not plan to assert the insanity
defense notwithstanding evidence that could support that
defense, it should undertake a detailed colloquy at the
conclusion of the State’s case in order to ensure that defendant
understands the ramifications of his or her decision.2 The court
should explain to the defendant the nature and purpose of the
defense. It should generally describe the evidence relevant to
that defense, including expert opinion that could be used to
support or counter that defense. The court should inform the
defendant of his or her sentencing exposure in the event of a
conviction. It should describe civil commitment and the other
potential dispositions that are prescribed by N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)
in the event of an acquittal by reason of insanity. The court
should confirm the defendant’s understanding of the insanity
2 When, as in this case, defense counsel informs the court that
the defendant has rejected the advice of counsel to assert the
insanity defense, counsel’s representation is a strong
indication that the court should conduct a colloquy with the
defendant about the defense. There may be circumstances in
which the court determines that a colloquy is appropriate,
despite the failure of defense counsel to raise the issue before
the court. That said, we rely on defense counsel to present
this issue.
24
defense as it may affect the outcome of the trial, defendant’s
risk of incarceration and the prospect of civil commitment.
Having found the defendant to be competent and explained
the consequences of the defendant’s decision, the trial court
should respect the defendant’s independent choice. A competent
defendant is deemed capable of deciding whether or not to assert
a defense. See N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4.3 His or her decision may not
align with counsel’s considered advice. It may not represent
sound trial strategy. It constitutes, however an exercise of
the defendant’s autonomy.
Accordingly, if the trial court has made a finding of
competency, it should not interpose its own judgment for that of
the defendant, but should respect the defendant’s choice. To
the extent that our case law suggests otherwise, we decline to
follow it. See Handy, supra, 215 N.J. at 362; see also State v.
Marut, 361 N.J. Super. 431, 444-47 (App. Div. 2003), certif.
denied, 190 N.J. 256 (2007); Cecil, supra, 260 N.J. Super. at
488-90; Khan, supra, 175 N.J. Super. at 80-84.
C.
In the competency determination conducted in this case, the
trial court found that defendant understood the trial process
3 We note that a defendant’s refusal to assert the insanity
defense, without more, does not compel the conclusion that he or
she is unable to “participate in an adequate presentation of his
[or her] defense.” See N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4(b)(2)(g).
25
and the fundamental choices that she would be called upon to
make. It concluded that defendant was capable of actively
participating in her defense. Thus, before its hearing on the
insanity defense began, the court had already determined that
defendant had the capacity to understand and participate in
trial strategy, and to make decisions on her own behalf.
After finding defendant competent and receiving Dr. Weiss’s
report, the trial court properly conducted a colloquy with
defendant regarding her refusal to assert the insanity defense.4
In that colloquy, the trial court summarized Dr. Weiss’s opinion
to defendant, who disputed the expert’s findings. Defendant
asserted that although her judgment had been “somewhat impaired”
by financial concerns and alleged threats by C.L.’s colleague
when she left Colorado for New Jersey, she was not “completely
out of [her] faculties” at that time. The court advised
defendant that she might be incarcerated if convicted of the
alleged offenses, but that she would not be incarcerated for the
stalking offense if she were found not guilty of that charge by
reason of insanity. The court explained in detail the options
4The trial court did not conduct a bifurcated proceeding as
directed by the Appellate Division panel in Khan, supra, 175
N.J. Super. at 84, in which the insanity defense would be
adjudicated first and the substantive defense reached only if
the factfinder rejected that defense. The trial court tried the
case as a unitary proceeding, which was consistent with this
Court’s subsequent decision in Handy, supra, 215 N.J. at 360.
26
that would be available to it under state law, including civil
commitment and an order releasing defendant with or without
supervision and conditions, in the event of an acquittal by
reason of insanity. In short, the trial court ensured that
defendant had the information that she needed to make a decision
whether to assert or forego the insanity defense.
The trial court’s thorough explanation was reflected by
defendant’s responses to the court’s comments. Although she did
not express herself in sophisticated language or legal terms,
defendant conveyed to the court two objections to the insanity
defense: first, she did not believe that she was legally insane
at the time of her offense; and second, she wanted to avoid
civil commitment, a prospect that she equated to incarceration.
Defendant clearly understood – and rejected - her counsel’s
professional advice and the trial court’s cautionary comments.
Although defendant’s decision not to assert the insanity defense
may have been imprudent, it was nonetheless an informed exercise
of her free will.
Accordingly, the trial court erred when it declined to
respect defendant’s autonomy in the decision whether to assert
the insanity defense. That error warrants a new trial on the
stalking charge. On remand, the trial court should assess
defendant’s competency in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4, based
on current information and mental health evaluations. The court
27
should consider, among other issues, the question whether
defendant’s delusionary condition, if it persists, renders her
unable to participate in an adequate presentation of her
defense. N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4(a), (b)(2)(g). If defendant is found
competent to stand trial, and declines to invoke the insanity
defense despite the availability of evidence to support that
defense, the court should advise defendant about the defense and
the consequences of her choice at the close of the State’s case.
IV.
Defendant contends that the trial court committed other
errors that deprived her of a fair trial and warrant the
reversal of her convictions for weapons offenses.
