Vogel v. Mestemaker ( 2016 )

[Cite as Vogel v. Mestemaker, 2016-Ohio-7244.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DARKE COUNTY
CHRISTY A. VOGEL, fka :
MESTEMAKER :
: Appellate Case Nos. 2015-CA-20 and
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross- : 2015-CA-22
Appellant :
: Trial Court Case No. 06DIS63221
v. :
: (Appeal fromDomestic Relations
RICHARD A. MESTEMAKER : Court)
:
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-
Appellee
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OPINION
Rendered on the 7th day of October, 2016.
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JAY M. LOPEZ, Atty. Reg. No. 0080819, 18 East Water Street, Troy, Ohio 45373
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant
QUENTIN M. DERRYBERRY, II, Atty. Reg. No. 0024106, 15 Willipie Street, No. 220,
P.O. Box 2056, Wapakoneta, Ohio 45895
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee
.............
HALL, J.
{¶ 1} Richard Mestemaker appeals from the trial court’s entries adopting a
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magistrate’s decision regarding reallocation of parental rights and entering judgment
designating his former wife, Christy Vogel, as residential parent of the younger of their
two children. Richard also appeals from a separate judgment entry finding both parties in
civil contempt for failing to comply with parenting-time orders. In a cross appeal, Christy
likewise appeals from the trial court’s entry finding her in contempt.
{¶ 2} The record reflects that Richard and Christy divorced in 2006. At that time,
Christy was designated the residential parent of their two minor children. In 2010, Richard
became the residential parent. In 2012, Christy moved to Tennessee. Thereafter, in July
2014, she moved for reallocation of parental rights, seeking to be named the residential
parent of both children. She later modified her request, seeking to be named the
residential parent of only the younger child. The matter proceeded to a December 2014
hearing before a magistrate. The evidence included testimony from Richard, Christy,
Christy’s mother, and a guardian ad litem, who recommended sustaining Christy’s motion.
The magistrate also spoke with both children in camera. At the time of the hearing, the
younger child was 12 years old and wanted to live with Christy. The older child was 16
years old and wanted to remain with Richard. In January 2015, the magistrate filed a
decision and order recommending that Christy be designated the younger child’s
residential parent. (Doc. #103).
{¶ 3} Both parties filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. Christy’s objections,
which are not at issue here, primarily addressed child-support computation. In his
objections, Richard asserted that the evidence did not support a finding of a change in
circumstances since the prior order designating him the residential parent and did not
support a finding that designating Christy as the younger child’s residential parent would
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be in the child’s best interest. (Doc. #123). In conjunction with his objections, on May 7,
2015, approximately five months after the evidentiary hearing, Richard separately filed a
motion to appoint counsel to represent the younger child. (Doc. #120). In support of that
motion, he attached a letter from the younger child in which the child expressed a change
of heart and a desire to remain with him. Richard argued that the guardian ad litem’s
opinion conflicted with the child’s new wishes and, therefore, that counsel should be
appointed to represent the child.
{¶ 4} The trial court subsequently filed a May 14, 2015 “Judgment Entry- Objection
to Magistrate’s Decision.” (Doc. #124). Therein, the trial court acknowledged that the
parties had filed “objections and supplemental pleadings.” (Id. at 1). It proceeded to
overrule Christy’s objections regarding child support. It then turned to Richard’s argument
about the child’s recent letter. It found the letter inadmissible in that it attempted to
introduce new evidence and that it was excluded under R.C. 3109.04(B)(3) which states:
“No person shall obtain * * * from a child a written or recorded statement or affidavit setting
forth the child’s wishes and concerns regarding the allocation of parental rights and
responsibilities concerning the child. No court, in determining the child’s best interest for
purposes of making its allocation of the parental rights and responsibilities for the care of
the child or for purposes of resolving any issues related to the making of that allocation,
shall accept or consider a written or recorded statement or affidavit that purports to set
forth the child’s wishes and concerns regarding those matters.” The trial court also
declined to appoint counsel to represent the child. (Id.). Finally, the trial court indicated
that it had reviewed the magistrate’s findings of fact and conclusions of law along with a
transcript of the hearing and exhibits. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision as
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its own. (Id. at 3).
