Robinson v. Turoczy Bonding Co. , 2016 Ohio 7397 ( 2016 )

[Cite as Robinson v. Turoczy Bonding Co., 2016-Ohio-7397.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 103787
L. BRANDON ROBINSON
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
TUROCZY BONDING COMPANY, ET AL.
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-13-811184
BEFORE: Boyle, J., Stewart, P.J., and Blackmon, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 20, 2016
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Brett M. Mancino
Mancino Co., L.P.A.
75 Public Square, Suite 1016
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Joseph F. Scott
Ryan A. Winters
Scott & Winters Law Firm, L.L.C.
The Superior Building
815 Superior Avenue E., Suite 1325
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
Kevin V. Rogers, Jr.
Kraig & Kraig
815 Superior Avenue East, Suite 1920
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
MARY J. BOYLE, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Turoczy Bonding Company (“Turoczy Bonding”),
filed this appeal after judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff-appellee, L. Brandon
Robinson (“Robinson”), following a jury trial. Turoczy Bonding appeals from the jury
verdict, the trial court’s decisions denying its motions for directed verdict, judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and new trial, as well as the trial court’s order awarding
prejudgment interest. Finding no merit to the appeal, we affirm.
A. Procedural History and Factual Background
{¶2} Robinson worked for Turoczy Bonding (a.k.a. City Bonding) as an
authorized bail bond agent from October 2009 through December 2011. Turoczy
Bonding is a local company that posts surety bonds (up to one million dollars) entirely
backed by Universal Insurance. Robinson became a bail bond agent after taking a
course taught by Elizabeth Reyes Large (“Elizabeth”), who worked with Garrett
McClellan, the manager of Turoczy Bonding.
{¶3} In July 2013, Robinson filed a lawsuit against Turoczy Bonding, Spring
Break, L.L.C., as well as Elizabeth and Donnell Mitchell (“Donnell”) — both bail bond
agents of Turoczy Bonding, asserting claims for breach of contract, fraudulent
inducement, conversion, and unjust enrichment. The matter proceeded to a jury trial,
where the breach of contract claim against Turoczy Bonding was the only claim to
survive defendants’ motion for a directed verdict following the close of Robinson’s case.
{¶4} According to Robinson’s case at trial, Turoczy Bonding had failed to pay
Robinson the commission that he was promised for bond premiums that he collected. In
the bail bond industry, a bail bond company is required to charge the statutory rate of 10
percent on the face value of a bond — which is the premium for the bond. Robinson
established that Turoczy Bonding had agreed to pay him under the following commission
structure: 40 percent commission on the premium for all bonds with a face value greater
than $5,000, and 30 percent commission on all bonds with a face value of less than
$5,000. For example, if Robinson wrote a bond for $10,000, he would be entitled to
$400 of the $1,000 premium. According to Robinson’s case at trial, he was owed
$103,444 in unpaid commissions. Robinson offered his receipt book and a detailed
spreadsheet as evidence of every bond that he wrote and the commissions that had not
been paid. Specifically, Robinson’s spreadsheet, which was admitted as an exhibit and
not challenged on appeal, reflected that he handled 395 bonds, which produced a total of
$361,060 in premiums.
{¶5} Conversely, Turoczy Bonding maintained that it never employed Robinson,
that he was solely an “independent-contracted agent,” and that Robinson “possessed”
many of the commissions that he now claims he is owed but then turned these
commissions over to Elizabeth or Donnell — not Turoczy Bonding. According to
Turoczy Bonding’s records, Robinson was paid in full on all the commissions that he was
due. Specifically, Turoczy Bonding offered a detailed spreadsheet, summarizing the
weekly bail agent reports submitted by Robinson. McClellan testified that bail bond
agents were paid based on the agent’s submission of weekly reports, and Turoczy
Bonding’s records demonstrated that Robinson was paid $13,812.10 on the $38,596.10 in
premiums collected on bonds that he wrote.
{¶6} We will discuss the evidence presented at trial in greater detail as it relates
to our disposition of the assignments of error.