First, defendant contends that the trial court abused its
discretion when it admitted evidence that at the time of her
arrest, she possessed certain weapons that were not the basis
for either of her weapons charges. At trial, defendant objected
to the evidence on the ground that it violated N.J.R.E. 403,
which authorizes the exclusion of relevant evidence “if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of (a)
undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury or
(b) undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.” After conducting a hearing pursuant to
N.J.R.E. 104, the trial court determined that the evidence was
relevant to the stalking charge, because the number and type of
28
weapons in defendant’s possession could have affected the extent
to which a reasonable person would be put in fear of bodily
injury or death. The court, however, permitted only the
testimony of an officer regarding the weapons, and barred the
admission of the actual weapons and photographs depicting them.
The Appellate Division affirmed that ruling.
We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse
of discretion. State v. T.J.M., 220 N.J. 220, 233-34 (2015);
State v. Buda, 195 N.J. 278, 294 (2008). We concur with the
Appellate Division’s determination that the trial court properly
exercised its discretion. The disputed evidence bore a direct
nexus to defendant’s stalking charge, and accordingly was
intrinsic to one of defendant’s alleged offenses. See State v.
Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 177-78 (2011) (holding evidence intrinsic to
charged crime need only satisfy N.J.R.E. 403 and other relevancy
rules); State v. Brockington, 439 N.J. Super. 311, 325 (App.
Div. 2015) (“Since the [intrinsic] evidence is properly subject
to an analysis under N.J.R.E. 403 and meets the criteria for
admissibility under that rule, it is unnecessary to consider its
admissibility under N.J.R.E. 404(b).”). The evidence at issue
therefore satisfied the relevancy and admissibility standards of
N.J.R.E. 401 and 402, and its probative value was not
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect for purposes
of N.J.R.E. 403. The evidence was properly admitted.
29
Defendant next argues that she was denied a fair trial on
her weapons offenses due to a single instance of prosecutorial
misconduct: the prosecutor’s comment, in summation, that the
gun found by police officers with defendant is “not a toy,” and
that it “gives fear, it brings about death, it can kill, it can
maim, it can destroy families.”
“[I]t is well-established that prosecuting attorneys,
within reasonable limitations, are afforded considerable leeway
in making opening statements and summations.” State v.
Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 443 (2007) (quoting State v. DiFrisco,
137 N.J. 434, 474 (1994)), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1146, 128 S.
Ct. 1074, 169 L. Ed. 2d 817 (2008). “Prosecutorial misconduct
is a basis for reversal of a criminal conviction if the conduct
was so egregious that it deprived the defendant of the right to
a fair trial.” State v. Josephs, 174 N.J. 44, 124 (2002).
Generally, however, a “fleeting and isolated” remark is not
grounds for reversal. State v. Watson, 224 N.J. Super. 354, 362
(App. Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 620, cert. denied, 488
U.S. 983, 109 S. Ct. 535, 102 L. Ed. 2d 566 (1988). When, as
here, the defendant does not object to the prosecutor’s
statement, that statement does not warrant reversal of the
conviction unless it is “of such a nature as to have been
clearly capable of producing an unjust result.” R. 2:10-2.
30
We agree with the Appellate Division that the prosecutor’s
comment was not so egregious as to require a new trial on her
weapons offenses. This was a single remark about the impact of
a gun on a potential victim, in a trial in which the reaction of
a reasonable person to the defendant’s conduct was directly
relevant to her stalking charge. In light of the evidence
presented regarding defendant’s possession of the weapons, the
prosecutor’s comment was not clearly capable of producing an
unjust result.
Finally, defendant contends that the trial court committed
plain error when it responded to three questions posed by the
jury, with no objection from defendant. The jury’s first
inquiry was “[w]hen did [defendant] enter the State of New
Jersey and when was she searched?” The trial court restated the
sparse information on that issue, advising the jury that C.L.
found a message from defendant stating that defendant was “here”
on July 8, 2002, and that defendant’s vehicle was searched on
July 10, 2002. Second, the jury asked, “[i]s there a grace
period to register guns in New Jersey?” The trial court
properly reread to the jury the relevant provision of the
statute governing the offense of unlawful possession of a
handgun without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b). The jury also
asked, “[d]oes knowingly and willingly clause apply to
[defendant’s weapons charges]?” The trial court read to the
31
jury the relevant statutes, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f) and -5(b), and
summarized the elements of each offense. In each case, the
trial court properly responded to the jury’s inquiry. See State
v. Scher, 278 N.J. Super. 249, 271 (App. Div. 1994) (noting
trial court properly repeated jury instructions in response to
jury question about relevant legal principles), certif. denied,
140 N.J. 276 (1995). The court did not commit error, much less
plain error, in responding to the jury’s questions.
V.
The judgment of the Appellate Division with respect to
defendant’s conviction for possession of a prohibited weapon and
unlawful possession of a weapon is affirmed. The judgment of
the Appellate Division, affirming the trial court’s judgment of
acquittal by reason of insanity on the charge of stalking, is
reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, FERNANDEZ-
VINA, and SOLOMON; and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned), join
in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion.
32