{¶ 5} Richard appealed from the trial court’s May 14, 2015 ruling. We dismissed
his appeal for lack of an appealable order due to the trial court’s failure to issue a separate
judgment beyond adopting the magistrate’s decision. Richard then again unsuccessfully
sought to have counsel appointed for the younger child. (Doc. # 150, 152). Thereafter,
the trial court filed a September 4, 2015 judgment entry in which it expressly entered a
detailed judgment in favor of Christy on her motion for reallocation of parental rights,
designating her as the younger child’s residential parent and legal custodian. (Doc. #162).
Richard has appealed from that judgment.
With regard to the contempt issue, the record reflects that Christy filed a June 1,
2015 motion that, inter alia, sought a show-cause order directed to Richard regarding his
alleged failure to facilitate her summer parenting time. (Doc. #127). She filed a second
such motion against Richard on June 15, 2015. (Doc. #135). That same day, the trial
court filed a show-cause order against Richard and set the matter for a hearing on June
17, 2015. (Doc. #136-138). The next relevant entry in the trial court’s docket is a June 22,
2015 “Agreed Judgment Entry for Summer 2015 Companionship.” (Doc. #148). It states
that the parties had appeared before the trial court and had reached an agreement
regarding Christy’s summer parenting-time schedule. The trial court adopted the
agreement as a court order. (Id.). Based on the content of that agreed order, it appears
that no show-cause hearing regarding Richard’s allegedly contemptuous behavior
occurred. One month later, the trial court filed a July 22, 2015 “Memorialization of
Proceedings.” (Doc. #151). That filing attempted to clarify ongoing confusion or ambiguity
regarding summer parenting time. Although the trial court noted that the parties had
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declined to have a record made, it appears from the content of the trial court’s order that
a conference or proceeding of some type occurred in court. (Id. at 1-2). No motions were
addressed at that time however. (Id.).
{¶ 6} On August 25, 2015, Richard filed his own motion and supporting affidavit
seeking to have Christy held in contempt. (Doc. #155, 156). The motion alleged that
Christy had deprived him of communication and companionship with the younger child
(who by then was in Tennessee with Christy) primarily by obtaining an ex parte TPO
against him from a Tennessee court. According to Richard’s motion, the TPO prohibited
him from having any contact or communication with Christy or the child. Richard asserted
that Christy’s sworn statements in support of the TPO were false, misleading, and
intended to interfere with his rights under the trial court’s existing orders. On August 27,
2015, the trial court issued a show-cause order and directed Christy to appear for a
September 4, 2015 contempt hearing to address Richard’s allegations. (Doc. #158).
{¶ 7} At the outset of the September 4, 2015 hearing, the trial court stated that the
parties were before it on two matters, to wit: “an old motion from June filed by the first
petitioner [Christy] and then more recent motions by the second petitioner [Richard]
regarding compliance with the Court’s prior orders on parenting time.” (September 4,
2015 Hearing Tr. at 5). The trial court then asked counsel for Richard and Christy what
relief they were seeking. Each attorney responded that the relief sought included a finding
that the other party was in contempt. (Id. at 6, 8). The trial court proceeded to hear
testimony from Richard and Christy regarding various perceived violations regarding
parenting time and communication with the child. The only witnesses at the hearing were
Richard, Christy, and their older child. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ruled
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orally from the bench. It found both parties in civil contempt. (Id. at 79). The trial court
also memorialized its contempt findings in a September 4, 2015 judgment entry. (Doc.
#163). As a sanction, it imposed three-day jail sentences and $250 fines on both parties.
It suspended these penalties on condition of future compliance with parenting-time orders
and the split payment of court costs. (Id.). Richard and Christy both have appealed from
the trial court’s contempt ruling.
{¶ 8} In his first assignment of error, Richard contends the trial court erred in failing
“to address and consider the arguments and citations” in his objections to the magistrate’s
decision on Christy’s motion to reallocate parental rights. The essence of his argument is
that the trial court did not properly engage in an independent review of the magistrate’s
decision, as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d), because it did not explicitly address and
resolve the issues raised in his objections. (Appellant’s brief at 10-12).
