Siciliano, A. v. Mueller, A. ( 2016 )

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2016 Pa. Super. 229
ALISHA SICILIANO, CASSIE STARETZ, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
SAMANTHA LYNN EARLY AND JUSTIN PENNSYLVANIA
ECK, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF
ALL SIMILARLY SITUATED PERSONS
Appellees
v.
ALBERT/CAROL MUELLER, T/A
MCDONALDS; ALBERT AND CAROL
MUELLER LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS;
ALBERT MUELLER, INDIVIDUALLY; AND
CAROL MUELLER, INDIVIDUALLY
Appellants No. 1321 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered May 29, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
Civil Division at No(s): 2013-07010
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and DUBOW, J.
OPINION BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 21, 2016
Albert and Carol Mueller, Albert and Carol Mueller Limited
Partnerships, and Albert/Carol Mueller t/a McDonalds (collectively “the
Muellers”) appeal from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne
County denying their motion for summary judgment. After careful review,
we affirm.
The Muellers, through their limited partnership, own and operate
sixteen McDonalds franchises in Pennsylvania. On August 26, 2013,
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Plaintiffs, a class consisting of current and former McDonalds’ hourly
employees1, filed an action against the Muellers alleging violations of the
Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law (WPCL). 43 P.S. § 260.3.
Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that the Muellers violated the WPCL by paying
their wages from November 2010 to July 2013 through a mandatory JP
Morgan Chase Payroll Card rather than by cash or check. Plaintiffs sought,
inter alia, compensatory and punitive damages as well as counsel fees and
litigation costs.
On May 14, 2015, the trial court certified this matter as a class action.
Shortly thereafter, on May 29, 2015, the court denied the Muellers’ motion
for summary judgment; the court included in the order a statement that the
matter involved a controlling question of law, as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion, the immediate appeal of which might
materially advance the ultimate termination of the matter. See 42 Pa.C.S. §
702(b) (interlocutory appeals by permission).2 The Muellers filed a petition
to appeal the May 29, 2015 order, which this Court granted on August 3,
2015.3
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1
Plaintiffs averred that Appellants allowed managerial employees to be paid
wages by direct deposit. Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, 8/26/13, at ¶ 9.
2
Plaintiffs’/Appellees’ motion to dismiss this interlocutory appeal is denied.
3
On October 19, 2015, the Muellers filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief
in the Supreme Court, which was denied on December 10, 2015.
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The sole issue on appeal, a question of first impression, is whether
mandatory payment of wages by payroll debit card (“payroll card”) meets
the requirement of section 260.3 of the WPCL that “wages shall be paid in
lawful money of the United States or check.” 43 P.S. § 260.3. We conclude
that it does not, and, therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order.
Our standard of review of an order granting or denying summary
judgment is well-settled:
We view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Only
where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is
clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law will summary judgment be entered. Our scope of review
of a trial court’s order granting or denying summary judgment is
plenary, and our standard of review is clear: the trial court’s
order will be reversed only where it is established that the court
committed an error of law or abused its discretion.
Daley v. A.W. Chesterton, Inc., 37 A.3d 1175, 1179 (Pa. 2012) (citation
omitted).
Section 260.3(a) of the WPCL provides, in relevant part:
Wages other than fringe benefits and wage supplements. Every
employer shall pay all wages, other than fringe benefits and
wage supplements due to his employes on regular paydays
designated in advance by the employer. . . . The wages shall
be paid in lawful money of the United States or check.
43 P.S. § 260.3(a) (emphasis added).
As our analysis involves interpreting section 260.3 of the WPCL, we
begin by considering the Statutory Construction Act. 1 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1501,
et seq. The Statutory Construction Act is clear: the objective of all
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interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the
intention of the legislature. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a). Our Supreme Court has
found that “the best indication of the General Assembly’s intent is the plain
language of the statute.” Ario v. Ingram Micro, Inc., 965 A.2d 1194,
1201 (Pa. Super. 2009), citing Martin v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of
Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 905 A.2d 438, 443 (Pa. 2006). See
1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b) (when words of statute are clear and unambiguous,
there is no need to look beyond plain meaning of statute “under the pretext
of pursuing its spirit.”). Only where the words of a statute are not explicit,
or they are ambiguous, is there need to resort to consideration of the factors
in aid of construction enumerated in 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(c). See
Commonwealth v. Fithian, 961 A.2d 66, 74 (Pa. 2008).
The WPCL states that wages “shall be paid in lawful money of the
United States or check.” 43 P.S. § 260.3. The language is clear. A debit
card is not “lawful money” and it is not a “check” as contemplated by the
drafters of the WPCL. We agree with the learned trial judge, the Honorable
Thomas Burke, Jr., that the Legislature obviously did not contemplate the
concept of a payroll debit card when it adopted the language of section
260.3 in 1961.