{¶7} The jury ultimately returned a verdict in Robinson’s favor in the amount of
$75,000. The trial court entered judgment on this amount and awarded Robinson
prejudgment interest. Turoczy Bonding subsequently filed motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and new trial, both of which the trial court denied.
{¶8} Turoczy Bonding appeals, raising the following five assignments of error:
I. The jury verdict against Turoczy was against the manifest weight
of the evidence.
II. The trial court erred in not granting a directed verdict in favor of
Turoczy, or in the alternative, a new trial in light of the fact that Donnell
was a named necessary party but never served with the complaint and he
did not participate in the trial.
III. The trial court erred in instructing the jury on the breach of
commission claim.
IV. The trial court erred in not dismissing the case because
Robinson could not testify with any degree of reasonable certainty as to his
claimed damages.
V. The trial court erred when it granted prejudgment interest
without a motion being filed and without a hearing.
B. Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶9} In his first assignment of error, Turoczy Bonding argues that the jury’s
verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
{¶10} When reviewing the manifest weight of the evidence in a civil case, this
court weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of
witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact
clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment
must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St. 3d 328,
2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 20. Weight of the evidence concerns “‘the
inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one
side of the issue rather than the other.’” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d 380, 387,
678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990).
{¶11} “We are guided by a presumption that the findings of the trier of fact are
correct.” Di v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101760,
2016-Ohio-686, ¶ 115, citing Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St. 3d 77, 80,
461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). This presumption arises because the trier of fact had an
opportunity “to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice
inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered
testimony.” Id.
{¶12} At the heart of Turoczy Bonding’s manifest weight of the evidence
challenge is its claim that Robinson had collected but turned over to Elizabeth or Donnell
many of the commissions that he later sought Turoczy Bonding to pay. Specifically,
Turoczy Bonding relies on Robinson’s testimony admitting that he would collect payment
from a client and then turn the payment over to Donnell or Elizabeth at the end of the day.
Turoczy Bonding argues that Robinson failed to present any evidence that Donnell or
Elizabeth had any authority to accept payments on Turoczy Bonding’s behalf or that
Turoczy Bonding actually received the payments.
{¶13} But our review of the record reveals otherwise. The evidence at trial
supported Robinson’s case that Donnell or Elizabeth had apparent authority to accept
payments on behalf of Turoczy Bonding. The evidence revealed that Elizabeth brought
Robinson on board at Turoczy Bonding, introduced him to McClellan and Donnell, and
that Donnell took him under his wing. Robinson further testified that he initially
believed Elizabeth to be his boss. And while Elizabeth was an independent bail bond
agent of Turoczy Bonding during part of Robinson’s tenure with Turoczy Bonding, she
also worked as one of the office employees in 2010. According to McClellan’s
testimony, Elizabeth had authority to accept cash payments on financed bonds and deliver
the commission owed to the respective bail bond agent while working as an office
employee. Elizabeth also testified that she “may have” collected money from Turoczy
Bonding to be paid to Robinson, specifically referencing if Robinson had a client coming
into the office.
{¶14} The other compelling evidence that supports the jury’s reasonable inference
that Donnell or Elizabeth had apparent authority to accept payments on behalf of Turoczy
Bonding is the fact that some of the weekly reports submitted on Robinson’s behalf were
completed by either Donnell or Elizabeth. Notably, Turoczy Bonding’s defense at trial
was that it paid Robinson what it owed him based on the weekly reports filed.
According to McClellan, the weekly report was the sole method for determining the
commissions owed a bail bond agent. Given that Turoczy Bonding was obviously
paying Robinson for commissions based on reports filled out by Donnell or Elizabeth, we
find that the jury reasonably believed that Turoczy Bonding was on notice of Donnell and
Elizabeth accepting payments. McClellan further acknowledged that it was his
responsibility and job duty as officer manager to make sure that commissions were
properly delivered to the bail bond agent who earned them. While McClellan denied
that Robinson ever complained about not being paid his commission, Robinson testified
to the contrary.
