United States v. Inong , 58 M.J. 460 ( 2003 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Miguel E. INONG, Damage Controlman
First Class (E-6)
U.S. Navy, Appellant
No. 00-0327
Crim. App. No. 9801667
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued April 9, 2003
Decided July 10, 2003
CRAWFORD, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which GIERKE, EFFRON, and ERDMANN, JJ., joined. BAKER, J.,
filed a separate opinion concurring in part and in the result.
Counsel
For Appellant: Major Anthony C. Williams, USMC (argued and on
brief).
For Appellee: Lieutenant Lori McCurdy, JAGC, USNR (argued);
Colonel Rose M. Favors, USMC (on brief).
Military Judge: G. N. Gonzalez
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO EDITORIAL CORRECTION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Inong, No. 00-0327/NA
Chief Judge CRAWFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
Pursuant to his pleas, Appellant was convicted by a
military judge sitting as a general court-martial of conspiracy
to commit larceny, desertion, larceny, making and uttering bad
checks, housebreaking, and carrying a concealed weapon, in
violation of Articles 81, 85, 121, 123a, 130, and 134, Uniform
Code of Military Justice [hereinafter UCMJ], 10 U.S.C.
§§ 881, 885, 921, 923a, 930, and 934 (2000), respectively. He
was sentenced to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for three
years, total forfeitures, and reduction to the lowest enlisted
grade. The convening authority approved the sentence but
suspended confinement in excess of 20 months in accordance with
the terms of a pretrial agreement between Appellant and the
convening authority.
The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed
the findings and sentence in a short-form, unpublished opinion.
United States v. Inong, NMCM No. 98-01667 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App.
Sep. 29, 1999). Thereafter, Appellant petitioned this Court for
review, and for the first time at either the trial or appellate
level, he sought sentence relief for what he argued was illegal
pretrial punishment. In response, this Court set aside the
decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remanded the case
to that court “to consider this question initially and to take
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remedial action if necessary.” United States v. Inong, 54 M.J.
375 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
Prior to that remand, but after the lower court initially
decided Appellant’s case, this Court decided United States v.
Southwick, 53 M.J. 412 (C.A.A.F. 2000), and United States v.
Tanksley, 54 M.J. 169 (C.A.A.F. 2000). In Southwick and
Tanksley, we held that when the record reflects a tactical
decision to present the issue of illegal pretrial punishment to
the court-martial panel with the goal of obtaining a lesser
sentence, rather than presenting the issue to the military judge
for the purpose of obtaining pretrial punishment credit, that
tactical decision waives the issue of whether a specific credit
for pretrial punishment is warranted.
Relying on these cases, the Court of Criminal Appeals again
affirmed the findings and sentence in Appellant’s case,
concluding that Appellant made a tactical decision at trial to
use the conditions of his pretrial confinement as a means of
obtaining a lesser adjudged sentence, rather than seek credit
against his adjudged sentence by arguing the issue of illegal
pretrial punishment. United States v. Inong, 57 M.J. 501, 502-
03 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2002).
Thereafter, Appellant again petitioned this Court for
review, and we granted the petition on the following issues:
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I. WHETHER APPELLANT WAS SUBJECTED TO ILLEGAL
PRETRIAL PUNISHMENT BY BEING CONFINED IN MAXIMUM
CUSTODY FOR 37 DAYS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13,
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 813 (2000).
II. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
APPELLANT AFFIRMATIVELY WAIVED THE ISSUE OF
ILLEGAL PRETRIAL PUNISHMENT.
As to Issue II, we hold the Court of Criminal Appeals
correctly applied Southwick and Tanksley to the facts of
Appellant’s case, and thereby correctly determined that
Appellant is not entitled to any appellate relief stemming from
the conditions of his pretrial confinement. We further hold
that in the future, failure at trial to raise the issue of
illegal pretrial punishment waives that issue for purposes of
appellate review absent plain error. See United States v. King,
58 M.J. 110 (C.A.A.F. 2003)(holding the same as to restriction
tantamount to confinement).
Given our resolution of Issue II, we need not address
Issue I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Between October 2, 1996, and January 9, 1997, Appellant
conspired with two different servicemen on three separate
occasions to steal government-owned computers worth in aggregate
more than $8,700. In turn, each of these planned larcenies was
completed, with Appellant and his co-conspirators breaking into
several Navy office buildings in the middle of the night and
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stealing the desired computers. However, shortly thereafter,
Appellant’s co-conspirators were questioned by law enforcement
agents, and they made statements incriminating both themselves
and Appellant. As a result, charges were preferred against
Appellant for these offenses, and he soon faced court-martial.