The term “check” is defined in the WPCL as follows: “A draft drawn on
a bank and payable on demand.” 43 P.S. § 260.2(a). A “draft,” though not
defined in the WPCL, is “[a]n unconditional written order signed by one
person (the drawer) directing another person (the drawee or payor) to pay a
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certain sum of money on demand or at a definite time to a third person (the
payee) or to bearer. A check is the most common example of a draft.”
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
The term “lawful money” is not defined in the statute; however, its
common definition or approved usage does not include a debit card. See 1
Pa.C.S. § 1903 (where terms are not defined in statutes, Statutory
Construction Act requires words and phrases to be construed by their
common and approved usages). The Statutory Construction Act itself
defines “money” as: “Lawful money of the United States.” 1 Pa.C.S. §
1991. Black's Law Dictionary defines “lawful money” as: “Money that is
legal tender for the payment of debts.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed.
2014). “Legal tender” is defined as follows: “The money (bills and coins)
approved in a country for the payment of debts, the purchase of goods, and
other exchanges for value.” Id. The dictionary defines “money” as:
“something generally accepted as a medium of exchange, a measure of
value, or a means of payment: officially coined or stamped metal currency.”
See Merriam-WebsterDictionary http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/money. None of these definitions includes a debit
card or a payroll debit card.4
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4
Shortly after this litigation was instituted, Representative Gerald J. Mullery
(Luzerne County) introduced legislation to amend the WPCL. The bill was
referred to the Committee on Labor and Industry on June 2, 2015. See
2015 Pennsylvania House Bill No. 1274, Pennsylvania One Hundred Ninety-
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The Muellers’ argument that a debit card is the “functional equivalent”
of a check or lawful money is unavailing, particularly because the payroll
cards, which were mandatory for hourly employees, forced users to incur
fees, including over-the-counter cash withdrawal fees and inactivity fees,
unless the employees complied with the requirements of the bank/company
issuing and managing the debit cards. For example, the fee schedule
indicates the cardholder was limited to one free withdrawal per deposit, and
thereafter each withdrawal carried a $5.00 fee. See Amended Complaint,
8/26/13, at ¶¶ 61, 96, 118, 143, 154.
In an amicus brief in support of the Muellers, the American Payroll
Association (APA) argues that the Legislature has made clear that an
employer may satisfy the requirements of the WPCL when “lawful money or
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
Ninth General Assembly - 2015-2016 (June 02, 2015). The proposed
amendment allows employers to pay an employee’s wages in the form of a
payroll debit card. The bill adds “payroll card” to the manner in which wages
shall be paid under the WPCL, provided the “employe voluntarily provides
advance authorization, in writing, permitting payment of the employe’s
wages in this manner.” See H.B. 1274, June 2, 2015, Section 3(4)
(emphasis added). The bill also proposes definitions of “Lawful money” and
“[p]ayroll card,” defining “[l]awful money” as “legal tender of the United
States[,]” and “Payroll card” as “[a] prepaid card or other device used by an
employe to access wages from a payroll card account.” See H.B. 1274, June
2, 2015, Section 2.1. The proposed legislation “establishes requirements and
parameters for employers using payroll debit cards in the payment of
employee wages, ensuring increased protection for workers. Required
guidelines will not only ensure that employees have access to the full
amount of their wages, but are provided with unlimited, no-cost access to
their accounts.” Mullery, Co-Sponsorship Memoranda, 2/3/15 (emphasis
added).
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a check is not involved by depositing an employee’s wages into an account
at a financial institution[.]” See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Payroll
Association, at 10. The APA cites to section 6121 of the Banking Code,
which provides:
For the purposes of any statute, rule or regulation requiring any
payment to be made in lawful money or by check, whether for
wages, salaries, commissions or other claims of any kind, such
payment may be made by credit to an account in a bank, credit
union or other financial institution authorized to accept deposits
or payments designated by the recipient of such payment if the
recipient has requested such method of payment in writing.
7 P.S. § 6121 (emphasis added). Amicus argues that, “[b]y definition,
payroll cards involve the deposit of wages into an employee’s account at a
financial institution.” Id. at 11. However, what the Muellers fail to address
is the fact that the statute clearly requires the written request of the
recipient. We emphasize that Plaintiffs here alleged they were required to
“receive their employment wages exclusively by a Chase Payroll Card.”
Amended Complaint, supra, at ¶ 7.
The use of a voluntary payroll debit card may be an appropriate
method of wage payment. However, until our General Assembly provides
otherwise, the plain language of the WPCL makes clear that the mandatory
use of payroll debit cards at issue here, which may subject the user to fees,
is not. See note 4, supra.
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We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
the Muellers’ motion for summary judgment, Daley, supra, and, therefore,
we affirm the trial court’s order.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/21/2016
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