{¶15} Notably, Turoczy Bonding is not challenging Robinson’s evidence related to
the number of bonds that he handled on Turoczy Bonding’s behalf. At trial, Robinson
established that Turoczy Bonding is required to track all of the power of attorneys issued
to its bail bondsmen and that they are required to keep on file for five years all
applications filed in support of a bond. Robinson further demonstrated that, despite
Turoczy Bonding’s ability to refute the receipt records offered by Robinson in support of
his claim of unpaid commissions, Turoczy Bonding did not present any of the bond
applications. McClellan acknowledged producing documents reflecting Robinson
having issued only 45 powers of attorney to Robinson, despite Robinson’s receipts
reflecting 395 powers of attorney. McClellan conceded, therefore, that Turoczy
Bonding had some “missing records.”
{¶16} Although conflicting evidence was presented at trial, we cannot say that the
jury clearly lost its way. The jury clearly found Robinson to be more credible, which it
was free to do. Based on the evidence in the record, we find that the verdict is not
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶17} The first assignment of error is overruled.
C. Motion for Directed Verdict, Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict, or New Trial
{¶18} In its second assignment of error, Turoczy Bonding argues that the trial
court erred in denying its request for directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, or new trial on the basis that Donnell was never made a party to the action.
According to Turoczy Bonding, Donnell’s absence from the trial as well as the trial
court’s granting directed verdict in favor of Elizabeth were procedural irregularities that
prejudiced its defense. Turoczy Bonding further argues that the trial court “exacerbated
the issue when it erroneously and prejudicially instructed the jury” as follows during
Turoczy Bonding’s cross-examination of Robinson:
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, I would explain to you that
when the lawsuit was originally filed, there was a claim asserted against this
additional person, Donnell Mitchell; however, that person has not been
formally brought into the lawsuit, therefore, no one is being now — there is
no claim before you against this person because that person has never been
formally brought into the lawsuit. Thank you.
{¶19} We find this argument to lack merit.
{¶20} Civ.R. 50 sets forth the standard of granting a motion for directed verdict:
When a motion for directed verdict has been properly made, and the trial
court, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party
against whom the motion is directed, finds that upon any determinative
issue reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion upon the evidence
submitted and that conclusion is adverse to each party, the court shall
sustain the motion and direct a verdict for the moving party as to that issue.
{¶21} The same standard applies to a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. Chem. Bank of N.Y. v. Neman, 52 Ohio St. 3d 204, 207, 556 N.E.2d 490 (1990).
We employ a de novo standard of review in evaluating the grant or denial of a motion
for a directed verdict or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Grau v.
Kleinschmidt, 31 Ohio St. 3d 84, 90, 509 N.E.2d 399 (1987). “The trial court does not
weigh or consider the credibility of the witnesses, but rather, reviews and considers the
sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law.” Siebert v. Lalich, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 87272, 2006-Ohio-6274, ¶ 14 (citing a string of cases).
{¶22} Although it broadly attacks the trial court’s denial of its motions for directed
verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Turoczy Bonding raises no argument
related to the evidence presented at trial. Instead, the gravamen of its argument is that it
“was prejudiced because Donnell (and Elizabeth) were necessary and indispensable
parties who should have participated at the trial.” This argument therefore relates solely
to Turoczy Bonding’s motion for a new trial under Civ.R. 59(A).
{¶23} The standard of review we apply to a trial court’s ruling on a motion for new
trial filed under Civ.R. 59 depends on the grounds for the motion. For example, a
motion for new trial premised upon a procedural irregularity under Civ.R. 59(A)(1) is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Harris v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 116 Ohio St. 3d 139,
2007-Ohio-5587, 876 N.E.2d 1201, ¶ 35 – 36. A motion for a new trial premised upon
“error of law occurring at the trial and brought to the attention of the trial court” under
Civ.R. 59(A)(9), however, is reviewed under a de novo standard.
{¶24} Applying either standard to Turoczy Bonding’s motion for a new trial, we
find no basis to reverse the trial court’s judgment. Contrary to Turoczy Bonding’s claim
on appeal, we find no instance in the record where Turoczy Bonding raised this issue and
asked that Donnell be made a party to the trial. In fact, despite that Turoczy Bonding’s
defense strategy relied heavily on pointing the finger at Donnell as the culpable party,
Turoczy Bonding never moved the court to have Donnell joined as a necessary party.
