United States v. Terlep , 2002 CAAF LEXIS 1250 ( 2002 )

IN THE CASE OF
UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Hanalei M. TERLEP, Staff Sergeant
U.S. Air Force, Appellant
No. 01-0241
Crim. App. No. 33408
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued October 4, 2001
Decided September 30, 2002
SULLIVAN, S.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
CRAWFORD, C.J., and GIERKE, EFFRON, and BAKER, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Kyle R. Jacobson (argued); Colonel James R. Wise
and Lieutenant Colonel Timothy W. Murphy (on brief); Lieutenant Colonel
Beverly B. Knott.
For Appellee: Captain Christa S. Cothrel (argued); Colonel Anthony P.
Dattilo and Major Lance B. Sigmon (on brief); Captain James C. Fraser.
Military Judge: Kurt D. Schuman
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO EDITORIAL CORRECTION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Terlep, 01-0241/AF
Senior Judge SULLIVAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
During August of 1998, appellant was tried by a general
court-martial composed of a military judge sitting alone at
Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii. In accordance with a pretrial
agreement, he pleaded guilty to wrongfully using and
distributing marijuana, in violation of Article 112a, Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 USC § 912a. Moreover,
although charged with burglary and rape, appellant also pleaded
guilty to the lesser offenses of unlawful entry of a dwelling
and assault consummated by a battery, in violation of Articles
134 and 128, UCMJ, 10 USC §§ 934 and 928. He was found guilty
of all the offenses to which he pleaded guilty, and on August
28, 1998, he was sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge, two
years’ confinement, and reduction to Airman Basic. The
convening authority approved this sentence on October 19, 1998.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed on November 13, 2000.
On May 14, 2001, this Court granted three issues for
review:
I
WHETHER IT WAS PLAIN ERROR FOR THE
MILITARY JUDGE TO ALLOW, IN THE PRE-
SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS, TESTIMONY BY THE
ASSAULT VICTIM THAT SHE WAS RAPED AND
ARGUMENT BY TRIAL COUNSEL THAT WHEN THE
ASSAULT VICTIM TESTIFIED, SHE TOLD THE
“TRUTH.”
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United States v. Terlep, 01-0241/AF
II
WHETHER IT WAS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL TO FAIL TO OBJECT TO THE ASSAULT
VICTIM’S TESTIMONY, IN THE PRE-SENTENCING
PROCEEDINGS, THAT SHE WAS RAPED, IN LIGHT
OF THE STIPULATION OF FACT TO AN ASSAULT,
NOT A RAPE, AND TO FAIL TO OBJECT TO
TRIAL COUNSEL’S SENTENCING ARGUMENT.
III
WHETHER THE AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL
APPEALS ERRED BY USING THE CONFINEMENT
CAP IN APPELLANT’S PRETRIAL AGREEMENT AS
A CONCESSION THAT HIS SENTENCE IS
APPROPRIATE AND AS A FACTOR IN FINDING
THAT APPELLANT SUFFERED NO PREJUDICE AS A
RESULT OF HIS COUNSEL’S DEFICIENT
PERFORMANCE.
We hold that neither the victim’s sentencing testimony nor trial
counsel’s sentencing argument constituted plain error under RCM
811(e), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1998 ed.).1
See United States v. Corpus, 882 F.2d 546, 551 (1st Cir. 1989);
cf. United States v. Gerlach, 16 USCMA 383, 385, 37 CMR 3, 5
(1966). We further hold that appellant was not denied effective
assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to object on
the basis of RCM 811(e) to this government evidence and
argument. See United States v. McConnell, 55 M.J. 479 (2001).
Finally, we hold that in view of our resolution of the first two
granted issues, the third granted issue in this case is moot.
1 The current versions of all Manual provisions cited are identical to the

ones in effect at the time of appellant’s court-martial, unless otherwise
indicated.
3
United States v. Terlep, 01-0241/AF
Appellant was charged with the rape of S and burglary of
her uncle’s home with the intent to commit rape, in violation of
Articles 120 and 129, UCMJ, 10 USC §§ 920 and 929. He pleaded
guilty to assaulting S with his hands and unlawful entry of her
uncle’s home, in accordance with a pretrial agreement and
stipulation of fact.