{¶ 9} Upon review, we find Richard’s argument to be unpersuasive. The trial court
did not ignore his objections. To the contrary, the trial court explicitly recognized the
objections in its May 14, 2015 ruling adopting the magistrate’s decision and in its
September 4, 2015 judgment entry on Christy’s motion to reallocate parental rights. The
first of those two rulings also makes clear that the trial court engaged in an independent
review of the record, including the transcripts and exhibits, before adopting the
magistrate’s findings of fact and conclusions of law as its own. The “better practice” is “for
a trial court to individually itemize and address objections separately[.]” Alessio v. Alessio,
10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-988, 2006-Ohio-2447, ¶ 36. A trial court’s failure to
specifically address an objection, however, does not necessarily mean that it failed to
conduct an independent review, particularly where it has considered the objection, a
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transcript, and the file. Id.; see also Phillips v. Phillips, 2014-Ohio-5439, 25 N.E.3d 371, ¶
28 (5th Dist.) (“While the trial court never expressly addressed each and every objection,
it is presumed that the trial court, sub silentio, overruled the objections when it proceeded
to enter judgment disposing of the objections.”). We see no basis for concluding that the
trial court failed to conduct an independent review of the magistrate’s decision. Richard’s
first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 10} In his second assignment of error, Richard contends the trial court erred in
addressing his motion to appoint counsel for the parties’ younger child, and the child’s
letter expressing a change of heart, in the context of adopting the magistrate’s decision
on Christy’s motion to reallocate parental rights. As we understand it, Richard’s argument
is that his motion for the appointment of counsel and the accompanying letter had nothing
to do with the magistrate’s earlier reallocation decision and his objections to that decision.
Richard suggests that the trial court was confused when it adopted the magistrate’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law and that it “lacked sufficient overall understanding
of the issues to enter Judgment pursuant to Ohio Civ. R. 53(D)(4)(a) and (d).” (Appellant’s
brief at 12).
{¶ 11} We find Richard’s argument to be unpersuasive for at least two reasons.
First, we will not presume that the trial court was confused or lacked an understanding of
the issues simply because it ruled on his motion for the appointment of counsel while also
adopting the magistrate’s decision on the reallocation-of-parental-rights issue. At the
outset of its May 14, 2015 ruling, the trial court noted that the parties had filed “objections”
to the magistrate’s decision and “supplemental pleadings.” (Doc. #124 at 1). It is
reasonable to infer that the trial court’s reference to “supplemental pleadings”
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encompassed Richard’s motion to appoint counsel for the child, which the trial court
seemingly distinguished from his “objections.” Second, the trial court could not possibly
have been confused when it later entered its own September 4, 2015 independent
judgment on Christy’s motion to reallocate parental rights. (Doc. #162). Shortly before
that ruling, Richard filed a July 22, 2015 “Motion to Consider/Reconsider Motion to
Appoint Counsel for Child.” (Doc. #150). Therein, he made clear that his motion to appoint
counsel was distinct from his objections to the magistrate’s decision on the reallocation
of parental rights. (Id.). The trial court addressed and overruled Richard’s July 22, 2015
motion on July 24, 2015. (Doc. # 152). Therefore, we see no basis for concluding that the
trial court was confused or was acting under any misapprehension on September 4, 2015
when it entered judgment in Christy’s favor on her motion to reallocate parental rights.
Accordingly, Richard’s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 12} In his third assignment of error, Richard contends the trial court erred in
finding him in contempt. He argues that the September 4, 2015 contempt hearing was
held to address his August 25, 2015 motion to hold Christy in contempt. (Appellant’s brief
at 14). Richard asserts that no contempt motion was pending against him at the time of
the hearing. (Id.). He further asserts that during the September 4, 2015 contempt hearing,
“there was no claim or call by the Court indicating that a contempt finding against [him
was] under consideration.” (Id. at 15-16). Richard also argues that Christy’s two June
2015 show-cause motions directed toward his alleged contempt lacked proof of service
on him. He admits being personally served, however, just prior to a June 17, 2015 pretrial
conference. (Id. at 16). Nevertheless, he maintains that the June 22, 2015 agreed
judgment entry referenced above “was read upon the record and included that all pending
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motions pertaining to contempt were to be dismissed.” (Id. at 17). For the foregoing
reasons, Richard contends the trial court erred in finding him in contempt at the conclusion
of the September 4, 2015 hearing.
{¶ 13} Upon review, we find Richard’s assignment of error to be unpersuasive. He
acknowledges that Christy filed two show-cause motions in June 2015 seeking to have
him held in contempt for failing to facilitate her summer parenting time. (Doc. #127, 135).
Even if those motions lacked proper proof of service, Richard admits being served with
them personally that same month. Contrary to his argument, we also see nothing in the
record in connection with the June 22, 2015 agreed entry reflecting dismissal of any
contempt motions. (Doc. # 148). Finally, the transcript of the September 4, 2015 contempt
hearing belies his claim that the trial court never indicated that a contempt finding against
him was under consideration. At the outset of the hearing, the trial court stated that the
parties were before the court on competing contempt issues. (September 4, 2015 Hearing
Tr. at 5). Richard’s counsel registered no surprise and made no objection to this
statement. The trial court then proceeded to ask both attorneys what relief the parties
wanted. Each attorney responded that the relief sought included a finding that the other
party was in contempt. (Id. at 6, 8). Again, Richard’s attorney made no objection when
Christy’s counsel requested this relief. The trial court then heard testimony from Richard
and Christy regarding allegedly contemptuous acts committed by the other. Once again,
Richard’s attorney did not object or assert that the hearing was limited to Christy’s alleged
contempt.
{¶ 14} Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Christy’s June 2015
motions remained pending and, in any event, that Richard received both notice of his
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alleged contempt at the outset of the September 4, 2015 hearing and an opportunity to
be heard regarding his conduct. By failing to raise any objection, he implicitly consented
to his alleged contempt being tried on that date. Under these circumstances, we reject
his argument that the trial court improperly proceeded to make a contempt finding against
him. Richard’s third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 15} In her sole assignment of error on cross appeal, Christy challenges the trial
court’s judgment finding her in contempt. She argues that Richard’s August 25, 2015
motion sought a contempt finding based solely on her obtaining an ex parte TPO in
Tennessee. Christy maintains that Richard’s motion constituted an improper attempt to
litigate the TPO issue in the wrong jurisdiction. Christy additionally argues that the trial
court deprived her of due process by vaguely finding her in contempt for violating
unspecified “prior orders involving parenting time under circumstances which prevented
the timely exchange of [the child] for purposes of residential custody or summer parenting
time.” (Doc. #163 at 1). Christy asserts that Richard’s motion did not give her notice of
the need to defend against anything other than contempt allegations premised on the
TPO.
{¶ 16} Upon review, we find Christy’s assignment of error to be persuasive, albeit
based on reasoning somewhat different than hers. As a threshold matter, we note that
Richard’s August 25, 2015 contempt motion is primarily premised on her obtaining an ex
parte TPO in Tennessee on August 13, 2015, although the motion arguably also
encompassed an alleged lack of communication between Richard and the child between
August 6, 2015 (when Christy took the child back to Tennessee from Ohio) and August
13, 2015 (when Christy obtained the TPO). (See Motion, Doc. #155, and Supporting
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Affidavit, Doc. #156). When Richard’s counsel attempted to question him about other
issues, Christy’s counsel objected to the scope of the hearing. (See, e.g., September 4,
2015 Transcript at 23). With regard to the TPO, Christy’s counsel argued that the trial
court lacked authority to address it, as it was a matter for the Tennessee court. (Id. at 73).
{¶ 17} In its oral ruling from the bench, the trial court notably did not find Christy in
contempt based on anything related to her obtaining the TPO. (Id. at 87). Nor did the trial
court find Christy in contempt based on any “lack of communication” between Richard
and the child between August 6, 2015 and August 13, 2015. Rather, the trial court’s only
specific recitation of facts supporting its contempt finding against both parties is as
follows:
I mean, Mrs. Vogel, you’re in contempt of [the] Court’s prior orders
with regard to failing parenting exchange. I don’t find your denial that you
didn’t cut off his summer visitation credible. Yeah, you denied it. I don’t find
it credible when a Deputy Sheriff’s out there trying to mediate, as they often
do, the exchange that didn’t happen. And it’s no excuse, Mr. Mestemaker,
for you to not give visitation—I’m sorry—parenting exchange to your ex-wife
because you think you’re going to get choked out of or cheated out of
summer visitation.
So you were wrong when you relied upon the fact that she was going
to be wrong, and I don’t find that that half exchange was the way you
expected it to happen. I rely upon, essentially, the police officer trying to
come out and mediate. So what you thought you were doing isn’t, in fact,
what was going on.
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So you’re both in contempt of the orders * * *.