But a court-martial was something Appellant was unwilling
to face, so on July 19, 1997, he left the military in order to
avoid prosecution, and remained absent until March 1, 1998, when
his absence was terminated by apprehension. Prior to his
apprehension, Appellant continued his criminal conduct by
knowingly writing ten bad checks while he had insufficient funds
and no intent to pay. Nine of the checks were for cash received
totaling $2,700, and one was to “purchase” yet another computer
valued in excess of $3,400. All of the checks bounced.
Initially, Appellant was apprehended by civilian
authorities. At the time of his apprehension, Appellant was
found illegally concealing a loaded .40 caliber handgun
underneath the seat of a car. Shortly thereafter, Appellant was
transferred to military control and placed in “maximum custody”
pretrial confinement. In an affidavit filed with the Court of
Criminal Appeals after our remand, Appellant described these
conditions as follows:
On March 10, 199[8] I was confined to the Camp
Pendleton Base Brig. Upon arrival at [4:00 a.m.] my
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United States v. Inong, No. 00-0327/NA
head was shaved bald and I was placed in [maximum]
confinement.[*] Two U.S. Marine guards escorted me in
my bare feet, with leg irons and my hands handcuffed
to my waist to a 5-foot by 8-foot metal cell. The
Ambient air temperature was right around 48 degrees
Fahrenheit. I was given three wool blankets and told
to fill out a cell evaluation and then go to sleep.
At [4:45 a.m.] I went to sleep and was told to rise at
[5:00 a.m.] by guard for reveille. I was feed [sic]
my meal through a 12 inch by 5 inch opening in the
metal door. The same opening used to pass a toilet
brush to clean my toilet. When I showered I was
handcuffed and any other time I left the special
quarters area I was handcuffed to my waist and legs
were shackled with leg irons.
On or about March 28, 199[8] my brig assigned
counselor, SGT [M] informed me that if I signed a Pre-
trial agreement he would get me out of [maximum]
Confinement. Later that week I spoke to my defense
counsel, Lt. [N], and counsel informed me that he
would be coming to the brig to discuss a Pre-trial
agreement.
On or about April 4, 199[8] Lt. [N], Defense
counsel, arrived at Camp Pendleton base brig. He
informed me of a pre-trial agreement the government
had offered and that if I accepted the agreement He
would get me out of [maximum] Confinement. I signed
the agreement.
On or about April 10, 199[8] I received a fax
copy of my signed pre-trial agreement from my
Convening Authority, naval Weapons Station: Seal
Beach. Upon receipt of that agreement I gave a copy
to my Brig Counselor, SGT [M]. SGT [M] stated that he
would be able to get me out of [maximum] Confinement
soon. On or about April 15, 199[8] I was released
from [maximum] Confinement.
*
In his affidavit, Appellant mistakenly referred to the year as “1997” and
the confinement as “solitary.” United States v. Inong, 57 M.J. 501, 502 n.2
(N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2002).
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Appellant argues the conditions of this maximum custody
pretrial confinement amounted to illegal pretrial punishment
entitling him to sentence credit. The Government has not
contested Appellant’s version of the conditions of his pretrial
confinement, and we accept them as true for purposes of this
appeal. See United States v. Steele, 53 M.J. 274, 275 (C.A.A.F.
2000)(uncontested facts in document offered by Appellant and
admitted by this Court accepted as true for purposes of appeal).
As for Appellant, he has never suggested that the relationship
between entering into a pretrial agreement and being released
from maximum custody affected the voluntariness of his pretrial
agreement or the providence of his pleas, and no such issue is
before us. See Inong, 57 M.J. at 503 n.5 (“[Appellant] stated,
under oath, that no one had threatened or forced him to enter
into the pretrial agreement, [and] that he entered into the
agreement voluntarily”).
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Neither Appellant nor his defense counsel filed any
complaint or grievance prior to trial asserting that the
conditions of Appellant’s pretrial confinement rose to the level
of illegal pretrial punishment. Moreover, at trial, before
receiving Appellant’s pleas, the military judge asked if the
defense had any motions, and the defense had none. That is
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United States v. Inong, No. 00-0327/NA
significant, because if Appellant wanted sentence credit for
what he believed was illegal pretrial punishment at the
confinement facility, he could have asked for it, as he was not
precluded from doing so by the terms of his pretrial agreement.
See United States v. McFadyen, 51 M.J. 289 (C.A.A.F. 1999)
(accused can waive right to seek relief for illegal pretrial
punishment as part of pretrial agreement with convening
authority).
Although at trial Appellant did not seek sentence credit
for illegal pretrial punishment, he twice made reference to the
conditions of his pretrial confinement when he gave an unsworn
statement before being sentenced. At the beginning of his
statement, he said: “While I was confined at Camp Pendleton base
brig, the first weeks I spent I spent in solitary confinement.