The stipulation of fact stated in pertinent part:
On Friday, 29 August 1997, in the
evening, [S] joined the accused and
others for a “going-away” party for the
accused. The accused and [S] and several
of his friends and cousins, Wade Terlep,
Christopher Leming, Robert Hanzon and
Derek Distajo, shortly thereafter went
onto Hickam Air Force Base to the party
planned for the accused. The party was
held in the dormitory room of SrA Steve
Reyes as well as in the dormitory
recreation room.
The party activities consisted
largely of drinking alcohol and playing
pool. Eventually, several party-goers,
including the accused, [S], Wade Terlep,
Christopher Leming, Robert Hanzon and
Derek Distajo went to a local nightclub
called Dancers. Sometime after midnight,
these five individuals then left Dancers
and returned to [S]’s uncle’s house to
drop her off. At this point, [S] was
intoxicated. Several of the young men
present assisted her into the house and
onto her bed. Each of these young men
then left the house. At this point, only
[S], her young son, and her uncle were in
the house and all of them were in their
beds. Eventually, Christopher Leming
went back into the house to spend time
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United States v. Terlep, 01-0241/AF
with [S]. He stayed with [S] for a
period of time and eventually left the
house to return to the accused’s house
where the accused and Wade Terlep, Robert
Hanzon and Derek Distajo had settled in
for the night. Shortly thereafter, the
accused left his house and went to [S]’s
[uncle’s] house. By this time, [S] had
closed her door, turned out her lights,
and gone to sleep in her bed with her son
sleeping in his bed in the same room.
The accused let himself into [S]’s
[uncle’s] house without her permission.
He then entered [S]’s bedroom and touched
her body with his hands without her
permission. After [S] told the accused
to stop touching her, the accused then
immediately stopped touching her and left
her [uncle’s] house. [S] followed him
outside and, while crying, asked the
accused what it was he thought he was
doing. The accused responded that it was
better if he just went home which he then
did.
* * *
When the accused assaulted [S] at or
near the island of Oahu, Hawaii, on or
about 30 August 1997, as described above,
he did bodily harm to her by offensively
touching her body through a culpably
negligent application of force. The
touching was without legal justification
or excuse and without her lawful consent.
The accused’s acts were negligent and
accompanied by a reckless disregard for
the foreseeable results to [S].
When the accused entered the
dwelling house of Stanley N[] on the
island of Oahu, Hawaii, on or about 30
August 1997, such entry was unlawful.
Under the circumstances of this entry,
the conduct of the accused was to the
prejudice of good order and discipline in
the armed forces and was of a nature to
bring discredit upon the armed forces.
5
United States v. Terlep, 01-0241/AF
The military judge found appellant guilty of the above
offenses as pleaded to by appellant. During sentencing, the
Government called the victim to the stand to testify as follows:
Q: Did you fall asleep fairly quickly
after you laid down?
A: Pretty quick.
Q: Can you tell the judge what you
remember next happening to you?
A: Well, I was sleeping and well, I
thought that I was having a dream that,
you know, a sex dream. Then I was awoken
because I guess my body felt as though it
wasn’t just like I was dreaming this,
that something was really happening to
me. When I woke up, I saw Hanalei’s
face, and I told him to get, you know,
the “f” off of me. Then, you know, he
did. Then after that, he--I was getting
loud and he said to be quiet before I
wake up my son.
Q: When you--you say you woke up and saw
his face. Was he on top of you at that
time?
A: He was on top of me.
Q: Were you wearing any clothing at that
time?
A: No, I was not.
Q: Now, when you fell asleep, did you
have any clothing on?
A: No, I did not.
Q: So, you had fallen asleep without any
clothes?
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United States v. Terlep, 01-0241/AF
A: That’s correct.
Q: And when he was on top of you, was he
wearing any clothing?
A: Maybe some articles, like a shirt and
that’s about it.
Q: Were his pants down or up?
A: They were [down].
Q: Was he--how was it that he was
touching your body?