(Emphasis added) (Id. at 79).
{¶ 18} From our review of the record we harbor no doubt that multiple actions
initiated by Christy in this case are contemptuous. The trial court did not find her credible
when she testified she never told Richard she would not return the child to Richard for
visitation at the time of the failed May 29, 2015 exchange. She failed, without notice, to
appear with the child at the exchange point at a designated service station between Ohio
and Tennessee on July 5, 2015, as ordered by the Agreed Judgment Entry filed June 22,
2015. There is abundant evidence from which one could believe that she did not facilitate
communication between the child and her father between August 6th and August 13th,
2015 when the father and the child’s sister were unable to contact the child by phone. In
fact, Christy failed to provide the child’s new cell phone number until she was asked for it
under oath at the September 4, 2015 hearing. Christy also appeared at Richard’s house
on August 6, 2017, apparently unannounced, and took the child back to Tennessee with
only the child’s note left on Richard’s counter.
{¶ 19} Nevertheless, we are constrained by the trial court’s finding with regard to
the contemptuous act Christy committed which, we conclude from the context of the trial
court’s remarks, was only predicated on a May 29, 2015 incident involving an attempted
parenting-time exchange. On that occasion, Christy went to Richard’s residence,
accompanied by a deputy sheriff, to obtain the younger child for court-ordered parenting
time. According to Richard, he refused to give Christy the child because she would not
agree to return the child to him days later, as required by the same court order. (Id. at 19-
22; 33-34). For her part, Christy agreed that she went to Richard’s house with a deputy
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sheriff to pick up the child for her parenting time. But she denied telling Richard that she
would not return the child to him. (Id. at 44-45).
{¶ 20} Because the record reflects no other parenting-time exchange involving the
participation of a deputy sheriff and a denial by Christy, we conclude that the trial court’s
contempt finding against both parties was premised on the foregoing incident. Such a
conclusion is further supported by remarks made during Christy’s counsel’s closing
argument. When counsel asserted that “[t]here is no basis to hold mother in contempt,”
the trial court responded: “Did she not tell the Sheriff that she wasn’t going to give summer
visitation to the father?” (Id. at 73). Although counsel then cited Christy’s denial, the trial
court’s oral ruling found her denial not credible.
{¶ 21} Even if we assume, arguendo, that Richard’s August 25, 2015 contempt
motion was broad enough to encompass the May 29, 2015 incident, the trial court erred
in finding Christy in contempt based on her role in that incident. Christy’s statement that
she would not return the child to Richard was prospective. When she made the statement,
she was not yet required to turn over the child because the appointed day had not arrived.
In essence, Richard then engaged in a contemptuous act based on Christy’s threat that
she would do likewise in the future. She never got an opportunity to do so, however,
because Richard did not give her the child. Therefore, she never disobeyed the court
order. “ ‘There is no doctrine of anticipatory contempt in our legal system. An adjudication
of contempt relates to past conduct, not prospective conduct. Prior to the end of the time
for performance, any alleged failure to perform is speculation and cannot be the basis for
a contempt finding.’ ” (Internal citations omitted.). Hetterick v. Hetterick, 12th Dist. Brown
No. 2012-02-002, 2013-Ohio-15, ¶ 42, quoting Kirk v. Kirk, 172 Ohio App.3d 404, 2007-
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Ohio-3140, 875 N.E.2d 125, ¶ 5 (3rd Dist.).
{¶ 22} Here Christy only prospectively failed to satisfy her obligation to return the
child to Richard. His failure to transfer the child to her prevented her from engaging in
contemptuous conduct at the required time for her performance. Because Christy did not
in fact fail to return the child to Richard in accordance with the court order, the trial court
erred in finding her in contempt. Christy’s assignment of error is sustained.
{¶ 23} Based on the reasoning set forth above, we affirm the trial court’s
September 4, 2015 judgment in favor of Christy on her motion for reallocation of parental
rights. (Doc. #162). We affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s September 4,
2015 judgment finding Richard and Christy in contempt. (Doc. #163). That judgment is
affirmed with regard to the contempt finding against Richard but reversed and vacated as
to the contempt finding against Christy.
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WELBAUM, J., concurs.
FROELICH, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:
{¶ 24} I agree with the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s judgment of
contempt with respect to Richard, but I disagree with the reversal of the finding of
contempt as to Christy.