Civ.R. 19(A) expressly provides that if a party fails to timely assert the defense of failure
to join a party, the defense is waived. Bamba v. Derkson, 12th Dist. Warren No.
CA2006-10-125, 2007-Ohio-5192, ¶ 22, citing Garcia v. O’Rourke, 4th Dist. Gallia No.
04CA7, 2005-Ohio-1034, ¶ 18; see also Cawley JV, L.L.C. v. Wall St. Recycling L.L.C.,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102121, 2015-Ohio-1846, ¶ 18 (other than in a declaratory
judgment action, “the failure to properly raise and maintain a joinder defense waives that
defense”). In the instant case, Turoczy Bonding never raised this issue in the trial court
proceedings below and therefore has waived it.
{¶25} Likewise, Turoczy Bonding’s failure to raise the issue before or even during
trial is fatal to the grounds asserted in its motion for a new trial. Indeed, “[a] movant
may not obtain relief pursuant to Civ.R. 59(A)(1) for an irregularity in the proceedings
when the movant could reasonably have avoided the prejudice the irregularity caused.”
See Allin v. Hartzell Propeller, Inc., 161 Ohio App. 3d 358, 2005-Ohio-2751, 830 N.E.2d
413, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.) (plaintiff’s failure to seek continuance in order to properly serve
witness waived his right to complain that irregularity chargeable to court prevented him
from having a fair trial). Similarly, Civ.R. 59(A)(9) allows for a new trial based on an
“[e]rror of law occurring at the trial and brought to the attention of the trial court by the
party making the application.” Again, Turoczy Bonding never brought this alleged error
to the trial court’s attention during the trial. Nor did it object to the trial court’s
instruction during Turoczy Bonding’s cross-examination of Robinson, which it now
argues deprived it of a fair trial. Aside from finding no error in the trial court’s
explanation to the jury that Donnell “has not been formally brought into the lawsuit,”
Turoczy Bonding has waived this issue on appeal by not objecting. See Galmish v.
Cicchini, 90 Ohio St. 3d 22, 32, 734 N.E.2d 782 (2000) (the failure to object at the trial
court level constitutes a waiver of the issue on appeal).
{¶26} Having found that the trial court neither abused its discretion nor erred, we
overrule the second assignment of error.
D. Jury Instruction
{¶27} In its third assignment of error, Turoczy Bonding argues that the trial court
erred in instructing the jury on the breach of commission claim because “it attributed
liability to Turoczy through ‘an authorized employee’ (presumably Donnell and
Elizabeth) when there was no evidence that Donnell and Elizabeth were ‘authorized
employees’ with authority to act on behalf of Turoczy.”
{¶28} The decision to give a specific jury instruction rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion. Sicklesmith v. Chester Hoist, 169 Ohio App. 3d 470, 2006-Ohio-6137, 863
N.E.2d 677, ¶ 62 (7th Dist.). In determining the appropriateness of jury instructions, an
appellate court reviews the instructions as a whole. Wozniak v. Wozniak, 90 Ohio App. 3d
400, 629 N.E.2d 500 (9th Dist.1993). If the totality of the instructions clearly and fairly
expresses the law, a reviewing court should not reverse a judgment based upon an error in
a portion of a charge. Peffer v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94356,
2011-Ohio-450, ¶ 45. “A strong presumption exists in favor of the propriety of jury
instructions.” Schnipke v. Safe-Turf Installation Group, L.L.C., 190 Ohio App. 3d 89,
2010-Ohio-4173, 940 N.E.2d 993, ¶ 30 (3d Dist.), citing Burns v. Prudential Sec., Inc.,
167 Ohio App. 3d 809, 2006-Ohio-3550, 857 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 41 (3d Dist.).
{¶29} With respect to Robinson’s commission claim, the trial court instructed the
jury as follows:
The undisputed evidence shows that Turoczy Bonding Company has
agreed to pay Mr. Robinson 40 percent of any payment that he or Turoczy
Bonding Company received for a bail bond that he sold that equaled or
exceeded $5,000, and 30 percent of any payment he or Turoczy Bonding
Company received for a bail bond he sold that was less than $5,000. Mr.