A: All I know is that when I told him to
get off of me, he had to take his private
part out of me and get off, and that’s
all. I don’t know. When I was sleeping,
I have no--I don’t know what he did to
me. I have no recollection, because I
was sleeping. I was--I didn’t think
anybody was coming over or anything, so I
don’t know. I just woke up when I
noticed, you know, my--somebody was on
top of me.
Q: You told him--you screamed at him and
told him to get off of you?
A: Yes, I told him get the fuck off.
Q: And again, what did he do?
A: He got off when I told him, and he
started putting on his clothes, whatever,
you know, pull up his pants, get his
stuff. Then he started going out of my
room down the hallway. I grabbed my
shirt, put it on and followed him out to
make sure that he was leaving the house.
Then I was out on the street and I was
really upset. I was shocked and
disorient[ed]. I told him “Do you know
what you just did? Do you know that I’ve
just been through, you know, something
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United States v. Terlep, 01-0241/AF
horrible? What if, you know, you got me
pregnant? What are you doing here?”
Then he was like in a rush to go, and he
says that he thinks he better go, and he
left.
(R. 57-58) (emphasis added).
She then testified about a later confrontation with
appellant sometime after this incident:
Q: What happened then?
A: Then he came into the house and I was
really upset. I was pretty much yelling
at him, screaming, and I wanted him to
admit what he had done--what he had done
to me.
Q: What did he say?
A: He kept looking at the ground. He
didn’t really say anything. Like he had
a look on his face like just empty.
Q: Did you do anything then?
A: I told him that I was so upset. I
said, “You know what? I’m not going to
hit you with the broom.” Then I picked
up part of my vacuum. I said, “This is,
you know, I’m going to hit you with
this.” Then he just walked on over to
the middle of the living room and stood
there while I, you know, kept hitting him
with the part of the vacuum. He didn’t
move or nothing, he just took it. He
admitted--he said what he had done. He
said, “I raped you.”
(R. 61-62) (emphasis added).
8
United States v. Terlep, 01-0241/AF
Trial counsel did not expressly ask for a greater sentence
in this case based on the victim’s purported rape by appellant.
He did note her experiences at the hospital with a “rape
protocol kit”; of standing naked while other people probed her
body; and her feelings of being “violated” and “contaminated” on
the night in question. (R. 116-117) In his closing rebuttal
argument, he further asserted that the victim “has weathered the
storm of this whole incident with dignity and with a courageous
spirit to get up there and tell you what happened that night, to
tell you the truth.” (R. 127) (emphasis added).
___ ___ ___
The first two granted issues focus on the victim’s
sentencing testimony that on the night in question, she was also
raped by appellant, an offense for which he was neither tried
nor convicted. They also address trial counsel’s assertion in
his sentencing argument that the victim spoke the truth in her
sentencing testimony. Appellant recognizes that his defense
counsel did not object to this government evidence or argument.
He contends, however, that the admission of this testimony and
allowance of this argument was plain error under RCM 811(e)
(Issue I), and his counsel’s failure to object on this legal
basis constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. (Issue II)
9
United States v. Terlep, 01-0241/AF
In order for plain error to be found, appellant must
establish, inter alia, that an error occurred. See United
States v. Barner, 56 M.J. 131, 138 n.5 (2001) (holding a complete
plain error analysis is not required if there was no error).
Here, appellant particularly argues that the victim’s testimony
concerning her purported rape by appellant was inadmissible
under RCM 811(e). Relying on the opinion of the appellate court
below, he argues that aggravation evidence which goes “well
beyond” the facts stipulated to by the parties is “inconsistent
with the stipulation of fact” and, therefore, inadmissible. The
appellate court below cited United States v. Faircloth, 45 M.J.
172, 174 (1996), RCM 910(e), Manual, supra, and Article 45(a),
UCMJ, 10 USC § 845(a), as a basis for its construction of this
rule.
R.C.M. 811(e) is the Rule for Courts-Martial that covers
stipulations of fact. It states:
(e) Effect of stipulation. Unless
properly withdrawn or ordered stricken
from the record, a stipulation of fact
that has been accepted is binding on the
court-martial and may not be contradicted
by the parties thereto. The contends
[sic] of a stipulation of expected
testimony or of a document’s contents may
be attacked, contradicted, or explained
in the same way as if the witness had
actually so testified or the document had
been actually admitted. The fact that
the parties so stipulated does not admit
10
United States v. Terlep, 01-0241/AF
the truth of the indicated testimony or
document’s contents, nor does it add
anything to the evidentiary nature of the
testimony or document. The Military
Rules of Evidence apply to the contents
of stipulations.