{¶ 25} The trial court expressly stated that “both parties ha[d] wilfully [sic] failed to
comply with prior orders involving parenting time.” The court also observed, with respect
to both parties, that they had “poor communication” and “continuing acrimony” beyond
what would normally be expected following a divorce. The court described “the parties’
wilful [sic] non-compliance” with the court’s orders as “approaching the point where its
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purpose seems to be primarily to frustrate the judicial process and to publically [sic]
disregard court orders,” although still within the realm of “civil, indirect contempt.”
Further, the court characterized the parties as frustrating and manipulating one another.
To address these issues, the court stated that its “remedy” – finding both parties in
contempt -- was “designed with the purpose of modifying the parties’ behavior toward
each other.”
{¶ 26} The majority opinion “harbor[s] no doubt that multiple actions initiated by
Christy in this case are contemptuous,” and it cites several examples, including her failure
to facilitate communication between the younger daughter and Richard during part of
August 2015 and Christy’s failure or refusal to provide the child’s new cell phone number
to Richard. It also acknowledges that Richard’s August 25, 2015 motion for contempt
“arguably * * * encompassed an alleged lack of communication between Richard and the
child” during this period.
{¶ 27} The majority concludes that the trial court’s finding of contempt was based
solely on Christy’s threat to withhold future parenting time, and therefore examined only
whether Christy was in contempt for the single incident on May 29, 2015, where she
threatened not to return the child on a future date. While I agree with the majority’s
conclusion that Christy could not be held in contempt for threatening to commit a future
violation of the parties’ parenting agreement, I disagree that this incident was the only
basis for the trial court’s finding of contempt.
{¶ 28} The parties’ agreement with respect to parenting time that summer, as
stated in the Memorialization of Proceedings filed by the trial court on July 22, 2015 amid
ongoing disputes between the parties, was that the younger child would return from
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Richard’s home to Christy’s home in Tennessee “on the Sunday prior to the beginning of
school,” and that this exchange would be effectuated by the parties’ meeting at Lebanon
Junction on Interstate 75 (in Kentucky). Richard testified that Christy picked the child up
from his home on August 6, 2015, without any notice to him; he came home and found a
note from the child on the counter. Christy claimed that these actions were necessary
because school was about to start in Tennessee and Richard had failed to meet her the
previous Sunday, although it is not clear if or when Christy had accurately communicated
with Richard about the start of school, especially in light of her attempt to define the end
of summer break in terms of the start of fall activities, rather than the actual start of school.
Richard was unable to communicate with the child for several weeks after this event.
{¶ 29} At the hearing, the court scolded both parties for acting like children and
putting their own “acrimony” ahead of the children’s interests. The court criticized Christy
for attempting to prioritize school extracurricular activities over Richard’s parenting time
in the summer of 2015. It also criticized her for failing to “tak[e] the high road” in
communicating with Richard clearly and civilly about when school began before showing
up to take the child while he was not at home. The trial court found Christy in contempt
“with regard to failing parenting exchange,” and it found her explanation of the
circumstances surrounding her attempt to “cut off [Richard’s] summer visitation” lacking
in credibility. These findings supported the trial court’s finding of contempt.
{¶ 30} Furthermore, as discussed above, the court’s judgment detailed an
extensive history of both parties’ violating its orders. It also found that the documents
Christy filed in Tennessee in August 2015 in support of a temporary protection order
against Richard contained allegations which ignored her own “culpability in prompting the
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behavior of which she complains” and demonstrated her “desire to manipulate
circumstances in an attempt to frustrate this Court’s prior orders pertaining to parenting
time.”
{¶ 31} An appellate court reviews a finding of contempt for an abuse of discretion.
Obara v. Obara, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26668, 2016-Ohio-5651, ¶ 19. “An ‘abuse of
discretion’ implies that the trial court’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary or
unconscionable.” Id., citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d
1140 (1983). In light of the evidence that Christy failed to facilitate communication
between her younger child and Richard while the child was in Tennessee during August
2015 and did not herself make reasonable efforts to communicate with him about the
exchanges of the children that summer, I would find no abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s determination that Christy was in contempt of the court’s orders.
..........
Copies mailed to:
Jay M. Lopez
Quentin M. Derryberry, II
Hon. Jonathan P. Hein