Robinson earned a commission as part of any payment that he or any
authorized employee of Turoczy Bonding Company received for a bail bond
he sold. He did not earn a commission for money that a bond purchaser
failed to pay him or Turoczy Bonding Company.
{¶30} Turoczy Bonding objected to the instruction on the basis that it included
language referring to payment that “any authorized employee of Turoczy Bonding
Company received.” Specifically, defense counsel objected as follows:
I propose that Mr. Robinson earned a commission as part of any
payment for any premium actually paid and collected.
I don’t think there is enough evidence that he was entitled to
anything collected by any authorized employee. I think that [Elizabeth]
has been dismissed from this case. That’s what I think their theory of the
case was at the beginning. She’s testified that she’s not an authorized
employee, authorized agent, to do anything on behalf of the company.
{¶31} We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to accept
defense counsel’s proposed change. As discussed above, there was evidence presented
that would allow the jury to reasonably conclude that Elizabeth was an authorized
employee to accept payment from a client for a bail bond that Robinson sold. Aside
from Elizabeth expressly testifying that she was an employee of Turoczy Bonding in 2010
and that she would collect cash payments from clients, she also testified that she may
have collected money for Robinson from Turoczy Bonding. Further, Turoczy Bonding
paid Robinson based on weekly reports completed by Donnell or Elizabeth on Robinson’s
behalf. This evidence coupled with Robinson’s testimony supported the trial court’s
instruction.
{¶32} Turoczy Bonding further claims that the instruction was inadequate and
misleading because “Robinson was not entitled to any commissions paid on a payment
plan if Turoczy was not actually paid.” But the instruction expressly stated as much:
“He did not earn a commission for money that a bond purchaser failed to pay him or
Turoczy Bonding Company.” To the extent that Turoczy Bonding now complains that
the trial court should have provided an agency instruction, we find that it has waived this
argument by not requesting such an instruction. Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St. 3d
116, 121, 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997) (failure to request a jury instruction generally results in
the waiver of the issue on appeal).
{¶33} Having found no abuse of discretion in the instruction given, we overrule
the third assignment of error.
E. Damages
{¶34} In its fourth assignment of error, Turoczy Bonding argues that the trial court
erred in not dismissing the case because the damages were merely speculative.
According to Turoczy Bonding, “Robinson could not testify with any certainty as to the
damages allegedly owed,” and therefore his action should have been dismissed. We find
these arguments to lack merit.
{¶35} First, under Ohio law, “[t]he uncertainty which prevents a recovery of
damages is generally uncertainty as to the fact of the damages, not the amount.”
Bemmes v. Pub. Emp. Retirement Sys., 102 Ohio App. 3d 782, 789, 658 N.E.2d 31 (12th
Dist.1995), citing 22 American Jurisprudence 2d, Damages, Section 25 (1988,
Supp.1995). Ohio courts consistently recognized that recovery on a breach of contract is
precluded only when the existence of damages is uncertain, not when the amount is
uncertain. Woehler v. Brandenburg, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2011-12-082,
2012-Ohio-5355, ¶ 35; Fiorilli Constr., Inc. v. A. Bonamase Contracting, Inc., 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 94719, 2011- Ohio-107, ¶ 36.
{¶36} Second, we disagree that Robinson failed to satisfy his burden to prove his
damages to a reasonable degree of certainty to support the award given. We find that
Turoczy Bonding misconstrues Robinson’s statements and that they do not support its
claim that Robinson could not testify to any reasonable certainty as to the damages
amount.