(Emphasis added.)
This Manual rule precludes the Government from evidencing
facts at a court-martial which “contradict” those agreed to in
an accepted stipulation of fact. See also para. 154b, Manual
for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 (Rev. ed.); United
States v. Gerlach, 16 USCMA at 385, 37 CMR at 5. However, this
rule says nothing about precluding the parties from presenting
evidence which “goes beyond” the facts in the stipulation.
Generally speaking, stipulations of fact do not prohibit proof
of facts which are neither designated nor necessarily implied in
the stipulation. See 83 C.J.S. Stipulations §§ 87 and 88
(2000). Accordingly, error did not occur in appellant’s case if
the testimony of the victim did not contradict expressly or
implicitly the stipulation of fact.
For several reasons, we conclude that the victim’s testimony
did not so contradict the stipulation of fact in this case. See
United States v. Corpus, 882 F.2d at 551. First, we note that
this stipulation of fact did not expressly state that a rape did
not occur that night. Cf. United States v. Gerlach, supra.
11
United States v. Terlep, 01-0241/AF
Second, the stipulation of fact did not expressly provide that
appellant’s assault with his hands on the victim’s “legs,”
“torso,” and “breasts” were the only touchings that occurred
that night. Id. Third, it was not necessarily inferable from
the sexual assaults stipulated to that a rape did not also
occur. Cf. Harrison v. United States, 20 M.J. 55, 60 (CMA 1985)
(Everett, C.J., concurring in the result). Finally, defense
counsel, without caveat, indicated his understanding that the
stipulation of fact was limited in nature and the parties had
additional evidence as to the events of that evening. (He said
to the military judge in his closing argument on sentencing: “I
think you can tell from the structure of the plea agreement that
the facts were highly contested in this case, and both sides, in
recognizing that fact, came to the agreement that we came to.”
(R. 118)) See United States v. Cambridge, 3 USCMA 377, 384, 12
CMR 133, 140 (1953) (scope of stipulation to be measured by
intent of parties to it). In these circumstances, we find that
the victim’s sentencing testimony did not contradict the
stipulation of fact in violation of RCM 811(e).
An additional question we must address is whether trial
counsel’s sentencing argument constituted plain error.
Appellant, again relying on R.C.M. 811(e), particularly contends
that trial counsel was barred from arguing that the victim’s
12
United States v. Terlep, 01-0241/AF
purported rape occurred as a matter of fact. See United States
v. Gerlach, supra. As noted above, we conclude that RCM 811(e)
did not prohibit trial counsel from presenting evidence as to
aggravating facts not expressly or implicitly covered by this
stipulation. Accordingly, argument as to the occurrence of a
rape not particularly addressed in the stipulation was also not
prohibited by R.C.M. 811(e). Cf. United States v. Gerlach,
supra.
Of course, we do not hold that it is proper for a trial
counsel to express his personal opinion or belief that a
government witness is telling the truth. See R.C.M. 919,
Discussion, Manual (1998 ed.), supra. Such a statement, even as
part of an otherwise appropriate argument, would be improper.
See United States v. Cox, 45 M.J. 153, 156 (1996); United States
v. Fuentes, 18 M.J. 41, 52 (CMA 1984); see also TJAG Policy Number
26, Attachment One, Air Force Rules of Professional Conduct,
Rule 3.4(e) (4 Feb. 1998), based on ABA Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.4(e). In the instant case, however, we
conclude that appellant has not carried his burden of
demonstrating that assistant trial counsel personally vouched
for the victim’s credibility in general or with respect to her
allegation of rape. See United States v. Fuentes, supra. In
our view, his argument could reasonably be construed as simply
calling the court’s attention to the victim’s fortitude in
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United States v. Terlep, 01-0241/AF
performing her civic duty as a witness in this personally
difficult case. Accordingly, we see no obvious error on this
basis in this case.
A final question we will address is whether defense
counsel’s failure to object to this evidence and argument under
RCM 811(e) constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. See
generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). As a
general matter, we have repeatedly said that ineffective
assistance of counsel requires, inter alia, that “the defendant
must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the ̀counseĺ guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” United States v. Dewrell, 55
M.J. 131, 133 (2001). We see no such errors in this case.
The failure to pursue a legal claim is not necessarily
deficient conduct by counsel. If that claim is not shown to
have a reasonable probability of being found meritorious as a
matter of law and fact, the failure to pursue it is not error
and certainly not ineffective assistance of counsel. See United
States v. McConnell, 55 M.J. 479, 481 (2001). As noted above,
R.C.M. 811(e), Manual, supra, does not preclude the evidencing
of facts which are not expressly or by necessary implication
covered by the stipulation of fact. Moreover, we have concluded
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United States v. Terlep, 01-0241/AF
that the victim’s sentencing testimony did not contradict the
stipulation of fact in this case. Accordingly, the failure to
make an RCM 811(e) objection in this case was not deficient
attorney conduct.
Appellant has not further argued that his counsel were
ineffective for failing to secure an agreement limiting the
Government’s right to introduce aggravation evidence. Moreover,
we see no obvious attorney error in failing to secure an
agreement between the parties not to evidence additional facts
on sentencing. A limited or strict construction of the plea
agreement and stipulation in this case makes sense for both
parties. For the Government, it avoided a contested trial. For
the defense, a conviction for assault consummated by a battery
was a far better tactical outcome than a conviction for rape,
even if the Government retained its right to introduce evidence
that a rape may have occurred on the night in question. See
para. 54e(2), Part IV, Manual, supra (bad-conduct discharge, six
months’ confinement, and total forfeitures is maximum punishment
for assault consummated by battery); cf. para. 45e(1), Part IV,
Manual, supra (death or such other punishment as a court-martial
may direct is maximum punishment for rape); see also United
States v. McConnell, supra at 484-85. Accordingly, no deficient
15
United States v. Terlep, 01-0241/AF
counsel conduct occurred in failing to object on the basis of
RCM 811(e).2
In closing, a military judge, in some cases, is required by
law to determine the sentence at a court-martial. See Article
51(d), UCMJ, 10 USC § 851(d). He or she must do so in
accordance with the limits and procedures set by the President.
See Articles 54 and 36, UCMJ, 10 USC §§ 854 and 856. The Manual
for Courts-Martial provides that the judge must determine an
“appropriate sentence,” and RCM 1001(b)(4) permits evidence of
aggravating circumstances to be considered towards this end.3
See R.C.M. 1001(a)(1), Manual, supra. Such rules provide for
accuracy in the sentencing process by permitting the judge to
fully appreciate the true plight of the victim in each case.
See United States v. Loya, 49 M.J. 104, 108 (1998) (holding
evidence admissible on sentencing which provides a full or
complete picture of tragic event); United States v. Wilson, 47
M.J. 152, 155-56 (1997); United States v. Irwin, 42 M.J. 479, 482-83
(1995); see also United States v. Mullens, 29 M.J. 398, 400 (CMA
1990).
We do not decide the facts of this case. However, the
2 Since we find no deficient attorney conduct by defense counsel in this

case, we need not address the additional prejudice question raised in Granted
Issue III.
16
United States v. Terlep, 01-0241/AF
entrance of the Government and appellant into a plea bargain for
a lesser charge than rape does not change the facts as to what
happened to the victim that night in her view. Furthermore, the
search for truth in the courtroom need not be dispensed with
simply because a plea agreement exists outside it. The plea
agreement here did not expressly bar the victim in this case
from giving her complete version of the truth, as she saw it, to
the factfinder at the sentencing hearing. Absent an express
provision in the pretrial agreement or some applicable rule of
evidence or procedure barring such evidence, this important
victim impact evidence was properly admitted. See United States
v. Wilson, 47 M.J. at 155-56.
The decision of the United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
3 RCM 1001(b)(4) was amended after appellant’s court-martial on October 6,

1999, by Executive Order Number 13140, effective November 1, 1999.
17