I sat in a six by nine cell, next to convicted murderers,
rapists and drug dealers.” At the end of his statement he
also said: “During my six weeks of solitary confinement at
Camp Pendleton base brig, I sunk to the lowest point in my
Life . . . . In that six by nine cell . . . I realized I must
accept responsibility for my actions.”
Appellant’s trial defense counsel also referenced the
conditions of Appellant’s pretrial confinement during counsel’s
sentencing argument. Counsel said:
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Earlier we mentioned that the maximum [confinement
the accused faces] is 126 years. That’s a long time,
sir. What is the purpose of keeping him in there that
long? The message we’re sending out to the fleet is
“hey, we’re not going to tolerate this. And that’s
why if you get caught, we’re going to send you to Camp
Pendleton, spend six weeks in maximum and then whatever
else time.”
On appeal, Appellant asserts that during the period of his
pretrial confinement, the brig had a policy of confining all
pretrial detainees in maximum custody who could be sentenced to
more than five years’ confinement, and that the policy was
applied arbitrarily to him.
DISCUSSION
1. Appellant’s Case
Article 13 provides:
No person, while being held for trial, may be
subjected to punishment or penalty other than arrest
or confinement upon the charges pending against him,
nor shall the arrest or confinement imposed upon him
be any more rigorous than the circumstances required
to insure his presence [at trial].
Thus, in United States v. Fricke, 53 M.J. 149 (C.A.A.F. 2000),
this Court recognized that Article 13 prohibits two things: (1)
the intentional imposition of punishment on an accused before
his or her guilt is established at trial, i.e., illegal pretrial
punishment, and (2) arrest or pretrial confinement conditions
that are more rigorous than necessary to ensure the accused’s
presence at trial, i.e., illegal pretrial confinement. Id. at
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154 (citing United States v. McCarthy, 47 M.J. 162, 165
(C.A.A.F. 1997)).
If an accused, or appellant, can demonstrate that either
existed, he or she is entitled to sentence relief. United
States v. Mosby, 56 M.J. 309, 310 (C.A.A.F. 2002)(“burden is on
appellant to establish . . . violation of Article 13”); Rule for
Courts-Martial 305(k)[hereinafter R.C.M.](“additional credit for
each day of pretrial confinement that involves an abuse of
discretion or unusually harsh circumstances”); United States v.
Suzuki, 14 M.J. 491 (C.M.A. 1983).
Nothwithstanding these rules, an appellant is not
entitled to sentence credit on appeal for what is alleged to
have been illegal pretrial punishment or confinement if such
relief was not sought at trial, but instead, a tactical decision
was made to use the complained of conditions as a means of
obtaining a lesser adjudged sentence. Southwick, 53 M.J. at
416; Tanksley, 54 M.J. at 177. In Appellant’s case, the Court
of Criminal Appeals concluded that is exactly what happened. We
agree with the court below. Appellant is now precluded under
Southwick and Tanksley from arguing that the conditions of his
pretrial confinement violated Article 13. He is therefore
entitled to no sentence relief.
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2. Future Cases
In United States v. Huffman, 40 M.J. 225, 227 (C.M.A.
1994), a majority of this Court held that “we will not invoke
waiver [of alleged Article 13 violations] unless there is an
affirmative, fully developed waiver on the record.” Today,
however, we conclude Huffman’s affirmative waiver rule is
unworkable. As a result, we now overrule Huffman and begin
following the “raise or waive” rule required by the Manual for
Courts-Martial, United States (2002 ed.)[hereinafter MCM], as
relates to assertions of illegal pretrial confinement and
punishment. See R.C.M.s 905(e), 906(b)(8); Huffman, 40 M.J. at
228-29 (Crawford, C.J., joined by Gierke, J., dissenting in part
and concurring in the result). In so doing, we also overrule
Southwick, 53 M.J. at 416, and Tanksley, 54 M.J. at 177-78, to
the extent they establish a “tantamount to affirmative waiver”
rule in the Article 13 arena.
This we do not do lightly, respectful as we are of the
important doctrine of stare decisis. Thus, in United States v.
Tualla, 52 M.J. 228 (C.A.A.F. 2000), we stated:
Under this fundamental principle, adherence to
precedent “is the preferred course because it
promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent
development of legal principles, fosters reliance on
judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and
perceived integrity of the judicial process.”
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Id. at 231 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827
(1991)). However, we also recognized in Tualla that “[s]tare
decisis is a principle of decision making, not a rule, and need
not be applied when the precedent at issue is ‘unworkable or
. . . badly reasoned.’” Id. Unfortunately, Huffman’s
affirmative waiver rule has proven to be unworkable when one
considers the result it has generated in light of the strong
policy reasons behind the “raise or waive” rule.
The purpose of the MCM’s “raise or waive” rule is “to
promote the efficiency of the entire justice system by requiring
the parties to advance their claims at trial, where the
underlying facts can best be determined.” King, 58 M.J. at 114.
This rule is especially important in the military justice system
“[b]ecause of the turnover of personnel and changing conditions
at [military] confinement facilities.” Huffman, 40 M.J. at 229
(Crawford, C.J., joined by Gierke, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in the result). Once an Article 13 violation is
suspected, the parties “must determine who was responsible for
operating the facility, interview witnesses at the facility to
determine the nature of the confinement conditions, and
determine” whether there actually was illegal pretrial
punishment or confinement. Id. “Obviously, raising an
allegation such as [this] on appeal for the first time that
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could have been raised as early as in the pretrial stage places
an unnecessary burden on a worldwide justice system. That is
precisely why there are Manual Rules invoking waiver.” Id.
The rationale behind waiver is “to eliminate the expense to
the parties and the public of rehearing an issue that could have
been dealt with by a timely objection or motion at trial” by the
one party best positioned to make that happen – the party in
need of relief. Id. This principle is “essential” to the
continued effectiveness of our heavily burdened trial and
appellate judicial systems. Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552,
556 (1941). At odds with this principle, however, is the result
produced by the Huffman rule and exemplified by Appellant’s case
– “one more case demonstrating the wisdom of the waiver rule in
R.C.M. 905(e).” Fricke, 53 M.J. at 156 (Gierke, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
Time and again since Huffman was decided, appellants have
waited until the appellate stages of the court-martial process
to advance claims of illegal pretrial confinement and
punishment, and to seek sentence relief. See Tanksley, 54 M.J.
at 169; United States v. Scalarone, 54 M.J. 114 (C.A.A.F. 2000);
Southwick, 53 M.J. at 412; Fricke, 53 M.J. at 149; United States
v. Yunk, 53 M.J. 145 (C.A.A.F. 2000); United States v. Avila, 53
M.J. 99 (C.A.A.F. 2000); see also King, 58 M.J. at 110 (same for
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restriction tantamount to confinement). At the same time,
however, appellants frequently have placed before the trial
level sentencing authority information and argument about those
very same pretrial conditions, hoping it will result in a
lenient sentence. See Tanksley, 54 M.J. at 177; Southwick,
53 M.J. at 416; Inong, 57 M.J. at 502.
The end result of this practice is expensive, time-
consuming appellate litigation characterized by undeveloped
factual records (which could have been created at the trial
level), the resulting need for remands and rehearings, and the
difficulty in conducting those proceedings years later when
confinement facilities, personnel, and programs have changed.
We therefore conclude that Huffman is unworkable and must be
overruled, along with the Southwick and Tanksley “tantamount to
affirmative waiver” rule. We therefore hold that once this
opinion becomes final, failure at trial to seek sentence relief
for violations of Article 13 waives that issue on appeal absent
plain error. See King, 58 M.J. at 114 (same for restriction
tantamount to confinement). Having said that, however, we urge
all military judges to remember that nothing precludes them from
inquiring sua sponte into whether Article 13 violations have
occurred, and prudence may very well dictate that they should.
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DECISION
The decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court
of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
15
Judge BAKER (concurring in part and in the result):
I would decide this case on the ground that Appellant has
not carried his burden of demonstrating a violation of Article
13, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 813 (2000).
As this court has recognized on previous occasions, Appellant's
failure to raise the matter at trial may be indicative of, but
not dispositive as to, whether or not an individual was subject
to pretrial punishment.
Although I agree with the majority and the lower court that
United States v. Southwick, 53 M.J. 412 (C.A.A.F. 2000), and
United States v. Tanksley, 54 M.J. 169 (C.A.A.F. 2000), were the
law at the time, I am less confident than the majority that an
appellate court can infer from Appellant's sentencing statement
a tactical choice to abstain from seeking credit for alleged
pre-trial punishment as a means of obtaining a lesser adjudged
sentence. Certainly, I am not prepared to conclude that
Appellant’s words, or those of his counsel, amounted to an
affirmative waiver on Article 13.
In my view, Tanksley and Southwick invite appellate courts
to engage in appellate speculation regarding trial tactics that
in context may be undue. This concern is readily avoided by the
prospective rule adopted by the court today or by having
military judges affirmatively inquire where the facts suggest
the possibility of Article 13 credit. Where liberty interests
United States v. Inong, No. 00-0327/NA
and unlawful government conduct converge in Article 13, legal
policy should favor clear black-letter rules. Therefore, I join
that part of the lead opinion adopting a clear raise or waive
rule linked as it is to this Court’s admonishments that military
judges should exercise their inherent and prudential authority
to affirmatively inquire where the facts suggest that an Article
13 violation may have occurred. See United States v. King, 58
M.J. 110, 115 (Baker, J., with whom Erdmann, J., joined
concurring in result).
2