{¶37} As a general rule, “an injured party cannot recover damages for breach of
contract beyond the amount that is established by the evidence with reasonable certainty,
and generally, courts have required greater certainty in the proof of damages for breach of
contract than in tort.” Rhodes v. Rhodes Indus., Inc., 71 Ohio App. 3d 797, 808-809, 595
N.E.2d 441 (8th Dist.1991). A plaintiff can only be compensated for damages for
breach of contract for “an amount that is established by the evidence with reasonable
certainty.” Kinetico, Inc. v. Indep. Ohio Nail Co., 19 Ohio App. 3d 26, 30, 482 N.E.2d
1345 (8th Dist.1985). But if sufficient evidence is presented from which the jury could
award damages, then the jury’s verdict should not be disturbed. Fiorilli Constr., Inc. at
¶ 38.
{¶38} We find that sufficient evidence was presented to support the damages
award in this case and that the amount of damages is established by the evidence with
reasonable certainty. Robinson presented all of his receipts in support of the bonds that
he wrote and testified in detail as to the commissions that he had not been paid but owed.
He further offered a detailed spreadsheet that was admitted as an exhibit and not
challenged on appeal, which summarized the unpaid commission owed on each bond.
To the extent that Robinson’s evidence could not account for whether Turoczy Bonding
received payment on the financed bonds that Robinson sold, and Turoczy Bonding
presented credible evidence that it never received payment on those financed bonds, the
jury clearly deducted this amount from its damages award. The jury also obviously took
into account some of the stated errors in Robinson’s receipt book. But the mere fact that
Robinson had some inaccuracies in his recordkeeping does not preclude recovery on the
other properly supported claims for unpaid commissions.
{¶39} The fourth assignment of error is overruled.
F. Prejudgment Interest
{¶40} In its final assignment of error, Turoczy Bonding argues that the trial court
erred when it granted prejudgment interest sua sponte and without holding a hearing.
We disagree.
{¶41} Relying on the Twelfth Appellate District’s decision in Nguyen v. Chen,
12th Dist. Butler No. CA2013-10-191, 2014-Ohio-5188, Turoczy Bonding argues that the
trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest on a breach of contract claim without a
motion and without a hearing. Although the court in Nguyen found that the trial court
erred in failing to hold a hearing based on the plain language of the statute, the court was
addressing subsection R.C. 1343.03(C), which applied specifically to “a civil action that
is based on tortious conduct.” The court was not discussing R.C. 1343.03(A), which
governs a breach of contract claim as presented in this case. See Waina v. Abdallah, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86629, 2006-Ohio-2090, ¶ 55 (“award of prejudgment interest as to
claims arising out of breach of contract is governed by R.C. 1343.03(A)”). Thus, the
decision in Nguyen is not applicable.
{¶42} Conversely, the subsection that governs the instant case, R.C. 1343.03(A),
does not contain the same requirement to hold a hearing. The statute provides as
follows:
In cases other than those provided for in sections 1343.01 and 1343.02 of
the Revised Code, when money becomes due and payable upon any bond,
bill, note, or other instrument of writing, upon any book account, upon any
settlement between parties, upon all verbal contracts entered into, and upon
all judgments, decrees, and orders of any judicial tribunal for the payment
of money arising out of tortious conduct or a contract or other transaction,
the creditor is entitled to interest at the rate per annum determined pursuant
to section 5703.47 of the Revised Code, unless a written contract provides a
different rate of interest in relation to the money that becomes due and
payable, in which case the creditor is entitled to interest at the rate provided
in that contract.
{¶43} This court has consistently recognized that in a breach of contract case
between private parties where liability is established, “the trial court does not have
discretion in awarding prejudgment interest.” Fiorilli Constr., Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 94719, 2011-Ohio-107, at ¶ 57, citing Waina, supra; Reminger & Reminger Co.,
L.P.A. v. Fred Siegel Co., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 77712, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 760
(Mar. 1, 2001). Indeed, “where a party has been granted judgment on an underlying
contract claim, that party is entitled to prejudgment interest as a matter of law.” Id.
{¶44} Thus, based on the argument raised, we find no error in the trial court’s
granting of prejudgment interest without holding a hearing or waiting for a motion.
{¶45} The final assignment of error is overruled.
{¶46} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recovers from appellant the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE
MELODY J. STEWART, P.J., and
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR